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PREFACE 
Though not rare, it is however uncommon for people of my age-group nearing almost 
retirement to pursue a doctoral dissertation.   
 
Having obtained my MBA in 1979, I had thought that my academic achievements would 
suffice and the pursuit of further academic excellence was but a fleeting thought.  Being a 
firm believer of life-long learning, the experience of “going back to school” whenever I 
had the occasion to undertake executive programmes initiated by my various employers, 
was one that I would savour immensely. 
 
My first opportunity for executive education came in the mid-eighties when I was sent to 
INSEAD for a two-week course on Mergers and Acquisitions.  I thoroughly enjoyed my 
short executive education programme.  Some ten years later, I returned to INSEAD for 
another programme called Strategic Management in Banking.  A sense of déjà vu dawned 
when I was drawn to INSEAD for the third time; this time, for a longer programme 
stretching over a year-and-half. This programme called Consulting and Coaching for 
Change was run by INSEAD jointly with another well-known French business school, 
HEC.  I was admitted to this eight-module one-and-a-half-year programme as a pioneer 
batch of 33 international senior executives, where I was the only Malaysian. This 
programme which was designed by Manfred Kets de Vries assisted by his programme 
directors, Roger Lehman, Erik van de Loo and Gilles Amado using the clinical paradigm, 
psychoanalytic concepts and emotional intelligence among others, had such a profound 
impact on me that not only did I graduate the INSEAD Diploma and HEC Master's degree 
with 'Bien', but was also so deeply drawn into the world of psychodynamics that I wanted 
to explore the world of psychodynamics at a deeper level. 
 
My passion for the subject did not go unnoticed by Manfred, Erik and Roger, who then 
encouraged me to pursue a doctoral degree.  It was through their gracious assistance and 
introduction that I had the good fortune of meeting Steven ten Have, a professor in Vrije 
Universiteit (VU).  Recently appointed as a professor in VU, Steven took a great interest 
in my research and assumed the role of my Promoter to oversee my research jointly with 
another professor from VU, Jan D. J. Eppink.  Erik van de Loo who was my co-promoter 
also became a professor at VU subsequently which also worked in my favour. The 
guidance of my two promoters and my co-promoter was beyond the call of duty and they 
gave me valuable input throughout my research journey.  
 
At my age, I was not entertaining the thought of career advancement when I embarked on 
this research; rather, I was driven by my innate desire and passion for knowledge and the 
inspiration to contribute in some way to the betterment of society.  It was this desire that 
prompted me to look for a suitable research topic. 
 
The opportunity arose when I attended the Harvard Club of Malaysia’s dinner in 2002, 
where the keynote speaker was then the sitting Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad.  His speech, entitled “The New Malay Dilemma”, piqued me in the quest to 
understand Malay leadership better through the clinical lens. 
 
 
 
 
I have elaborated this in the introductory chapter of my dissertation.  Suffice to say, I am 
deeply indebted to Dr Mahathir for triggering in me, the interest to research a topic which 
I hope will be useful in understanding Malay leadership qualities in politics and business.  
It is my opinion that the Malays have not been fully understood; both by the Malays 
themselves as well as the other races that live in Malaysia thereby resulting in the Malays 
being criticised on many accounts rather unfairly. 
 
Using the clinical and psychodynamic perspectives, I have attempted what I call, “an 
exploratory journey” in understanding the Malay mind.  Many writers before me have 
written about the Malays which came in handy for me at the outset.  Special mention must 
be made to the works of Munshi Abdullah, Syed Hussain Alatas and Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad.  The blueprint of this research was gleaned from the works of previous writers; 
only that I had re-looked the Malays through the lens of clinical paradigm. 
 
A research of this magnitude involving psychodynamics would merit a wider array of 
methods and over and above the literature survey, a multi-disciplinary approach in the 
methodology involving the three methods of focus group interviews, 360-degree feedback 
instruments and expert panel interviews, were employed.   
 
I would be remiss in not mentioning the painstaking efforts of all those who accorded 
their cooperation for the three methods I deployed for a deeper understanding of the 
Malays.  I am humbled by their magnanimity and acknowledge with the deepest 
appreciation for their untold efforts which have gone a long way in helping me to 
complete this dissertation. 
 
Amongst the expert panel interview members; to Dr Mahathir who was the first person I 
interviewed, I convey my gratitude and thanks to him for affording the opportunity for me 
to hear his insights. 
 
To Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, another expert panel interview member; for his invaluable 
input, I thank him for his insights which have helped me to piece part of the jigsaw of this 
research.  Other senior political leaders who accorded me with interviews and 
encouragement include Musa Hitam, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Daim Zainuddin, Nor 
Mohamed Yakcop, and Mustapa Mohamed. 
 
Another group of distinguished and eminent Malay professionals, corporate leaders and 
entrepreneurs who consented to participate in the focus group discussions and 360-degree 
feedback instruments deserve appropriate acknowledgement and mention.  I am also 
deeply indebted to them for taking time off their busy schedules and commitments, and 
had made every effort in helping me journey through this research.  My special thanks to 
Azman Mokhtar, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah and Halim Saad. 
 
While it is my sincere wish to acknowledge all those who have contributed their efforts in 
making this research a success, the list is rather exhaustive. Nonetheless, they are 
mentioned in the accompanying “Acknowledgements”.  I have my share of foibles too, 
and there may be a few names which I could have inadvertently missed out; and if I have 
done so, I tender my apologies. 
 
My deepest thanks and gratitude to all of you!  Undoubtedly, without the participation of 
these political leaders, professionals, CEOs, entrepreneurs, civil servants and associates, 
this research would not have come to fruition. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
My deepest appreciation and grateful thanks to the participants of the Expert Panel 
Interviews namely:- 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Musa Hitam, Tengku Razaleigh 
Hamzah, Daim Zainuddin, Mustapa Mohamed, Nor Mohamed Yakcop, Sulaiman 
Mahbob, Prof.Dr Wazir Jahan, Dr Rais Saniman, Sidek Hassan, Kadir Jasin, Azman 
Hashim, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Halim Saad, Wan Abdul Aziz, Marina Mahathir, 
Henry Barlow, Professor Emeritus Dr Khoo Kay Kim and Tharuma Rajah; 
and the members of the Focus Group discussions as well as the 360-degree feedback 
participants:- 
 
Abdul Rahman Ahmad, Abdul Wahid Omar, Abu Bakar Tambi, Ahmad Kabeer Nagoor, 
Ahmad Rafidi, Amirudin Abdul Wahab, Arpah Abdul Razak, Arshad Ayub, Azizi 
Mustafa, Azman Mokhtar, Basheer Hassan Abdul Kader, Dr Abdul Wahab Ismail, Dr 
Ismail Noor, Dr Kamal Khir, F.D. Iskandar, Haniza Abdul Aziz, Hasmah Abdullah, 
Hussin Shukri, Ismee Ismail, Izzaddin Idris, Jalaludin Hashim, Jalilah Baba, Jamelah 
Jamaluddin, Jazri Husin, Kadir Kassim, Kamaruddin Taib, Kambali Semon, Madinah 
Mohamad, Maznah Jalil, Megat Hisham Megat Mahmud, Mohd Ali Dewal, Mohd Bakke 
Salleh, Mohd Najib Abdullah, Mokhtar, Nazir Razak, Raimee Tamin, Rinalia Abdul 
Rahim, Salim Abdul Rahim, Shah Hakim Zain, Shahnaz Al Sadat, Shahnaz Radhiah 
Zulkifli, Shahril Ridza Ridzuan, Sharifatul Laila Said Ali, Tengku Azmil Zahruddin Raja 
Abdul Aziz, Tunku Ahmad Burhanuddin, Ungku Farid Ungku Abdul Rahman, Yusli 
Mohamed Yusoff, Zaid Ibrahim, Zaiton Hassan, Zakaria and Zulkifli Hamzah. 
 
Also to the following who have contributed to the success of this research:- 
 
Alexandra Bratishcheva, Anita Voortman, Anna van Houwelingen, Assoc. Professor 
Anupam Agrawal, Assoc. Professor Paul Temporal, Carol Lei S. J, Fabienne Chemin, 
Firoz Abdul Hamid, Kirsten Egger, Lim Chee Sing, Maggie Wan, Malou Mac Gillavry, 
Margriet Buseman, Marin Geuze, Nadine Scheer, Noor’aini Noor, Nur Akmar Yusoff, 
Richard Curtis, Sharifah Shifa al-Attas, Sheila Loxham, Sudhir Kakar and Svetlana 
Khapova 
 
I was also fortunate in having access to the facilities of the libraries of:- 
 
1. Boudleian Libraries, University of Oxford, England 
2. Sainsbury Library, Said Business School, Oxford, England 
3. University of Melbourne Library, Australia 
 
 I record my grateful appreciation to these institutions. 
 
To my family members who have stood by me and given me the encouragement to pursue 
this long journey of research, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the love, 
patience and encouragement especially my immediate family members, my wife Nisha, 
my sons, nieces and nephews. 
 
Vaseehar Hassan 
29
th
 July 2013 
  
 
 THE MALAY LEADERSHIP MYSTIQUE 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
 
 
   
Chapter 1 A Psychoanalytic Approach to understanding Malay 
Leadership Qualities 
1 
 
1.1 Introduction 1 
   
1.2 Identifying the need for research 1 
   
1.3 The historical background of Malaya/Malaysia 3 
 
1.4 A brief preview of the political leadership of the Malays 9 
   
1.5 The position of the Malays in business 11 
   
1.6 Objectives of this study 12 
 
1.7 The research approach 14 
   
1.8 Structure of the research 16 
   
1.9 Conclusion 18 
 
 
Chapter 2 The Political Administration and Management of 
Malaysia 
19 
 
2.1 Introduction 19 
   
2.2 Some relevant Malay leadership values 20 
   
2.3 Malaysia’s economic success 23 
    
2.4 Leadership of Malaysia’s past prime ministers – Some aspects of their 
success 
28 
   
2.5 Conclusion 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 3 The Inner Theatre of the Malays 42 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 42 
   
3.2 Swettenham on the Malay character 44 
   
3.3 Four Models of Culture 45 
   
3.4 Rationale for the choice of the Four Models 48 
    
3.5 Foreigners’ perception of the Malays 64 
   
3.6 Indigenous writers’ perceptions of the Malays 66 
 
3.7 Background to the formation of the Malay character 73 
 
3.8 Contextual factors in the moulding of the Malay character 80 
 
3.9 Salient features of Malay characteristics and culture 83 
 
3.10 Synthesis of the Four Models of Culture 96 
   
3.11 Conclusion 107 
 
 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 112 
   
 
4.1 Introduction 112 
   
4.2 Nature of research and choice of methodology 113 
   
4.3 Multi-method approach 116 
     
4.4 Fieldwork 134 
 
4.5 Crystallisation or Triangulation? 138 
   
4.6 Caveats 141 
   
4.7 Conclusion 142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5 A Deeper Understanding of Malay Leadership 
through Focus Groups and Expert Panel Interviews 
146 
 
5.1 
 
Introduction 
 
146 
   
5.2 Focus Groups 147 
 
5.3 Expert Panel Interviews 165 
 
5.4 Conclusion 200 
 
Chapter 6 Malay Leadership from the eyes of 360-degree 
Feedback Instruments 
203 
 
6.1 Introduction 203 
   
6.2 Psychological testing and the birth of 360-degree feedback instrument 204 
   
6.3 What is a 360-degree feedback instrument? 205 
   
6.4 The five (5) 360-degree feedback instruments used in this research 212 
   
6.5 Results and analysis of the 360-degree feedback instruments 218 
 
6.6 Findings from the five (5) 360-degree feedback instruments 256 
   
6.7 Overview of the findings and results 264 
 
Chapter 7 Unveiling the Malay Leadership Mystique through 
the Clinical Paradigm 
268 
 
7.1 Introduction 268 
   
7.2 What is Clinical Paradigm? 270 
   
7.3 Acculturation and intercultural relations in the Malay context 273 
   
7.4 Tracing the origins of the Malay problem 275 
   
7.5 The problems of the Malays as a race 279 
   
7.6 Large-group identity in the Malay context 289 
   
7.7 Psychological phenomena of trauma 294 
   
7.8 Defence mechanisms of regression 296 
   
7.9 Foreigners and their psychological impact on Malays 300 
   
 7.10 Malayan Union – The revival of Malay chosen glory? 302 
   
7.11 The re-birth of the Malay chosen glory 303 
   
7.12 The birth of NEP and Malay economic development 306 
   
7.13 Racial relations in Malaysia 307 
   
7.14 The NEP and its impediments to Malay success in business leadership 315 
   
7.15 The Chinese factor in NEP 323 
   
7.16 Unconscious impact of culture in business 325 
   
7.17 The selection process to develop Malay entrepreneurs 327 
   
7.18 Inadequate training and development 329 
   
7.19 The dependency syndrome 330 
   
7.20 Current situation of the Malays 332 
   
7.21 In conclusion 335 
   
   
Chapter 8 Knitting the Research Together 340 
   
Chapter 9 Reflections and thoughts for the future 347 
 
9.1 Reflections on the future of Malay political leadership 347 
   
9.2 Thoughts on Malay leadership in business 350 
 
References  353 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
Chapter 1 Table 1 Percentage of population and monthly household 
income 
6 
Chapter 2        -   
Chapter 3 Table 2 Hofstede’s four- dimension model 52 
 Table 3 Universalist versus Particularist 57 
 Table 4 Individualism versus Communitarianism 58 
 Table 5 Diffuse versus Specific 60 
 Table 6 Achievement versus Ascription 61 
 Table 7 Affective versus Neutral 62 
 Table 8 Malaysia’s ranking in the four dimensions of 
Hofstede’s model. 
 
96 
  Table 9 Malaysia’s classification under the cultural dimensions 
of Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner. 
98 
 Table 10 Malay characteristics associated with Power Distance. 105 
Chapter 4 Table 11 Recommendations of Lee (1999), Marshall & Rossman 
(1995), Miles & Huberman (1994) to determine the 
qualitative nature of research. 
115 
 Table 12 Epistemological underpinnings of Grounded Theory 120 
 Table 13 Objectivist Grounded Theory versus Constructivist 
Grounded Theory 
121 
 Table 14 Sixteen steps of the selection process 129 
Chapter 5 Table 15 Positive attributes of Malays identified during the 
focus groups and expert panel interviews 
186 
 Table 16 Negative attributes of Malays identified during the 
focus groups and expert panel interviews 
187 
 Table 17 Criticisms and positive features identified during the 
focus groups and expert panel interviews. 
202 
Chapter 6 Table 18 Global database of GELI respondents 218 
 Table 19 Mean and Standard Deviations of the Malay database, 
compared to Global GELI database (N = 8124) 
219 
 Table 20 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N = 8124) 
220 
 Table 21 Asian database of GELI respondents 222 
 Table 22 Mean variables measured against the Asian leaders 
(N=1358) 
223 
 Table 23 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N= 1358) 
224 
 Table 24 Seven dimensions of Personality Audit   226 
 Table 25 Global database of PA respondents 227 
 Table 26 PA- Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Global 
leaders (N= 2727) 
228 
 Table 27 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N= 2727) 
229 
 Table 28 Asian database of PA respondents 231 
 Table 29 PA – Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Asian 
leaders (N=315) 
232 
 Table 30 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N= 315) 
233 
 Table 31 Global database of LAQ respondents 235 
 Table 32 LAQ Leadership archetypes (N =1349) 235 
 Table 33 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N = 1349) 
236 
 Table 34 Asian database of LAQ respondents 238 
 Table 35 LAQ – Mean variables between Malay leaders and 
Asian leaders (N=206) 
238 
 Table 36 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; 
Clustered Standard Errors (N= 206) 
239 
  Table 37 Summary of comparison between Malay, Asian and 
Global leaders 
240 
Chapter 7 Table 38 The emic and etic approaches 274 
 Table 39 Seven threads composing large-group identity 282 
 Table 40 Technical problems and adaptive challenges 321 
Chapter 8        -   
Chapter 9        -   
 
Chapter 1 Figure 1 Exploratory research on the Malay Leadership 
Mystique 
13 
Chapter 2       -   
Chapter 3 Figure 2 Understanding the inner theatre of Malays, through 
historical, contemporary and evolutionary perspectives 
using four cultural models 
43 
 Figure 3 An ecocultural framework of relationships among 
classes of variables employed in cross-cultural 
psychology. 
46 
 Figure 4 Schein’s Levels of Culture 53 
 Figure 5 The connectedness of Schein’s model 54 
 Figure 6 The Wheel of National Culture 64 
 Figure 7 Socio-Political hierarchy of traditional Malay society 81 
 Figure 8 Synthesis of Hofstede’s, Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner’s, and Kets de Vries et al’s models. 
103 
 Figure 8.1 Synthesis of Hofstede’s, Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner’s and Kets de Vries et al’s models. 
104 
 Figure 9 Schein’s Levels of Culture 107 
 Figure 10 The “Wheel of Malay Culture” with feudalism as its 
axis 
111 
 Figure 11 Malay Model of Culture 111 
Chapter 4 Figure 12 A multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the 
Malay leadership mystique 
116 
 Figure 13 ESCI Model with the four clusters 133 
 Figure 14 Understanding Malays through the five different 
methods 
144 
 Figure 15 Five methods leading to the understanding of Malays 144 
 Figure 16 Five layers of understanding Malays 145 
Chapter 5 Figure 17 Key points relating to Malay leadership in business as 
identified by the focus groups 
200 
 Figure 18 Key points relating to Malay leadership in business as 
identified by the expert panel   
201 
Chapter 6 Figure 19 Five levels for understanding Malay leadership 
qualities 
203 
 Figure 20 GELI -- Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus 
Global leaders  
221 
 Figure 21 GELI - Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus 
Asian leaders  
224 
 Figure 22 PA - Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus 
Global leaders 
230 
 Figure 23 PA – Graphical comparison of Malay and Asian 
leaders 
234 
 Figure 24 LAQ – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus 
Global leaders 
237 
  Figure 25 LAQ – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus 
Asian leaders 
239 
 Figure 26 Inventory of Leadership Styles (Malay participants, 
n=38) 
250 
 Figure 27 Inventory of Leadership Styles (direct reports, n= 115) 250 
 Figure 28 Inventory of Leadership Styles – Comparison between 
Malay participants and their direct reports 
251 
 Figure 29 Summary results of participants’ four ESCI 
competencies 
253 
 Figure 30 ESCI results of 40 participants 254 
 Figure 31 Comparison of GELI Leadership Dimensions between 
Malay leaders and their observers, and Global leaders 
and their observers 
257 
 Figure 32 Comparison of GELI Leadership Dimensions between 
Malay leaders and their observers, and Asian leaders 
and their observers 
257 
 Figure 33 Personality Audit – Graphical comparison of Malay 
versus Global leaders 
258 
 Figure 34 Personality Audit – Comparison of Malay versus Asian 
leaders 
258 
 Figure 35 LAQ – Comparison of Malay versus Global leaders 259 
 Figure 36 LAQ – Comparison of Malay versus Asian leaders 260 
 Figure 37 Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports 
Version) for Asians 
261 
 Figure 38 Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports 
Version) for Malaysians 
262 
 Figure 39 Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports 
Version) for Malays based on the participants of this 
research 
262 
 Figure 40 Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports 
Version) – Comparisons between Malays, Malaysians 
and Asians 
263 
 Figure 41 Summary of preliminary findings using the five 360-
degree feedback instruments 
267 
Chapter 7 Figure 42 Artefacts level 312 
 Figure 43 Espoused values and beliefs 313 
 Figure 44 Basic Assumptions 313 
 Figure 45 Feudalism in the Malay mindset: past and present 328 
 Figure 46 Unconscious collusion between politicians and Malay 
businessmen perpetuating regression in Malays 
resulting in immunity to change as hypothesized by 
Kegan and Lahey (2009). 
332 
 Figure 47 Current situation of the Malays 335 
 Figure 48 Cycle of Feudalism 337 
Chapter 8 Figure 49 Knitting the research together 345 
 Figure 50 Knitting process which led to the preliminary findings 346 
Chapter 9         -   
 
 
 
 
 Appendices  
 
Chapter 1 Appendix 1 Exports 2012 country ranks: Malaysia 27
th
 leading 
trading nation. 
394 
Chapter 2 Appendix 2 Chart: Strong investments and foreign participation in 
the Manufacturing sector 
400 
 Appendix 3 Chart : One of the highest saving rates in the world 401 
 Appendix 4 Chart : Transformation from Agriculture to a broader 
Manufacturing-based economy 
402 
 Appendix 5 Chart : Rising Income Per Capita 403 
 Appendix 6 Chart : Transformed from a Net Debtor to a Net 
Savings economy 
404 
 Appendix 7 Chart : Enviable record of strong growth with low 
inflation 
405 
Chapter 3        -   
Chapter 4        -   
Chapter 5 Appendix 8 The success of NEP in the educational field 406 
Chapter 6 Appendix 9 Explanatory notes to GELI, PA & LAQ 407 
Chapter 7 Appendix 10 Defence mechanisms in psychoanalysis 428 
Chapter 8           -   
Chapter 9           -   
 
Executive Summary (English) 
 
Executive Summary (Dutch translation) 
 
 
 
Executive Summary (Bahasa Malaysia translation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank> 
 
 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
AP                       Approved permit  
ASNB                 Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad   
BCIC                  Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community 
CCL                   Creative Leadership  
CEO                   Chief Executive Officer 
CIMB                 CIMB Bank  
DAP                   Democratic Action Party 
ECI                     Emotional Competency Inventory  
ESCI                   Emotional and Social Competency Inventory 
FELDA               Federal Land Development Authority  
FIC                      Foreign Investment Committee  
GELI                  Global Executive Leadership Inventory 
GLCs                  Government-linked corporations 
GLOBE              Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness  
GTP                    Government Transformation Programme  
IDV                     Individualism Index  
IGLC                   INSEAD Global Leadership Centre  
ILS                      Inventory of Leadership Styles  
IMD                    Institute for Management Development  
IPO                     Initial public offering  
ISA                      Internal Security Act  
ISIS                     Institute of Strategic and International Studies  
KAP                    Knowledge, Attitude and Practice 
LAQ                    Leadership Archetype Questionnaire 
MARA                Majlis Amanah Rakyat  
MAS                   Masculinity Index  
MCA                   Malaysian Chinese Association   
MIC                     Malaysian Indian Congress  
MIDF                  Malayan Industrial Development Finance Berhad  
MMPI                 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory  
MSF                    Multi-source feedback  
MSI                     Managerial Style Inventory  
MSQ                    Managerial Style Questionnaire  
MU                      Malayan Union 
NDP                    National Development Policy 
NEM                   New Economic Model  
NEP                    National Economic Policy 
NGO                   Non-government organization 
NIEs                   Newly-industrialising economies 
NOC                   National Operations Council  
PA                      Personality Audit  
PAS                    Islamic Party 
PDI                     Power Distance Index  
PNB                    Permodalan Nasional Berhad  
PNS                    Perbadanan Nasional Berhad  
PUNB                Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad  
SME                   Small and medium-sized enterprises 
SOV                   Study of Values  
UAI                    Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
UiTM                 Universiti Technologi MARA  
UMNO               United Malays National Organisation   
WPDS                Woodworth Personal Data Sheet  
1 
Chapter 1 - A Psychoanalytic Approach to Understanding Malay 
Leadership Qualities 
 
“The first quarter century of British rule saw the rapid and far reaching changes.....which 
cumulatively left Malay life behind like a prahu
1
 in the wake of an ocean liner, rocking 
slightly but otherwise left to pursue its own way....." 
 
Roff (1967) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter approaches the notion of the Malay leadership mystique by 
identifying a critical dilemma for the country - how to tackle the contrast between 
the success of Malays in the world of politics and their lack of presence in the 
world of business. Despite forty years of continuous affirmative action from 
successive national governments, the majority of the Malay population of 
Malaysia still has little economic power. 
 
A brief overview of the history of Malaya/Malaysia leads into an examination of 
the economic and political position of the Malays. Malaysia’s politics is 
dominated by the Malays, who have administered their country admirably since 
independence in 1957 and contributed to the political stability and economic 
growth of the nation. However, the Malays are economically backward compared 
to the immigrant Chinese and Indian sectors of the population. This sets the 
context for the study’s research objectives - to understand the qualities of Malay 
political and business leadership and unearth the reasons for the poor 
performance of the Malays as business leaders and entrepreneurs. 
 
The chapter ends with an outline of the multi-disciplinary research approach. 
 
1.2 Identifying the need for research  
 
Research on the characteristics of Malay leadership is of national importance to 
Malaysia. For more than forty years, the Malaysian government has been 
grappling with this issue in an effort to find ways of establishing long-term, 
sustainable peace and economic prosperity in the country. 
 
In a speech on “The New Malay Dilemma,” delivered at the Harvard Club of 
Malaysia dinner in 2002, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad,
2
 was highly critical of the Malays’ failure to take full advantage of the 
government’s affirmative action under its New Economic Policy (NEP).  
    
                                                 
1
  prahu refers to a tiny sailing boat in the Malay language. 
2
  Dr Mahathir Mohamad was the Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003.  He is credited with 
having written several books, three of which entitled: The Malay Dilemma (1970); Malays Forget 
Easily (2001); and A Doctor in the House (2011), have been used in this research.   
2 
The NEP, which was formulated after the May 1969 race riots
3
, provided a 
framework to improve the socio-economic position of the Malays. It was devised 
in response to the apparent failure of the laissez-faire economic policies that had 
continued throughout merdeka (independence) and that had disappointed the 
Malays’ expectations. The NEP was aimed to redress the economic imbalance 
and give Malays a greater share in the economy. One of the specific goals of NEP 
was to increase Malay share ownership from less than three per cent in 1971 to 
thirty per cent over a 20-year period. This involved a massive government effort 
to bring the Malays - who were overwhelmingly involved in rural agriculture and 
fishing - into the modern urban economy (Cheah, 2002; Leete, 2007; Shome, 
2002). 
  
In his speech, Dr Mahathir Mohamad recounted that when he wrote The Malay 
Dilemma (1970), he recognised that Malays lacked the basic opportunities to 
develop and become successful: education, vocational training, funding, licences 
and premises. He had assumed that if these opportunities were made available to 
them, they would succeed. 
 
He went on to observe that he had expected affirmative action to solve the 
economic backwardness of the Malays; yet despite the government having 
provided the Malays with capital, licences and permits, they had failed to take full 
advantage of what they were offered. 
 
The government had set up agencies to represent the Malays; when privatization 
was adopted, it represented many opportunities for the Malays. Yet the vast 
majority seemed to see these as something to be exploited for the quickest return. 
Very early on, they sold off their nascent businesses in order to become sleeping 
partners in an arrangement cynically known as “Ali Baba,” in which Ali (a 
common Malay name) merely obtains licences, permits, shares, or contracts and 
immediately sells them off to non-Malays (mainly Chinese). They learned 
nothing about business and become even less capable of conducting it.  
 
The thirty per cent NEP quota would have been achieved long ago, had the 
Malays taken the opportunities they were given, seriously. 
 
                                                 
3
  The Malaysian General Elections in 1969 brought the latent inter-ethnic tensions between Malays and 
Chinese into open. The ruling Alliance Party, comprising a coalition of Malays represented by United 
Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) representing the 
Chinese and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)  representing the Indians which had been in power 
since merdeka fared badly in the 1969 elections losing for the first time it's two- thirds majority in the 
Parliament. The opposition parties especially the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) 
increased its share of votes in the elections triggering a fear among the Malays. This created an 
atmosphere of dissatisfaction over 'non-Malay' threats and challenges to Malay rights and Malay 
political primacy. The victory celebrations of the non-Malays and opposition parties of their electoral 
success resulted in a bloody racial riots among Malays and Chinese on a scale never seen before in the 
newly independent nation. The racial riots often referred to as the 'May 13 riots ' resulted in the 
government realising the frustrations of the Malays in their own country where they had little economic 
power. This led to the formulation of NEP (adapted from Cheah, 2002). 
3 
Dr Mahathir then asked why this had happened and provided a straightforward 
answer: Malay culture. Malays are laidback and inclined to take the easy way out. 
And the easy way out is to sell off whatever they get and ask for more. Working 
hard, taking risks and cultivating patience are not part of their culture. 
 
I was at the Harvard Club dinner and was intrigued by Dr Mahathir’s speech. 
Some of his criticisms of the Malays may be true. But while he raised some 
pertinent questions about the Malays’ attitudes and their leadership qualities in 
business, blaming the Malay culture and religion for the Malays’ malaise was 
over-simplistic. The issue needs in-depth research. 
 
In their own country, where they make up close to sixty per cent of the 
population, the Malays control less than twenty per cent of economic activity. 
This underachievement after more than fifty years of independence is always 
likely to produce racial tension in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country like 
Malaysia.  
 
When a minority, immigrant segment of the population controls a country’s 
economic activities, you have a politically sensitive and potentially explosive 
situation. The government of Malaysia has treated this economic disparity as a 
top priority since the May 1969 race riots. The country could not afford a repeat 
of such social disturbance. The implementation of NEP was made somewhat 
easier by the genuine and pervasive fear that followed the riots. The Chinese 
suffered significant economic losses and were prepared to consider - albeit 
reluctantly - sharing economic wealth with the Malays. So why have things not 
turned out as the government hoped and planned? 
 
It is quite obvious that the Malays have a serious lack of business skills. Yet, as I 
listened to Dr Mahathir’s speech, I reflected that the very Malays he was 
attacking for their lack of business acumen were the main architects of national 
politics. From the independence negotiations until today, the Malays have been 
the major driving force behind the political management of the country, without 
which economic success could not have been achieved. It is the Malay political 
leaders (supported by non-Malay politicians) who have built Malaysia into a 
politically stable and economically successful nation. Political management skills 
and stability are prerequisites for economic prosperity. No matter how hard and 
smart the non-Malays work in Malaysia, they would not be able to achieve their 
economic wealth without them. The Malay political leadership, then, becomes an 
ancillary research objective. 
 
A survey of the literature revealed that little research has been done on the Malay 
leadership in general, so there is little data to support this study, which by default, 
is exploratory in nature.  
 
1.3 The historical background of Malaya/Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is a former British colony that attained merdeka on 31
st
 August, 1957.  
At the time, Malaysia was known as Malaya and had a population mix of Malays 
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(50%), Chinese (37%), and Indians and others (13%) (Douglas, 2008, p. 1215). In 
1963, the states of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (in North Borneo) joined 
Malaya to form the Federation of Malaysia. However, Singapore’s stint in the 
Federation was short-lived; it was expelled in 1965. According to the 1970 
census, the population of Malaysia was made up of 55.5% Malays and indigenous 
communities collectively known as Bumiputras (“sons of the soil”—a term used 
to distinguish the Malays and other indigenous races of Malaysia from the 
immigrant races, primarily Chinese and Indians). Non-Bumiputras made up the 
balance, with Chinese forming 34% and Indians and others 10.5%. Malaya was 
known as Tanah Melayu, “land of the Malays,” in the Malay language. However, 
the British colonial masters had encouraged the influx of Chinese and Indians, 
and Malaya had been evenly peopled by Chinese and Indians during British 
occupation. The Chinese mainly worked in the tin mines and the Indians in 
rubber plantations and on the railways. 
 
The Malays were already successful traders when the Malacca Sultanate was 
formed in the 1400s.  Dames (1989), drawing on the travels of Duarte Barbosa, a 
Portuguese writer in the early 16th century, wrote that Malacca was the richest 
port in the region, where merchants carried out wholesale trade and bought 
shipping services from all over the world. The geographic position of the Malay 
Archipelago was a key to Malacca’s success (Andaya & Andaya, 1982). 
 
The Malay empire began to decline from this prominent trading and seafaring 
position following the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511 (Mohamad 
Jali et al, 2003). The Dutch took over Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641, 
followed by the British in 1824. While Malacca was changing hands from one 
European power to another, the only thing that remained constant was the decline 
of Malay influence on trade and business in their own land.  
 
The steady advance of the British occupation of the Malay Archipelago began 
with Penang in 1786, then Singapore in 1819, and Malacca in 1824. The British 
extended their influence by establishing a policy of indirect rule in Perak, 
Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, collectively known as the Federated 
Malay States, in 1895. The remaining Malay states (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, 
Terengganu, and Johore) accepted a British resident advisor and were collectively 
known as the Unfederated Malay States (Rabushka, 1973).  British control of the 
Malay states saw mass migration of Chinese workers from the 1840s onward and 
Indian labour to work in plantations from the 1870s (Gullick & Gale,1986).  
 
1.3.1 Economic position of the Malays 
 
With the mass migration of the Chinese and Indians, the Malays withdrew to the 
interior of the country.  As a result, Malay participation in business and trade was 
almost non-existent at independence by 1957. After merdeka, the Malays found 
themselves the poor of their own country whereas the immigrant races - mainly 
Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indians - were far better off economically.  The 
Malays had been economically displaced in their own land, Tanah Melayu. They 
played neither a creative nor a service role in the new economy; they had been 
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supplanted as a dominant and dynamic force in their own country (Emerson, 
1964). The Malays formed an overwhelming rural community largely engaged in 
agriculture and fishing. Only one in five urban dwellers in 1957 was a Malay 
(Crouch, 1996). Omar (2006, p. 17-18) paints a vivid picture of the economic 
state of the Malays in British Malaya at this time: 
 
British Malaya was rich but the Malays were poor, backward, and 
dispossessed. The Malays were subdued to remain poor, if not poorer, 
after the British granted independence in 1957… 
 
The Malays had not only been displaced demographically as a 
minority in their own country by the new influx of immigrants from 
China and India, but had become economically insignificant, 
primarily identified as farmers and fishermen in the Straits 
Settlements
4
 under the British rule… 
 
The Malays steadily became spectators in their own country. Although 
Malaya was becoming plural in ethnic composition, the Malays unlike 
the Chinese were not really part of its economic life. Stamford Raffles 
who regarded the Malays as a fine race conceded that they were 
dragged down by European political and commercial encroachment. 
 
Similar views were expressed by others, including Husin Ali (2008), Dr Mahathir 
(1970), and Faaland, Parkinson & Saniman (2003). 
 
The Malays did not own anything significant. Most of their participation in trade 
was confined to small sundry-goods shops in villages. Most of the British-owned 
mines and estates employed Chinese and Indians. The Malays continued to live in 
villages, pursuing traditional agricultural and fishing activities. Life among rural 
Malays was depressed (Husin Ali, 2008). Data on average monthly income, 
employment, and ownership in 1970 reveal significant differences between 
Malays and non-Malays. The average monthly income for a Malay household in 
Malaysia in 1970 was estimated to be RM179 (US$51; based on an exchange rate 
of RM3.50 per US$1). In comparison, the incomes of Chinese and Indian 
households were RM387 (US$110) and RM310 (US$88), respectively. Malay 
households accounted for nearly 85% of all households earning less than RM100 
(US$28), while Chinese and Indians households were 9.6% and 4.1%, 
respectively. In the RM400 to RM 699 (US$114 to US$200) income range, 
Malay households accounted for 31% while Chinese and Indian households 
accounted for 56% and 13%, respectively (Table 1 below; Second Malaysia Plan 
(EPU, 1971).  
 
                   
 
   
 
                                                 
4
  “The Straits Settlements” refers to Penang, Malacca and Singapore. 
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Table 1: Percentage of population and monthly household income (1970) 
 
 
In terms of total employment, the Malays accounted for 51% while the Chinese 
accounted for 37% and the Indians 11%. On a sectorial basis, however; Malays 
were primarily engaged in agriculture. In the professional and managerial groups 
in the manufacturing sector, the Malays accounted for only 7% compared to the 
Chinese 68%, Indians 4% and foreigners 18%. In equity ownership, the Malays 
held only 1.9%, compared to the Chinese 22.5%, Indians 1% and foreigners 
74.6%.  
 
Based on the statistics provided above, it could be seen that Malay participation 
in business was almost non-existent in their own homeland compared to the 
immigrant races immediately after merdeka. While Malays were faring badly in 
the economic scene, a look at the political scene would reveal a totally different 
picture. 
 
1.3.2 Political position of the Malays 
 
The Malay dominance of the political scene is well-documented in history (refer 
to Andaya & Andaya, 1982; Cheah, 2002; Harper, 1999; Leete, 2007; Dr 
Mahathir, 2011; Sopiee, 2005).   
 
Malay political activism started with their role in opposing the Malayan Union. It 
is appropriate to provide a brief account of the Malayan Union so that a full 
picture of the Malay political activity in Tanah Melayu could be appreciated.  
 
In the course of World War II, the British surrendered to the Japanese army in the 
Malay land in 1942 and for almost three-and-a-half years, the Malay states were 
occupied by the Japanese. The British reoccupation and surrender of the Japanese 
took place in September 1945. As soon as the British returned, a proposal known 
as the Malayan Union was unilaterally proclaimed by the British which, for the 
first time, saw the rise of the Malays against the British rule.  
 
Having been defeated by the Japanese a few years earlier, the British image of 
being invincible had been shattered in the eyes of the Malays and others. 
Moreover; at about this time the spirit of Independence was beginning to take full 
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effect in countries like India and Indonesia. This gave the Malays for the first 
time, some preliminary hopes of self-rule as well.  
 
While the seeds of independence were being sowed in the Malay minds, the 
proposal for the Malayan Union (imposed on 1
st
 April, 1946) by the British 
without any form of consultation with the Malays took them by surprise and 
shock. In essence, the Malayan Union meant a single sovereignty and a common 
citizenship for all races by transferring jurisdiction over the Malay states from the 
Sultans to the British crown by offering citizenship both to the Malays and non-
Malays on equal terms.  
 
There was widespread discontent with this British-imposed politically-unified 
system of administration resulting in the diminution of the status and powers of 
the Malay rulers, as it was seen as eroding the power of, and separating the 
identity of the Malay states. In addition, the offer by Britain of citizenship to the 
non-Malays was not well-received by most Malays. The usually docile Malays 
would rise in unity only against three issues which they consider sacrosanct - 
religion, rulers and race, which I would call as the 3R’s.  
 
In the Malayan Union proposal, two of the 3R’s were affected i.e. rulers and race. 
The Malays had never invited nor were involved in the settling of non-Malay 
immigrants in Tanah Melayu. The influx of foreign immigrants was encouraged 
by the British in collusion with the Malay rulers under the pretext of increased 
revenue for the rulers as well as the British. The ordinary Malay was a silent and 
helpless spectator who experienced great stress and pain to see his land being 
'invaded' by the Chinese and Indian migrant workers. However, he could not react 
nor oppose this invasion by foreign workers because in his mind, it was endorsed 
by his ruler for whom he had undivided loyalty and respect.  
 
When the Malayan Union was announced, the Malay had to rise against it as it 
meant the weakening of his rulers as well as his own position in his land through 
the granting of citizenship for non-Malays with equal rights as them. Hitherto, it 
was the fantasy of the Malays to assume that one day these immigrants who were 
temporary workers would leave their country. But the granting of citizenship on 
equal rights to the Malays was something they could not accept. 
 
Succumbing to the strong reactions by the Malays against the Malayan Union, the 
colonial government proposed a new agreement in February 1948 that was more 
favourable to Malay interests. Known as the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 
the rights of the rulers and the special privilege of the Malays were protected.  
 
This arrangement was acceptable to UMNO
5
 as the citizenship rights for non-
Malays which was re- negotiated, in no way impinged on the special rights of the 
                                                 
5
  The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was and still is the main and dominant political 
party in Malaysia.  In 1957, it formed the Alliance Party which comprised three political parties: 
UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, which later became known as Malaysian Chinese 
Association) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC, which later became known as Malaysian Indian 
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Malays. 'Malayness' was thus enshrined in the constitution whereas the idea of 
'Malayans' (a new inclusive term coined to include Malays and non-Malays as the 
people of the Federation of Malaya) had no status at all.  
 
The new political entity was translated as 'Persekutuan Tanah Melayu'. It 
contained within it no legal definition of the 'Malayan'. It was a state, but not a 
template for a nation. For many Malays, after the Union fiasco 'Malayan' was a 
dirty word (Harper, 1999; Leete, 2007). It was in this context that Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia in emphasising the Malay 
dominance in the political scene, said in a speech as President of United Malay 
National Organisation (UMNO) on 26
th
 August, 1951: 
 
With regard to the proposal that independence should be handed over 
to the “Malayans,” who are the “Malayans”? This country was 
received from the Malays and to the Malays it ought to be returned. 
What is called “Malayans,” it is not yet certain who they are; therefore 
let the Malays alone settle who they are. (Cheah, 2002.)  
 
It was the UMNO nationalists who dictated their terms for the future nation-state 
of Malaya (and obtained them) in 1948, when they and the Malay rulers had 
secured the Federation of Malaya Agreement from the British government. 
According to Cheah (2002), the agreement also secured concessions from UMNO 
representatives and Malay rulers that qualified immigrant non-Malays who were 
resident in Malaya for Malay citizenship. However, conditions for obtaining 
citizenship were restricted by both parties. UMNO was perceived as the premier 
protector of the Malays and Islam (Shome, 2002; Lau, 1991).  
 
Political power rested with the Malays but the British agreed to go only when 
inter-racial cooperation and unity had been established among the different races. 
Consequently, the UMNO formed a coalition with the Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), known as the Alliance 
Party. In the eventual agreement, which the Alliance coalition parties worked out 
between themselves and with the British government, the UMNO leaders 
dominated the negotiations and dictated their terms (Cheah, 2002). These terms 
were eventually spelt out more clearly in Malaya’s 1957 Constitution in its 
provisions for “the special position of the Malays,” “Malay Reservations”, Malay 
as “the national language” and Islam as the “religion of the Federation.”  
 
Malay supremacy in the new nation was also reinforced by the affirmation of the 
sovereignty of the Malay rulers over their individual states
6
. The rulers were also 
given considerable powers as constitutional monarchs to “safeguard the special 
position of the Malays.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
Congress).  After 1971, the Alliance Party was enlarged and has now been re-named Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) to assimilate several other parties. 
 
6
  There are nine Malay states in Malaysia each with a ruler called “Sultan” in eight states and “Raja” in 
one state. 
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From the days of negotiating for merdeka to today, the UMNO has been the 
driving force in the political leadership of Malaya and Malaysia. Any threat to the 
leadership position of the Malays in politics has always been dealt with 
decisively. One example of this was the formation of Malaysia in 1963. 
Singapore - which had a predominantly Chinese population led by Lee Kuan Yew 
- merged with Malaya and two other Borneo states; (Sarawak and Sabah), to form 
the Federation of Malaysia. When the first Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku 
Abdul Rahman saw a threat to Malay supremacy from Lee Kuan Yew, he 
expelled Singapore from the Federation in 1965.  
 
1.4  A brief preview of the political leadership of the Malays  
 
Since independence, Malaysia has been led by UMNO and Malay leaders. I will 
examine the success of this political leadership in greater depth in later chapters. 
For now, Sheridan’s (1999) account provides a brief summary:  
 
As a majority Muslim state [Malaysia] satisfies every criterion of 
Western paranoia—ethnic division, Islamic predominance, and a 
developing economy. Yet for 30 years, through good times and bad, 
through the oil shock of 1970s, the recession of the mid-80s, the 
political upheaval of the late 80s, the rapid social change associated 
with the boom years of the fast economic growth during most of the 
90s, and the most recent savage regional economic downturn of the 
late 90s, Malaysians have kept the racial calm. This is no mean 
achievement anywhere. For a developing nation making the transition 
out of poverty and buffeted by the cruelties of market swing and 
radical capital flows, it is worth more recognition internationally than 
it usually gets.  
 
The Economist (2003) also paid tribute to Malaysia’s success: 
 
With a well-educated, English-speaking workforce and a relatively low 
cost base, Malaysia was favourably placed to take advantage of the 
wave of investments that rolled into Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 
1990s … During these two decades some U.S. $80 billion was invested 
in Malaysia, turning it into one of the world’s most export-dependent 
economies. 
 
Only Singapore and Hong Kong, both tiny city-states, sell more abroad 
as a proportion of GDP. In the 30 years from 1970 to 2000, Malaysia’s 
economic growth despite the Asian crisis of 1997–8 averaged about 
seven per cent. 
 
Most important, Malaysia is an economic success story, well integrated 
into the world of trading and steadily increasing the living standards of 
its people.  
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It is generally accepted that at the time of merdeka, the Malays were an 
economically backward race within their own country. In the political 
administration however, they held the upper hand. The Malay leadership has been 
the major guiding force in the administration of the government. Since merdeka, 
all the six prime ministers of Malaysia have been Malays, by tacit understanding 
rather than constitutional agreement. Other races have come to accept Malay 
political dominance. Since 1957 until today, a coalition government has been in 
power led by the Malays, and including Chinese, Indians, Ibans, and Dayaks. The 
coalition was known as the Alliance until 1973 and the Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) after 1974. The key portfolios in the Cabinet, such as Finance, 
Education, Defence, Home Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Foreign Affairs, have 
traditionally been held by Malay ministers. The civil service and diplomatic corps 
are also largely made up of Malays.  
 
While the vast majority of the Malay population was engaged in agricultural 
activities and concentrated in rural areas at the time of merdeka, economic wealth 
was mainly in the hands of foreigners (largely British trading houses) and the 
Chinese. This meant there was great economic disparity between the two largest 
racial groups in Malaysia. This only increased when the Chinese became the 
biggest beneficiaries as the British trading houses began divesting their business 
interests in Malaysia.  
 
As Malay participation in business was almost non-existent, there was a sense of 
frustration among them. It could be said that the Malays’ fantasy7 was that, after 
merdeka, all immigrants in Tanah Melayu would leave their land - the Chinese 
and Indians as well as the British. While the Malays began to define their 
community and imagine their homeland as a whole, the Chinese and Indian 
politicians began to reconcile the claims of the motherland to their local 
predicament (Harper, 1999). The Malays learnt during the negotiations with the 
British, that the Chinese and Indians would not only continue to live in Malaya 
but would also be accorded equal rights and citizenship. “One of its conditions 
before it would relinquish colonial rule was that there should be first inter-racial 
cooperation and unity among the various races” (Cheah, 2002). This was initially 
a major shock and the Malays resisted it strenuously. Harper (1999, p. 14) noted: 
“The ‘original sovereignty’ of the Malays proved hard to reconcile to the new 
historical reality of the peninsula’s plural society. This is the central dilemma of 
Malay nationalism.” Eventually the Malays had reluctantly to accept that they 
would have to share Tanah Melayu with the other races. On Independence Day, 
31
st
 August, 1957, Tanah Melayu became a new, inclusive “Malay” nation-state 
called the Federation of Malaya, to be known as Malaya. 
 
Over the next decade, the economic disparity between the native Malays and 
Chinese widened and worsened, until dissatisfaction broke out in race riots in 
                                                 
7
  Fantasy here is a psychoanalytic concept that refers to the primary context of unconscious mental 
process. It is sometimes spelt “phantasy” by psychoanalytic writers. 
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1969, undoing almost all the political and economic success achieved by 
Malaysia since independence (Dr Mahathir, 1970).  
 
Crouch (1996) & Faaland et al (2003) agree that the economic and social 
positions of the Malays on the one hand and non-Malays, especially the Chinese, 
on the other, were the root cause of racial tension and the major threat to future 
political stability. The race riots of 1969 were a turning point in Malaysian 
political history. They forced the Malaysian government fundamentally to rethink 
its economic policies. Political unity alone would not overcome economic 
disparities (Andaya & Andaya, 1982). A more egalitarian distribution of income 
and a reduction of Malay unemployment through economic restructuring had to 
be introduced (Andaya & Andaya, 1982; Cheah, 2002; Husin Ali, 2008).  This 
led the government to undertake a vigorous new economic initiative through a 
strong government intervention. Known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) and 
implemented through four 5-year plans from 1971 to 1990, the NEP had two 
principal objectives: firstly, a reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, 
irrespective of race; and secondly, a restructuring of society so that identification 
of race with economic function would be reduced and ultimately eliminated. The 
Malays would no longer be excluded from the modern sector of the economy. 
 
1.5 The position of the Malays in business  
 
Since the 1970s, with the NEP as its guiding principle, the government of 
Malaysia has made various attempts to create a cadre of successful Malay 
entrepreneurs and corporate leaders - but with limited success. Various 
programmes have been undertaken by the government to encourage Malay 
participation in business and corporate sectors. According to Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Malays (particularly the 
young) have failed to exploit the opportunities accorded to them by the 
government’s affirmative action to develop them into business and corporate 
leaders: “They don’t seem to appreciate the opportunities that they get. They 
become more interested in other things, politics in particular, in detriment of their 
studies” (Dr Mahathir, 2002). However, their relative success in politics raises the 
question whether Malays have by nature, a greater inclination for politics than 
business. 
 
The failure of the Malays to take advantage of the government’s affirmative 
action is reflected in the government’s failure to achieve the economic targets set 
by NEP: 
 
Implementing affirmative action was not as easy as planning it. 
Capital, licences and permits, premises, etc., were made available and 
later contracts and shares were given to aspiring Malays to improve 
their capacity to take advantage of the affirmative actions of the NEP. 
When the idea of privatisation was espoused, it was natural to give 
many opportunities to Malays. 
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In education, quotas and scholarships were created to provide 
opportunities for them to gain the required knowledge in all fields so as 
to ensure their upward mobility. It was ensured that the Malays would 
grab all these opportunities. Initially they did. But today, the attitude 
has changed. (Dr Mahathir, 2002). 
 
These criticisms from Malay political leaders indicate the depth of the 
government’s frustration at the failure of its attempts to uplift the Malays 
economically. The NEP, which was to run for a 20-year period from 1971 to 
1990, did not achieve its targets. When it expired, it was replaced by the National 
Development Policy (NDP), which aimed to provide continuity of the NEP’s 
policies. Specifically, the NDP promoted the creation of the Bumiputra 
Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC), recognising the fear among 
Bumiputra business leaders and the wider community that the little that had been 
achieved over the past 20 years might be lost again (Omar, 2006).  
 
Now, after forty years since introducing the NEP, the Chinese and Indians have 
begun openly to question the government’s decision to extend affirmative 
policies that, over four decades, has seen only mixed results. 
 
1.6 Objectives of this study 
 
Against this background, the objective of my research is two-fold: first, to 
understand the qualities of Malay business leadership; and second, to understand 
the qualities of Malay political leadership. The research question is expressed 
diagrammatically in Figure 1 below:- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 1> 
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Figure 1: Exploratory research on the Malay leadership mystique 
 
 
 
1.6.1 Core Objective: The assessment of the qualities of Malay business 
leadership. 
 
If the hypothesis about the political leadership of Malays is established with 
reasonable conviction, it leads to the question why Malays have not shown 
similar success as business leaders. A literature search revealed that hardly any 
formal research has been conducted in this area. A search for leadership studies in 
Wiley online library resulted in 141105 results for leadership in all fields and 
1572 results for leadership studies and Malaysian leadership and 1437 results in 
all fields and Malay leadership. A scrutiny of the 1437 results showed no study of 
this nature has been conducted previously.  There is therefore very little data 
available on the subject. The central aim of this exploratory research is ergo to 
study the reasons for the unsatisfactory performance of Malays as business 
leaders.  
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Despite the temptation to refer to it as the “failure” of Malays in business, a term 
that has been used by several angry and frustrated politicians who have attempted 
to bulldoze the Malays into being successful business leaders and entrepreneurs; I 
prefer to use the term “lack of success.” There are, admittedly, a few success 
stories; however, they come nowhere near the targets set by the government’s 
NEP and later NDP.  
 
1.6.2 Ancillary Objective: The assessment of the qualities of Malay political 
leadership. 
 
The Malays played the most critical role in negotiating the independence of 
Malaya and were the prime movers against the formation of the Malayan Union 
by the British, which would have politically weakened the Malay rulers and the 
Malays alike with the other migrant races mainly the Chinese and Indians gaining 
an equal foothold in Malaya. The Malays were not prepared then to give equal 
rights to the immigrant races.  
 
An initial assessment of the political leadership qualities of the Malays points to 
success and admiration. In Chapter 2, I deal in greater detail with the effective 
political assessment and political leadership of the Malays in shaping the country 
for economic prosperity and political stability. There is ample literature on 
Malaysia’s enviable nation-building. Crouch (1996), Sheridan (1999), Shome 
(2002), and Leete (2007) are just some who support the view that Malaysia’s 
political administration led to high economic growth.  
 
1.7 The research approach  
 
The research methodology is elaborated in Chapter 4. It was not easy or 
straightforward to determine an appropriate methodology for studying the Malays 
as a community and race. My study involves understanding the Malays’ historical 
background, culture, values, religion, economic position, mindset, psyche, and a 
brief review of the development over the 600 years since the founding of the 
Malacca Sultanate. Understanding all these perspectives requires a multi-
disciplinary approach involving history, sociology, economics, psychoanalytic 
psychology, and anthropology. Within this approach, I focus on behavioural 
aspects, using psychoanalytic psychology to apply a clinical paradigm to the 
research questions.  
 
Omar (2006) points out that the casualty rate of Malay entrepreneurs is high. In 
the depths of the last Malaysian economic recession of 1984–7, significant 
numbers of Malay entrepreneurs were subject to an unprecedented rate of 
bankruptcy proceedings. The recession of the mid-1980s exposed their 
weaknesses; reasons were identified in government analysis. In 1993, Mustapa 
Mohamed, the then Minister for Entrepreneurial development, presented a paper
8
 
                                                 
8
  Paper presented at the 4th MEDEC Annual Colloquium on February 23, 1993, Shah Alam, Selangor, 
Malaysia. 
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stating such reasons as lack of capital, lack of managerial competencies, and lack 
of opportunities. However, according to Omar, the attitudinal and behavioural 
aspects of Malay businesses were not highlighted as contributing factors to their 
lack of success. This is precisely the gap that this research attempts to fill. 
 
To understand leadership, we have to be willing to go beyond the directly 
observable and pay attention to the presenting internal and social dynamics, the 
intricate playing field between leaders and followers, and the unconscious and 
invisible psychodynamic processes and structures that influence the behaviour of 
individuals, dyads, and groups in organisations. The complex clinical dimension 
of leadership needs to be studied in depth to understand what life in organisations 
is all about (Kets de Vries, 2001b). 
 
In spite of spending billions of dollars to develop Malay business leaders and 
entrepreneurs, the government has failed to take cognizance of these “soft 
matters” (Kets de Vries, 2001b, p. XXI). He says that organisations are 
preoccupied with rationality and objectivity, and seem to be interested only in 
“hard” data when analysing complex business situations. The general tendency is 
to perceive intuition, emotion, and subjectivity as lying somewhere on the 
continuum between wishy-washy and dangerously soft, and to fail to realise that 
“soft matters” can actually be hard. Studying Malay leadership through a clinical 
lens may throw some light on the problems the government faces in developing 
Malay business leaders.  
 
Generally, a lot of research has been done on organisational structures and 
systems rather than the people who make up the organisation, and who are 
conspicuously neglected. This research is an attempt to analyse what has been 
neglected in Malay leadership development and to reach an understanding of the 
invisible, complex nature of Malay leaders using a clinical approach and analysis.  
 
Another significant element is Malay culture and religion, and the Malays’ 
perception of their performance in both politics and business. Malays are 
Muslims and the state religion is Islam. “The Malays are deeply religious but they 
are not knowledgeable enough about Islam to distinguish between what is Islamic 
and what is not. Religious piety is highly valued by the Malays but they equate 
piety with outward appearance and not the true teachings of the Al-Quran and the 
true tradition or Hadith of the Prophet.” (Dr Mahathir, 2002, p. 6). 
 
The study of organisational culture has increased significantly in the recent past 
(Billsberry, 2009; Schneider & Barsoux, 1997; Western, 2008) as has the 
recognition that organisations are themselves cultures. This view emerged from 
the attempt to explain the reasons for the phenomenal success of Japanese 
manufacturing organisations in the 1970s and 1980s. Looking for the secret of 
Japanese success, scholars focused increasingly on the culture of these companies 
and their relations with wider Japanese culture (Gabriel, 1999). Culture is largely 
made up of value systems that are accepted, even if not actually practised, by a 
people or a race. Observations have shown that the culture of a people determines 
whether they succeed or fail. It is not race or ethnicity that determines success; it 
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is culture (Dr Mahathir, 2002). The importance of culture is further emphasised 
by Ronald Inglehart, who coordinates the World Values Survey. Inglehart argues 
that there is a powerful link between cultural values and the political and 
economic performance of nations (Harrison & Huntington, 2000). 
 
The multi-disciplinary approach to the research questions is dealt with fully in 
Chapter 4.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Research 
 
This section outlines the research report and its structure: 
 
Chapter 1 - This chapter begins with an introduction of the research which looks 
at the exploratory research of Malay leadership qualities in politics and business.  
The research question is articulated as to how the Malays have administered their 
country politically in an admirable manner which has contributed to the political 
stability and economic growth and prosperity of the nation since achieving 
'merdeka' in 1957. 
 
This chapter also reviews the economic performance of the Malays, the largest 
race in multi-ethnic Malaysia and with relevant statistics, concludes that the 
Malays are largely economically backward compared to the other races living in 
Malaysia especially the Chinese and Indians. It also provides a brief introduction 
to the NEP and the various affirmative actions taken by the government after the 
1969 racial riots. In spite of almost 40 years of government intervention to assist 
the Malays, it is concluded that the Malays have not achieved the targets set by 
the government to bring them on par with the other races especially the Chinese 
who control the economic wealth of the country. 
 
Based on the poor performance of the Malays in business, the central theme of 
the research is to unearth the reasons for the poor performance of the Malays as 
business leaders and entrepreneurs. 
 
Chapter 2 is called “The Political Administration and Management of Malaysia”.  
This chapter looks more deeply at the political management of Malaysia over the 
last 55 years.  Based on the successful political management which contributed to 
a steady economic growth, the chapter concludes with reasonable conviction that 
the Malays are skilful political administrators as they have played the crucial role 
in the political management of the country. This chapter also analyses all the past 
five prime ministers and their leadership styles which contributed to the political 
and economic success of Malaysia. 
 
Chapter 3 entitled “The Inner Theatre of the Malays” analyses the Malay culture 
with the help of four culture models developed by Hofstede & Hofstede (2005); 
(Kets de Vries, Stanislav Shekshnia, Konstantin Korotov & Elizabeth Florent-
Treacy (2004); Schein (2004), and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998).  
This chapter also provides, through a literature survey, a good understanding of 
the Malay characteristics from the eyes of historical as well as contemporary 
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writers.  With the aid of the four culture models and literature survey, this chapter 
constructs a below-the-surface understanding of the Malays and lays the 
foundation for a deeper understanding of the Malays through the clinical 
paradigm in Chapter 7. 
 
Having understood the Malay situation in the first three chapters, Chapter 4 
provides the research methodology for the entire research. Using a multi- 
disciplinary or mixed methods approach, this research relies quite heavily on the 
constructivist grounded theory for its methodology with the help of interpretive 
methodology, experiential data and fieldwork. Empirical research using five 360-
degree instruments also provide valuable input for the research. With the use of 
multi-disciplines, this research could also be classified as a crystallisation method 
which Richardson (1994) explains as a design which recognises the many facets 
of any given approach to the social world as a fact of life. 
 
Chapter 5 is devoted entirely to focus group discussions and expert panel 
interviews. Realising the importance of eliciting rich information about the 
Malays from the Malays themselves, focus group discussions - with three groups 
of Malay businessmen and professionals and expert panel interviews with 20 top 
policy makers and political and business leaders, - added to the depth of this 
research. Only three of the 20 expert panellists were non-Malays and were 
included as expert panel members for their involvement in one way or another 
towards helping the Malays. Those who participated in the focus groups and 
expert panel interviews gave their views freely on various issues affecting the 
Malay performance as business leaders including the historical and cultural 
contexts which are important for this research. 
 
Chapter 6 called “Malay Leadership from the eyes of 360-degree Feedback 
Instruments” deals with understanding Malays through using 360-degree 
feedback instruments.  In this chapter, the results of 41 senior corporate leaders’ 
and senior civil servants’  survey using five different 360-feedback instruments is 
analysed and benchmarked against international leaders to understand the Malay 
leadership profile. 
 
Chapter 7 which is the concluding chapter entitled “Unveiling Malay Leadership 
Mystique Through Clinical Paradigm” deals with the crux of the entire research 
question of why Malays have not been largely successful in business leadership 
and provides some possible explanations using the psychodynamic lens based on 
the research findings of chapters 3, 5 and 6 and applying the appropriate 
conceptual framework of psychodynamic theories of large-group identity and 
large-group regression. A big picture of the Malay Leadership Mystique is then 
presented. The explanations provided are no doubt one aspect and the least 
explored aspect in understanding the Malay’s lack of success in business. There 
could be other factors in addition to what has been explored in this chapter. At 
best the findings in this chapter add to a better understanding of the Malays from 
the context of business leadership. 
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Chapter 8 entitled “Knitting the Research Together” provides the thought 
process of the entire research to knit each of the seven chapters to provide the 
common thread from “Introduction” in Chapter 1 to “Unveiling the Malay 
Leadership Mystique through Clinical Paradigm” in Chapter 7. 
 
In Chapter 9 I share my "Reflections and thoughts for the future".  The research 
having gone through the metamorphosis of various stages, attains the final stage 
of developing into a 'butterfly' and flies freely in its world of fantasy providing 
some reflections and thoughts for some future work in this area. As this 
research is consciously classified exploratory in nature, there is no doubt that 
there is a lot to be done in future. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
 
As I stated at the opening of this chapter, the nature of this research is of national 
importance to Malaysia. Astute Malaysians are observing a paradox in their 
midst. Malaysia has flourished into a burgeoning economy, whose population 
enjoys a relatively high standard of living. This has come about under the 
political stewardship of a succession of Malay leaders. Today, Malaysia is 
considered a leading trading nation (27th in the world – CIA World Factbook as 
per Appendix I), which is a great credit to its young age (55 years since merdeka) 
and its small population of around 26 million. 
 
The paradox however, is that the Malays who led and laid the foundation for this 
transformation through pragmatic economic policies, have been unable to achieve 
the same level of success when it comes to involvement in business. This 
phenomenon has been repeated, despite the enormous assistance provided by the 
government. Unless this anomaly is rectified, Malaysians will always live in fear 
of a repeat of the 1969 race riots. It is therefore in the interest of all Malaysians, 
including the government, to remedy this paradox for the sake of long-term, 
sustainable economic and political stability. 
 
Within an exploratory framework, this study aims to probe this very complex 
issue using a multi-disciplinary approach weighted towards the psychodynamic 
and clinical perspectives. Limitations of time and resources inevitably place 
constraints on a fuller study. While leadership has been widely debated in 
management literature, sometimes acrimoniously; little if anything has been 
written about situation-specific leadership, particularly from a clinical paradigm. 
This pilot study seeks to fill that gap in this much misunderstood but very 
important area of human development, at least as far as the Malays and Malaysia 
are concerned.  
 
 
<End of Chapter 1> 
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Chapter 2 - The Political Administration and Management of Malaysia 
 
 
"The Malaysian leader is expected to behave in a manner that is humble, modest and 
dignified.” 
House R.J et al (1999) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks more closely at the political management of Malaysia over the 
last 50 years. As Shome posits in his introduction to Malay Political Leadership, 
“What is different about Malay political leadership is that there is no leadership 
of its kind anywhere that has been able to maintain indigenous primacy in a fairly 
even multi-racial environment and one that subscribes to western democracy for 
its governance while retaining conservative Islamic values” (Shome, 2002, p.1).  
 
In order to evaluate Malay political leadership, it is necessary to examine its 
administration and management styles. And for this we must begin with the birth 
of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), because most of the 
political leaders who have governed Malaysia since independence in 1957 have 
been members of UMNO, (see footnote on UMNO in page 15). UMNO was 
founded in 1946 as a response to British attempts to reduce the Malay rulers to 
mere figureheads and their efforts to extend citizenship rights to the immigrant 
Chinese and Indian communities in a new political entity called the Malayan 
Union (Singh, 1998).  This was in contradistinction to British policy before the 
Japanese occupation, which sought at the time to preserve Malaya for the Malays 
and accord them special rights. When the British returned to Malaya at the end of 
the Japanese occupation in 1944 the British post-war government wanted to offer 
equal citizenship rights to non-Malays. Under their proposals, the various 
communities would no longer be treated differently but would live as one 
enlarged and centralised community known as the Malayan Union (MU) (Cheah, 
2002).  
 
Malay opposition to the MU proposal was spearheaded by UMNO and was 
immensely successful. It forced the British government to rescind the plan, 
demonstrating clearly how the Malays would react to any threat to their political 
authority (Ratnam, 1967). Their strong, unified opposition to MU confirms my 
view of the Malay “fantasy” and Tanah Melayu (as explained in Chapter 1). The 
leading role played by UMNO in mobilising Malay opposition, and the 
subsequent retraction of the MU proposal by the British in 1948, established 
UMNO firmly as the leading political organisation of the Malays, a position it has 
held ever since. Its role in opposing the MU gave UMNO the tacit legitimacy as 
the champion of Malay nationalism. It also catapulted UMNO into prime position 
as the natural successor to colonial rule, evidenced by its key role in achieving 
independence from British rule in 1957. In place of the MU came the Malayan 
Federation, which was established in 1948 and was based on a central 
government with federal legislative functions but maintaining the sovereignty of 
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the Malay rulers in the Malay states. The Federation marked Britain’s 
accommodation of Malay concerns and, indeed, its recognition of UMNO as its 
partner in a dialogue on self-government and, ultimately, independence. 
 
2.2 Some relevant Malay leadership values  
 
Before a statistical examination of Malaysia’s successful economic performance 
over the last half-century is conducted, it is appropriate to take a brief look at 
some softer issues. These centre principally on certain leadership styles 
historically found among the Malays, both as sovereign rulers and as political 
leaders. In order for a country to be well-managed, those governing it must have 
certain skills and leadership qualities conducive to a proper administration of 
national affairs.  
 
Malay leadership success in the political and administrative sphere has its roots in 
several things; not least of which is the fact that Malays have traditionally, and 
for the most part even in modern times, been immensely loyal to their rulers and 
leaders. Despite political and economic problems arising from past colonisation 
and post-independence, the Malays have always been loyal to their royal and 
political leaders.  Loyalty is one of the most important elements in all Malay 
relationships. Of course, in historic times the social contract was that the sultans 
exacted unerring loyalty from their subjects in return for the assurance that the 
sultan would protect them - even if this protection were only sacral or spiritual - 
from evil. As Khoo (1991) has said, from the time of the Malacca Sultanate, the 
ruler’s position was sacred because it was built upon a system of royal 
patrilineage whereby the institution of the monarchy was surrounded by an aura 
of sanctity. Khoo argues that although the details may have changed (technically 
the system of royal patrilineage ended in 1699), its spirit lingers on today in the 
establishment of the Malay polity according to the spirit of the Malacca Sultanate, 
which is firmly based on the institution of a raja (Malay ruler). The aura of 
sanctity built around and legitimizing a raja is known as daulat, (divine sanction 
of a monarch’s reign). What follows is the subjects’ absolute acceptance of the 
ruler’s absolute authority, even if tyrannical, because anything else would amount 
to treachery, or derhaka. It is important to realise that this custom is bound to a 
tightly-woven framework of respect for authority and legitimacy of the 
ruler/leader. This has been the basis of the Malay nation, which is far more than 
just the state as understood in Western political theory - as Khoo says, “The 
Malay conceptualization of authority was directly linked to the presence of a raja; 
territory was unimportant, hence the term kerajaan (the state of having a raja), 
which is, more appropriately, the Malay equivalent of the Western concept of a 
‘kingdom’ (Khoo, 1991, p. 25). Islam did not change this mindset - indeed; it 
sanctioned it, justifying the existence and sanctity of the raja on the grounds that 
he was God’s representative on earth (Khoo, 1991, p. 41). As Khoo argues, it was 
the Malacca Sultanate that provided the impetus for a transformation of Malay 
society so that this mindset has remained in both the political and social culture of 
the Malays until the present day, regardless of whether or not there is a raja—for 
wherever there is a class of followers and a leader, then the concept of kerajaan 
exists in the Malay framework, driving the entire structure of relations within it. 
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Thus; loyalty has always been one of the most valuable ingredients in the Malay 
leadership tradition for leaders and followers alike. These concepts of loyalty 
(kesetiaan) and treachery (derhaka) are dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 3, 
“The Inner Theatre of the Malays.”  
 
Malay culture traditionally places great value upon the way its rulers use subtlety 
(kehalusan) to maintain harmony. The Malay Annals and other literary-historical 
texts are full of stories of how rulers were able to control delicate situations by 
means of cunning, self-control and subtle language, all the while maintaining 
politeness and regard for the other party (Shome, 2002). This is evident in Malay 
legends and its folklore traditions, for example, tales of the famous cunning and 
subtle mouse-deer, Sang Kancil.  As Shome argues, proper leadership, in the 
Javanese-Malay psyche, “demands virtue and politeness in character”9 and that a 
“leader who chooses warfare when diplomacy appears a better option manifests a 
weakness in his leadership.” This frame of mind is also present in the Javanese-
Hindu, pre-Islamic Malay psyche but it is also one of the traditions of virtuous 
Islamic leadership, where the Muslim, whether leader or follower, is required to 
act with dignity and regard not only for himself but also for his adversary, unless 
the latter chooses to destroy him. Only in that instance should the Muslim fight 
with everything at his disposal. Shome provides the example from the Malay 
Annals of Sultan Muzaffar Shah’s diplomatic and subtle refusal to engage the 
Siamese king in battle - the Sultan argued with the king, through his envoy, that 
God preserved the Sultan from his enemies, thereby preserving also his subjects 
in Malacca, but that he would not fight Siam because Siam faced west, and since 
west was the direction they as Muslims faced when they prayed, then “We cannot 
therefore face that way when we are fighting” (Shome, 2002, p. 20).  
 
This sort of subtlety, impressive as it was in averting fighting between Siam and 
the Malacca kingdom, was intrinsically a valued leadership strategy. While 
historians have advanced many theories about the legacy of the Hindu versus 
Islamic traditions for Malay leadership practice, as manifested by the actual and 
fictional practices of Malay rulers, the concern here is with the main aspects of 
the phenomenon of Malay leadership as it may be observed in Malay social and 
political history. Along with loyalty and subtlety, there is the concept of derhaka. 
 
                                                 
9 Anthony S. K. Shome, Malay Political Leadership (London: Routledge Curzon , 2002), page 20ff. The 
present research does not deal with issues like the possible origin of Malay characteristics like 
kehalusan and derhaka, nor with the influence of religion on Malay language and culture. These have 
been dealt with by other scholars and are not within the scope of this research. It may be said that many 
of Shome’s arguments dealing with the influence of Hindu-Buddhist elements upon Malay culture are 
inaccurate - for instance, his erroneous claim that mu’afakat was inherited by Malay rulers from Hindu 
tradition, as well as his position that Malay rulers were slow to adopt Islamic law or Islamic ideas of 
kingship and his inaccurate interpretation of Islam and Sufism. Shome’s arguments, often 
contradictory, are based on somewhat superficial discussion and rely mostly on Orientalist sources 
whose authenticity has mostly already been disproved by later scholars who have a better and more 
profound understanding of Islam and the history of the region. Thus the present research draws upon 
Shome’s work only insofar as it is able to provide some useful insights into some of the leadership style 
tendencies observable among the Malays in history. 
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While Shome argues that derhaka refers to lèse-majesté (sin or treason against the 
ruler), his concept should be interpreted in the larger leadership context to mean 
the sin of a follower against the leader; that sin being disobedience or disrespect 
(a form of disobedience) toward someone in authority. The Malays describe a 
disobedient child as derhaka against his or her parents, especially his or her 
mother; in a similar way a subject is derhaka if he or she does not show due 
respect to a leader. Loyalty is also a factor here, although derhaka is a much 
greater treachery than mere disloyalty. Psychologically, derhaka, kesetiaan and 
kehalusan continue to have observable effects on Malay leadership traditions. As 
such, they are more powerful than mere leadership styles or tendencies, which 
may be adopted and then un-learned or cast off according to need. Arguably they 
also reside more permanently in the Malay psyche, becoming enduring drivers of 
Malay leadership patterns and preferences. As I will explore in Chapter 3, “The 
Inner Theatre of the Malays”, these psychological traits means that the Malays 
resort to primitive defence mechanisms like splitting, repression and regression
10
.  
 
Deference to authority is evident not only in ideas of Malay kingship but also in 
Malay political and administrative styles. Although present in the pre-Islamic 
Malay psyche, its lasting presence can be explained by the fact that respect for 
authority is asserted in the Islamic tradition, and is even a matter of creed. 
Manifestations of this kind of respect can often be found in sibling birth order, for 
instance, where there are numerous religious as well as historical precedents for 
the younger to defer to the elder. For example, there is the saying that “an older 
brother’s right over his younger siblings is similar to a father’s right over his 
children.” This deference is not so much towards the person as towards the 
authority vested in him. Historically, this is shown in the concept of vassalage 
and tributary over lordship. The relation of vassal to lord is often likened to the 
relationship between elder and younger siblings; for example, the Raja of Siak, 
which was a vassal of Malacca, once rashly ordered the execution of a man 
without first obtaining the authority to do so from the Sultan of Malacca. Later 
realising his folly, the Raja of Siak begged the Sultan’s pardon by appealing to 
the latter’s authority over him: “The younger brother has erred, he can only hope 
for the pardon of his older brother” (Shome, 2002, p. 31). European colonisation 
of the Malays may have modified their leadership style, especially as it was 
formerly practised under the sultans, yet the underlying psyche driving many 
leadership patterns has endured.  
 
Interpreted within this context, it may be easier to find some answers to the 
question of why Malay administrative and political leadership has been more 
successful than Malay economic and business leadership since Independence. 
There would doubtless be ingrained tensions between derhaka, kesetiaan and 
kehalusan as played out against the leadership and followership requirements of 
the Malays post-independence, especially after the introduction of radical 
affirmative-action policies like the NEP, which was introduced after the 1969 
race riots. This research affirms this idea through interviews with leaders from 
different sectors in Malaysia and from results of psychometric evaluations 
                                                 
10
  For explanation of these terms, please refer to Appendix 10. 
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(discussed in greater detail later in Chapters 5 and 6). These psychological 
aspects can also go some way towards explaining the resilience of Malay political 
and administrative leadership both before and after the NEP, and the fact that 
derhaka, kesetiaan and kehalusan can be viewed as the mainstays of the Malay 
leadership style.  
 
2.3 Malaysia’s economic success 
 
A review of Malaysia’s economic indicators compared to other former British 
colonies, or countries that achieved independence at about the same time as 
Malaysia would certainly support the hypothesis that Malay political and 
administrative leadership has been strong and that Malaysia has been successfully 
managed and governed as a nation since independence.  The fact that over the 55-
year period of its independence, Malaysia has only had six prime ministers 
(including the present incumbent, who has been in office for less than five years) 
testifies to the ability of the nation’s prime drivers to provide the stability 
necessary to move the country forward. It has certainly done this on the economic 
front.  
 
Obviously, a well-managed and deftly-administered nation will result in an 
economically prosperous economy and citizenry. This is one measure of the 
success of the Malays as political and administrative leaders. Milne & Mauzy 
(1999) consider Malaysia’s economic success truly remarkable for shifting its 
economic dependence from reliance upon natural resources towards 
manufacturing. Malaysia’s annual economic growth for the decade up to 1997 
averaged approximately 8%. Milne & Mauzy further states that Malaysia is now 
emerging from being a developing country. A 1993 study analysing Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand in terms of how they 
succeeded in achieving the status of NIEs (Newly Industrializing Economies) 
concluded that there were three vital ingredients in their success. The study by 
Leipziger & Thomas (1993) found that, apart from natural resources and other 
givens, the essential characteristics for growth were outward orientation 
(especially with regard to exports), stability, and investment. In addition, 
Malaysia also had a high rate of savings, another key driver of growth.  
 
Additionally, several development plans were initiated when the country was still 
Malaya, which enabled the government to check how closely implementation 
conformed to planning, thereby facilitating future revisions if necessary (Milne & 
Mauzy, 1999).  Thus; in addition to the economic indicators outlined above, the 
various development plans that have been conceived by its respective prime 
ministers over the last 55 years are also relevant to the story of Malaysia’s 
political and administrative leadership success. 
 
2.3.1 Enviable record of rapid economic growth  
 
Malaysia has had an enviable record of rapid economic growth with price 
stability under the Malay political and administrative leaderships.  The country 
has recorded impressive economic growth averaging 6.2% since the country 
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achieved independence in 1957, with an inflation rate of 3% per annum. Over the 
period 1988–96, economic growth was even more spectacular, averaging 9.5%, 
with an inflation rate of only 3.5%.  Rapid economic growth during this period 
was achieved on the back of strong investments supported by high savings.  
Private investments (in real terms) averaged 30% of GDP during this period, 
while national savings were about 34.5% of gross national income during the 
same period.  The general low inflation has been the result of an open economy, 
liberal imports, and the general absence of deficit financing of the government by 
the monetary system.  The impressive performance of the economy has helped to 
position the country prominently on the world investment map and become a role 
model for other developing nations. 
 
2.3.2 Strong investments in the manufacturing sector 
 
Malaysia’s record of strong economic growth, political stability, rich natural 
resources and firm commitment to human resources and infrastructural 
development has attracted substantial foreign manufacturing investments since 
the second half of the 1980s.  Foreign investors have poured hundreds of millions 
of dollars into Malaysia, with direct investments in the manufacturing sector 
increasing rapidly from RM2.1 billion in 1987 to RM17.8 billion in 1992.  The 
World Bank had ranked Malaysia after Mexico and China as the third largest 
recipient of foreign investments in the developing world.  Although the inflow of 
foreign investments in the manufacturing sector slowed and was range-bound 
between RM6.3 billion and RM19.8 billion during the period 1993–2005, it 
peaked at RM46.1 billion in 2008 (please refer to Chart in Appendix 2), before 
slowing down to RM22.1 billion in 2009 following the global economic 
downturn.  Similarly, domestic investments in the manufacturing sector have also 
risen significantly, from RM1.9 billion in 1987 to RM17.2 billion in 1996.  It was 
range-bound between RM4.7 billion and RM15.6 billion from 1997 to 2005, and 
reached RM26.5 billion in 2007 before slowing down to RM10.5 billion by 2009. 
 
2.3.3 Supported by high national savings 
 
High national savings underpinned the strong investment and sustained rapid 
economic expansion of the country (see Chart in Appendix 3). Gross national 
savings have averaged about 36.7% of GNP over the last decade, comparable to 
high savings economies such as China and Singapore, but much higher than other 
developing countries and advanced countries such as the U.S.  Malaysia has one 
of the best infrastructures in Asia, made more efficient by a continuing 
programme of privatisation, which underlines the private sector’s fundamental 
role in the Malaysian economy. 
 
2.3.4 Diversified and resilient economy 
 
Overall, under Malay political and administrative leadership, Malaysia has 
successfully engineered a transition from primary resources to a broader 
manufacturing-based economy.  In 1980, Malaysia was still heavily dependent on 
agriculture as a source of growth, export earnings, government revenue and 
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employment.  However, the economy has become increasingly diversified.  The 
nation’s dependence on agriculture had declined from 22.9% of GDP in 1980 to 
7.3% in 2012 and from 43.5% of total exports in 1980 to 8.3% in 2009.  
Contributions from other sectors, particularly the manufacturing industries, 
became more predominant with its share of GDP rising from 19.6% in 1980 to 
24.9% in 2012 and exports from 22.4% to 77.8% during the same period (see 
Chart in Appendix 4).  Since the contribution of the manufacturing sector peaked, 
the country has begun to promote the services sector as another key engine of 
growth for the Malaysian economy.  Today, the broad services sector - 
comprising finance and insurance, wholesale and retail trade, real estate and 
business services, transport, storage and communications, government and other 
services - accounts for 57.4% of the country’s GDP.  
 
The economy is now more broad-based and more resilient.  Manufacturing 
exports grew much faster than GDP during the past decade.  From domestic 
market-oriented beginnings, the industries developed rapidly into an export-
oriented sector.  Today, Malaysia is one of the world’s largest exporters of air-
conditioners, semi-conductor devices, television sets and audio and video 
equipment.  These changes helped to sustain the export sector as the main engine 
of growth and the ratio of exports to GDP rose from 55% in 1990 to 94% in 2012. 
Malaysia today has diversified its export markets and is less dependent on 
Western economies.  The country has entered into more than 30 bilateral trade 
agreements with the developing world. Today, more than half of its total exports 
actually go to countries in Asia, although a significant percentage of Malaysia’s 
exports to Singapore and China are re-exported to the rest of the world. For the 
year 2010, the latest ranking available, Malaysia is ranked the world’s 25th largest 
export nation (Source: World Trade Organization (WTO).  The country’s per 
capita income rose from a low of US$1,052 in 1977 to US$10,074 in 2012. (See 
Chart in Appendix 5) 
 
2.3.5 Transformation of High Current Account Deficit into a Net Savings 
Economy 
 
The vision of becoming an industrialized nation by the year 2020 has led to the 
Malaysian government embarking on an aggressive policy to attract foreign 
investors to form joint ventures with local partners.  This is necessary to build a 
domestic industrial base for sustained growth.  In order that infrastructure 
bottlenecks do not become an obstacle to investment and growth, the government 
together with the private sector has planned a massive infrastructure programme. 
Since about half the inputs in the manufacturing sector are imported, the increase 
in investment also meant increased demand for imports of intermediate inputs.  
As a result of high imports of capital and intermediate goods, as well as the high 
freight and insurance payments and investment income due to non-residents, the 
country suffered a high current account deficit in its balance of payments up to 
1997, to the tune of 6.3% of gross national income.   
 
Nevertheless, the heavy investment paid off.  It translated into higher productive 
capacities and exports, and the balance of payments has had a surplus since 1998.  
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Indeed, from 1998 to 2009, the country’s accumulated current account surpluses 
amounted to about US$220 billion.  Consequently, the country has been 
transformed from a net debtor country to net savings economy (see Chart in 
Appendix 6). 
 
2.3.6 From Investment-driven to Consumption-led economy 
 
The flip side of this is that current account surpluses are not substantially 
ploughed back and re-invested in building capacities for growth.  This has been 
the case since the Asian financial crisis in the later months of 1997.  Foreign 
direct investments were diverted to countries that embarked on aggressive 
liberalisation, such as China, Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam.  At the same 
time, there was mounting evidence of outward regional investment, as Malaysian 
companies sought to expand abroad.  The Malaysian government also encouraged 
reverse investment in order for domestic industries to establish forward links, 
gain economies of scale, have the means to acquire technology tie-ups, and secure 
market access for Malaysian goods and services.   
 
As a result, the contribution of private investment dropped sharply from 36% of 
GDP in 1996–7 to 8.2% in 2002 before building up to an average of 10% 
thereafter.  Real GDP growth for the economy has eased correspondingly to an 
average of 4.3% per annum over the last decade.  The nation’s economy is now 
driven more by consumer spending, where its contribution to GDP has risen from 
about 43.8% in 2000 to 53.7% in 2009.  Malaysia has had an enviable record of 
strong GDP growth with low inflation as shown in the Chart in Appendix 7. 
 
2.3.7 Embarking on a new economic model  
 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian government, under the current Prime Minister Najib 
Abdul Razak, has embarked on a series of reforms to improve the economy’s 
prospects over the longer term.  A Government Transformation Programme 
(GTP) was launched in January 2010 to improve its delivery system and reduce 
the cost of doing business in the country.  Under the programme, national and 
ministerial key result areas are spelt out to ensure that the objectives of reducing 
crime rate, corruption and poverty as well as improving education standards, rural 
infrastructure and urban transportation are met over time. 
 
At the same time, the government has taken this transformation a step further by 
announcing a new approach of policy towards affirmative action which is more 
market-friendly, more transparent and merit-based.  The details of this affirmative 
action are contained in the New Economic Model (NEM), unveiled by the Prime 
Minister on 30
th
 March 2010.  The NEM aims to move the country towards a 
high-income economy through innovation, knowledge and R&D as well as to 
improve efficiency and productivity.  It essentially shifts the ethnic focus of the 
previous New Economic Policy to one that focuses on the bottom 40% of 
households by income levels.  The target is to achieve an average economic 
growth of 6.5% a year over 2011–2020, from an average of 4.3% per annum 
achieved during the period 2000–2009. 
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These initiatives, together with the culmination of various strong policy measures 
over the last 12 months, beginning with the announcement on 30
th
 June 2009 to 
repeal Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) guidelines on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) as well as on property transactions, have led to the 
country’s promotion to the tenth most competitive nation among 58 economies 
surveyed, according to the World Competitiveness Yearbook study by the Swiss-
based Institute for Management Development (IMD) in 2010, a quantum leap 
from 18
th
 position in the previous year.  
 
2.3.8 Success based on forward planning 
 
Under Malay political and administrative leadership, the foundation of growth 
and progress in the economy was based on long-term forward planning put 
forward by various prime ministers.  The goal is industrialisation and the strategy 
is to promote manufacturing industries that are more capital-intensive, 
technologically sophisticated and export-oriented, provide stronger links between 
industries and use domestic resources. The aim is to move towards higher value-
added and technology production to help Malaysia leapfrog to a position as an 
advanced industrial society by 2020.  As the contribution of manufacturing 
matures, the country is moving forward to develop its services industry to ensure 
sustainable growth over the medium term. The strategic objective of the 
government to transform the economy from agro-based to manufacturing- and 
service-based has worked well. It has given the country an economy diversified 
from over-dependence on primary commodity exports.  
 
Few countries are as precise about their development ambitions.  The road to 
affluence is mapped out in Five-year Malaysia Plans, the National Development 
Policy and Outline Perspective Plans, which stipulate specific time frames for 
development goals.  These forward-planning programmes are supplemented by 
various industrial, financial and capital markets master plans.  The ultimate target 
is the Prime Minister’s Vision 2020 (under the stewardship of former Prime 
Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed), a policy aimed at achieving fully industrialized 
status by 2020. The economic success of Malaysia since independence is quite 
unparalleled. Very few countries that were colonies of western powers have 
matched or surpassed Malaysia’s success story. In Asia, apart from South Korea 
and Taiwan, and the smaller city states like Singapore and Hong Kong, no other 
country can compare to Malaysia’s economic success. This success is primarily 
attributed to the country’s political leadership. 
 
Malaysia is one of the world’s most open, globalised economies.  Trade currently 
accounts for more than 200% of its GDP.  In 2006, Malaysia was ranked as the 
19
th
 most globalised economy by Kearney’s globalisation index (Kearney 2006) 
and it is expected to become even more so. 
 
Since independence, Malaysia’s GDP has grown in real terms at an annual 
average of between 6% and 7%.  This outstanding growth record, supported by 
the country’s sustained expansion of exports and openness to imports, has 
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brought with it, rising prosperity for a growing middle-class.  Malaysia’s growth 
has resulted from high levels of domestic savings and investments, as well as 
major public investment in infrastructure, education and health. 
 
After independence, substantial investments were made in growth supporting the 
physical and social infrastructure.  Although the country has experienced deep 
economic recessions, including the severe 1997 Asian financial crisis, it has 
always recovered quickly because of its strong political resolve, forward-looking 
and skilful macroeconomic planning, and a long-term perspective towards nation 
building. 
 
Over the last 50 years, Malaysia’s economy has increasingly transformed and 
diversified.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the country was the world’s leading exporter 
of natural rubber, tin, palm oil and a significant exporter of timber, natural gas 
and petroleum.  By the late 1980s, Malaysia had become one of the world’s 
leading manufacturers of electronics and electrical products. 
 
In the next section, I analyse each of the post-independence prime ministers of 
Malaysia and how their leadership skills, strengths and shortcomings contributed 
to the country’s change of fortune. 
 
2.4 Leadership of Malaysia’s past prime ministers - Some aspects of their 
success 
 
Each of the five post-independence Malaysian premiers had to administer and 
manage a multi-religious and multi-racial country. All did this with skill, to 
ensure stability which contributed enormously to Malaysia’s overall economic 
success.  
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1957–70)11 
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman was born in Alor Setar, Kedah on 8
th
 February 1903. A 
prince, his father was the Kedah ruler, Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, and his 
mother, of Siamese-Burmese origin, was the sultan’s sixth wife. The Tunku 
would later often repeat that he “was born under a lie”. His mother had told the 
sultan a white lie, saying she was pregnant by him before she really was, in order 
to avert his threatened punishment of the Keeper of the Ruler’s Seal and his entire 
family for some wrongdoing (Harry Miller, 1959). His mother, an expert in the 
art of kehalusan, allegedly pleaded with her royal consort not to jeopardize her 
early pregnancy by insisting upon the Keeper’s punishment and encouraging evil 
to enter the child in her womb. Happily for her, she conceived soon afterwards; 
Malays like to think that the Tunku was the kind and generous man that he was 
due in no small part to his mother’s charitable intercession on behalf of the 
Keeper and his family.  
 
                                                 
11
 The dates in parentheses indicate time in office.  
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Early British presence and their influence in Malaya were ushered in by the 
Tunku’s great-great-great grandfather, Sultan Abdullah II, who signed a treaty 
with Captain Francis Light, giving the British East India Company possession of 
Penang Island for use as a trading station in exchange for British assistance 
against Kedah’s enemies, the Bugis. Thus began almost two centuries of British 
influence and government in Malaya, a fact never forgotten by Tunku Abdul 
Rahman. On receiving the British promise of independence for his country by 31
st
 
August 1957, Tunku – then Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya – 
declared, “I will thus right the ‘wrong’ done by my ancestor”. Kesetiaan and 
kehalusan were ingrained in the Tunku from birth, cemented by the 
circumstances of his own royal lineage, which also helped to give his premiership 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Malays.  
 
Hierarchical order is very important to the Malays and the fact that its first Prime 
Minister came from a royal family helped stabilise the new political order.  The 
ruler, or Raja, also called Sultan (monarch), was at the top of the hierarchical 
order. The aura of sanctity built around the institution of Raja led to the concept 
and ideology of legitimacy, or daulat.  
 
At the time of independence it was easier for Malays to accept a prime minister 
from royal or aristocratic lineage as their leader than a commoner. In fact, the first 
four prime ministers of Malaysia were all from aristocratic families. Dr Mahathir 
was the first commoner to hold the position. This underscores the deeply 
engrained, feudalistic mindset of the Malays, who initially were willing to accept 
only people from the noble and aristocratic families in leadership positions. It 
took Malaysia a good 25 years before the country was ready to accept a prime 
minister from the people. A keen contender to Dr Mahathir, the first commoner to 
become prime minister, was Tengku Razaleigh, a prince who had high 
expectations that he would be selected because of his royal lineage. His failure to 
be elected as prime minister led to a serious crisis in the UMNO, splitting the 
party. 
 
For all his adoption of British styles and certain customs, the refinement and 
subtlety that are trademarks of Malays, and typically of this royal Malay and first 
Prime Minister, were never relinquished. Perhaps this may explain why the 
Tunku found Mahatma Gandhi so inspirational - perhaps it was the subtlety as 
much as the non-violent aspect of his Satyagraha that attracted the Tunku. His 
take-over of the Malay vote from Onn bin Ja’afar, founder of the UMNO, was 
similarly subtle and, indeed, unexpected. Tunku was utterly unspoiled by his 
royal lineage; his nickname was one of a village boy - close friends simply called 
him Awang. It is telling that in his engaging biography of the Tunku, Henry 
Miller quotes his Lower School teacher, one Mr Cheeseman, as saying that he 
had a weak spot for the Tunku not because he was clever (apparently he only just 
scraped through his examinations)
12
 or good-looking or any of the usual reasons, 
                                                 
12
 Another teacher concurred that “he was a nice and polite pupil, but I did not succeed in teaching him 
very much” (Miller, 1959, p. 46). In spite of this, Tunku Abdul Rahman earned a degree from 
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but “because he was the typical Malay, a courteous, friendly youth” (Miller, 
1959, p. 35). 
 
Tunku was known to be shrewd in judging character and an expert politician, yet 
given to ignoring details, which may go some way to explain his lack of attention 
to the country’s economic problems during his time as Prime Minister. At the 
beginning of his time in office, the Malay civil service was more or less impartial, 
in the sense that civil servants then were less inclined to hustle for political 
rewards because the civil service was the government itself, answerable to the 
High Commissioner. Later, this changed because as democracy and political 
power changed hands, the civil service gave way to the elected legislature. As 
will be seen later, this is one possible reason for the shift in mindset of the Malay 
civil servant, away from ‘service’ towards expectation of special treatment from 
the government. Of course, Dr Mahathir’s NEP later became the apex of this 
mentality, which grew through the years almost into a culture of dependency. 
Many leaders interviewed as part of this research (discussed in later chapters) say 
the same thing: that the nature and style of Malay leadership changed in great 
measure due to the existence of the NEP, not so much because it was flawed in 
concept, but because it fell short of its true ideals of execution.  
 
Nevertheless, Tunku’s main preoccupation at independence was not the economy 
but how to maintain an efficient administration and the sound execution of policy 
in the face of British mass exodus from the Malayan civil service. Coupled with 
this worry was the terrorist threat from the communists, which was not altogether 
eliminated. His greatest asset, apart from his gift to the nation of independence 
from British rule,
13
 was his insistence on unity among all the races. The Tunku’s 
method of obtaining this unity was undoubtedly a result of his own uniquely 
honest leadership style - indeed, he had thought himself totally unsuitable for 
leadership of the UMNO party - and his ability, as Rudyard Kipling famously put 
it, “[to] talk with crowds and keep your virtue, or walk with Kings - nor lose the 
common touch”.14 Tunku’s common touch had much to do with his upbringing - 
his mother apparently did not spare him and his brothers the rod, as other Malay 
princes might have been spared by dint of their royal status. This approach to 
discipline, coupled with his mother’s giving him the common nickname Awang, 
must have helped to develop in the Tunku, a sense of humility and brotherhood 
with his fellow men. It is certainly what earned him the title of Father of Malaysia 
(Bapa Malaysia). Under his leadership, stability was maintained and the nation 
was well managed – despite his having to contend with the nation’s new 
independence, as well as confrontation with Indonesia and the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia. None of these major things caused the end of his 
leadership; instead, the more insidious disunity among the races finally signalled 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cambridge University in 1925 and became the first Kedah prince to receive a degree from a British 
university.  
13
 In fact, in the Tunku’s own evaluation, independence was his greatest victory because with it came the 
coming together of all racial groupings for the first time in the history of the country. (Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, 1983, p. 134).  
14
 Quoted from Miller, 1959, p. 210.  
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his exit. His leadership style was consensual with a preference for delegation, 
illustrating the kehalusan aspect of Malay politics.  
 
The end of Tunku’s leadership came with the 1969 race riots. The Tunku, as later 
political commentators like Dr Mahathir pointed out, was happy to develop 
Malaysia without any major change in policy from the British colonial 
government. The Malay fantasy that the other races in Malaya would leave with 
the British did not happen. Neither did merdeka, the “chosen glory15” (please 
refer to Chapter 7 for further explanation of “chosen glory”), when the Malays 
had dreamt they would take control of the businesses and the rich natural 
resources of the country. This resulted in great frustration among the Malays. 
Merdeka had brought about little change to their economic status even when the 
political power was restored to their hands. Their simmering dissatisfaction was 
kept under control because of their loyalty to the leader, the Tunku, a prime 
minister who was also a prince. Finally, the event that triggered and hastened the 
end of the Tunku’s leadership was the results of the 1969 general election in 
which the UMNO and the ruling Alliance coalition performed so badly that for 
the first time they lost Penang and almost lost Selangor, two of the largest states 
in terms of economic activity. Malays are very tolerant people and have great 
respect for others but when their political authority is threatened they react very 
strongly. The 1969 general election results were seen by the Malays as a threat to 
their political dominance and riots broke out on a scale never before seen in the 
country. 
 
Volkan (2001), describing the way that large groups protect their large-group 
identity, says that under extreme and threatening conditions, they feel entitled to 
do anything, whether sadistic or masochistic. This is precisely what happened to 
the Malays in May 1969 when their hitherto unquestioned political dominance 
was shaken. After the riots, the UMNO’s younger leaders, in their own subtle 
way (except for one – Dr Mahathir Mohamed, who was more daring and 
challenged the Tunku in an untypical, non-Malay manner), edged the first prime 
minister out of office. His deputy, Abdul Razak Hussein, took over the UMNO 
leadership and prime ministership of the nation in 1970. 
 
 Abdul Razak Hussein (1970–76) 
 
Unlike Tunku Abdul Rahman, Abdul Razak was ambitious and inclined towards 
leadership, distinguishing himself as a schoolboy in his academic studies, sports 
and other activities. The Principal of the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar, where 
he studied, described him as “a boy of strong character. He is a good leader and is 
absolutely reliable” (Shaw, 1976). He was thus appointed in 1939, as a student-
probationer in the Malay Administrative Service. This sowed the seeds for his 
future scrutiny of the education system, especially after he noticed how the 
                                                 
15 
 Chosen glory refers to the shared mental representation of an event perceived as a triumph over the 
enemy. This "chosen glory" is reactivated again and again to summon support for a group's self-esteem. 
(http://www.vamikvolkan.com/On-%22Choosen-Trauma%22.php) 
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Malays, even those educated at his old school at Kuala Kangsar, had an inferior 
quality of education compared to that provided in other schools, and thus, that 
education should be democratised. Many years later, in 1956, the Razak Report 
on Education established a pattern for public education that is still followed 
today. Two broad categories of primary school were created: the first, a standard 
primary school with the national language of Malay as the language of instruction 
and compulsory English; and the second, standard schools where the language of 
instruction was Chinese or Indian but where Malay and English were 
compulsory. He also proposed that all secondary schools follow a national 
curriculum and, most importantly, that this be taught entirely in Malay. The 
Razak Report was an effective strategy for unity and tolerance at a time when it 
was most needed - it offered a pro-Malay education policy in exchange for a less 
stringent policy on citizenship for non-Malays. This largely managed to achieve 
its objectives through good management tactics, as was independence, similarly 
gained for the nation soon after. In typical non-confrontational Malay consensual 
style, the latter was achieved through many rounds of talks with the British in 
which Abdul Razak, although present throughout and despite his personal 
ambition, was content to maintain a low profile vis-à-vis his good friend and 
leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman. This behaviour is a typical yet very important 
Malay principle of not overshadowing one’s superior. As will be seen in Chapter 
3, Malaysia ranks number 1 in the world in the Power Distance Index (PDI), 
reflecting high degree of inequality in societal hierarchy. Abdul Razak was 
similarly content to be Minister of Education when Tunku Abdul Rahman 
became the new nation’s first Prime Minister, only succeeding him in that 
supreme post more than a decade later, by which time circumstances had changed 
considerably. Even then, Abdul Razak managed to negotiate a peaceful end to the 
confrontation with Indonesia, as he had previous experience working with the 
Tunku for a peaceful secession of Singapore.  
 
However, all these events combined with a resurgence of communist activity to 
create the bloody riots of May 13 1969. According to Shaw, Abdul Razak’s 
biographer, he was “probably the only man in modern times first to become 
virtually the dictator of his country, then voluntarily to relinquish that position in 
order to become prime minister of its elected government, and finally to be 
democratically re-elected to that office three years later with an overwhelming 
parliamentary majority” (Shaw, 1976). Shaw does not use “dictator” as it is 
commonly understood in the political sense, but rather describes the leadership 
style behind it - the events of May 13 caused the leadership style of Malaysia’s 
premier to shift drastically to one of such absolute firmness that no one 
questioned his authority, in the interest of maintaining peace and stability in the 
still relatively new nation. In this sense, the race riots of May 13 provide an 
intriguing example of Malay administration at its most adept. Although actual 
violence had only erupted in Selangor and Malacca, the government acted 
promptly and firmly to quell any likelihood of its erupting elsewhere; and there 
was swift realignment of Malaysia’s economic as well as its foreign policy. The 
Malay response was firm, and Abdul Razak became the official Director of 
Operations on 18
th
 May that year, giving him virtually unlimited executive 
powers. Although a new Cabinet with the Tunku being re-elected as Prime 
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Minister was sworn in two days later, according to many, it was Abdul Razak, the 
Deputy Prime Minister then, who was the main decision-maker of the country.  
He established “an army-type chain of command that was able, quickly and 
decisively to implement, without the need for the time-wasting discussion and 
argument seemingly inseparable from the normal democratic process.” (Shaw, 
1976, p. 212). 
 
In the aftermath of May 13, Malaysia’s government, with the consent of the King, 
decided to suspend parliament for a period of time until peace was restored to the 
country. The running of the government was taken over by the National 
Operations Council (NOC), headed by Abdul Razak. The NOC had full powers 
under the Emergency Ordinance to administer the country. Parliamentary powers 
were only restored once the NOC was fully satisfied that the country had returned 
to normalcy. 
 
The temptation of power is very great; other leaders of other regimes might have 
been tempted to continue to rule the country in this way and disregard 
parliamentary democracy. Nearly all the elite Malay politicians of the pre- and 
post-merdeka era were overseas-educated, usually in the UK, and therefore 
ardently followed the pro-Westminster style of democracy, as had India, which 
was the role model for Malaya then. 
 
Understood in this context, kehalusan need not mean slow. In this case it meant a 
no-nonsense attitude to problem-solving. Abdul Razak’s attitude was mirrored in 
that of his equally no-nonsense deputy Dr Ismail. The rather leisurely laissez-
faire of the previous national administration was completely altered. That there 
were anti-Malay sentiments had been known for some time already. But the fact 
remains that May 13 saw the eruption of racial tensions mostly because of the 
way in which the non-Malay opposition parties chose to exhibit their anti-Malay 
sentiments – in an in-your-face completely unrefined manner, completely at odds 
with Malay non-confrontational, subtle preferences.  
 
Another incident from this time highlights not only the nature of Abdul Razak’s 
personal administrative style, but also that of the Malays as a whole. Apart from 
abhorrence for confrontation and a preference for kehalusan (subtlety), Malay 
leadership style is firmly characterized by a strong sense of kesetiaan (loyalty). 
This was seen plainly during the incident when Dr Mahathir, then a member of 
UMNO’s Executive Council, launched an attack on Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
blaming him for an alleged desertion from the UMNO of a large number of 
Malays and demanding his resignation not only as prime minister but also from 
politics altogether.  Abdul Razak’s reaction was swift and firm: although the loss 
of party members was treated as a matter not only of personal vendetta but of 
national concern, the overwhelming fact remains that Abdul Razak’s loyalty to 
his long-standing friend and leader remained. It was Abdul Razak who had 
persuaded the Tunku to enter politics in the first place, against the latter’s 
personal inclination. So it was Dr Mahathir who was asked to resign from the 
UMNO’s Executive Council, which he did, again significantly, without further 
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confrontation. And when Dr Mahathir re-emerged into politics some years later, 
he served under Abdul Razak as a cabinet minister without malice. 
 
This episode of the “disciplining” of Dr Mahathir  by asking him to leave UMNO 
and then readmitting him after the Tunku had left active politics, is typical of the 
Malay way of handling sensitive issues. It is contrary to Malay culture to speak 
out against the leader. When Dr Mahathir untypically criticised the Tunku in 
public, he had to pay the price by being “expelled” from the UMNO. 
Notwithstanding that Dr Mahathir’s criticism of Tunku may have been right and 
that many Malays privately agreed with him, it was not acceptable in Malay 
culture to be so direct, open and “rude” to their leader. Dr Mahathir had breached 
kehalusan and kesetiaan and had to suffer the consequences. 
 
When Abdul Razak took over as prime minister, one of his first acts was to 
readmit Dr Mahathir into the UMNO. The UMNO leaders who had supported his 
expulsion a few years earlier neither questioned nor opposed his reinstatement. 
Their new leader Abdul Razak had proposed his readmission and UMNO 
members displayed their loyalty by accepting the proposal wholeheartedly. 
 
To an outsider who does not understand the subtleties of Malay culture the whole 
episode may seem bizarre and confusing. A young Malay politician (Dr 
Mahathir) was sacked from UMNO for showing disrespect to the leader only to 
be readmitted and given a cabinet portfolio (education) within a few years. A 
non-Malay mind might find this sandiwara (drama) strange to understand. For 
those who know the Malay people, this is a perfectly acceptable proceeding: the 
affected person had been punished enough and now it was time for reconciliation 
because their new leader, Abdul Razak, was in favour of Dr Mahathir’s return. In 
the hypothetical event that Abdul Razak had decided that Dr Mahathir should not 
be readmitted to the party, the Malays would have respected his view and kept Dr 
Mahathir out.  
 
In the same no-fuss, subtle way, Abdul Razak kept knowledge of his leukaemia 
from all except one or two others for six years. This is not to argue that he had a 
deliberate martyr-like quality. Dr Ismail later also similarly endured cardiac 
problems stoically and without fuss, carrying out his duties out of loyalty for king 
and country. Abdul Razak, an avid and ambitious leader, doubtlessly knew what 
were the consequences for his leadership had he made his illness known. It is no 
small coincidence that in every national school exercise book; the tenets of 
Malaysian citizenship are printed, including, very clearly, ‘loyalty to king and 
country’ (kesetiaan kepada raja dan negara). It is significant that this is second 
only to the first tenet, belief in God. This encapsulates the Malay leadership 
mindset, and its priorities. Shaw argues that Abdul Razak permanently and 
completely altered the style of government. This may be so, but his leadership 
style remained true to the Malay spirit. As Shaw himself says, Abdul Razak 
implemented his changes gradually so as not to ruffle too many feathers; waiting 
patiently until the old guard, whose feathers would have been most likely to be 
ruffled, had been pensioned off, and their younger replacements – who were 
mostly university-educated and a little left of centre – had raised the intellectual 
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calibre of the entire cabinet. It was this style that returned the country to 
parliamentary government in 1970 after his initial premiership, and which 
managed to succeed in administering the nation so well that it has, in general, 
been one of the most stable and prosperous of the world’s post-colonial nations.  
 
Hussein Onn (1976–81) 
 
Victor Morais, Hussein Onn’s biographer, remarked that Hussein had “the 
unflappability of Abdul Razak and the humanity of Tunku Abdul Rahman” 
(Morais, 1981, p.59). The most prominent and consistent aspect of Hussein’s 
legacy is his character, more than his actual policies. He impressed all who knew 
him with his integrity, honesty and fairness. These are important virtues in terms 
of management and administration, since they involve dealing with people. 
Hussein is felt by many to have pioneered a clean, strong brand of government.  
 
This brand was marked by several innovations that Hussein introduced during his 
time in office. One was his pioneering ‘meet the people’ sessions, whereby 
people’s needs, especially those of different races, were heard and discovered. 
Cabinet ministers, members of parliament and state assemblymen were urged to 
hold consultations with industry leaders, and the Ministry of Finance was the first 
to do so, holding pre-budget meetings with financial leaders to find out what their 
needs were. This was a major shift in modus operandi from the administrations of 
Tunku and Razak, where budget proposals had been shrouded in secrecy. In a 
similar move, Hussein created a Monitoring Section in the Prime Minister’s 
Department in order to ensure that no complaints and suggestions made to the PM 
would go unanswered, as had been the tendency before. Hussein had a direct and 
disarming approach that won people over, and which was particularly effective in 
his foreign relations efforts, notably with China. His mission to China in May 
1979 succeeded in bringing the two countries closer together in terms of 
economic and cultural cooperation as well as promoting greater understanding of 
regional security issues. He was, as Morais remarks (1981, p.55), a person who 
“got things done though not in a particularly exciting way”. Authenticity is one 
characteristic that is valued in any leader, but especially in the Malaysian context, 
tied up as it is with the other equally important leadership traits of loyalty, 
humility and honesty. This is well-illustrated in the moment Hussein became by 
default, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, on the death of their leader; his 
predecessor.  Announcing Abdul Razak’s death to the nation, he declared that he 
wished to “beg forgiveness” (Morais, 1981, p. 160) from the late premier (who 
had succumbed to leukaemia in London in 1976), and wept several times during 
his speech.
16
  
 
This is not the place to judge the virtues or otherwise of any of Malaysia’s 
premiers. However, it needs to be mentioned that the flipside of Hussein’s image 
of clean and fair administration, was the perception at that time, that he could be 
manipulated as well. This perception might have stemmed from Hussein’s 
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 Of course, their close political relationship was further strengthened by the fact that their wives were 
sisters.  
36 
willingness to listen to all sides. Whatever the case may be, during his time in 
office, a stable and peaceful administration of the country was maintained, as was 
generally the case with all the Malaysian premiers. Indeed, during Hussein’s 
administration, the economy achieved an annual real GDP growth rate of 8.6% 
(Shome, 2002), higher than during Abdul Razak’s time.  
 
The issue of leadership succession and planning prevailed during Hussein’s 
administration; indeed, although he was already deputy prime minister at the time 
of Abdul Razak’s sudden death, his premiership was still more by default. 
Throughout his time as prime minister, his leadership style was not as assertive as 
Abdul Razak’s, and Hussein was most comfortable leading by consensus and 
delegation. When he stepped down, it was ostensibly for health reasons – but 
perhaps he simply felt that the time had come for someone else to take over. 
When he left, a pseudo-capitalist Malay middle-class had begun to emerge, and 
his successor, Dr Mahathir, worked aggressively to close the economic gap 
between the Malays and their non-Malay compatriots. Dr Mahathir’s leadership 
style was markedly different from that of his three predecessors and many have 
pointed to a clear shift in Malay leadership and administrative style that had its 
beginnings in his administration. 
 
Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981–2003) 
 
For many, Dr Mahathir redefined the modern Malay leader. He was “the epitome 
of modern leadership. He is modern but not westernised in the way previous 
prime ministers were.” (Shome, 2002, p. 129). Dr Mahathir’s leadership saw 
Malaysia’s economic and development performance increase at an impressive 
rate while maintaining Asian values. However, the particularly Malay brand of 
subtlety underwent a transformation under Dr Mahathir whose ‘Malaysia Boleh!’ 
(literally, ‘Malaysia Can!’) spirit pioneered a brand of straightforwardness and 
confidence, even bordering on arrogance, not seen before, particularly in the 
Malays. In fact, it could be said that this rising confidence played a big role in the 
‘removal’ of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as premier years later by a dissatisfied 
Malay electorate. Until then, prime ministers had never left office in such un-
subtle circumstances. Before Dr Mahathir, such a scenario could not easily have 
been imagined.  
 
In terms of the actual policies that Dr Mahathir enacted, his first act on coming 
into office in 1981, at the age of 55, was to make some sweeping reforms. He 
began to release detainees held under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and, most 
importantly, he began to make big changes in the administrative and civil service, 
concrete changes that heralded a change in mindset and values. Principal among 
these was his insistence upon discipline and punctuality within the civil service. 
There was a literal understanding now of the term ‘civil servant’ – all civil 
servants, including himself, were required to clock in for work and to wear name-
tags for identification (Encyclopedia of Malaysia, Volume 11, Government and 
Politics, 2006). Never before had such an emphasis upon personal responsibility 
and accountability been simultaneously emphasised and effected. Dr Mahathir 
also actively endeavoured to bring Islamic principles tangibly into public policy, 
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setting up Bank Islam Malaysia in 1982 and the International Islamic University 
in 1983.  In that same year also, Dr Mahathir introduced the ‘Malaysia 
Incorporated’ concept, whereby the government and private sector cooperated to 
corporatize and privatize state-controlled entities to increase productivity and 
efficiency and reduce the economic burden on the government. On the economic, 
political and administrative front, Dr Mahathir exhibited a previously unseen 
boldness, and his Vision 2020 for a fully developed nation by that year helped 
him withstand the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 by galvanizing the banking 
and corporate sectors through strict capital controls, setting up a national asset 
management company (Danaharta) to reduce non-performing loans, and pegging 
the rate of exchange for the Ringgit, all the while “threatening to remove the 
‘crutches’ unintentionally created by the NEP” (Encyclopedia of Malaysia, 
Volume 11, Government and Politics, 2006, p. 81). All of this flew brazenly in 
the face of conventional economic wisdom at the time.  Earlier in 1990, he had 
introduced the NDP, or National Development Policy, to modify the NEP and 
move it away from social realignment towards growth and development. All 
these measures served to change the prevailing mindset, which became more 
assertive, even aggressive, at times.  
 
During his twenty-two years as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the economy 
grew at an average rate of 61 per cent, transforming Malaysia as one of the 
developing world’s most successful countries (Wain 2009).  Wain further adds 
“Over the years, Dr Mahathir reformulated, repackaged and refined his vision, but 
never wavered in his commitment to it.  He relentlessly badgered, berated and 
browbeat Malaysians, especially the Malays, to shape up and convert his dreams 
into reality.  If necessary, he would crucify opponents, sacrifice allies and tolerate 
monumental institutional and social abuses to advance his project.  Much of what 
he did, or did not do, could be explained by devotion to this cause.” (p. 88) 
 
It is interesting that, for all Dr Mahathir’s political, cultural and social alignment 
with the South and with Asian values, and the fact that the previous three prime 
ministers were all British-educated and in many ways more ‘westernised’ than Dr 
Mahathir, their administrative styles were more Malay in terms of how they ran 
the country, in particular, preferring consensus over confrontation.
17
 Not that Dr 
Mahathir eschewed consensus; but he was not averse to having open 
confrontations with those who opposed him or his policies if necessary. A master 
strategist, he was able in 1987, to legally outmanoeuvre his opponents who were 
out to remove him, successfully convincing the courts to declare the UMNO 
illegal because it had failed to register properly. Dr Mahathir was able to dissolve 
the UMNO and form a new Malay party, UMNO Baru, or New UMNO. (Baru 
was dropped ten years later and the original name restored.) Although Dr 
Mahathir’s opponents countered by forming Semangat ’46 (Spirit of ’46), he was 
                                                 
17
 It has been said that the effectiveness of the Malaysian machinery of government has to do with its 
uniqueness, having “strong genetic links to the British ‘Westminster’ and ‘Whitehall’ models”, which 
have been adapted to suit Malaysia’s particular circumstances, including the unique function of its 
Constitutional Rulers combined with its three key branches of government, namely, the legislature, 
executive and judiciary (Encyclopedia of Malaysia, Volume 11, Government and Politics, 2006, p. 65).  
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by then already respected as a straightforward, if at times confrontational, force to 
be reckoned with. Even the Malay rulers conceded this, as they did during the 
constitutional crises of 1983 and 1990 when Dr Mahathir, again victorious, 
fought successfully to remove royal ‘immunity’ from the law. On the foreign 
policy front, there was his ‘Buy British Last’ campaign of the early 1980s, his 
‘Look East’ policy, the on-going tensions in Malaysia’s relations with Australia, 
not least due to Dr Mahathir’s straight-talking style, and similarly though not as 
strongly with the United States during Al Gore’s race for the presidency, when Dr 
Mahathir freely shared his derision for the former Vice-President. To this day Dr 
Mahathir’s vigorous rhetoric demanding that Malaysians should be free from 
‘colonialism of the mind’ seems to invite confrontation.  
 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–2009) 
 
Malaysia’s fifth prime minister was, like his predecessors, a tried and tested 
leader before taking up the position of Prime Minister, but he was more of a 
consensus builder. In fact, this was Badawi’s lasting legacy. Perceived as much 
more accessible than his immediate predecessor Dr Mahathir, Badawi was 
affectionately known as ‘Pak Lah’18. Perhaps his choice of premiership was 
influenced by the spirit of Islamic revivalism strongly current upon his taking 
oath of office, for he was perceived as being a practising Muslim, from a family 
of Islamic educationists with a firm religious background. There were also some 
subtle, oblique connections with independence – Badawi’s father and grandfather 
were apparently consulted by Tunku Abdul Rahman for advice about an 
auspicious date to select for independence of the nation, and 31
st
 August 1957 
was chosen following their advice (Encyclopedia of Malaysia, 2006). Badawi was 
the only prime minister to formulate a concrete policy on Islam, which he called 
Islam Hadhari, in 2005. Although its ten principles often caused confusion about 
their meaning and relevance within and outside the civil service, the 
‘civilizational Islam’ that Badawi propounded went a long way to show that 
Islamic principles mattered in all aspects of Malaysian life. It is significant that 
these principles were meant to apply to non-Malays as well as Malays.  Because 
of this, Islam Hadhari may not have been successful in terms of political strategy, 
but it did succeed in reflecting a value-based, principle-driven leadership style. 
The discomfort with this style in non-Muslim quarters is only relevant insofar as 
it maintains our focus on the leadership styles of the Malaysian premiers and their 
impact on the administration and stability of the nation. Stability was still present 
during Badawi’s administration, although politically his time saw the most severe 
split within the ranks of the Malays, and political disunity among the Chinese and 
Indians as well.  
 
Badawi had been dropped from the cabinet in the UMNO leadership crisis of 
1987, when attempts were made to oust Dr Mahathir. In spite of this, however, he 
remained loyal to the UMNO. This is one of the reasons why Dr Mahathir 
reinstated him in the cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1991, a position he 
                                                 
18
  Badawi was popularly known as Pak Lah, literally meaning ‘Uncle Abdullah’ (referring to his first 
name).   
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held for eight years. It may also have played a role in Dr Mahathir’s appointing 
him to the position of Deputy Prime Minister in 1998, a position that had become 
vacant following his sacking of Anwar Ibrahim. This loyalty might have 
presented Badawi in a benevolent, non-threatening light. Indeed, he was un-
threatening; advocating during his premiership later on the eradication of 
corruption, reform of the education system and the civil service, and the 
introduction of the National Integrity Plan and Institute of Integrity Malaysia. All 
Badawi’s various initiatives during his time as Prime Minister were aimed at 
instilling the right values and mindset into people while building consensus rather 
than conflict. For example, it was during his time that the National Ulama 
Consultative Council was established to complement the functions of the 
National Fatwa Council. The consultative council was an avenue for dialogue and 
problem-solving among the ulama
19
 on issues affecting Muslims locally and 
worldwide. One reason why the Council was set up was due to incidents 
involving the ulama and intellectual commentators, many of whom were felt to 
have breached social etiquette by insulting the ulama. The prevailing position, 
upheld by Badawi, was in favour of subtlety and courtesy in all matters, even in 
matters over which there is disagreement – it was felt that the ulama “boleh 
ditegur, tak boleh dicaci”20 (Noor, 2003: p 66). Badawi’s administration took the 
need for subtlety and decorum seriously. He was consensual to the end, sticking 
by his Islam Hadhari principles, which called for Malaysians as a whole to adopt 
holistic values and develop themselves in all spheres. Because of his non-
confrontational, consensus-building style, the political rifts and dissent that 
surfaced during his administration were quelled and, on the whole, peace and 
stability were maintained in the country.  
  
Anyone stepping into the leadership role following the departure of a strong 
leader of 22 years would have a hard act to follow. Increasing level of corruption 
and lack of transparency in managing the government were some of the issues 
that Badawi had to fix when he took over from Dr Mahathir. Policy 
implementation was slow; the people and indeed, their kehalusan, had all begun 
to erode and give way to the more confident and straightforward style shown by 
Mahathirism, as political commentators have since termed it. Although Dr 
Mahathir was no longer at the helm, the style he displayed remained, and it was 
this, among other factors, that were responsible for Badawi’s poor showing in the 
2008 general election. This was the first time in Malaysia’s history that a prime 
minister had been forcibly removed; not only that, it was done by a people’s vote, 
ushering in a new chapter in Malay political leadership.  
 
As will be seen in Chapter 5 later, the majority of the expert panel members also 
agreed with the view that the Malay political leadership in the country has been a 
major contributory factor providing the political stability and economic growth of 
the nation for the last 55 years since merdeka. 
 
 
                                                 
19
  Muslim theologians and religious leaders. 
20
 In other words, religious leaders can be corrected but not insulted.  
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The following quote by an expert panel member sums up the general view on the 
Malay political leadership:- 
 
Basically, what you are talking about is the ability for the Malays to generate 
political capital.  They have had this ability over five centuries to combat all 
the sinister forces from the invasions of the Thai, Javanese, Acehnese and 
they’ve won quite a lot of these wars…. they are extremely intelligent in 
monitoring conflict situations.  One way they do is through the ability to 
mediate and negotiate, so … they are good diplomats. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
All five prime ministers of Malaysia since merdeka had different leadership 
styles. All of them except for Dr Mahathir, the longest serving prime minister in 
the history of the young nation, have largely adhered to the Malay political 
culture, which espouses the concepts of daulat (legitimacy), kesetiaan (loyalty) 
and kehalusan (subtlety) and emphatically rejects derhaka (treachery).  In spite of 
their differing leadership styles, all of them contributed to the economic success 
of Malaysia. 
 
In his over-zealous ambition and hurry to modernise and develop the Malays to 
be on par with the Chinese in Malaysia and advanced societies elsewhere, Dr 
Mahathir jettisoned several Malay customs he considered impediments to 
progress, all in good faith. In the process, he created a very small clan of new 
Malays who were confident – bordering on arrogance – about taking on the world 
and raring to be successful. As I will show in later chapters, this haste to build 
Malay entrepreneurs and business leaders led to other unintended calamities and 
the success rate was far from satisfactory. 
 
Dr Mahathir is the only prime minister who understood the psyche of the Malays 
and his book The Malay Dilemma, (Dr Mahathir, 1970) written during the time he 
was in exile from politics and the UMNO, is one of the few books written with a 
deep understanding of the Malay problems in their homeland. I have drawn 
extensively on this book to understand the Malays, as there are few other 
published sources that deal with the Malay mind. Having understood Malay 
problems thoroughly, Dr Mahathir still failed to address the underlying issues that 
affected the Malays. He failed to go beneath the surface to understand the Malay 
mind. His failure in this respect is understandable as he is not a trained 
psychoanalyst or psychologist. As various attempts to develop the Malay 
entrepreneurial and business leaders by the government have met with only very 
limited success, in my research I apply the clinical paradigm to the study of 
Malay leadership qualities in business. In a way this research could be deemed a 
continuation of Dr Mahathir’s earlier work. In The Malay Dilemma, Dr Mahathir 
outlined the various problems of the Malays at the cognitive level. In my research 
I draw on Dr Mahathir’s earlier works, among others, and apply the 
psychodynamic lens to understand the “inner theatre” of the Malays. The inner 
theatre relates to the things that collectively motivate the Malays, the things that 
are important to them, the things they are passionate about and what drives them 
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crazy (Kets de Vries, 2011a). As will be discussed in later chapters, it is an 
attempt to understand the Malay mindset, exploring how the Malays have 
succeeded in the political management of the country and the causes for their lack 
of success in the world of business with the aid of psychoanalytic theories and 
cultural studies. 
 
 
<End of Chapter 2> 
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Chapter 3 – The Inner Theatre of the Malays 
 
"... It is, therefore, fallacious to accept the Malay at face value...." 
 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1970) 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to understand Malay culture and character 
in order to build the foundation for understanding Malay leadership qualities, 
their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the underlying assumptions of what 
makes up the Malay psyche. In this chapter, I build the foundation to look 
beneath the surface to study their attitudes; values and culture, using the clinical 
paradigm to lay the rationale for understanding the Malay mind (see Figure 2). 
 
I begin with a brief introduction about the Malays written by a British officer, 
Frank Swettenham, who worked in the Malay states between 1875 and 1904.  He 
was fond of the people and took pains to learn the Malay language.  
 
Section 3.3 deals with the importance of culture and character in understanding 
race generally. In order to understand the culture of the Malay race, I draw on 
four models of culture and describe the essential features of each. The chapter 
then moves to a literature review of what has been written about the Malays; first 
by foreigners – primarily a historical perspective, then by different Malay writers. 
The choice of key commentators from among many, was made on the basis of 
their level of recognition in their respective professions; for example, one author 
was a prime minister; another, an anthropologist, and the depth of their analyses.  
 
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 look at a number of contextual factors that provide the 
backdrop to the formation of the Malay character.  
 
In Section 3.9, I identify some key salient features of Malay character and culture. 
Combining the four models of culture, the literature review and my own 
observations as a Malay and a Malaysian national, I identify the key pointers to 
the inner theatre of the Malays.  
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank> 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
44 
3.2 Swettenham on the Malay character  
 
Below is a description of the Malay character by Sir Frank Swettenham (1850–
1946), first Resident General of the Federated Malay States (1896–1901) which is 
extracted from “Malay Sketches” (Swettenham, 1895). Swettenham’s description 
of the Malays lays the groundwork for understanding Malay character and 
culture. Although not all his observations were accurate, Swettenham summed up 
the Malay qualities accurately and other writers, both foreign and national, have 
echoed his description. 
 
His disposition is generally kindly; his manners are polite and easy. 
Never cringing, he is reserved with strangers and suspicious, though 
he does not show it. He is courageous and trustworthy in the 
discharge of an undertaking; but he is extravagant, fond of borrowing 
money and very slow in repaying it. He is a good talker, speaks in 
parables, quotes proverb and wise saws, has a strong sense of humour 
and is very fond of a good joke. He takes an interest in the affairs of 
his neighbours and is consequently a gossip. He is a Muhammadan 
and a fatalist, but he is also very superstitious. Above all things, he is 
conservative to a degree, is proud and fond of his country and his 
people, venerates his ancient customs and traditions, fears his Rajas, 
and has a proper respect for constituted authority – while he looks 
askance on all innovations and will resist their sudden introduction. 
But if he has time to examine them carefully, and they are not thrust 
upon him, he is willing to be convinced of their advantage. At the 
same time he is a good initiative learner, and when he has energy and 
ambition enough for the task, makes a good mechanic. He is, however, 
lazy to a degree, is without method or order of any kind, knows no 
regularity even in the hours of his meals, and considers time as of no 
importance … 
 
A Malay is intolerant of insult or slight; it is something that to him 
should be wiped out in blood. He will brood over a real or fancied 
stain on his honour until he is possessed by the desire for revenge. If 
he cannot wreak it on the offender, he will strike out at the first human 
being that comes in his way, male or female, old or young. It is this 
state of blind fury, this vision of blood that produces the amok. The 
Malay has often been called treacherous. I question whether he 
deserves the reproach more than other men. He is courteous and 
expects courtesy in return, and he understands only one method of 
avenging personal insults. 
 
The spirit of clanship is also strong in him. He acknowledges the 
necessity of carrying out, even blindly the orders of his hereditary 
chief, while he will protect his own relatives at all costs and make 
their quarrel his own. 
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… As with other Eastern people, hospitality is to the Malay a sacred 
duty fulfilled by high and low, rich and poor alike. Though the Malay 
is an Islam by profession, and would suffer crucifixion sooner than 
deny his faith, he is not a bigot; indeed his tolerance compares 
favourably with the professing Christian ….. Christian missionaries of 
all denominations have apparently abandoned the hope of his 
conversion. 
 
 Having seen the description of a Malay by Swettenham, let’s look at the four 
Models of Culture which could provide us a good basis for understanding the 
Malay culture.  
 
3.3 Four Models of Culture 
 
It is generally accepted that for an understanding of the leadership style of a 
particular group (i.e. race), one must first look at the salient features of a race 
culture and character (Kets de Vries et al, 2004; Harrison and Huntington, 2000). 
Schein (2004) says culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin; neither 
can be understood by itself. Cultural norms determine the leadership style of a 
nation or organisation – and the most important thing leaders do is to create and 
manage culture. The importance of culture to leadership style is emphasised in 
the Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness study known 
also as Project GLOBE. This is a multi-phase, multi-method project examining 
the interrelationships between societal culture, organisational culture and 
leadership (Javidan, Stahl, Brodbeck & Wilderom, 2005; Kennedy, 2002). 
 
Culture is a powerful force that can undermine or bolster the effectiveness of 
nations and businesses. It is important to recognise the underflow – the presence 
and power of culture – in order to navigate the rough seas of international 
business. Harnessing the power of culture is necessary to gain competitive 
advantage (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). The current interest in exploring the 
cultural elements underpinning business behaviour or practice is the result of the 
post-war economic miracle associated with Japan and East Asian countries such 
as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The economic success of 
these countries has prompted Western scholars to obtain insights to the success 
factors of the East Asian economies (Tham, 1992). 
 
Several seminal studies on national and organisational culture have been 
conducted by academics since the 1980s using a variety of approaches. All have 
more or less concluded that there are national and cultural differences in work 
values, beliefs and orientations of organisations across different countries 
(Bhaskaran & Sukumaran 2007; Black & Mendenhall 1989; Hofstede 1991, 
2001; Hofstede & Bond 1988; Holt, Bjorklund, Green 2009; Ingelhart, Basáñez 
& Moreno, 1998; Trompenaars, 1994; Wendt, Euwema, van Emmerik, 2009). It 
is therefore pertinent to look at Malay culture and character for a deeper 
understanding of Malay leadership qualities. Also, for positive changes to be 
made in the Malay leadership style and practices, it is important to have an 
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informed understanding of the Malay character and how it has been moulded by 
contextual forces, as historical and developmental factors are important. 
 
Because Malaysia is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society 
comprising Malays, Chinese and Indians, the framework of the cross-cultural 
psychology of Berry et al (2002) is used partially to understand the issues 
affecting the Malays within the cross-cultural context.  As the Chinese in 
Malaysia have an upper hand in the economy, it is inevitable that the “Malay 
bashing” politicians would be implicitly and explicitly comparing the Malays 
with the Malaysian Chinese. This in turn, creates further complications in the 
inter-racial relationship in the country. So, one needs to be also aware of this 
issue in this research. 
 
Berry et al (2002) call their general framework “ecocultural” framework which is 
reproduced below in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: An ecocultural framework of relationships among classes of 
variables employed in cross-cultural psychology. 
 
 
 
 
They call their framework a conceptual framework rather than a theoretical model 
from which specific testable hypotheses can be derived. It is a general guide to 
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classes of variables and their relevance for the explanation of similarities and 
differences in human behaviour and experience to be found across cultures. 
 
The authors of cross-cultural psychology attribute this framework to “thinking 
about how behavioural, cultural and ecological phenomena might be related, 
particularly the work of Malinowski (1924) and Rivers (1924). For Malinowski, 
(whose views are known as functionalism) features of a culture are to be 
understood by the manner in which they are related to the psychological 
surroundings (1924, p xxx)”.  Here the linkages between ecology and culture are 
proposed. 
 
For Rivers, “the ultimate aim of all studies of mankind…..is to reach explanation 
in terms of psychology…..by which the conduct of man, both individual and 
collective, is determined…..by the social structure of which every person…..finds 
himself a member… (p. 11). Here, the linkages between human behaviour and 
sociocultural context are proposed.  Together, the sequence of ecology – culture – 
behaviour came to be part of thinking about how to account for psychological 
similarities and differences around the world.” (p. 11-12) 
 
The usefulness of this framework would be clear when focus groups and expert-
panel members discuss the “laidback attitude of Malays and the hardworking 
nature of the Chinese”.  This is supported by Berry et al’s framework where they 
rightly support the situation in Malaysia when they comment “…socioeconomic 
status has come to be related to cultural or ethnic group characteristics in many 
societies.” (p. 13). 
 
I am only using this framework in a limited manner in the context of the 
inevitable Chinese/Malay comparisons in Malaysia.  As the main purpose of this 
research is on Malays and not a comparative study of Malays and Chinese, this 
cross-cultural framework is useful to that extent.  Also, this could be useful to 
create an awareness for some of the Malay behavioural attributes which could be 
seen in the later part of this chapter as well as in Chapters 5 and 7. 
 
There are also other well-researched cultural models such as Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck’s (1961) Value Dimensions, and Parsons’ (1951) Social System and 
several others. 
 
However, while I have used largely the four models and partially Berry’s cross-
cultural framework that are relevant for this study for reasons mentioned above, I 
also realised that the later models developed by Hofstede & Hofstede; Kets de 
Vries et al; Schein and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, have generally taken 
cognizance of the earlier models developed by others and incorporated some of 
the elements of these models to build on and expand their own models. 
 
For the continued political and economic success of Malaysia and its ability to 
compete in the globalised economy, it is imperative that the salient leadership 
values, attitudes and behaviour of the Malays be carefully identified. This will 
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facilitate the design and implementation of organisational transformation and 
change in order to better Malay leadership in future. 
 
Several writers have written extensively on culture and its relevance and 
importance to leadership and economic performance. Leaders, whether from the 
political or business fields as well as the people they work with, are all part of 
national societies. In order to understand their behaviour, we have to understand 
those societies. This means understanding their culture. Only with an in-depth 
understanding of a society’s or race’s culture can we understand the causes for 
success or failure of a particular society or race. To do this I draw on four models 
that explain the relationship between culture and leadership. They are Hofstede’s 
Dimensions of National Cultures, Schein’s Levels of Culture, Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner’s Five Fundamental Dimensions of Culture and Kets de Vries 
et al’s Wheel of the National Culture. 
 
3.4 Rationale for the choice of the Four Models 
 
Culture is an extremely complex topic. The most logical way to understand 
Malay culture was to comb through existing research on culture and select a 
model that would fit my research purpose. The selection process was neither easy 
nor straightforward. After evaluating the existing conceptual frameworks I 
selected four models that seemed suitable and they are described in Sections 3.4.1 
to 3.4.4. 
 
While I was planning this research, a book entitled The New Russian Business 
Leaders (Kets de Vries, Shekshnia, Korotov & Florent-Treacy, 2004) was 
published. As the book dealt specifically with business leaders of a particular 
country (Russia) and I was looking to research Malaysian business leaders, it 
caught my attention. 
 
In this book, Kets de Vries et al (2004) provided a list of what they termed the 
“better known models”, listing those of Hall; Hofstede; Javidan & House; 
Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck; Laurent; Parsons; Schein; and Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner. Kets de Vries et al had combined and summarised various 
models to identify dimensions that highlighted specific cultural patterns; they 
called their own model the Wheel of Culture and applied it to the study of 
Russian business leaders. So I did not have to reinvent the wheel – it had already 
been invented by Kets de Vries (the original summary can be found in a Human 
Relations article: Kets de Vries, M.F.R. (2001), “The Anarchist Within: Clinical 
Reflections on Russian Character and Leadership Style,” Human Relations, 54 
(5) 585-627). 
 
However relevant and appropriate the Wheel of Culture is, it is not sensible to 
rely on just one model. So I continued my search. The next model I selected was 
Schein’s Levels of Culture. The rationale for choosing this model was two-fold. 
First; Schein is one of the few acknowledged pioneers in the research and study 
of culture and leadership since his first publication, Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, in 1985. The key words in Schein’s title – culture and leadership – 
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were the crux of my own research, to understand Malay leadership by 
understanding Malay culture. The second reason for selecting Schein’s model 
was the three levels he defined – artefacts, espoused values and beliefs, and 
underlying basic assumptions – which would enable me to compare the Malays, 
Chinese and Indians, the three major races in Malaysia. The selection of 
Hofstede’s model does not need great defence as Hofstede had included data from 
Malaysia in his Dimensions of National Culture in Culture and Organizations—
Software of the Mind. Finally, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, in their Riding 
the Waves of Culture also included data from Malaysia. Although I do not 
specifically refer to other models, I do quote them where relevant; Javidan & 
House’s Project GLOBE was a particularly useful guide for the research on 
Malay leadership. 
 
The four models are summarised in the following pages. 
 
3.4.1 Hofstede’s Dimensions of National Cultures 
 
The four dimensions in the Hofstede model relevant and applicable to this 
research are Power Distance, Collectivism versus Individualism, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Masculinity-Femininity as a dimension of societal culture. 
 
Power Distance 
 
‘Power Distance’ is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions (family, school or community) and organisations (the workplace) 
accept that power is distributed unequally. It is measured by the Power Distance 
Index (PDI). In the home where there is large power distance, children are 
expected to be obedient towards their parents and, among those children, the 
younger are expected to respect and obey the older. Respect for parents and other 
elders are seen as a basic virtue and endure through adulthood. Parents and 
grandparents are treated with formal deference even after the children have taken 
control of their own lives. Parent-child inequality is extended to teacher-student 
inequality. Teachers are respected like parents and students may have to stand up 
when teachers enter the classroom. Students in class speak up only when invited 
to. Teachers are never publicly contradicted or criticised and are treated with 
deference even outside school. 
 
In the workplace where there is large power distance, superiors and subordinates 
consider each other as existentially unequal. These organisations are hierarchical 
and highly centralised. Subordinates expect to be told what to do and accept this 
situation as desirable. 
 
Note that in Hofstede’s PDI, Malaysia ranked consistently as number one among 
54 countries.  The implication of this for Malay culture is discussed later in the 
chapter. 
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Collectivism versus Individualism 
 
Individualism refers to societies where ties between individuals are loose.  
Collectivism pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are 
integrated into strong cohesive in-groups. According to Hofstede & Hofstede, the 
vast majority of people live in societies in which the interest of the group prevails 
over the interest of the individual. These societies are called Collectivist. The 
term has no political connotation but refers to the power of the group.  
 
In most collectivist societies, the extended family in which the child grows up 
consists of people other than just parents – grandparents, uncles, aunts and 
servants, for example. In such societies, they learn to think of themselves as “we” 
or members of an in-group. The in-group is the only secure protection against the 
hardships of life; one therefore owes lifelong loyalty to one’s in-group. Between 
the person and the in-group a mutual dependence develops that is both practical 
and psychological. 
 
A minority of people in our world lives in societies in which the interest of the 
individual prevails over the interest of the group. In these individualist societies, 
most children are born into families consisting of two parents and possibly other 
children (in some societies there is a growing number of one-parent families). 
Other relatives are rarely seen. Children from the nuclear family grow up to think 
of “I”. Children in individualist societies are expected to leave home as soon as 
they are able after completing their education. “I” people are supposed to be 
neither practically nor psychologically dependent on a group. 
 
Hofstede & Hofstede define individualistic societies as those in which people are 
expected to look after themselves and their immediate family; ties between 
individuals are loose. Collectivism, on the other hand, refers to societies in which 
people are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups from birth, which continue 
to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
On the Individualism Index (IDV) as measured by Hofstede & Hofstede, 
Malaysia ranked 52 out of 74 countries, a low score. This clearly places Malaysia 
as a collectivist society. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance refers to ways of handling uncertainty, which is part and 
parcel of the human condition. All human beings have to deal with an uncertain 
future. Extreme ambiguity creates high levels of anxiety and every human society 
has developed three main ways of alleviating it: technology, law and religion. 
According to Hofstede & Hofstede, modern and traditional societies do not differ 
much in this respect. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture 
feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. Hofstede & Hofstede’s 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) is similar to the PDI. UAI values range from 
0 for the country with the weakest uncertainty avoidance to around 100 for the 
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strongest. Malaysia, ranking 65 out of 74 with a UAI score of 36, is classified as a 
weak uncertainty avoidance group. 
 
Masculinity-Femininity as a dimension of societal culture 
 
Hofstede & Hofstede describes a society as masculine when emotional gender 
roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on 
material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender and 
concerned with quality of life. 
 
A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and 
women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life. 
 
The Masculinity Index (MAS) was calculated by Hofstede & Hofstede for 74 
countries and scores represent relative rather than absolute positions of countries. 
Unlike individualism, masculinity is unrelated to a country’s economic 
development: the authors found rich and poor masculine countries as well as rich 
and poor feminine countries. 
 
Malaysia, with a score of 50 (110 was the highest score – for Slovakia) and 
ranking of 34, falls right in the middle, indicating it has neither very strong 
masculine nor feminine attributes but falls somewhere in between. 
 
Hofstede & Hofstede asserts that Masculinity-Femininity is the most controversial 
of the dimensions of national cultures. National cultures differ dramatically on the 
value issues related to this dimension. One unrecognised aspect of the 
masculinity-femininity dimension is that it is entirely unrelated to national 
wealth. For the other three dimensions (Power Distance, Collectivism versus 
Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance) wealthy countries are more often 
found at one end of the spectrum and poor countries at the other. The association 
with wealth serves as an implicit justification that one pole must be better than 
the other. But this does not apply to masculinity-femininity. There are just as 
many poor as wealthy masculine or feminine countries; wealth is no clue on 
which to base one’s values, and this unsettles people. 
 
Table 2 provides the four dimensions of Hofstede’s model. 
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Table 2:  Hofstede’s four- dimension model 
 
 
Source: adapted from Hofstede, G. & Hofstede, G. J. (2005), Cultures and 
Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill. 
 
3.4.2 Schein’s Levels of Culture 
 
Schein’s Levels of Culture shows that culture can be analysed at several different 
levels with “level” meaning the degree to which a cultural phenomenon is visible 
to the observer. 
 
He feels that some of the confusion surrounding the definition of culture is due to 
not differentiating the levels at which it manifests itself. So Schein defines the 
culture of a group as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that 
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems”. 
 
Culture formation is always striving towards patterning and integration, even 
though the experiential history of many groups prevents them from ever 
achieving a clear-cut, unambiguous paradigm, because culture is formed over a 
long period of time. 
 
Schein feels strongly that the confusion surrounding the definition of culture 
results from not differentiating the levels at which it manifests itself. These levels 
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range from the very tangible, overt manifestations that one can see and feel to the 
deeply embedded, unconscious, basic assumptions that Schein defines as the 
essence of culture.  
 
The major levels of cultural analysis that Schein has developed are artifacts, 
espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Schein’s Levels of Culture 
 
 
 
Source: Schein (1985) 
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Figure 5: The connectedness of Schein’s model 
 
 
                 
Artefacts
21
   
 
Artefacts comprise all the phenomena we can see, hear, and feel when we 
encounter a new group with an unfamiliar culture. They include the group’s 
visible products, such as architecture, technology and products, clothing, manners 
of address, emotional displays, observable rituals and ceremonies, myths and 
stories told by and about the group. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998) 
define artefacts as explicit culture, the observable reality of language, food, 
buildings, houses, monuments, agriculture, shrines, markets, fashions and art. 
 
The most important point to be made about the artefacts level is that while it is 
easy to observe, it may be difficult to decipher. Artefacts need to be understood 
deeply. Otherwise, we risk making wrong interpretations. It’s only by living with 
a group long enough that we can get the clear meanings of artefacts. 
 
To understand a group more quickly, we could attempt to analyse the espoused 
values, norms and rules that provide the day-to-day operating principles by which 
members of the group guide their behaviour. 
 
 
                                                 
21
  “Artefacts” and “artifacts” mean the same; the former being British English and of which I shall be 
using throughout this research. 
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Espoused beliefs and values 
 
“Espoused values” are what a group or organisation thinks its values are; they 
may not necessarily be the values that a group actually adopts. We must be 
careful not to conclude that we can understand the culture of a group by knowing 
its espoused values. 
  
Espoused values may be accepted over time after a process of social validation. 
Social validation is the shared social experience of a group. For example, no 
culture can prove that its religious and moral systems are superior to another 
culture’s, but if members reinforce each other’s beliefs and values, they come to 
be taken for granted. Social validation also applies to broader, untestable values, 
such as ethics and aesthetics. 
 
The group learns that certain beliefs and values, promulgated by prophets, 
founders and leaders, really do “work” in the sense that they reduce uncertainty in 
critical areas of the group’s functioning. If not followed through, espoused values 
would remain only “espoused theories” (Argyris & Schön, 1978), which predict 
accurately enough what people will say in a variety of situations but which may 
be out of sync with what they will actually do in situations where those beliefs 
and values should in fact, be operating. Today, this is commonly referred to as 
failing to “walk the talk”. 
 
If the espoused beliefs and values are reasonably congruent with the underlying 
assumptions, then the articulation of those values into a philosophy of operating 
can be helpful in unifying the group and serving as a source of identity and core 
mission. But in identifying beliefs and values, one must be careful to segregate 
those that are congruent with underlying assumptions and those that are in effect, 
either rationalisations or only aspirations for the future. There may be 
inconsistencies between the espoused beliefs and values of what a group says it 
stands for and the reality of what actually happens in the group. These 
inconsistencies reveal that a deeper level of thought and perception drives overt 
behaviour and may or may not be consistent with the values and principles 
espoused by the group. 
  
According to Schein, espoused beliefs and values often leave large areas of 
behaviour unexplained; leaving a group with a feeling that it only partially 
understands its culture. To get at that deeper level of understanding in order to 
decipher the pattern and to predict future behaviour correctly, we have to 
understand the third level of culture, the category of basic underlying 
assumptions. 
  
Basic underlying assumptions 
 
Basic assumptions become so taken for granted that we find little variation within 
a social unit. This degree of total uniformity or consensus results from repeated 
success in implementing certain beliefs and values, says Schein. Basic 
assumptions are such a strongly-held value in a group that members will find any 
56 
other behaviour that does not conform to their value as deviant and inconceivable. 
Basic assumptions in this sense are similar to what Argyris has identified as 
“theories-in-use” – the implicit assumptions that actually guide behaviour, that 
tell group members how to perceive, think about, and feel about things (Argyris, 
1976; Argyris & Schön, 1974). 
 
Basic assumptions are non-confrontational and non-debatable and hence are 
extremely difficult to change. To learn something in this realm requires a group to 
resurrect, re-examine and possibly change some of the more stable sections of a 
group’s cognitive structure. Argyris and others have described this process as 
“double loop learning” or “frame breaking” (Argyris et al, 1985; Bartunek, 1984). 
Such learning is intrinsically difficult because the re-examination of basic 
assumptions temporarily destabilises a group’s cognitive and interpersonal world, 
resulting in severe basic anxiety. 
 
The human mind needs cognitive stability; therefore any challenge or questioning 
of a basic assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. The shared basic 
assumptions that make up the culture of a group are psychological cognitive 
defence mechanisms that operate at both individual and group level and permit 
the group to continue to function. Recognising this connection is important when 
one considers changing aspects of a group’s culture, for it is no easier to do that 
than to change an individual’s pattern of defence mechanism. 
  
According to Schein, culture at the basic assumption level is like the DNA of a 
group. If new learning growth is required, the genes have to be there to make 
such growth possible and the auto-immune system has to be neutralised to sustain 
new growth. 
 
Schein maintains that the two keys to successful culture change are (1) the 
management of the large amounts of anxiety that accompany any relearning at 
this level; and (2) the assessment of whether the genetic potential for the new 
learning is even present. 
 
Any group’s culture can be studied at these three levels – artefacts, espoused 
beliefs and values, and basic assumptions. Failure to decipher the pattern of basic 
assumptions that may be operating at group level may lead to difficulties in 
interpreting artefacts correctly or how much credence to give to the articulated 
values. Fundamentally, the essence of a culture lies in these shared, basic, taken-
for-granted assumptions. The difficulty is getting at them. But once we 
understand them, we will understand the more surface levels and be able to deal 
appropriately with them. 
 
3.4.3 Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner’s Five Dimensions of Culture 
 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998) have studied the effect of culture on 
management for many years and have described the different cultural orientations 
based on a 15-year academic and field research study. Their research dispels the 
notion that there is one best way of managing and organising.  
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Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner follow Schein’s three layers of culture, 
referring to the outer layer as artefacts and products, and the middle layer as 
norms (“right” and “wrong”) and values (“good” and “bad”). The third layer; 
Schein’s basic underlying assumptions, they refer to as core basic assumptions. 
Core assumptions, the result of problem-solving, have become such an integral 
part of a group or society that they have disappeared from a group’s 
consciousness. When someone questions the core assumption of a group, the 
question may provoke irritation. 
 
In every culture, says Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, a limited number of 
general, universally-shared human problems need to be solved. One culture can 
be distinguished from another by the specific solution it chooses from those 
problems. The anthropologists, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961) have identified 
five categories of problems, arguing that all societies are aware of all possible 
kinds of solution but prefer them in different orders. In any culture there is 
therefore a set of dominant or preferred value orientations. The five basic 
problems mankind faces according to this scheme involve the five value 
dimensions of Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner: 
 
1) Universalism versus Particularism (rules versus relationships); 
2) Communitarianism versus Individualism (the group versus the individual) 
3) Diffuse versus Specific (the range of involvement) 
4) Achievement versus Ascription (how status is accorded) 
5) Neutral versus Emotional (the range of feelings expressed) 
 
Universalism versus Particularism 
 
The approach of universalists is that what is good and right can be defined and 
applied indiscriminately. In particularist culture, far greater attention is given to 
obligations of relationships and unique circumstances. Instead of assuming that 
the one good way must always be followed, particularist reasoning is that 
friendship has special obligations and may take priority. Less attention is given to 
abstract societal codes. Table 3 gives the differences between universalist and 
particularist as provided by Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner. 
 
Table 3: Universalist versus Particularist  
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Individualism versus Communitarianism 
 
The conflict between what individuals want and the interests of the group the 
individuals belong to is the conflict of individualism and communitarianism. Do 
people regard themselves primarily as individuals or as part of a group? What 
should take priority; the individual or the community? 
 
Individualism is often regarded as the characteristic of a modernising society 
while communitarianism is reminiscent of both more traditional societies and the 
failed communist experiment. There are, however, exceptions where certain 
Asian countries, such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan – commonly 
referred to as the Five Dragons – have shown that communitarianism and success 
can go hand in hand.  
 
There is also considerable evidence that individualism and communitarianism 
follows the Protestant-Catholic religious divide. Calvinists had contracts or 
covenants with God and one another for which they were personally responsible. 
Each Puritan worshipper approached God as a separate being seeking justification 
through work. Roman Catholics have always approached God as a community of 
the faithful. Research has found that Catholics score higher on group choices and 
Protestants much lower. Hofstede’s (1980) research also confirms this. Catholic 
cultures, like Asian cultures, score lower on individualism than the Protestant 
West such as the UK, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Germany, USA and Canada. 
 
There are a lot of arguments in support of individualism or self-orientation as a 
crucial element of modern society. But realistically, no one can achieve success 
solely as an individual. Some form of collaboration or credit sharing with others 
is necessary.  
 
Individuals are either self or community-oriented. A community or groups in a 
society may identify with a family, a trade union, a corporation, a religion, a 
profession or a nation.  
 
The summary of the salient features of individualism versus communitarianism is 
provided in the table below.  
 
Table 4: Individualism versus Communitarianism 
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Diffuse versus Specific  
 
According to Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, in specific-oriented cultures, 
managers segregate the task relationship they have with subordinates and insulate 
this from other dealings. In some countries, however; every life space and every 
level of personality tend to permeate all others. Managers in such diffuse cultures 
are looked up to in areas even outside their job, by their subordinates.  
 
For example, “Monsieur le direteur is a formidable authority wherever you 
encounter him. If he runs the company it is generally expected that his opinions 
'haute cuisine' are better than those of his subordinates. His taste in clothes and 
value as a citizen are all permeated by his directorship and he probably expects to 
be deferred to by those who know him, in the street, the club or a shop.” (p. 83). 
 
Specific cultures have small areas of privacy clearly separated from public life 
and have considerable freedom for direct speech (even if accompanied by “Do 
not take this personally” types of comment).  
 
In diffuse cultures, losing face is considered shameful and is avoided. This is why 
in diffuse cultures so much more time is taken to get to the point – it is necessary 
to avoid private confrontation because it is impossible for participants not to take 
things personally. Doing business with a culture more diffuse than one’s own 
feels very time consuming. In diffuse cultures everything is connected to 
everything else. 
 
Diffuse and specific cultures are sometimes called high and low context. Context 
refers to how much you have to know before effective communication can occur. 
High context cultures (e.g. Japan) believe that strangers must be filled in before 
business can be discussed properly. Low context cultures (e.g. USA) believe that 
strangers should share in rule-making and the fewer initial structures there are the 
better. 
 
Low context cultures are adaptable and flexible whereas high context cultures are 
rich and subtle but carry a lot of baggage and may never feel really comfortable 
to foreigners who are not fully assimilated. 
 
The differences between diffuse and specific cultural attributes are provided in 
Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 5> 
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Table 5: Diffuse versus Specific  
 
 
 
Achievement versus Ascription 
 
Some societies accord status to people on the basis of their achievements; others 
ascribe status to people by virtue of age, class, or family background, education, 
etc. The achieved status refers to “doing” while the ascribed status refers to 
“being”. 
 
Managers from achieving cultures become upset and irritated during negotiations; 
ascriptive teams refer major decisions to someone in the background whose 
position is unclear and expects deference from everyone present.  Ascriptive 
managers also become upset when the achieving teams bring in aggressive young 
members who spout knowledge as if it were a kind of ammunition before which 
the team opposite is expected to surrender. Sending whizz-kids to deal with 
people who are 10–20 years their senior insults the ascriptive culture. 
 
In ascriptive cultures, unless the head of the organisation is present, no one has 
the personal discretion to commit the company without extensive consultation. 
Even though an individual from an achievement-oriented culture may have the 
delegated authority to commit the company to any agreement reached, an 
ascriptive team may not accept that this is so.  
 
Ascribed status simply “is” and requires no rational justification, even though 
such justification may exist. For example, a preference for men, seniority or 
social connections is not usually justified or defended by a culture that ascribes 
importance to older men from “good” families. That does not mean the 
preference is irrational nor has no competitive advantage; it simply means that 
justification is neither offered nor expected. 
 
Achievement-oriented organisations justify their hierarchies by claiming that 
senior people have “achieved” more for the organisation; that their authority is 
justified by their skills and knowledge and is beneficial to the organisation. 
Ascription-oriented organisations justify their hierarchies in terms of “power-to-
get-things-done”. In ascribing cultures, status is attributed to those who naturally 
draw the admiration of others, such as older people, highly qualified people, 
technically-skilled people, or those linked with a project of national importance. 
61 
 
Achievement-oriented organisations in Western countries often send young, 
promising managers on challenging assignments to faraway countries not 
realising that the local culture will not accept their youthfulness and/or gender, 
however much they achieve.  
 
Table 6 below provides the differences between an achievement-oriented society 
versus an ascription-oriented society.  
 
Table 6: Achievement versus Ascription 
 
 
Affective versus Neutral  
 
People from affectively Neutral cultures do not display their feelings but keep 
them carefully controlled and subdued. In cultures high in Affectivity, people 
show their feelings openly by laughing, smiling, grimacing, scowling and 
gesturing – they immediately find the outlet for their feelings. Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner however, cautioned not to over-interpret these differences. 
Neutral cultures are not necessarily cold or unfeeling, nor are they emotionally 
repressed. The amount of emotion we show is often the result of convention. 
 
The amount of visible emotional display is a major difference between cultures. 
There are norms about acceptable levels of vehemence and this can be much 
higher in some countries than in others.  
 
Americans generally tend to be on the expressive side – a large country with a 
high immigrant population has to break down social barriers again and again. In 
smaller countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, etc., on the 
other hand, the experience is very different. There it may be harder to avoid than 
to meet the people with whom one grew up. Friendships tend to start early in life 
and last many years, so there is much less need to be effusive towards relative 
strangers.  
 
There is a tendency for those with norms of emotional neutrality to dismiss anger, 
delight or intensity in the workplace as unprofessional. Though Americans tend 
to exhibit emotion, they are able to separate it from objective and rational 
decisions. Italians and southern European nations in general tend to exhibit and 
not separate. Dutch and Swedes tend not to exhibit and to separate. Trompenaars 
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& Hampden-Turner feel that there is nothing “good” or “bad” about these 
differences. We can argue that emotions held in check may skew someone’s 
judgment despite all efforts to be rational. Alternatively, we could also argue that 
the pouring out of emotion makes it harder for anyone present to think straight. 
 
Overly neutral or affective (expressive) cultures have problems doing business 
with each other. The neutral person risks being accused of coldness and 
heartlessness; the affective person is seen as out-of-control and inconsistent. 
When such cultures meet, it is important to recognise the differences and refrain 
from making any judgements based on emotions or the lack of them. 
 
The following table (Table 7) shows the features of affective versus neutral 
societies. 
 
Table 7: Affective versus Neutral  
 
 
 
3.4.4 Kets de Vries et al – “Wheel Of National Culture” 
 
In its simplified form, the “Wheel of National Culture” is made up of the 
following dimensions, often seen as polarities: 
 
 Environment: How individuals perceive both the world around them 
and their fellow human beings. Some enjoy a feeling of 
mastery over nature, while others feel controlled by the 
surroundings; some tolerate uncertainty well, while 
others avoid it; some view people as basically good, 
while others see them as basically evil. 
 
 Action Orientation: Some favour being and others favour doing; some have 
an internal focus and have a sense of control over their 
lives; others focus externally, feeling an absence of 
control. 
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 Emotion: Some are emotionally expressive while others control 
their emotions and tend towards inhibition. 
 
 Language: Some people use high-context language (difficult to 
interpret) while others use low-context language (easy to 
understand). 
 
 Space: Relates to people’s preference for a private or public 
environment. Also refers to how individuals respect (or 
otherwise) another person’s privacy. 
 
 Relationships: Some people prefer individualism (and competition) in 
personal and business relationships, while others resort 
to collectivism (and cooperation). Some believe in the 
principle of universalistic rules while others opt for 
particularistic rules that depend on specific situations. 
 
 Power: Some believe that status is achieved while others value 
ascribed status. Some prefer equality and advocate 
position based on ability, while others stress on the role 
of wealth, birthright and similar factors. 
 
 Thinking: Refers to people’s approach to issues. Some take a 
deductive approach while others take an inductive 
approach – some analyse phenomena by breaking them 
down into constituent parts while others take a holistic 
approach, identifying patterns and relationship in a 
wider context. 
 
 Time: Some prefer to do one thing at a time, i.e. they have 
monochronic orientation, while others prefer multi-
tasking, and i.e. they are polychronic. 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 6> 
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Figure 6: The Wheel of National Culture 
 
 
I use these four models as the basis for understanding Malay culture and 
analysing the Malay personality. After examining the Malays from the 
perspectives of foreign and indigenous writers, and from historical and 
contemporary perspectives, I will apply the four models of culture to the 
conclusions drawn from these various perspectives, with the aim of deepening 
understanding of the implications of the Malay culture for Malay leadership 
qualities. 
 
3.5 Foreigners’ perceptions of the Malays  
  
In his seminal work The Myth of the Lazy Native (1977) the Malay anthropologist 
Alatas provided a comprehensive analysis of the writings of the available 
literature on the Malays. Unsurprisingly, most have been written by European and 
British authors. 
 
Tom Pires (Portuguese) is one of the earliest and richest single sources quoted by 
Alatas. Tom Pires compiled accounts of the customs, laws and commerce of 
Malacca around 1512 to 1515.  As to the Malay character, Tom Pires mentions 
that they were a jealous nation – because the wives of important people were 
never to be seen in public. When the wives did go out, they were transported in 
covered sedan chairs, and never went singly. 
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Duarte Barbosa, another Portuguese whose accounts were completed around 
1518, described the distinguished Malays of Malacca as serious Muslims, leading 
a pleasant life, in large houses outside the city with orchard gardens and water-
tanks. Of the Malay character, Barbosa observed that the Malays were “polished 
and well-bred, fond of music and given to love”. 
 
Almost a century after the Portuguese had taken over Malacca; Godhino de 
Eredia wrote in 1613 that the Malay nobility occupied themselves with cock-
fighting and music. Eredia also described the Malays as cheerful, roguish, 
wanton, intelligent but negligent about studies and arts. 
 
A Dutch writer, François Valentyn, was one of the earliest Europeans who took a 
scholarly interest in the Malay culture and language. He spoke Malay and took 
the trouble to collect literary and historical works. Valentyn noted that the Malays 
were lively, witty and had great self-conceit. They were the most cunning, most 
ingenious and the politest people of the whole East, not to be much relied upon. 
 
Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the founder of Singapore, had his first contact with 
the Malays in 1810. Alatas considers Raffles’ study of the national character of 
the Malays a pioneering effort, despite the shortcomings of his method and 
conclusions (judged by modern scientific standards). 
 
According to Raffles, the Malays did not achieve a high intellectual stage of 
development. He blamed the country’s lawlessness as the greatest influence on 
the deterioration of the Malay character. According to Alatas, Raffles concludes 
rather erroneously that the absence of a general system of law was due to the 
conversion of the Malays to Islam, although Raffles also attributed this to the 
earlier Hindu influence. Before the coming of Islam, Raffles maintained, the 
Malays had in general made considerable progress in civilisation and the 
combined influences of Islam and the Arab, the Dutch and the Chinese led to 
their decline. 
 
Alatas argues that historically and sociologically Raffles’ views are unsound and 
were perhaps Raffles’ justification for his claim that the Malays were already 
degraded when the British found them:  
 
The causes have tended most to the depression of the Malays, and the 
deterioration of their character are the following: the civil commotions to 
which every state is liable from the radical want of strength in the 
sovereign, and the constant wars between petty chieftains, and the heads 
of villages or districts, the ill-defined succession to the throne, from the 
doctrine of primogeniture being imperfectly recognised in the Malay 
states: the prevalence of piracy in all the Eastern seas: the system of 
domestic slavery, with all its concomitant evils, as wars for the purpose of 
procuring slaves, and the want of general confidence between family and 
family, man and man: the want of a generally established and recognized 
system of laws regarding all questions, civil and criminal in the Malay 
states: the want of a similar system of commercial regulations respecting 
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port duties, anchorage, and other charges to prevent arbitrary exactions 
in the various Malay ports: the discouragement given to regular trade by 
the monopolies of the Malay Rajahs; the redress of these evils is, in a 
great measure in the power of the English nation; it is worthy of their 
general character and there is no other nation that possessed the 
inclination. (p. 39). 
 
Raffles also noted that the Malays “are habitually well-bred and if they are to be 
termed savages, certainly they are the most polite of all savages but in truth they 
are very far from being savages”. Raffles also observed that, though polite, 
Malays are very sensitive to insult and are resentful of conformity imposed by 
others. 
 
3.6 Indigenous writers’ perceptions of the Malays  
 
Since merdeka, several indigenous writers have written about the Malays. All 
these writings have one similarity with foreign writers’ accounts of the Malays – 
they cannot be labelled formal or scholarly research. The available literature on 
the Malays however, does provide a starting point for anyone aspiring to conduct 
formal research, as they provide some valuable insights into Malay culture and 
characteristics that are worthy of analysis. I review three principal publications: 
The Malay Dilemma by Dr Mahathir, written soon after the 1969 riots; Mental 
Revolution, an UMNO publication with 14 contributors, one of whom is Badawi, 
the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia, and The Malay Ideals by Zamani, a medical 
practitioner. The writings of two other authors, Omar, S and Husin Ali, among 
others, are quoted where relevant. 
 
Most Malay writings point to various Malay cultural habits, identifying their 
good nature and manners, unaggressive and fun-loving nature and the impact of 
religion in terms of strengths and weaknesses; while attributing Malay 
backwardness to the aggressive, selfish, if hardworking attitude of the Indian and 
Chinese immigrants.  
 
3.6.1 Dr Mahathir Mohamad: The Malay Dilemma 
 
Dr Mahathir, a Malay medical practitioner, published The Malay Dilemma, 
sharing his reflections on the Malay problem, in 1970. 
 
Among Dr Mahathir’s explanations for Malay backwardness was the influence of 
heredity and environment on the Malay race, which led to many Malays 
withdrawing to rural areas, leaving the towns to the immigrant Chinese, who 
were hardier; perhaps as a result of difficult conditions and calamities over 
millennia of Chinese history.  
 
The rural Malays remained purebred and numerous, whereas urban Malays of 
Arab and Indian descent were more advanced but fewer. Early marriage and 
inbreeding among the rural Malays were other factors that affected their 
physiological development. Dr Mahathir also blames the British for not only 
67 
dividing the Malays from the Chinese but also the rural Malays from the town 
Malays: “Both the division from the Chinese and the division between rural and 
town Malays affected the character of the Malays considerably and rendered them 
more and more impotent politically and economically.” (p. 26). 
 
The clash between the hereditarily and environmentally weak Malays and strong 
Chinese had an adverse effect on the former: “The Malays, whose own hereditary 
and environmental influence had been so debilitating, could do nothing but retreat 
before the onslaught of the Chinese immigrants.” (p. 25). The Chinese destroyed 
the self-reliance of the Malays in craftsmanship, skilled work and business. The 
Malays were completely excluded from these fields as a result of British 
encouragement of immigration. 
 
The displacement of the Malays through the increase in immigrant population 
under colonial rule was partly due to the courtesy and self-effacing psychology of 
the Malays: “The Chinese and Indians coming from countries with vast 
populations are less concerned about good behaviours and manners. In their lives, 
nobility, which is always associated with breeding, was totally absent. Age and 
riches are the only things they defer to. The Chinese and Indians have never 
understood the Malay’s habit of giving way. They saw nothing in it which 
bespoke good breeding. They do not admire it and they have never felt the need 
to copy it. But they certainly found it to their advantage. They found they do not 
have to conform, that they can get away with anything. They found it to their 
advantage that they can do things which the Malay cannot. They found in fact 
that in the land of the Malays, they are privileged.” (p.117). 
 
Dr Mahathir had rightly touched on the Malay character and the psychological 
problems of the Malays but due to his lack of knowledge of psychoanalytic 
psychology he was not able to articulate them clearly and adequately. However, 
his description of the Malay character is quite accurate and worth noting: 
 
The courtesy and self-effacing habits of the Malays are but one aspect of 
Malay character. The constant restraint the Malay imposes upon himself 
is unnatural. There is always an internal struggle, a conflict, and this 
conflict finds expression in a variety of ways. The first and most important 
result is withdrawing into himself and his race. He is never frank except 
with those whose sympathy he can rely on absolutely. And he can rely 
absolutely only on his own people. His opinions as expressed to those not 
his own kind are therefore different from those expressed to his own kind. 
Of course the difference only occurs when what he has to express to 
others is unpleasant or unpalatable. Where his true opinion will cause no 
unpleasantness or animosity, he does not hesitate to voice it to his own 
community as well as other communities. It is therefore fallacious to 
accept the Malay at face value. It is far better if his politeness and his 
abhorrence of unpleasantness are understood for what they really are. 
The conflict within him is potentially dangerous. It is perpetually seeking 
expression. (p. 117) 
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Dr Mahathir also describes running “amok” as part of Malay character: “Amok 
represents the external physical expression of the conflict within the Malay which 
his perpetual observance of the rules and regulations of his life causes in him. It is 
a spilling over, an overflowing of his inner bitterness. It is a rupture of the bonds 
which bind him. It is a final and complete escape from reason and training. The 
strain and the restraint on him are lifted. Responsibility disappears. Nothing 
matters. He is free. The link with the past is severed, the future holds nothing 
more. Only the present matters. To use a hackneyed expression, he sees red. In a 
trance he lashes out indiscriminately. His timid, self-effacing self is displaced. He 
is now Mr Hyde – the cruel; callous and bent on destruction. But the transition 
from the self-effacing courteous Malay to the amok is always a slow process. It is 
so slow that it may never come about at all. He may go to his grave before the 
turmoil in him explodes.” 
 
“Today amok is only a legend. Civilisation has subdued the Malay. He still 
harbours his resentment, but he is better able to control it. He is a better man for 
it. But it remains an essential part of his makeup, a basic part of his character.” (p. 
118) 
 
Dr Mahathir adds: “This brief examination of certain aspects of the Malay 
character is merely to illustrate that the Malay problem is more explosive than the 
evidence seems to indicate. It is meant to focus attention on the peculiarity of the 
Malays in suppressing their discontent. We can now understand why throughout 
history Malays appear to be contended to step further and further into 
background. They gave up, apparently politely, almost every vestige of power 
and authority in their own land.” 
 
Alatas (1977) maintains that Dr Mahathir’s book comes closest to understanding 
the Malay character and that Dr Mahathir has greater intellectual rigour than any 
other author to-date. 
 
3.6.2 Rahman, S.A: Mental Revolution  
 
In 1971, the UMNO, the dominant ruling party in Malaysia, published a book in 
Malay titled Revolusi Mental, subsequently translated into English in 2004 as 
Mental Revolution. The book’s editor was Senu bin Abdul Rahman (Rahman, 
S.A), then Secretary-General of UMNO as well as a former cabinet minister. 
 
Evaluating the book, Alatas (1977) summarises the Malay attitudes characterised 
in the book: 
 
The Malays are not honest to themselves and they do not see their own faults. 
Hence the causes of their backwardness are suggested to be colonialism, 
exploitation by other communities, the capitalist system, religion and a number of 
causes. The Malays on the whole lack the courage to fight for truth. The 
unresisted oppression which occurred frequently in Malay history is quoted as 
evidence of this. On the whole, the Malays know how to take on responsibility but 
there are many Malays who do not possess this quality. Malays are prepared to 
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make sacrifices under good leadership. They are law abiding and as long as their 
religion is not offended, and they are not insulted, they are tolerant of other 
communities. The Malays emphasise the general welfare but they are fatalists 
and this is a major cause of their backwardness. This is an attitude that makes the 
Malays less keen on making effort, and if they desire to make effort they easily 
admit defeat against even a small obstacle. (p. 147). 
 
Other attributes of the Malays elaborated in Mental Revolution, and which the 
authors say have moulded the traditional Malay character, are: 
 
 The Malays do not think rationally and are more often led by sentiment. In 
the past the Malays did not exhibit discipline or punctuality. It is pointed out 
that the saying janji Melayu (Malay promise) is commonly used to illustrate 
the unpunctuality of Malays. Malays show no spirit of perseverance in the 
face of adversity. 
 
 Malays desire wealth but their acquisitive efforts are inadequate. They are 
not frugal and waste money unnecessarily on feasts, celebrations and 
furniture far beyond their means. Many Malays do not think about their 
future or/and save for it. The Malays lack originality in thought, imagination 
and the spirit of enquiry. 
 
 Malays lack a realistic attitude and are incapable of effort. They do not 
consider the life of this world particularly important; they do not value time 
and are not serious. They do not have the courage to take risks and it is the 
poverty of their soul, not lack of money, which causes them to be backward. 
As a nation, they are neither frank nor forthright. They conceal their feelings 
in order not to hurt others. 
 
Alatas reckons that the contributors to Mental Revolution have focused on 
predominantly negative traits. The economic system they propound is liberal 
capitalism and their philosophy is individualism: they recommend wholesale 
adoption of individualism and a Western capitalist system of the West as a way 
forward for the Malays to be successful in business. The Malays, however, are a 
Collectivist society by nature and accustomed to feudalism. Alatas considers the 
studies by the authors of Mental Revolution – and to some extent Dr Mahathir – 
distorted due to their lack of insight into social sciences, their loose reasoning and 
their unfamiliarity within Malay history. He is highly critical of Mental 
Revolution as “a chaotic amalgamation of sound common knowledge of no depth, 
and absolutely ridiculous inferences, is perhaps the most naïve, the most simple, 
and the least well-defined philosophy of capitalism, while claiming to represent 
the modern and indigenous philosophy of the Malays. The influence of colonial 
capitalism is strong.” (p. 149) 
 
While Alatas’ criticism of Mental Revolution is to some extent, justified, we must 
also be mindful of the fact that he and the Malay ruling party, UMNO did not 
have a cordial relationship at the time Alatas published The Myth of the Lazy 
Native. In fact, in the late 1960s Alatas had been a founder member of a new, 
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multi-racial, opposing political party known as Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
(Gerakan). In the 1969 elections, Gerakan managed to take control of the state of 
Penang. Subsequently however, Gerakan joined the ruling coalition with UMNO. 
By then, Alatas had left active politics to continue his academic career. 
 
Perhaps their differences in political ideology led Alatas to criticise the UMNO’s 
Mental Revolution too harshly. Or perhaps he was aggrieved that he was not 
invited to contribute to the book himself. In The Myth of the Lazy Native, he 
comes very close to suggesting that the UMNO hijacked the title Mental 
Revolution from his own work while excluding him. Whatever the reasons for the 
divide, the real losers were the Malays: they could only have benefited from the 
inclusion of Alatas’ intellectual and academic excellence and his perspective on 
the challenges they faced. Alatas had, in fact, identified some core problems for 
the Malays; sadly his work seems to have been regarded only as an intellectual 
treatise and was totally ignored by the political elite. I draw on many of his 
conclusions in this research in Chapter 7.  
 
3.6.3 Zamani: The Malay Ideals  
 
Writing about Malay values and progress in The Malay Ideals, Zamani 
emphasises that Malays are the definitive people of Tanah Melayu. Unfortunately 
Tanah Melayu was replaced by the Federation of Malaya and later Malaysia. This 
was a major blow to the Malay unconscious: Tanah Melayu (Malay Land) is still 
part of the basic underlying assumption of the Malays. 
 
“Traditional Malays usually worked in the paddy fields or were forest product 
gatherers, boatmen and fishermen. The Malays were used to a relaxed atmosphere 
as a way of life. The environment and the easy life of the equatorial nations over 
thousands of years may have produced this mentality and contributed to the 
malaise of the Malays. This problem does not only beset the Malays but almost 
all Polynesians, who have possibly so perfected the spirit of cooperation in their 
daily lives that the spirit of competitiveness has been weeded out of their genes 
and only the goodness of community life, gotong royong, prevails.” (p. 145). 
Gotong royong is a way of life in Malay villages where everyone works together 
for the good of the community - during harvests, festivals, weddings, and road 
and house constructions. 
 
When the immigrant communities arrived in Tanah Melayu, gotong royong 
meant the Malays were unprepared to meet the highly competitive spirit and 
industriousness of the Chinese and Indians, who had come from faraway places, 
had faced extreme vicissitudes in their lives and were escaping from the dire 
situations and conditions in their homeland. The Malays had not had to face 
similar hardships. Because Malay life had been fair and comfortable, the Malays 
were unwilling to participate in the capitalistic schemes of westerners. They 
disdained labouring in the tin mines and rubber plantations and stuck to doing 
what preceding generations had been good at – their traditional occupations. 
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The Malays are by nature very tolerant, humble and unassuming people, ready to 
sacrifice their own comfort to satisfy and please visitors and foreigners. But the 
Malay tolerance is a virtue that has had detrimental effects on themselves. 
 
Malays avoid confrontation at any cost. Even if they feel dissatisfaction and 
anger, they do not normally express them. This trait was necessary when Malays 
lived in villages where most of the people were related to one another – Malays 
tend to marry within their own family group in order to strengthen the familial 
bond and ensure that the little property they had remained within the family 
group. Confrontations were therefore subdued: a Malay entangled in a quarrel or 
fight with another would, in more cases than not, be fighting his own relative. 
The whole community would be dragged into taking sides and a highly volatile 
situation would develop. For this reason, mengalah (giving in) is encouraged in 
the face of that risk. The downside of mengalah is that when facing challenges, 
stressful situations and conflicts, Malays resort to avoidance, retreating from 
confronting the problem and displaying timidity. Their passivity means they are 
unable to meet the challenges they face in their lives. 
 
“The Malays developed a penchant for compromise and appeasement that is not 
seen in any other community. This is why grievances were kept hidden; 
ultimately, of course, they could be contained no longer and there would be an 
outburst (amok) directed at all indiscriminately, including innocent bystanders. 
This tendency to avoid conflict has led the Malays to be sensitive individuals. 
They avoid attacking others openly and expect others to behave in the same way 
towards them. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Malays’ distaste for direct confrontation has led them to 
resort to a negative culture known as surat layang (poison pen letters) in order to 
express dissatisfaction, once they were no longer able to control their feelings. A 
surat layang is an anonymous letter directed to a person or a third party (usually a 
superior in an organisation) complaining or expressing anger, hatred and ill 
feelings as well as criticism. In a surat layang, the writer’s name is always 
withheld and therefore unknown.” (p. 152). 
 
The unwillingness of Malays to be confrontational also led to Westerners 
labelling them as docile. The hierarchical and feudalistic structure of Malay 
society means that values like respect for elders, loyalty, hospitability and 
generosity are deeply ingrained. Hence Malay society is collective rather than 
individualistic and the desire for personal wealth and acquisitiveness is lacking 
among the Malays. 
 
It was also common for the Malays to be classified as indolent and lazy by 
several European writers, although some of them – and almost all Malay writers – 
disagreed. The Malays are descended from the Polynesian group of people who 
spread across the Malay Archipelago (from Malaya to Sumatra and New Guinea). 
Because the land, forests and seas were so rich and abundant with food and 
resources, there was little need for innovation, exertion and persistent work. It is 
said that an hour’s toil would produce food for a week. The Malays therefore had 
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plenty of time for excessive entertainment and relaxation. This way of life was 
passed from one generation to another through Malay culture, passive learning, 
observation and experience. The sweltering heat and humidity of the climate 
sapped people’s energy and strained the most industrious of the Malays; it is 
often argued that in these conditions persistent hard work was impossible. 
 
Zamani argues that the question of laziness is a problem of social values. 
Indigenous peoples from all over the world, whether the aborigines of Australia, 
the Eskimos of the Arctic, the Amazonians of South America or the Masai of 
Kenya, who were hardly affected by industrialization or urbanization, could also 
be classified as “indolent” by Western standards. Western standards dictate that 
people have to be seen to accumulate or hoard massive amounts of wealth in 
order to be classified as successful. 
 
For native people who depend on the land for cultivation as their livelihood, 
however, the accumulation of material wealth is not a yardstick for measuring 
success. They live and work in harmony with nature and rely upon it to replenish 
their sources of food. They do not destroy the environment and allow nature to 
replenish itself. They do not compete but cooperate with one another. There are 
no losers, only winners. They assist one another for the mutual benefit of 
everyone in the community. To Westerners, this is indolence; to the native 
peoples, Westerners are greedy – a classic difference in values. 
 
Husin Ali (2002), Milner (2008) and Tham (1983), support another view of the 
alleged indolence of the Malays. In the feudal society in which the Malays lived, 
the Sultans, aristocrats and high-ranking court officials kept track of successful 
commoners. Invariably those who were seen to be accumulating wealth had their 
property confiscated. The leaders were always fearful that, if unchecked, the 
common Malays would accumulate influence and power along with their wealth. 
The Sultans or the Rajas led decadent lives and showed little concern for their 
subjects, whom they treated as little more than slaves; whatever little wealth they 
had could be exacted from them, if there was a need for it.  
 
Zamani points out that the decline of the Malays coincided with the arrival of 
Western powers in the East. Until then, the Malays had been well-known 
merchants and seafarers as early as the 13
th
 century. Trade between the Malay 
Archipelago and Turkey, Persia, India, China and the eastern seaboard of Africa 
flourished. With the arrival of Western colonialists, trade in the Malay kingdoms 
became the monopoly of European traders through coercive agreements with the 
Sultans in the region. The Malay merchant class slowly disappeared and by the 
turn of the 19th century had been completely wiped out.  
 
The Malay rulers, on the other hand, became greedier and oppressed the people 
into producing more than their colonial masters needed. The high-ranking 
officials and aristocrats who owned land suitable for mining would later procure 
cheap Chinese labour, replacing the Malays. With this displacement, Malay skills 
dwindled and vanished, never to be recovered. 
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Islam, and the poor understanding of it, is also offered as another reason for 
Malay backwardness. The Malays believed in various spirits, charms and 
talismans, all of which contradicted the teachings of Islam. Their 
misunderstanding of the concepts of Qada and Qadar (fate and predestination 
respectively) made them fatalists. Their poverty was justified as takdir (fate) and 
that they would be rewarded in the hereafter. This misconstrued belief in takdir 
bred complacency and a smug self-satisfied attitude. 
 
The situation was aggravated by misguided religious scholars who preached that 
poverty was desirable and chasing after wealth was the route to hell. The idea 
developed that wealth was unimportant in this world, justified by the undeniable 
fact that you can’t take it with you. Wealth acquired negative connotations and 
was associated with snobbery, excessive pride, cruelty, stinginess and 
ungratefulness – all of which would bring hell-fire. There was therefore a 
subconscious belief within the Malay psyche that riches should be avoided for 
fear of unrighteousness. 
 
3.7 Background to the formation of the Malay character 
 
The Malay civilisation is fairly young in historical terms, as its surviving written 
history is only about 600 years old. The Malay race may be much older than this, 
as historians have written about the existence of Hindu kingdoms in the Malay 
Archipelago dating back several thousand years. Hindu customs that remain 
entrenched even in modern Malay Muslim culture are strong evidence of the 
existence of Indian or Hindu influence among the people of the Malay 
Archipelago. It was into this Indianised world that the proponents of Islam began 
to introduce a new civilisation from the late 13
th
 century (Milner, 2008). “In so 
far as existing materials permit, the study of peninsular Malay Sultanates should 
take off from the period of the Malacca Sultanate. The Malacca Sultanate 
formally established a set of traditions which crystallized into what may be 
justifiably termed the 'political culture' of the peninsular Malays.” (Khoo, 2001, 
p.15). 
 
Modern Malay history therefore starts around 1400 with the founding of the 
Malacca Sultanate by Parameswara. "While there are good grounds for asserting 
that it was the Malacca Sultanate which formulated the basis of the peninsular 
Malay political culture, there can be no denial that a substantial proportion of 
Malacca's own traditions derived from elsewhere. Research to-date points to a 
close link between the Srivijaya-Palembang realm and the Malacca Sultanate. It 
seems indisputable that the latter was the successor to the former. But much of 
Srivijaya-Palembang history is still shrouded in mystery and largely speculative." 
(Khoo, 2001, p. 40). About the same time, Islam spread to Malacca and the other 
Malay states. Even though Malay civilisation is 600 years old, there are hardly 
any buildings or architecture in Malacca or anywhere in the Malay Peninsula 
reflecting the Malay sultanates of the past, possible evidence that the Malays may 
not have been so advanced in architecture and construction. Alternatively, as 
Malay architecture then was primarily timber-based, the lifespan of these 
buildings could have been short, and subject to easy destruction by fire and white 
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ants. In any case, the oldest buildings in Malacca today are those built by the 
Portuguese around 1511, when Malacca fell into their hands. 
 
Between 1511 and 1957, when the Federation of Malaya was granted 
independence, for almost 450 years the Malays were under the control of foreign 
colonialists – the Portuguese (1511–1640), the Dutch (1640–1795) and the British 
(1795–1957). While the Portuguese and Dutch controlled only Malacca and 
surrounding areas, the British ruled the Malay states the longest and brought 
about a pace of change in line with the far-reaching economic and political forces 
that were drawing Europe and Asia closer together. Expansion of western 
technology, closer relationships between European governments and commerce 
and the shrinking of distance through improved communications began to 
transform the nature of Malay society (Andaya & Andaya, 2001; Milner, 2008; 
Nah, 2003). 
 
The concept of the Malay race as a young civilisation is supported by several 
historians who see “Malay” consciousness as a relatively modern phenomenon. 
Malays only came to think of themselves as Malays as recently as the 1940s 
when the declaration “Hidup Melayu” (long live the Malays) became a powerful 
cry in their united opposition to the British government’s Malayan Union 
proposal (Shamsul, 2001). 
 
Milner (2008) quotes Ismail Hussein who in his seminal essays in the field of 
Malay studies, has referred to the period from the 14
th
 to the 17
th
 century as “the 
golden age of Malay consciousness”. This period, with its glory of illustrious 
courts, entrepôts, lavish textiles and so forth, does fulfil the criteria of golden age. 
But as to the question of whether it was the golden age of “Malayness”, Ismail 
himself recognises that he is making a retrospective claim. He has made it clear 
that in the pre-colonial period “the term ‘Malay’ was seldom used” and “Malay 
awareness” is a feeling that “perhaps never existed” at that time. 
 
European observers after the 16
th
 century used the term “Malay” and some 
historians agree that this reflects the way people identified themselves in these 
centuries. Based on this historical evidence and writings it could be accepted that 
the concept of Malay-ness and the consciousness of Malays as a race and their 
civilisation is about 600 years old. 
 
In addition, the modern Malay language uses a script known as Jawi, which is 
based on Arabic script. Islam is known to have spread to the Malay states only 
after the 12
th
 century when the Malacca ruler converted to Islam. After his 
conversion, according to chronicles from that period, he commanded all the 
people of Malacca irrespective of their status, from the highest to the lowest, to 
become Muslims. It has been claimed that Malacca played a major role in the 
Islamisation of South-East Asia. There is, however, a paucity of materials on the 
development of Islam in Malaysia for the period before 19
th
 century. British 
colonial records which have contributed so richly to modern historiography are 
almost silent on the subject of Islam (Khoo, 2001). Today, by constitutional 
definition, a Malay has to be a Muslim. The Malays identify Islam as 
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synonymous with their race to such an extent that when a non-Muslim embraces 
Islam, he is said to have “Masuk Melayu”, literally “become Malay”.  
 
A newly identified race, only six centuries old, with a new religion and a new 
script,
22
 the Malay nation is relatively young in Asia, where some of the oldest 
civilisations in the world – India, China and Japan – are found. For a 600-year-
old nation to be ruled by foreign colonialists for about 450 years – or about 75% 
of its existence – means that the Malay race as the world knows it today was 
independent for only about 100 years in its entire history prior to its independence 
in 1957. Probably no other race in the world has had such a short period as a free 
race. As I will show in later chapters the colonisation of such a young race, 
coupled with the influx of migrants from two of the world’s oldest and largest 
civilisations, became the major obstacles to Malay success as business leaders. 
 
When the British took over the various Malay states, in stages from 1795 to 1824, 
they sowed the seeds of development in the Malay Peninsula, which, with the 
exception of Malacca, had hitherto been largely jungle with some small fishing 
and trading stations. Western accounts of the politics in the region described them 
as “petty in scale, limited in resources and squabbling among one another and 
attracted to piracy.” (Milner, 2008). 
 
3.7.1 Collusion of the colonialists with the ruling class 
 
The Malay ruling class was a willing and collusive partner whenever foreigners 
took control of the Malay states, except for the conquest of Malacca by the 
Portuguese in 1511. The readiness of the Malay ruler to establish links with 
British officials in Singapore and Penang was in keeping with previous Malay 
diplomacy. Like the Dutch and Portuguese, the British represented a new and 
powerful element whose friendship was desirable (Andaya & Andaya, 2001). 
 
The British had already realised that the best way to control the Malay states was 
through the ruling class. Knowing full well that an adequate compensation would 
be sufficient trade-off for the British to take effective control of ruling the Malay 
states, they offered a monthly emolument to the individual rulers and maintained 
them as heads of state responsible for religion and local customs. All other day-
to-day government effectively shifted to the British resident in each Malay state. 
While the residential system in theory strengthened the authority of the ruler vis-
à-vis the Malay chiefs and nobles, in reality the Malay rulers became no more 
than a legal necessity upholding the legitimacy of British colonial rule in the 
peninsular. The ruling class was encouraged, tolerated, bullied, cajoled, rewarded 
and praised whenever required by the interests of the British Empire. This method 
of takeover required neither conquest not revolution. Controlling through the 
sultans, the natural leaders of the land, was easy because of the traditional loyalty 
of the Malays to their rulers. 
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  During Dutch rule in Indonesia and British rule in the Malay states, the Indonesian and Malay 
languages also adopted a Romanised version of their languages that is more widely used today than the 
original Jawi script. 
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To the Malays, who even under their rulers were never engaged in commerce or 
trade – activities that were tightly controlled by the ruling class and nobility – the 
change of rule from sultan to British colonialists meant nothing. Most rural 
Malays had hardly any direct contact with their colonial masters. They were both 
by colonial design and by geographical location excluded from the rapid social 
and economic changes that took place in the urban centres of the Malay states 
(Suwannathat-Pian, 2011). 
 
The Malays also benefited the least from the great socio-economic development 
of the natural riches of their motherland, compared with the wealth accrued by the 
Europeans and other immigrant communities. Any little benefits that came their 
way were indirect, such as socio-legal improvements that brought about law and 
order and the end to bondage and slavery. Some protection from the abuses of 
local chiefs was also accorded to the common Malays. 
 
The most effective way to get the cooperation and trust of the ruling class was to 
provide economic compensation for the incomes and socio-political influence 
they had surrendered. In addition to financial compensation there was a liberal 
policy that allowed the Malay ruling class to retain their traditional if now 
irrelevant, titles and honours – a conciliatory and face-saving gesture that counted 
for a great deal in Malay culture. In the eyes of ordinary Malays, the residential 
system had minimal impact on the administrative structure of the state. As far as 
they were concerned, the ruler remained the highest authority in the land with the 
Resident administrating in accordance with the ruler’s wishes and in his name.  
 
As time passed the Malay elite realised that they had lost all power, which was 
now vested in the Resident. By the end of the 1880s, most Residents had replaced 
the rulers as the de facto administrative authority. The Malay rulers had 
unwittingly surrendered their political and economic powers to the British 
Residents who, over time, became the chief executives of the states under British 
protection (Gullick, 1988). 
 
This collusion between the elite and the British meant that while the former 
relinquished their powers, they also enjoyed abundant economic benefits. The 
common Malays benefited from little more than improved law enforcement. As 
time went on they became further isolated with the arrival of new migrants and 
were pushed further into the interior of the country. 
 
 The fact that many of the local Malay elite were working hand-in-glove 
with the British should not come as a surprise. It must be remembered that 
under British rule, the self-serving feudal political culture of the Malay 
royalty and aristocracy was allowed to develop and prosper in many 
ways. (Noor, 2002, p. 79). 
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3.7.2 Colonialism and its impact on ordinary Malays 
 
It has been seen that Malay involvement in trade and commerce was negligible 
even under the glory years of the Malacca sultanates and in the various Malay 
states that were established subsequently. The feudalistic and hierarchical Malay 
society meant that only the royal and noble class and chiefs were involved in 
trade, while the ordinary Malays were peasants and fishermen. There was no 
major merchant class among the common Malays in this period as is commonly 
assumed or claimed. According to Hashim (1992) in the stratification of the 
Malacca society from 1400 onwards, the king and royal family were placed at the 
uppermost level, followed by the administrative class consisting of the officials, 
and then followed by the ordinary or common people. "The common people were 
divided into two groups - the free man and slaves. Free men are people who have 
possessions of their own. A free person who owned nothing at all could easily 
become enslaved for a variety of reasons such as committing an offence or failing 
to settle his debts. A free man might become a slave as a result of being a 
'follower' or becoming a 'retainer' (i.e. ahli or member) for the family of an 
official. So there were retainers of the Bendahara, the Laksamana, the 
Temenggong and others. These 'retainers' were easily identified because they 
lived together in kampungs (villages) such as the 'Kampung Bendahara', 
'Kampung Laksamana', and the 'Kampung Temenggong'” (p. 141).  
 
The common people (free men and slaves) were also conscripted for carrying out 
public tasks such as contributing their labour to all court ceremonies at the 
bidding of the Bendahara, building the royal palace and preparing the main 
thoroughfares of Malacca under the personal supervision of the Shahbandar. In 
short, the ruler governed; the officials supported the government and 
administered the kingdom; the common people (free men and slaves) lived under 
the patronage of the state officials and their masters but their overlord was the 
ruler (Hashim, 1992). The historical accounts of the Malay society and its rigid 
hierarchical structure led to the establishment of a 'pure' class whose function was 
to rule and another class which was destined to be ruled. 
 
Based on historical records, I conclude that there was no trading or merchant 
class among the common Malays. Some, like Alatas (1977) argue that it was the 
Portuguese and Dutch who were responsible for the elimination of the Malay 
trading class after the conquest of Malacca. So by the time the British took 
control of Malacca at the end of the 18
th
 century, they did not find a Malay 
trading class of comparable status. This may be true but my contention is the 
definition of 'Malay trading or merchant class'. While indeed there did exist 
Malay trading and merchant class, it mainly comprised those of ruling class and 
aristocracy classified as 'upper class' by Husin Ali (2008) and not the common 
Malays whom Husin Ali describes as 'lower class'. For the purpose of this 
research it is necessary to go beyond the general description of 'Malay trading or 
merchant class' to look for evidence as to who the so-called 'Malay trading and 
merchant class' is. I could conclude with reasonable conviction there is no clear 
evidence to prove that the common Malay was a trader of any scale. He was 
either a slave or a free man who served the aristocrats and the rulers. "There was 
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some engagement in commerce, but one account after another insists that trade 
was never a substantial nature among the commoners” (Ahmad, 1961, p.45; 
Gullick, 1988, p. 31; Leyden, 1968, p. 105; Milner 2008, p.56). 
 
When the British arrived in the Malay states they brought major transformation 
and development. Large numbers of workers were needed to work in new 
plantations, tin mines and railways. Naturally, the British authorities sought to 
recruit labour from the Malays. To their surprise, dismay and even shock, the 
Malays refused to be drawn into the workforce. Their refusal to work was deemed 
laziness by the British, a perception that was not peculiar to the Malays alone. For 
example, according to historical records, the Dutch considered the Indonesians 
lazy and the Filipinos were branded lazy by the Spanish. However, many have 
disagreed with the colonial masters’ sweeping and generalised perception of the 
indolence of the native peoples of Southeast Asia, one of the foremost of whom is 
the anthropologist, Syed Hussein Alatas, whom I have referred to earlier in this 
chapter. In his aptly titled book, The Myth of the Lazy Native (1977), he argues 
against these oversimplified conclusions. 
 
Alatas based his arguments on the fact that the British did not understand the 
Malay culture and way of life. He quotes Windstedt (1956) who pointed out that 
Malays preferred to be independent farmers than to work for hire. Because of this 
the Malays “got an undeserved reputation for idleness.” (p. 72). Alatas believed 
that it was this unwillingness to become a tool in the production system of 
colonial capitalism that earned the Malays the reputation of being indolent. 
 
There are several reasons why the Malays did not want to work as coolies for the 
British. As I pointed out earlier, they preferred to be independent farmers or 
fishermen who could work at their own pace, in their own way, and were not 
answerable to anyone. In Chapter 2, I explained the concept of kehalusan, or 
subtlety. The British officers, with the exception of the few who understood the 
Malay way of life, were naturally rough and tough with the Malays. The Malays 
– gentle-mannered on the one hand and hypersensitive to insults or scolding on 
the other – must have thought the best thing to do under the circumstances was to 
keep away from their new colonial masters. In some areas that were attractive to 
them, however, like working as naval crew or in government offices where 
maruah (pride) was observed, the Malays did work under the British, and 
flourished. 
 
Alatas cites Vaughan, who wrote in 1857, and who attempted to correct some 
misconceptions about the Malays. Vaughan considered truthfulness to be a 
prominent feature of the Malays and noted the absence of obscenity in their 
speech when they were angry. Vaughan records a very important observation that 
sheds some light on the Malays’ refusal to labour for the British: “European 
officers accustomed to the abuse of Indian sailors and ignorant of the Malay 
prejudices on his head, behave towards them as they are wont to do the Bengalis 
or other natives, and abuse and strike them indiscriminately. The consequence is 
the deadliest passions of the Malay are aroused and in revenge they wreak a 
fearful retribution on their oppressors. It is probably that a crew of Englishmen 
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would resort to the same course, if similar treatment were pursued towards them. 
On the other hand, when the Malay is treated as a man and not a brute, he proves 
docile, faithful and industrious and without exception, superior to any eastern 
sailor afloat.” (p. 119). 
 
Vaughan’s observation is still valid to this day. When treated with respect, the 
Malays work well but they do not tolerate insults or abuse. Additionally, the 
Malays considered Tanah Melayu as their land and could not accept strangers 
coming to their land and bossing them about. Being polite and conflict-avoidant, 
they did not rebel but kept away from the British. This somewhat ambivalent 
tolerance is more understandable if we remember that the presence of foreign 
authorities had been endorsed by the ruling class – and what the sultan or raja 
approved, the Malays accepted without question. 
 
3.7.3 Transitional stages of the Malay character 
 
Since merdeka, there have been a lot of changes in Malay value systems that 
inevitably affect the culture of the race. The only “chosen glory” of the Malays in 
their entire 600 years of modern history is merdeka, which was given to the 
Malays by the British. Closely associated with merdeka is their opposition to the 
Malayan Union soon after the end of the Second World War. The agitation and 
opposition to the Malayan Union could be identified as a solid victory for Malay 
nationalism: the British government, totally taken aback, withdrew the entire 
plan. 
 
The normally docile and polite Malays react strongly only to matters concerning 
the three R’s – Ruler, Race and Religion. In their Malayan Union plan, the British 
tried to meddle with two of the three – rulers and race. Effectively the sovereignty 
of the rulers would have been completely lost and the Malays’ position as the 
indigenous and rightful people of Tanah Melayu would be lost by granting 
citizenship to all immigrants with a status equal to the Malays. The British finally 
gave up and restored the sovereignty of the rulers and the special privileges of the 
Malays as “sons of the soil”. 
 
Since merdeka, and especially since May 13 1969, the economic position of the 
Malays has undergone major changes under NEP. For the first time in the history 
of Malaysia, Malay professionals (doctors, engineers and lawyers) began to 
appear in reasonable numbers. It has to be said that the government of Malaysia 
has achieved a major success in educating the Malays at all levels. With modern 
education both locally and overseas, there is a growing class of Malays who are 
confident at taking on the challenges of the modern globalised world. The NEP 
and subsequent positively favourable policies for Malays have resulted in a 
dramatic transformation of Malay society. The consequences of many of these 
changes have been mixed, however. Although certain segments of Malay society 
have benefited from the affirmative action, the transition of the Malays has left 
many segments of society feeling alienated and disenfranchised. There is a 
perception that only a chosen few have benefited, leaving the vast majority at the 
lower end of the economic spectrum of society. 
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3.8  Contextual factors in the moulding of the Malay character 
 
3.8.1 Geography 
 
All human beings are affected by the physical world in which they live – climate, 
terrain and weather systems, all have an enduring effect on the way we behave. 
The states of mind evoked by the seasons and the weather become part of a 
region’s cultural heritage (Kets de Vries et al, 2004). 
 
The Malays lived a very simple life before the arrival of foreigners on their soil. 
The geographical and climatic conditions in Malaysia are vastly different from 
countries such as Japan, China, India and Indonesia. There are no natural 
disasters in Malaysia like extreme climatic conditions of drought, floods, 
earthquakes or extremely cold blizzards and snow. The absence of such natural 
disasters, calamities and vagaries of extreme climatic conditions have created an 
unhurried pace of life. Malays do not rush to do anything. They cultivate crops 
with minimal hardship. There is plenty of food for everyone, both on land and in 
the sea, and agriculture and fishing have always been major occupations. Being 
simple people with no fear of famine, shortages or overpopulation, they were 
easily contented and saw no necessity to accumulate wealth. 
  
The Malays’ reputation for indolence and being lazy arose for a variety of 
reasons, not least because the favourable geographical conditions in which they 
thrived meant that they had no need to slog to live a happy and contented life. 
Additionally, Malay culture equated industriousness with acquisitiveness. They 
saw no need for commerce or empire building, the prime motivations of their 
capitalist foreign and Malay rulers. At the time when the Europeans were moving 
aggressively into the Malay Archipelago, most Malays were content to be 
fishermen and farmers. Equally significantly, Islam stresses the importance of 
living in harmony with nature and with one another. The world is deemed 
temporary and the hereafter permanent. As a result, materialistic and worldly 
wealth is not an ideal to which Malays aspire.  
 
3.8.2. Royalty and aristocracy 
 
Malay character formation is deeply affected by the hierarchical structure of their 
society. At the apex of the socio-political hierarchy was the sultan who retained 
the ultimate authority in all affairs and in addition was the source of wealth, 
honours and titles in his sultanate (Suwannathat-Pian, 2011). Next came the 
extended royal family. Since the sultans and rajas had numerous wives and 
concubines, and even more numerous offspring, there were a large number of 
people with royal titles. Below the sultan and royal family, were the nobility and 
aristocracy. The chief dignitaries among these were the Bendahara, Temenggong, 
Penghulu, Bendahari and the Shahbandar. The elite group was followed in their 
turn by the ruler’s four chieftains (Orang Besar Empat) and dignitaries (Orang 
Besar Raja). The common people and finally the slaves completed the general 
societal hierarchy of a Malay sultanate (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Socio-Political hierarchy of traditional Malay society 
 
              
 
Each societal tier accepted its place and responsibilities in the socio-political 
structure. As the sultan was projected and accepted as the representative of God 
on Earth, the society accepted unquestioningly the supremacy of the ruler and 
their abuse at his hands, and held to a firm belief that suffering is a virtue. 
 
All sorts of historical accounts of abuse by the ruling class are recorded in 
Hikayat Abdullah
23
 and quoted widely by historians. In general the picture 
painted of the ruling class is not a positive one. The rulers and nobility controlled 
trade and commerce to the total exclusion of any participation by the common 
Malays. Several writers have observed the total absence of a merchant class in the 
Malay sultanate (Alatas, 1977; Maaruf, 1982; Milner, 2008). As people with 
Hindu ancestry who embraced Islam, the Malays are also fatalists and accepted 
their position. From the Islamic perspective, they believed in the will of Allah to 
reward them and accept their position as rezeki, defined as ones’ livelihood or 
allocation of wealth fated and fixed by Allah. 
 
Commoners were not allowed to be involved in any form of business activity 
without the permission of the ruler. Permission to trade or engage in business was 
only granted to members of the higher echelons of society. In spite of these 
                                                 
23  The first volume of Hikayat Abdullah was written by Abdullah Munshi, a 19th century writer, in 1843 
where he expressed his pessimism and observations of the deplorable conduct, behaviour and habits of 
the ruling class. 
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restrictions, if any common citizen had the will and industriousness to succeed, it 
would immediately draw the attention of the ruling class who would in one way 
or another confiscate all the wealth accumulated by the commoner. 
 
Abdullah, quoted by Alatas (1977) described how if a man acquired a fine house, 
a plantation or an estate of any size, a raja was sure to get hold of it. He 
concluded that the ordinary Malays remained backward and isolated because of 
the tyranny of the Malay rulers. Abdullah’s points about the unjust leadership in 
Malay feudal society are supported by evidence in Misa Melayu
24
 and Sejarah 
Melayu.
25
 
 
I will build on these observations in later chapters in which I examine the 
backwardness and lack of success of Malays in business today. 
 
3.8.3 Schooling and moral upbringing 
Although Malaysia today spends the equivalent of almost eight per cent of its 
GDP on education, schooling was totally neglected until the British took control 
of the Malay states. Abdullah, quoted by Maaruf (1982), noted that in the 19
th
 
century, the leadership was not interested in the right kind of education. He also 
lamented the poor upbringing of the young rajas, who indulged in cock-fighting, 
opium smoking, gambling and lechery. These evils were attributed to their lack of 
education. If the ruling class paid no attention to educating their own children, 
there was little hope for the children of commoners. 
 
After merdeka the majority of children were not born in well-to-do families, 
which tended to be large, with the number of children ranging between three and 
12. Malay children were generally undernourished (not due to starvation but 
primarily due to a lack of a balanced diet between carbohydrates and proteins) 
and had no playthings. This material deprivation was matched by emotional 
deprivation: in traditional Malay families children did not get any show of love 
from their parents. Not receiving sufficient love, they grew up not knowing how 
to express love themselves.  When they fell sick, villagers would usually take 
their children to the traditional medicine man (bomoh), which meant they did not 
get proper medical attention. 
 
Malays do not adopt a culture of reading and there is little encouragement for 
children to read. The children are however, required to learn the Quran at an early 
age, usually in Arabic and without understanding the meaning. In Malay culture, 
as in some other Asian cultures, parents do not explain things to children. There 
is usually a one-way conversation. Children are told and directed. There are 
hardly any meaningful discussions between parents and children. Parents demand 
absolute obedience and respect from children. When elders are in discussion, 
                                                 
24
  Misa Melayu – is largely a composition of Malay historical literature written by Raja Chulan bin Raja 
Abdul Hamid from the Perak Royalty around the end of the 18
th
 Century. 
25
  Sejarah Melayu - also known as the Malay Annals are a collection of 32 different manuscripts 
preserved in libraries throughout the world and a source of Malay history. 
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children are rarely allowed to be present and are not allowed to join in. The policy 
that “children are to be seen and not heard” is strictly adhered to. 
 
It is the same when children go to school. Teachers teach and children listen. 
Asking questions is considered rude; although by the time children go to school 
they have already absorbed that questioning authority is unacceptable and are 
unlikely to challenge what teachers teach. A child who asks too many questions 
could incur the wrath of the teacher and be shunned by classmates. At the same 
time, Malay children are brought up in a generally peaceful, safe and protective 
environment. Growing up in this way, they are easily trusting and not exposed to 
risk-taking. 
 
In urban areas a great deal of change has taken place and many Malay children 
are exposed to modern education and activities that encourage inquisitive learning 
and questioning. However; largely speaking, the Malay environment described 
here holds true for Malay children growing up in the rural and semi-rural areas 
where most Malays still live. 
 
3.9  Salient features of Malay characteristics and culture 
 
3.9.1 Daulat (Supremacy of the Ruler) 
 
The Malay society is one which has a strong hierarchical order which originated 
from the Malacca Sultanate. This hierarchical tradition has continued to modern 
times. Historically, at the top of the hierarchical order was the ruler called raja. 
The raja is an institution and is set apart from the rest of the community in 
different ways. The raja was deemed representative of God and ‘shadow of Allah 
on Earth’ (Alatas, 1977; Kennedy, 2002; Khoo, 1991; Maaruf, 1982; Milner, 
2008). Detailed rules and regulations emphasise the gap between the ruler and his 
subjects. The aura of sanctity built around the raja, also termed the ideology of 
legitimacy, has survived until today and is known as daulat, which denotes the 
supreme expression of majesty.  The original connation of daulat was purely 
referred to the Malay sultans and rajas; whereas the concept of daulat in recent 
times, refer to a watered-down manner to the political elite, giving daulat a new 
dimension which means “legitimacy”. 
 
In the years since the Malacca Sultanate, these customs have become entrenched 
in Malay society and passed down through generations. In present day Malaysia, 
the institution of monarchy is an essential, integral part of the Malay political 
culture. The concept of daulat has evolved into the present day political and 
business world whereby the Malays observe utmost respect for their political 
leaders as well as their superiors in the corporate world. 
 
In order to understand modern Malay culture, political or corporate, it is 
important to understand the significance of daulat and derhaka, its polar opposite 
(treason). 
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Daulat is taken from the Arabic/Ottoman term daulah in the context of 
governmental politics and is the symbol of sovereignty of a reigning monarch. It 
was linked to the charisma of the king and the good fortune (tuah) he embodied. 
When the country was peaceful, prosperous and rich, this was not related to the 
skill or wisdom of officials and administrators, nor construed as the fruits of hard 
work and enterprise. It was seen as due to the good fortune of the king who 
reigned so justly over them – even if this was not the actual state of affairs 
(Hashim, 1992). This belief could also be seen as part of the Malays’ naive 
fatalism. 
 
Alatas (1977) notes that Malays are die-hard loyalists, as exemplified in the epic 
tale of Hang Tuah, a warrior in the Malacca Sultanate, who killed his childhood 
friend Hang Jebat because the latter was disloyal, and hence treacherous, to the 
ruler. The respect of the ordinary people for their ruler was so high that the 
Sejarah Melayu states that: “… it was the custom of the Malay subject that he 
would never seek to find fault with the wishes of his master (the king)” (Hashim, 
1992). Loyalty is often bound up with submissiveness and after generations of 
refining the system (Zamani, 2003); submission to authority is a way of life for 
the Malays. 
 
From the principle of daulat developed its opposite; derhaka (treason or 
treachery), which comprised any form of disloyalty or failure to acknowledge the 
supremacy of the raja.  It was believed that calamity would strike traitors in two 
ways.  First, they would become the victim of disaster; second, the offenders and 
their entire extended families would be punished, ensuring that no “traitorous” 
progeny was spared. 
 
Perhaps due to the handing down of these traditional beliefs of calamity that 
could befall the ‘offender’, the people became so ingrained in their hearts and 
minds that they became truly fearful of any retaliation that they might incur 
through the curse that might make their lives miserable.  And people also feared 
the punishment meted out to them in a collective manner at the command of the 
ruler for any display of disloyalty which was regarded as the gravest of offences 
in Malacca. 
 
The concepts of daulat and derhaka have been deeply ingrained in the Malay 
mind over several centuries so that one will rarely find Malays opposing those in 
power; whether in a political, social or corporate context. 
 
3.9.2 Hierarchy, Status and Rank 
 
Status, rank and nama (the word means ‘name’ but is also used to imply status 
and rank), were of great importance and carefully regulated in Malay society 
(Milner, 2008).  Like European monarchies, the Malay sultanate presided over a 
highly feudal society (Mansor & Mohd Ali, 1998; Suwannathat-Pian, 2011). 
 
Milner, quoting Andaya (1979), points out that even on a fishing expedition 
“each person’s place in the hierarchy and his social distance from the Sultan was 
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publicly demonstrated by the clothes he wore, the place where he sat, and the 
order in which he was served food or sireh (betel leaf).” (p. 64). 
 
Sumptuary laws were a prominent feature of Malay custom (adat) during the 
Malacca Sultanate. They determined the type of clothes people could wear, and 
the houses they could live in. Milner notes that there is plenty of evidence to 
show that these laws were taken seriously and their effects resonate today. For 
example; ordinary Malays were forbidden to live in big houses during the 
sultanate and today, successful Malays conspicuously build palatial houses, often 
with elaborate gilded gates. Professor Emeritus Khoo Kay Kim, an eminent 
authority on Malay history, has remarked that this demonstrates the fantasy of 
successful contemporary Malays to imitate the old days of the rajas (personal 
interview with the author). 
 
Abdullah, a critic of Malay royalty, claimed that the Malay sultanates and the 
‘kerajaan (government of the rajas) system’ were obsessed with sumptuary laws 
– when an umbrella might be raised, shoes worn or yellow (a royal colour) 
displayed – and that ordinary people were frustratingly willing to submit to them 
(Milner, 2002). In Malacca, wearing yellow was punishable by death. Even today, 
when there are no laws forbidding it, Malays avoid bright yellow in their 
clothing. 
 
In Malay society, hierarchy was valued and not denigrated. Details of dress, 
ceremony, manners, speech and other elements in the observance of custom 
(adat) were critically important. The privileges accorded to royalty were not 
treated defensively in royal texts – there was obvious pride in having a well-
regulated polity in which every rakyat (common people) was given his or her 
place, and was treated (and behaved) in a manner appropriate to that place. In 
court ceremonies and rituals particularly, status was displayed. On such 
occasions, it was critical to be dressed and to behave appropriately. Seating 
arrangements were made according to rank (Milner, 2008). 
 
There are numerous accounts of the orderliness of Malay ceremonies. One from 
Terengganu (a Malay state in Peninsular Malaysia) in the 1870s notes that there 
was no “hustling or pushing... everybody seems to be contented with the position 
he may have taken up” (Milner, 1982). Several European writers have 
commented that the Malays are the politest people of Southeast Asia. This 
behaviour is so ingrained in the Malays that even when they perform their Haj in 
Mecca they are seen as the best-behaved people during the pilgrimage. The Saudi 
authorities are full of praise for the orderliness of Malay pilgrims in contrast to 
the pandemonium displayed by other pilgrims from around the globe. 
 
The general acceptance of status, rank and hierarchy is still prevalent in Malay 
society, making Malaysia the number one country in Hofstede & Hofstede’s 
Power Distance Index (Abdullah, 1996; Dahlan, 1991; Paramasivam, 2007).  
Emphasis is still placed on the correct use of titles and protocol; honorifics are 
used to indicate fine grading in social status and levels of authority based on 
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connections with royalty, religious standing and awards for service to the state 
(Kennedy, 2002). 
 
3.9.3 Feudalism 
 
The term “feudal” refers to political structure, social organisation or an 
exploitative tendency on the part of the superiors and submissive mentality on the 
part of subordinates (Maaruf, 1984). The rajas and datoks (nobility) wielded 
unchallenged sway over their subjects, themselves subject only to the authority of 
a higher individual in their own caste; the apex of the social edifice being the 
sultan. No redress for the ruler’s edicts, whether just or unjust, wise or ridiculous, 
was conceivable. It was feudalism rampant and undiluted; whatever position a 
Malay may have held, whether he was a raja or big chief, he would always have 
greater authority than one of ordinary birth (Wheeler, 1928). 
 
Husin Ali (2008) describes two main strata of society; the ruling upper class 
(bangsawan) and the subject lower class (rakyat). The upper class was made up 
of the sultan, his family and chiefs. This group was small but had extensive 
political and economic power. Socially, it was highly respected and a refined 
form of language was used to address its members. The lower class was made up 
of the common people, including slaves. They lived outside the palace 
compound, or in villages where they performed agricultural or fishing activities. 
They did not have any political power and economically they owned only enough 
land and equipment to provide for their own needs. 
 
The concepts of daulat, hierarchy, status and rank and feudalism are intertwined 
and inseparable in the culture of the Malays. These concepts largely hold true to 
this day, in spite of modern education. For example; in the nine states of Malaysia 
where sultans are still the heads of the states, high-ranking, highly-educated 
officials still prostrate themselves before the sultan on his throne. 
 
The values of the Malay feudal court conflicted with those of Malay masses and 
peasantry, who depended on labour. The masses emphasised neighbourliness, 
cooperation, conformity and perseverance. This conflict between the values of the 
ruling group and their subjugated people is a central feature in Malay feudalism, 
giving rise to two conflicting system of values existing side by side (Maaruf, 
1984). From a religious perspective, the feudalistic Malay social structure is in 
conflict with Islamic principles. However, the Malays have managed to absorb 
this conflict in their day-to-day lives (Mansor & Mohd Ali, 1998). 
 
Maaruf (1984) touches on feudal psychology, quoting Erich Fromm’s (1960) 
description of the conscience in authoritarian ethics: “Good conscience is 
consciousness of pleasing (the external and internal authority); guilty conscience 
is the consciousness of displeasing it. The good (authoritarian) conscience 
produces a feeling of well-being and security, for it implies approval by and 
closeness to the authority; the guilty conscience produces fear and insecurity 
because acting against the will of the authority implies danger of being punished 
and what is worse, being deserted by authority” (p. 45). 
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Hang Tuah, whose story I recounted earlier, held steadfast to the principle of 
blind loyalty even when in his turn he was unjustly sentenced to death by the 
ruler. In Hang Tuah’s thinking, the ruler could do as he pleased because he was 
considered God’s representative on earth; absolute loyalty was important for 
one’s reputation and a necessary prerequisite for going to heaven. 
 
This brand of blind loyalty has been criticised of late by some writers as 
contradictory to Islamic values. It must, however, be recognised that Hang Tuah 
has been accepted as a brave Malay warrior and hero by Malays for over 500 
years. Feudal elements have pervaded the Malay elite’s and intelligentsia’s 
concept of the hero as well as certain aspects of their tendency to romanticise 
feudal history and court personalities (Maaruf, 1984). Feudalism is another 
reason why Malaysia tops Hofstede’s PDI. As Tham (1992) observes, “The 
dimension of power distance is certainly relevant to an explication of Malay 
cultural behaviour. Awareness of status was pervasive in Malay culture and to a 
large extent remains deeply embedded in the Malay psyche.” 
 
3.9.4 Artefacts 
 
Since the days of the Malacca Sultanate and subsequent Malay rajas, the Malays 
have cultivated what Schein (2004) describes as artefacts – visible products, 
artistic creations, clothing style, manners of address, emotional displays, 
published values, observable rituals and ceremonies, and so on. 
 
In the Malay tradition and culture, artefacts can take precedence over real work.  
For example, events that would be considered perfectly ordinary business actions 
in other countries - such as buying a computer system or signing agreements 
between local or foreign corporations – will be organised as elaborate ceremonies 
in five-star hotels with flower girls lined up to receive guests, souvenirs and door 
gifts, lavish food and elaborate speeches, and attended by ministers or high-
ranking government officials depending on the influence of organisers. Milner 
(2008) compares the English axiom “clothes do not make a man” to the Malay 
kerajaan, which gives the impression that external appearance and manner have a 
fundamental significance for the Malays.   
  
Maaruf (1984) describes Malay love for artefacts as “another misplaced ideal of 
the Malay elite is the desire to be grandiose; the more grandiose a project or an 
activity, the better.  They spend lavishly on buildings, cars, official functions and 
other expenditures for prestige.  This is another trait of the under-developed elite 
of the Third World.” 
 
According to Fanon (1974) this attitude is due to its incapacity to commit itself to 
higher and loftier ideals, and to its lack of genuine achievements.  
 
And in order to hide this stagnation and to mask this regression, to 
reassure itself and to give itself something to boast about, bourgeoisie can 
find nothing better to do than to erect grandiose buildings in the capital 
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 and to lay out money on what are called ‘prestige expenses'. (Fanon, 
1974, p. 118). 
 
Maaruf also provides examples of superficial acts and those of no consequence 
being promoted as symbols of Malay progress.  Non-achievements are treated as 
great moments in history such as organising a Quran reading competition, 
telecasting of Muslim call to prayers five times a day and organising the world 
heavyweight title fight in Malaysia. 
 
Another artefact is the rhetoric used to rally or motivate people into doing 
something positive or refrain from negative activities. Examples are several 
slogans used by different prime ministers, such as Kepimpinan Melalui Teladan 
(leadership by example); Cekap, Bersih, Amanah (clean, efficient, trustworthy), 
Malaysia Boleh (Malaysia can), Cemerlang, Gemilang, Terbilang (excellence, 
glory, distinction) and Satu Malaysia (One Malaysia). A new trend in both the 
government institutions and the private sector is that when holding a function 
where the prime minister is the guest-of-honour is to make specially-tailored 
shirts and dresses to commemorate the function. The guest-of-honour also wears 
the special shirt. 
 
These artefacts reflect the explicit culture, which has been defined as “the 
observable reality of language, food, buildings, houses, monuments, agriculture, 
shrines, markets, fashion, and art. They are the symbols of a deeper level of 
culture” (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). 
 
3.9.5 Instant gratification and lack of thrift 
 
Malays generally want to enjoy life and have little inclination to delay or 
postpone gratification.  Life is taken easily because the country is rich with 
resources and has a suitable climate for agriculture. There is no hardship for 
anyone. Drought and famine are unheard of, unlike in some countries in Asia and 
Africa. With very little effort, one can have sufficient food for one’s family.  
Over the years, this lifestyle has given the Malays their attitude to life. 
 
There is a Malay proverb that encapsulates this attitude – “kais pagi makan pagi, 
kais petang makan petang” (“toil in the morning for the morning meal and toil in 
the evening for the evening meal”). On the one hand it expresses the ease with 
which one can obtain food in the country, and on the other it discourages hard 
work and wealth accumulation. 
 
The lack of thrift among Malays was not altogether unreasonable in the old days 
when “the savings of the industrious were too easy a bait for the rapacity of the 
local chief, to whom no Malay would dream of refusing anything in the old days, 
for sufficiently weighty reasons” (Wheeler, 1928). This view is supported by 
Zamani (2002). Any accumulation of wealth by the rakyat (common people) was 
immediately interpreted as a political move and a threat – and they could have no 
such freedom (Milner, 2008). Hikayat Abdullah, quoted by Alatas (1977) and 
Milner (2008), also contains detailed accounts of how Malays’ ambitions to work 
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and accumulate wealth were completely undermined by the tyranny of the 
royalty. 
 
3.9.6 Ease of influence 
 
It is not difficult to influence the Malays.  The most remarkable demonstration of 
this is the wholesale conversion of the people to Islam in the 15
th
 century, when 
the reigning raja embraced the religion. Even among Arabs, there are non-
Muslims – but all Malays are Muslims. This reinforces the concept of daulat. It 
also goes to prove the influence the rulers had on the Malays and the Malays’ 
willing acceptance of total obedience and loyalty to their rulers. 
 
However, “ease of influence” should be taken in the right context. Malays adapt 
readily to modern living and are willing to try out new things – but not through 
force. It must be at their own volition and related to the things that attract them 
naturally, mainly what Schein would describe as artefacts (music, dress and 
lifestyle). The persistent influence of the feudal mindset means that Malays also 
follow their leader when making changes to their lives. However, there is no way 
that foreigners could force any changes to the Malay culture or lifestyle upon 
them. This was evident when the British could not get the Malays to work for 
them in their plantations, mines and railways. So when foreign anthropologists 
and scholars assert that the Malays’ “economic stagnation is due to their attitude 
towards economic development and resistance to change to adapt their lives to 
modern conditions and techniques” (Parkinson, 1967), they are missing the point. 
Parkinson has rightly observed that the Malays’ propensity to change is 
conditional on their freedom to maintain or retain the old as well as the new. He 
says that this is in keeping with the basic characteristics of the Malays. This 
characteristic is confirmed by Wheeler (1928), who observes, “Malays respond 
well to sympathetic and intelligent leadership but are not unnaturally backward 
when new ideas are insufficiently explained and taught.” 
 
Malays are swift to adapt to new lifestyles even when there is potential conflict 
with their adat (custom) and religion. This early-adapter attitude means that the 
Malays buy new products – for example, a new model of car, new trends in 
clothes and shoes – ahead of others. They are prepared to purchase these products 
even at very high hire-purchase prices, as long as they are spread over easy-
instalments. 
 
This ease of influence has also led to some decline in social morality.  It is said 
that drug addiction and other antisocial habits are higher among the Malays than 
other inhabitants of Malaysia (Omar, 2006). 
 
3.9.7 Fatalism 
 
Malays generally are strong believers in fate (takdir, nasib) and destiny.  This 
fatalist attitude has led them to accept poverty and other misfortunes as their 
predestined fate. It is also used conveniently by the Malays as a defence 
mechanism and excuse for their failures in life. 
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The takdir factor also prevents them from putting in their maximum effort into 
succeeding in life.  They give up easily and do not persevere.  Failure is justified 
as takdir.  This misinterpretation of takdir has resulted in complacency and a 
disinclination for hard work (Omar, 2006; Zamani, 2003).  For example; if a 
Malay student performs poorly in school due to lack of hard work, he will be 
quick to defend himself by pleading that it was his takdir to fail and that no 
amount of hard work would have altered his destiny. 
 
It is generally believed by Muslims that 'takdir' or fate - what is willed by the 
divine decree of Allah - cannot be changed. The Malays also believe (more in the 
rural areas and somewhat to a lesser extent nowadays in urban areas) that 'rezeki' 
- one's livelihood or allocation of wealth , what Malays call 'luck', is fated and 
fixed by Allah (Sloane, 1999). 
 
Misconstrued interpretations of Islam have also had a negative impact on the 
Malays.  Religious scholars aggravated the effects of the belief in takdir by 
emphasising that too much wealth is undesirable, as it could not be taken to 
paradise. A misconception that hard work was linked to wealth and therefore 
jeopardised one’s chances of paradise resulted in the Malays developing the idea 
that material wealth was unimportant and undesirable. The affluent people were 
snobbish, proud, stingy, cruel and ungrateful, destined to end up in hellfire. There 
was a subconscious belief that riches should be avoided for fear of 
unrighteousness. Unfortunately, all these beliefs stand in stark contrast to those of 
the immigrant Chinese, whose culture encourages hard work and material wealth 
(Zamani, 2003). 
 
3.9.8 Impact and influence of religion 
 
The concepts of tolerance, good moral character, humility, cleanliness, 
hospitality, and social cooperation that are closely linked to the Malay character 
are also espoused values in Islam. Although these values are universally good, 
embracing them unquestioningly and to the extreme has placed the Malays in a 
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the other races in Malaysia – the Chinese and 
Indians. 
 
In Malay society the ustaz (religious teacher) commands great respect. In many 
instances, the ustaz is only trained in memorizing Quran and is not conversant in 
Arabic, the language of the Quran (although this situation is changing very 
rapidly now, and more and more religious scholars are proficient in Arabic). If 
the ustaz misinterpreted the Quran or interpreted it in a narrow-minded way, he 
would impart misconceptions to his students, who nevertheless would accept his 
teaching unquestioningly because Malay children do not question their teachers. 
As a result it is not uncommon for Malays to have misguided concepts of dunia 
(the here and now) and akhirat (the hereafter). Religious teachers may teach that 
the hereafter is permanent world and the present world only temporary, ergo; 
people should strive more for the hereafter and not chase materialism in this 
world. These teachings breed complacency and a disinclination for hard work 
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from a young age. The Malays then rationalise their failure in adult life as 
sacrifice for their hereafter; in heaven. Suffering in this world is interpreted as a 
sacrifice and virtue for reward in the next. One must be careful here to 
differentiate that it is misinterpretation of the Quran that can be viewed as a 
factor in Malay backwardness or lack of success, and not the Quran or Islam 
themselves (Zamani, 2003; Omar, 2006). 
 
3.9.9 Sabar 
 
The Malays’ accommodating and tolerant nature has resulted in the other races 
taking advantage of them.  Goddard (2001) has provided a very comprehensive 
explanation of the word sabar, of which the Malays are very fond of; interpreting 
it as “calm, patient, forbearing”. It certainly has a much wider semantic range 
than the English word “patient”. It can be used in the expression sabar menunggu 
– waiting patiently – and addressed to someone who appears to be annoyed, in 
which case it is the equivalent to the English expression “calm down”. People 
who are grieving or distressed are also advised to be sabar, which in this context 
could be used to mean “able to endure troubles, suffering, not quick to anger” 
(according to the Malay Comprehensive Dictionary, Kamus Lengkap). The 
salience of kesabaran (noun) is explained in large measure by the importance of 
forbearance and patience in Islam. The importance of sabar or staying calm in 
troubling situations is fully consistent with other major themes of traditional 
Malay culture. Goddard cites the literary historian and critic Mohammad Haji 
Salleh who points out that kesabaran is a value promoted in the great moral 
history of the Malay sultanate, the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals). Salleh makes 
the point that kesabaran in connection with the Malay cultural hero Hang Tuah 
may also serve the value of kesetiaan, loyalty or devotion to the ruler.  (The 
concepts of “kesetiaan”, “kehalusan”, and “derhaka” were explained in Chapter 
2.) 
 
3.9.10  Kasihan 
 
Kasihan can be loosely interpreted as a sense of collective responsibility. The 
Malays are basically communitarians and have a tendency to protect one another 
when mistakes are made.  They will not blame, or point the finger even when one 
specific individual can be identified as responsible for a mistake or shortcoming.  
In an organisation where Malays make up the majority of the work force, the 
kasihan factor is commonly found and it is extremely difficult for anyone to be 
squarely blamed for any mistake.  Kasihan is displayed exclusively amongst 
Malays and only very rarely where both Malays and non-Malays are involved.  If 
a non-Malay is to be blamed for an error, Malays may not normally display 
kasihan.  
 
3.9.11 Dependency 
 
Malays have often been criticised for their dependence on government help. The 
former Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, is one of the most vehement 
critics of this attitude on the part of the Malays, whom he has described as 
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wanting “to be on crutches”. Some other critics have ascribed this situation to the 
NEP, which has created what is termed “carried entrepreneurs”. Carried 
entrepreneurs are the nominees of the political parties in power and influential 
individual politicians and are given preference in the award of government 
contracts, closed tenders and licenses only for Malays. 
 
However, this tendency towards dependence is not a new phenomenon in Malay 
society. Its origins can be traced to the early feudal system, when the sultan 
granted concessions for trade and collecting taxes to a selection of nobles and 
chiefs. Preferential treatment is an accepted practice that continues to the present 
time. 
 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad wants to see that the Malays can stand on their own feet 
with no need for privileged treatment (Milner, 2008). Obviously it would be hard 
for the Malays to jettison their rights when they know that the constitution of the 
country, as well as its economic policy, is to provide special privileges for the 
Malays. 
 
3.9.12   Grace 
 
Malays are graceful. Grace is reflected even in the Malay martial art, silat. In the 
heyday of Malay sultanates, silat was a highly valued art of self-defence. At the 
outset, the two opponents make intentionally slow and very deliberate 
movements. Malay custom dictates that it is disrespectful for someone to make 
sudden and unexpected moves in the presence of others. 
 
It is considered provocative, disrespectful and rebellious for Malays to move 
faster than a respected family member or other authority figure. Not only should 
they move more slowly but they should also lower themselves and bow down 
when walking directly in front of them, in a show of submission. Women are 
taught to walk slowly because moving quickly is a sign of unrefined upbringing 
and lack of grace (Zamani, 2003). 
 
The Malays by nature are not argumentative.  In fact, there is no Malay 
equivalent for the word argument.  The origin of the term used to describe a 
dispute, hujah/hujahan, is borrowed from Arabic (Lim, K.H. (2003).  However, 
the absence of an appropriate Malay expression does not mean that Malays never 
argue.  Argumentation does not exist among the Malays but it was confined to 
budi. 
 
Dahlan (1991); Muhammad & Isa (2009); Storz (1999) and Tham (1971) have all 
written on the importance of budi in the Malay culture. Budi is the essence of the 
Malays’ social relationships and embodies all the virtues ranked in their value 
system: generosity, respect, sincerity, righteousness, discretion, and collective 
and individual feelings of shame. To understand the behaviour patterns of Malays 
in business, we must understand the budi complex. . (For further understanding of 
“budi”, please refer to ‘BUDI AS THE MALAY MIND:  a philosophical study of 
Malay ways of reasoning and emotion in “Peribahasa” – a dissertation submitted 
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to the Asia-Africa Institute Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Hamburg in 
candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Lim, Kim Hui.’) 
 
3.9.13 Sang Kancil  
 
It is surprising but true that its folktales reflect the subtle characteristics of a race 
or society.  Malay folktales detail episodes in the lives of Malay peasants and 
common people. They are usually moral tales about survival, morality and justice 
featuring a trickster (Ahmad, 1990). One well-known folktale shared by all 
Malays is Hikayat Sang Kancil. Hikayat Sang Kancil has a social antecedent in 
the form of a small mammal known as Sang Kancil (mouse deer). Sang Kancil is 
special for three reasons: it figures cunning; it escapes from all kinds of tricky 
situations; and it is small, an analogy to the Malays’ physical stature in 
comparison with other ethnic groups. The main theme of the Sang Kancil stories 
is that gifted Malays may be small but are too clever, smart and cunning to be 
outwitted by their opponents because they can solve problems creatively. 
 
The story of Kancil and the crocodiles (McKean, 1971) depicts Sang Kancil as a 
trickster but also as a just, witty and creative problem-solver. The story below 
tells how Sang Kancil tricks other animals in order to fulfil his own needs and 
desires:- 
 
After Kancil escaped from the tiger, he was tremendously hungry and 
thirsty, so he went to a river where he drank deeply. On the one side of the 
river, he noticed some delicious fruit but he could not get across. Then he 
called out, “Hey Crocodile, I have been ordered by the Prophet Sulaiman 
to take a census so come to the top of the water and line up.” When the 
crocodiles were all assembled in a row from one side of the river to the 
opposite bank Kancil jumped on to them, and began to count loudly as he 
jumped from one back to the next. “One, two, three, four, five, six...” 
When he was across and safely on dry land he gleefully yelled back, “Hey 
crocodiles, I fooled you, thank you for the bridge!” Then he had his meal 
of fruit. 
 
This story illustrates how easily Sang Kancil was able to trick the crocodiles into 
making a bridge for him to cross over the river by invoking Prophet Sulaiman; 
the crocodiles were fooled because they thought they were obeying the wishes of 
their king. 
 
Stories involving Sang Kancil evolved over many centuries and the earliest 
stories depict a pagan practical joker and even a petty thief who pitched his wits 
and cunning against the strength of much larger beasts (Sabri Zain – 
www.sabrizain.org/malaya/parames2.htm - Sejarah Melayu). 
 
The cunning methods Sang Kancil uses to pursue his goals reflect the Malays’ 
own psychological manoeuvres to create situations conducive to their own 
survival (McKean, 1971). The Malays also display wit and cunning to outwit 
competitors and enemies without confronting them directly. The Malays because 
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of their budi complex are unable to be forthright when they disagree with others. 
The Malay inclination is to avoid direct confrontation especially between superior 
and subordinate. By nature Malays also tend not to say things bluntly, nor act 
aggressively unless seriously provoked (Chee, 1992). They might therefore resort 
to writing surat layang (poison pen letters) against their enemies and circulating 
them within an organisation (political or corporate) to discredit their enemies, 
competitors or even superiors. These underhand methods are seen as more 
acceptable than direct confrontation – and a long folk tradition of similar cunning 
legitimizes the action. 
 
3.9.14 Self-respect 
 
“A Malay is intolerant of insult or slight; it is something that to him should be 
wiped out in blood…” (Swettenham, 1993). Malays expect status issues to be 
respected in the working environment (Ibrahim, 1998). If a manager scolds 
someone, the workers insist that he should exercise discretion and do so in private 
rather than in front of fellow workers. It is expected and demanded that the 
manager expresses a spirit of empathy, and not speak in a kasar (rough) manner. 
Malay culture places great importance on proper (patut) conduct. One of the most 
salient distinctions is between behaviour that is halus (refined) as opposed to 
kasar (crass, coarse or rough) (Goddard, 1997).  Malays always evaluate each 
other along this dimension of halus and kasar. In comparison with other cultures 
and peoples such as Chinese or Indians, Malays are generally considered halus 
and others kasar. 
 
Ibrahim relates that one manager was told “You cannot speak in this way to a 
Malay because it lowers his maruah (dignity).” The concept of maruah is closely 
associated with nama (reputation). 
 
3.9.15 Malu 
 
Malays consider a sense of malu (shame) an element of basic goodness in society 
(Mastor, Jin & Cooper, 2000).  Swift (1965) equated malu with 
“hypersensitiveness to what other people are thinking about oneself”. Also a 
related social concept is that of a person’s “maruah”  glossed by various bilingual 
dictionaries as “dignity”, “self-respect”, “pride” and the like explained earlier 
under self-respect. Malays accept malu as virtuous although it does not mean 
being shamed into doing the right thing. Because Malays are very sensitive to 
criticism and are always conscious of being “shamed”, they strive to get along 
with people and prefer to avoid interpersonal contact. The shame culture may also 
be a factor in their reluctance to make decisions: they fear being criticised or 
reprimanded for making a wrong decision. This is one of the reasons why Malays 
favour consensus when making major decisions, so that no one person can be 
blamed if things go wrong. This attitude ties in with the kasihan factor explained 
earlier, where the tendency is to protect one another in a group when mistakes are 
made. 
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3.9.16 Envy 
 
For a society that is collectivist and espouses communitarianism, envy and 
jealousy often get entrenched in families especially between siblings in the Malay 
society. Rivalry and malicious envy become evident according to Zamani (2003) 
when the siblings leave the immediate family and settle down to have families of 
their own. 
 
Being a collectivist society, when everyone is of equal status, people are willing 
to work closely and cooperate. If one person in the group becomes more 
successful than others, then the envy factor triggers in. Known in the Malay 
language as 'perasaan hasad dengki' which is equivalent to feeling extreme 
jealousy and envy to the point of hatred, and commonly referred to as 'PHD' by 
the Malays, this trait is widely acknowledged by the Malays themselves. 
 
It is also aggravated by the tendency of the successful person's naive propensity 
to display his or her newly-achieved success through very conspicuous behaviour 
which borders on haughtiness. In the eyes of the Malays, such show of 
extravagance is considered arrogant and intolerable. Sloane (1999) observes that 
despite claims by Malays (and ethnographers) that they treat 'everyone' like 
brothers and sisters, it turns out that in real sibling groups they follow that 
principle least of all. "In reality there was often little affection among actual 
siblings in the families of many of my informants. Indeed, these relationships 
were often fraught with issues of financial competition, memories of past 
injustice, inequities in perceptions of parental love and almost brutal jealousy. 
Moreover this does not seem to be a contemporary problem. My informants' 
parents made frequent references to past family crises within their own sibling 
groups, old stories about stolen land and misused capital which obviously still 
had such emotional power that they could not be told without a very 
contemporary feeling of anger" (p. 43). 
 
This envy factor is not just confined to siblings alone but extends beyond to any 
successful Malay and seems prevalent at the societal level too which explains the 
well- known PHD acronym among the Malays. 
 
One of the expert panel members in his interview also mentioned,"...... The 
Malays' weaknesses are also related to their strengths. Because they are 
community-oriented, everyone thinks they all should be at the same level. If one 
of them is successful, then the envy factor comes in so they try to bring the 
successful Malay down, be it through rumours or “surat layang" (“surat layang” 
was explained under 'Sang Kancil' as poison pen letters). 
 
At the societal level, envy is brought about by deprivation and inequality. When 
there are gross inequalities there will be envy but it can be caused more by 
deprivation then by inherent difficulties in tolerating the good fortune of others. 
Some explanation may be offered in sibling envy in Malay families where there 
are several children and inadequate attention to the children at an early age by 
parents may result in envy. Klein as quoted by Barrows (2002) described how if 
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the baby has thoroughly satisfying experiences in the first few months, a basis of 
gratitude can develop that can serve to envy and destructiveness. 
 
As Malays are still deemed to be largely dependent on the Government for their 
employment directly or business opportunities indirectly, envy can also be evoked 
by the insecurities of the Malays and their feelings that someone else got a better 
deal. 
 
3.10 Synthesis of the Four Models of Culture 
 
The Four Models of Culture in the context of Malay culture 
 
When we take the four models of culture and apply them to the Malays, a clear 
picture of the Malay culture would emerge which is not surprisingly similar to, 
and echoes the views of the various writers on the Malays. 
 
Hofstede’s Model 
 
In Hofstede’s model which was discussed together with the other three models 
earlier in this Chapter, we saw that Malaysia has the following rankings to the 
four dimensions as presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8:  Malaysia’s ranking in the four dimensions of Hofstede’s model. 
 
 
 
In Hofstede’s model, the rankings observed in relation to Malaysia are critical 
and have therefore been recapitulated as follows:- 
 
a) In a society in which Power Distances are large, authority tends to be 
traditional; sometimes, even rooted in religion. Power is seen as a basic fact 
of society that precedes the choice between good and evil. Its legitimacy is 
irrelevant. Might prevail over right. This is a strong statement that may rarely 
be presented in this term but is reflected in the behaviour of those in power 
and ordinary people. There is an unspoken consensus in this world in which 
everybody has his or her place. Such an order satisfies people’s need for 
dependence, and it gives a sense of security both to those in power and to 
those lower down (p. 60-61). 
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b) Many countries that score high on the Power Distance Index score low on 
Individualism Index and vise-versa. In other words, the two dimensions tend 
to be negatively correlated: large power distance countries are also likely to 
be more collectivist and small power distance to be more individualist. 
(Malaysia which is number 1 in PDI is also low on the Individualism Index 
proving this argument; please refer to Table 8. 
 
c) In countries with weaker Uncertainty Avoidance, there is less of a prevailing 
sense of urgency, and therefore more public acceptance of a lower speed 
limit. 
 
Based on Hofstede’s model, we could see that Malaysia ranks number one on the 
Power Distance Index and given that Malays are feudalistic by nature, the 
acceptance of social inequality and the unequal distribution of power which goes 
with power distance is hardly surprising. 
 
The dimension of power distance is certainly relevant to an explication of Malay 
cultural behaviour. Awareness of status was pervasive in Malay culture and to a 
large extent, remains deeply embedded in the Malay psyche (Chee, 1992). 
 
In the Individualism Index, Malaysia ranks 52 out of 74 countries clearly placing 
it as a collectivist society. This classification also fits in with existing research 
classifying Malays as collectivists (Abdullah, 1996; Bochner, 1994; Burns & 
Brady, 1992; Dahlan, 1991; Keshvarz & Baharudin, 2009). 
 
Malaysia is also classified as country with a low Uncertainty Avoidance Index. A 
feudalistic society that accepts large power distance and social inequality would 
naturally be included as one with low uncertainty avoidance. 
 
In the Masculinity-Femininity Index, Malaysia falls right in between, reflecting 
neither strong masculinity nor strong femininity. Being a Muslim majority 
country it falls in the middle line with other Islamic countries in the index – Arab 
countries, Morocco (ranking 31-32), Pakistan and Malaysia share the same 
ranking 34-36. But this dimension while useful to note has no evident influence 
or impact for the purpose of this research. 
 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner Model 
 
In the Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner study on culture, Malaysia was included 
in one of the over 40 countries where the authors did several empirical tests to 
determine the cultural traits of the countries. Based on this study Malaysia's 
classification in the Five Dimensions of Culture are as follows: 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 9> 
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Table 9:  Malaysia’s classification under the cultural dimensions of 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner. 
 
 
 
Malay values are strongly identified with all the five dimensions of Trompenaars 
& Hampden-Turner. 
 
1) Universalism vs. Particularism 
That Malaysia is inclined towards particularism could be seen in the manner 
in which the government has been more lenient in awarding major contracts 
to only chosen few Malay entrepreneurs without any form of open tenders or 
selection criteria. In such cases, the Government’s rationale is that it knows 
these entrepreneurs and their capabilities and therefore it could rely on them 
rather than selecting unknown companies even though they may be admitted 
as more competent (this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 under 
Focus Groups and Expert Panel Interviews). 
 
The dimension of Particularism is closely associated with the ascription 
orientation. 
 
“While they no longer use siblingship terms outside that family and 
village circle, Malay use feelings of ethnic “connectedness” to 
establish valuable social and economic ties in the vast community of 
Kuala Lumpur and to confirm a sense of mutual obligation and 
entailment.” (Sloane, 1999, p. 44) 
 
2) Individualism vs Communitarianism 
 
As we have seen ample arguments throughout the research pointing to Malay 
culture as one of Collectivist, it would therefore be quite easy to classify 
Malays as oriented towards Communitarianism. Collectivism and 
Communitarianism go hand in hand.  
 
In the Malay society among the common people, close kinship ties among 
the members are common. On the basis of these social ties, many activities 
are carried out by members of the same village such as mutual assistance and 
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feasting and various forms of cooperation in the economic field (Husin Ali, 
2008). 
 
Kennedy (2002) also has similar views on the Malay culture as he agrees the 
Malay culture developed from a history of communal living. Villages 
historically, cooperated in agricultural tasks and the building of communal 
facilities. Cooperation is still important to Malays especially for the common 
good. 
 
Chee (1992) has cited the element in Malay culture that may have a bearing 
on business as the concept of “tolong-menolong” which roughly translated 
means mutual support. This term refers to a mode of mutual self-help 
associated with Malay rural life as in the planting and harvesting of padi. 
Malays take pride in themselves for their spirit of “tolong-menolong”. 
 
In the Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner survey of individual freedom, only 
45% of Malaysians voted for individual freedom against 55% who were 
willing to sacrifice individual freedom for the benefit of fellow human 
beings. 
 
3) Diffuse vs Specific 
Malays through the strong influence of feudalism tend to be a diffuse culture. 
The principle of losing face also goes with the diffuse culture and we have 
seen how self-respect is an important attribute in the Malay culture. People 
from diffuse cultures are also those with high context culture and therefore as 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner point out, doing business with a culture 
more diffuse than our own could be very time consuming. High-context 
communication involves emotions and close relationships while low-context 
interactions use the logical part of the brain and are less personal says Mohd 
Salleh (2005) quoting Hall (1998). “For example, a typical Malay tradition is 
to serve beverages and local cakes when guests visit their homes. Malays like 
their guests to feel comfortable and welcomed when the guests pay them a 
visit, so the way to do this is to provide hospitable atmosphere. This practice 
is brought in to their organisational business meetings during which business 
partners are typically served refreshments and light snacks during meetings. 
To Malays, building relationship comes before getting down the business” 
(Mohd Salleh, 2005, p. 3). 
 
We could therefore conclude that Malays have a Diffuse culture. 
 
4) Achievement-oriented vs Ascription-oriented 
When a society is inclined to feudalism, collectivism, communitarianism and 
diffuse culture, it is most likely to be Ascription-oriented. 
 
In the Malay culture, status is ascribed and achievement is not important 
especially when dealing with the upper clan (Husin Ali, 2008). Among the 
Malays the saying “It’s who you know not what you know” is commonly 
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used to imply that the society leans very much towards ascription rather than 
achievement. 
 
Again as mentioned earlier and would be discussed in Chapter 5, the Malay 
culture is quite comfortable with its ascriptive tendencies. 
 
As Wain (2009a, p. 102) noted, the “..most lucrative privatization contracts 
were directed at Malay businessmen associated with one of the three top 
political leaders: Dr. Mahathir, Daim and Anwar Ibrahim...” 
 
The extent and influence of ascription in the Malay society could be seen 
when the privatized entities that were devastated by the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997-1998 through too much borrowings and lack of managerial 
competence, were either bailed out or effectively renationalized by the 
government (Wain, 2009a, p. 103).  
 
No doubt the government rightly argued that it could not allow such major 
projects to fail and had to bail them out; nevertheless, the ascriptive tendency 
too did play its part in the whole process. 
 
5) Affective vs Neutral 
Members of cultures which are affectively neutral do not telegraph their 
feelings but keep them carefully controlled and subdued, say Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner which also describes the Malay personality adequately. 
 
According to Goddard (1996), the Malay culture discourages people from 
verbally expressing how they feel, the ideal demeanour being one of good-
natured calm. The Malays are also said to be extremely impassive. 
 
To drive home the point that the Malay culture conforms to Neutral, 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner relate this anecdote: “A British manager 
posted to Nigeria found that it was very effective to raise his voice for 
important issues. His Nigerian subordinates saw this unexpected explosion as 
a sign of extra concern. After success in Nigeria, he was posted to Malaysia. 
Shouting there was a sign of loss of face; his colleagues did not take him 
seriously and he was transferred” (p.77).   
 
The Malay concept of “malu” and their characteristics associated with their 
gentle upbringing, self-effacing habits and respect for the others, make them 
culturally neutral. 
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Kets de Vries et al Model 
 
In the Kets de Vries et al’s model, Wheel of National Culture, which has nine 
dimensions, the Malay culture fits in as described below: 
 
a) Environment (Mastery over nature vs. Harmony with environment) 
 
Malays live in harmony with nature and accept that forces beyond their 
control shape the world. This concept is intrinsic to the Malay culture and 
could be traced to the Islamic values (Abdullah, 1996; Parkinson, 1967). In 
the Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner survey, only 26 % in Malaysia 
responded that it’s worth trying to control nature. 
 
b) Action orientation (Being vs. Doing orientation) 
 
Malays adopt more of being oriented than doing. It is generally believed by 
Muslims that takdir (fate or what is willed by the divine decree of Allah), 
cannot be changed (Sloane, 1999). 
 
c) Emotion (Experience vs. Inhibitive) 
 
Malays tend to control their emotions and are not expressive. One of the 
main dimensions of Malay culture relates to the expression of personal 
feelings. In general, the Malay culture discourages people from verbally 
expressing how they feel, the ideal demeanour being one of good-natured 
calm as was pointed out in “sabar”. In summing up, the Malay race is 
extremely impassive (Goddard, 1996). 
 
d) Language (High context vs. low context) 
 
In the Malay culture, emphasis is on high context form of communication 
where verbal and circumstances surrounding the communication should be 
taken into account (Abdullah, 1996). In making a request for example, 
Malays are generally indirect. It is considered impolite to make an outright 
request, so Malays tend to talk around what they intend to convey in the hope 
that their message is understood. Not much information can be gathered from 
just speaking with a Malay. A lot of hidden messages are intertwined in the 
non-verbal communication of a Malay. 
 
e) Space (Public vs. Private) 
 
For a community that adopts Collectivism and Pluralism, Malays also respect 
the private space of families. 
 
The Neutral dimension of the Malay culture and the other aspects such as 
“malu” (shame) and self-respect, all augur well to support the Malay 
tendency to respect privacy.  
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f) Relationships (Individualist vs. Collectivist) 
 
In Hofstede’s model, it was seen that Malays ranked low for the 
Individualism Index and in Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner model, Malays 
were classified as Communitarianist. In the Globe study as quoted by 
Kennedy (2002), Malaysians gave the highest rating of any cultural scale to 
Collectivism. So Collectivism takes clear precedence over Individualism. 
 
g) Power (Achievement-oriented vs. Ascription-oriented) 
 
In this dimension again it was seen under the Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner model, Malays are ascriptive by nature. 
 
h) Thinking (Partial vs. Holistic) 
 
In the Thinking, the Malays look for the Holistic approach and look at the big 
picture seeing patterns and the relationship rather than viewing things in 
parts. 
 
i) Time (Monochronic orientation vs. Polychronic orientation) 
 
For Malaysians; past, present and future overlap considerably; quite similarly 
to the French (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). Polychronic 
orientation also described as synchronic culture is what would describe 
Malays best as they are not so insistent on punctuality preferring to “give 
time” to people with special relationships. Prominent people are expected to 
arrive late for meetings and there is plenty of food to go around in case more 
guests arrive in a function. 
 
RSVPs may not be seriously followed. In wedding receptions of the Malays, 
it is common to experience people who have responded to attend but not turn 
up, but others who have not bothered to inform the host of their attendance, 
turning up at the last minute. This may sometimes result in the need for 
additional seating and hotels usually anticipate such situations and would be 
prepared to manage them.  
 
Based on the four cultural models reviewed and how the Malay culture fits into 
the various dimensions, the next step is to see how the sixteen salient features of 
Malay characteristics would fit with the four models. 
 
Among the four models, Schein’s levels of culture stands separate and would be 
applied in Chapter 7, when I make comparisons of the cultures of the three 
different races. In this section we will see briefly how the Malay traits also would 
fit in Schein’s model. 
 
Of the other three models of Hofstede, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner and 
Kets de Vries et al, there are several overlapping dimensions which I have 
combined; such that the 18 dimensions, i.e., 4 of Hofstede’s; 5 of Trompenaars & 
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Hampden-Turner’s, and 9 of Kets de Vries’, become synthesised into  
12 dimensions as follows: 
 
Figure 8: Synthesis of Hofstede’s, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner’s and 
Kets de Vries et al’s models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 8.1> 
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Figure 8.1: Synthesis of Hofstede’s, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner’s and 
Kets de Vries et al’s models. 
 
 
 
    
  
Next, taking the sixteen salient features of the Malay character and culture which 
were distilled from the various books written on the Malays combined with my 
experience and observations over the years, as well as discussion with various 
Malays at different levels, focus group discussions and expert panel interview 
members, I made an attempt to fit the sixteen Malay traits with the different 
dimensions of the four models. 
 
In trying to match a characteristic against a particular dimension, to my surprise 
ten out of the sixteen characteristics of the Malays was related one way or another 
to Power Distance. 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 10> 
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Table 10: Malay characteristics associated with Power Distance. 
 
 
 
There are two other traits which are related to the Power Distance in the reverse. 
These are: 
 
Self-respect – Historically, the Malays have already suffered in their self-respect 
as part of the hierarchical structure where the commoners are just above the 
slaves. But they accepted this structure without any problem because of their 
feudalistic mindset. But when dealing with outsiders and themselves, they expect 
to be respected and not insulted. This could be a result of projection which is a 
defence mechanism. It is a way of dealing with wishes, thoughts, feelings and 
qualities – anything that individual refuses to recognise as belonging to him or 
rejects about himself.  Instead, he expects it from himself and attaches it to 
another person or thing. He recognises in others what he refuses to acknowledge 
in himself (Budd & Rusbridger, 2005). 
 
“Projection” is a psychological process that involves the attribution of 
inacceptable thoughts, feelings, traits or behaviours to others that are 
characteristic of oneself (Sandler, 1989; Clark, 1998) as quoted by Grant & 
Crawley (2002). 
 
Malays are being made to be subservient to higher authorities which they deny in 
themselves and project it to outsiders and get upset when someone is rude or 
insulting to them. 
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“Malu” or shame – can also be considered an attitude tied to Power Distance. By 
virtue of their respect for authority and acceptance of Power Distance, Malays 
have cultivated the sense of feeling of shame as a virtue. They are always 
conscious of being “shamed” by others and they strive to get along with people 
and prefer to avoid interpersonal contact. This is again caused by the 
internalization of their low status in the hierarchy of the feudal system. 
 
Internalization is defined as a process whereby the individual transfers a 
relationship with an external object into his internal world. Schafer (1968) as 
quoted by Wallis & Poulton (2001, p. 6) says “Internalization refers to all those 
processes by which the object transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions 
with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment, 
into the inner regulations and characteristics.” 
 
So over a period, the feeling of shame has been internalized and considered a 
virtue. 
 
“Sabar” (patience) – “Sabar” is an espoused value in the Malay culture and 
could mean “calm, patient”, “forbearing” as explained earlier.  This trait is 
closely aligned to the “neutral” or “emotion” dimension of the culture. 
 
“Kasihan” (feeling of pity or sympathy) and envy are attributes related to 
Collectivism and Communitarianism. It was pointed out earlier that “kasihan” is 
the tendency to sympathise when someone has made a mistake in the group 
(found largely only in Malays), the group would not pinpoint the responsibility to 
a single person. This arises mainly due to the feeling of the group as Collectivist 
or Communitarianist. 
 
Dependency also could be identified to be in alignment with the Collectivist or 
Communitarianist where the members of the society are dependent on one 
another through cooperation (gotong-royong) or dependent on the government for 
their economic survival. 
 
Envy is a negative attribute arising out of Collectivism and Communitarianism 
whereby as long as everyone is of equal status, people are willing to work closely 
and cooperate but if someone is more successful than others, then the feeling of 
envy begins to creep in. 
 
 “Grace”, a Malay characteristic, is closely aligned to language (high context/low 
context). As Malays have a high context culture where feelings or actions are not 
displayed directly, they do it in a slow and indirect manner. 
 
Artefacts 
 
Finally, the Malays’ love for artefacts seems to be an attribute that could be 
identified with their action orientation in which Malays could be classified as 
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more of Being than Doing and therefore, take pride in artefacts and form over 
substance. 
 
Schein’s model 
 
Schein’s “Levels of Culture” unlike the other three models stands as a separate 
model and the sixteen cultural traits of Malays could be broadly classified as 
follows forming the three levels of culture: 
 
Figure 9: Schein’s Levels of Culture 
       
 
Schein’s levels of culture would also be used in Chapter 7 when discussing the 
multi-ethnic races and their similarities and differences affecting the Malay 
leadership. 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 
Having carefully combed through the four models of culture to identify the Malay 
way of life in the various dimensions of the cultural models, we were able to get a 
clearer picture of the Malay culture. Then we identified sixteen Malay 
characteristics derived from the literature survey about the Malays and linked 
them to the various dimensions of culture. 
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As identified by Berry et al (2002), ecological influences, genetic transmission, 
cultural transmission and acculturation helped us to distill the observable 
behaviours and inferred characteristics of the Malays in this chapter.  Out of the 
sixteen observable behaviours and inferred characteristics of the Malays, we 
notice that ten of them are directly, indirectly or reversely linked to Power 
Distance. Needless to say, Power Distance in which Malaysia is the number one 
country globally is intertwined with feudalism as the axis. Therefore; the one core 
basic assumption fundamental to Malay culture and affecting most other facets of 
Malay culture is the strong and deep influence of feudalism. Feudalism is both 
consciously and unconsciously as strong in every aspect of Malay life and culture 
- both positively and negatively - that it clearly forms the axis of the wheel of 
Malay culture. The power of feudalism is reflected in making Malaysia a country 
with the strongest Power Distance (see Figure 10 in page 105). 
 
Most writers have identified feudalism and colonialism as the two main causes of 
the social and economic problems faced by the Malays (Alatas, 1977; Andaya & 
Andaya, 2001; Husin Ali, 2008; Milner, 2008; Omar, 2006; Zamani, 2003) while 
a few writers have also identified them as the root of serious psychological 
problems for the Malays. 
 
The earliest of the latter was Clifford (1898), who claimed that Malays were, as a 
whole, capable of developing a psycho-pathological disorder termed latah (please 
refer to the glossary of psychological terms provided in Appendix 10 for further 
description of latah)  if sufficiently persecuted, teased and harassed.  Added to 
the theory that the Malays were decadent and degenerate when the British 
colonised their territory, is that, as a nation, they were potential victims of a 
pathological mental disorder, the seed of which already existed in their makeup 
(Alatas, 1977). 
 
In 1843, Abdullah Munshi, soon after completing the first volume of Hikayat 
Abdullah expressed his pessimism about the Malays. Based on observations he 
had made since his youth, he concluded rather despairingly that their conduct, 
behaviour and habits were deteriorating over time and that far from becoming 
intelligent, “they became more and more stupid”.   
 
Abdullah concluded that there were several reasons for this state of affairs but 
that the main one was the inhumanity and the repressive tyranny of the Malay 
rulers towards their own subjects.  “The point has been reached,” he wrote, “at 
which their hearts have become like soil which no longer receives its nourishment 
and wherein therefore nothing at all can grow. Industry, intelligence and learning 
cannot flourish among them and they are simply like trees in the jungle falling 
whichever way the wind blows. I noticed that they were always ruled by men of 
other races, small fry whose only value is to provide food for the big fry.” 
Abdullah puts the blame for Malay society’s “extinction of the will to learn, to 
work hard, and to accumulate wealth” squarely on the dominant ruling power 
(Alatas, 1977, p. 139). 
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Dr Mahathir (1970) has also made observations on the Malay psyche and amok 
behaviour.  He maintained that the immigrant races neither admired nor 
appreciated the courtesy and self-effacing psychology of the Malays and took 
undue advantage of them. The Malays face a severe and perpetual internal 
struggle, as their own nature prevents them from openly criticising the selfish 
behaviour of the immigrants who exploit their generosity. “There is always an 
internal struggle, a conflict and this conflict finds expression in a variety of ways. 
The first and most important result is a withdrawing into himself and his race.  He 
is never frank except with those whose sympathy he can rely on absolutely. And 
he can rely absolutely only on his own people. His opinions as expressed to those 
not of his own kind are therefore different from those expressed to his own kind. 
Of course the difference only occurs when what he has to express to others is 
unpleasant or unpalatable. Where his true opinion will cause no unpleasantness or 
animosity, he does not hesitate to voice it to his own community as well as other 
communities. It is therefore fallacious to accept the Malay at face value. It is far 
better if his politeness and his abhorrence of unpleasantness are understood for 
what they really are.  The conflict within him is potentially dangerous. It is 
perpetually seeking expression.” Dr Mahathir also suggested that running amok – 
a response to this internalised conflict – is an essential part of the Malay character 
(Alatas, 1977; Dr Mahathir, 1970). 
 
Dr Mahathir described amok as the external physical expression of the conflict 
within the Malay that his perpetual submission to the rules and regulations that 
govern his life provokes. It is the result of the spilling-over of inner bitterness and 
the rupture of the bonds that bind him. He reaches a stage that is a final and 
complete departure from all reason and training. The lid of suppression is lifted, 
his responsibility disappears and he is free. He no longer cares. His mind severs 
its link with the past, and the future holds nothing. In a kind of trance, he lashes 
out indiscriminately. His timid, self-effacing self is displaced. He becomes a sort 
of Mr Hyde – cruel, callous and destructive. The transition from the self-effacing 
courteous Malay to amok is always a slow process, so slow that in most cases it 
does not manifest itself at all. 
 
Dr Mahathir examines amok in order to illustrate that the Malay problem is more 
explosive than the evidence seems to indicate. He stresses the peculiarity of the 
Malays in suppressing their discontent and reasons that this is one explanation of 
why, throughout their history, the Malays appear to be content to withdraw 
further and further into the background and give up, apparently politely, almost 
every vestige of power and authority in their own land.  Swettenham, who 
understood the Malays rather intimately, has also observed that the Malays were 
susceptible to amok. (See Section 3.2) 
 
The late Noordin Sopiee, former Chairman of Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS), believed that 400 years of external or colonial rule 
created a sense of powerlessness “psychologically crippling” the Malays 
(Kennedy, 2002). 
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A century-and-a-half ago, Clifford and Abdullah were already pointing to the 
serious psychological problems faced by the Malays. However, Alatas (1977) 
criticised Clifford’s apparent confidence, as a non-psychologist, in declaring the 
Malay as a nation were the victims of a pathological disorder of the mind.  
According to Alatas, “The disciplines in national character study such as history, 
anthropology, psychoanalysis and the sociology have never been applied by the 
scholar administrators and travellers. Their conclusions on Malay character do 
not qualify as scientific hypotheses.”  Now, almost 35 years after Alatas first 
lamented that no multi-disciplinary scholarly research had been done on the 
Malay problems, it is sad to note that the situation remains the same. With this 
research I hope to fill that void and establish a building block for a deeper 
understanding of the Malay mind. 
 
Since several writers have made serious comments about the Malay psychological 
problem since the 1800s to present day, I feel that my attempt to explore the 
Malay leadership using the clinical paradigm is a step in the right direction.  As 
the Malays’ psychological problem was identified at the societal level and not 
merely at individual level, the psychoanalytic theories relating to large-groups 
have to be applied to understand the Malay problems.  
 
Using the various models discussed in these chapters and combining the key 
issues identified in the historical and contemporary writings about Malays, I 
would attempt to integrate the major themes evolving from the focus group 
discussions and expert panel interviews in Chapter 5, and 360-degree feedback 
findings in Chapter 6, to paint a broad picture of exploring the Malay leadership 
position in business. This may then lead us to look at the future of Malay political 
and business leadership in Malaysia more critically.  
  
The summary of the Malay cultural traits are presented in Figures 10 and 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figures 10 and 11> 
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Figure 10: The “Wheel of Malay culture” with feudalism as its axis 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Malay Model of Culture 
 
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 3> 
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Chapter 4 – Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Selecting an appropriate methodology for research of this nature – related to 
human behaviour – is a challenge. Most early concepts of human nature were 
guided solely by philosophical or religious dogma, unlike knowledge that could 
only be obtained empirically, e.g. medicine, architecture or land cultivation. 
Empirical observations also gave birth to physics, chemistry and biology. Human 
behaviour is so complex that a scientific analysis of it seems a formidable task 
(Neale & Liebert, 1973). Therefore, it is extremely difficult to apply a purely 
quantitative approach to research of this nature. 
 
According to Denzin & Lincoln (2000, p. 8); the word “qualitative” implies an 
emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not 
experimentally examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, 
amount, intensity or frequency. 
 
Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry.  Such researchers emphasise the value-
laden nature of inquiry.  They seek answers to questions that stress “how” social 
experience is created and given meaning. 
 
For this reason, I have adopted a qualitative approach with some empirical input 
where relevant as an appropriate methodology for this research. 
 
Qualitative research design is very much like choreography (Janesick, 2003). Just 
as a good choreographer refuses to be limited to just one approach or technique 
from the dance repertoire, so the qualitative researcher refuses to be limited.  
 
The essence of a good qualitative research design turns on the use of a set of 
procedures that are simultaneously open-ended and rigorous. The qualitative 
researcher uses various techniques and procedures to capture the complexity of 
the social situation under study (Flick, 1998).  
 
This study involves qualitative research using a combination of participant 
observation, interviews, focus group discussions and document analysis. The use 
of such approaches and strategies in qualitative studies is well-documented and 
widely found in the literature (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Creswell, 1997; Denzin, 
1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Goetz & Le Compte, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Janesick, 1998, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 1995; Maxwell, 1996; Strauss 
& Cobin, 1990). 
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Over the last three decades grounded theory, literary criticism, and ethnographic 
approaches to qualitative research have been accepted because of their suitability 
to research questions (Janesick, 2003). 
 
4.2 Nature of research and choice of methodology 
 
The research will build a background to understanding Malay leadership qualities 
in business and politics; no previous study of this nature has been undertaken, so 
this is intended to be an exploratory study. Once a background for understanding 
Malay leadership qualities in business and politics is built, further research could 
be undertaken to arrive at a clearer and more definitive hypothesis on 
understanding Malay leadership qualities.  
 
An initial pioneering study such as this will enable researchers to form some 
preliminary hypotheses about Malay leadership qualities in business and politics. 
 
The nature of this research calls for a multi-disciplinary approach. In order to 
conduct a study about Malay leadership qualities, the entrepreneurial qualities of 
Malay business leaders, as well as the Malay community’s economic standing in 
the country compared to the other races, one has to understand the history of the 
Malays, their character and culture. This study draws on sociological, 
anthropological and economic theories. In addition, I apply the clinical paradigm 
which employs mainly the constructs taken from psychoanalytic psychology to 
understand Malay behaviour.  
 
Strauss (1998) mentions a set of assumptions that lie behind qualitative analysis. 
Some of the assumptions applicable to this research are: 
 
 Very diverse materials (interviews, transcripts of meetings, questionnaire 
responses, field observations, census statistics, etc.) provide indispensable 
data for research of this nature. 
 
 Compared to the quantitative analysis of data, actual data collection in 
qualitative research such as this, analysing materials is rudimentary. 
 
 The social phenomena examined in this research are complex and 
therefore require complex grounded theory.  
 
 There are no hard-and-fast rules governing qualitative analysis, given the 
diversity of social settings, research projects, individual research styles, 
and unexpected contingencies that affect the research. However, it is 
possible to lay out general guidelines and rules of thumb for effective 
analysis. 
 
 These guidelines are useful for exploratory and complex research 
regardless of “tradition or theoretical approach”. I firmly believe that this 
work could be furthered by the qualitative examination of materials.  
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Such analytic methods can be useful for this research irrespective of whether one 
considers this a field of social science or a more humanistic version of social 
research (“understanding”, “enlightenment”).  
 
Having established that the background for the research calls for a qualitative 
analysis, the research design needs to be established. 
 
Lee (1999) points out that in comparison to the moderate agreement about the 
major domains of qualitative research (and their underlying themes); there is 
substantial disagreement over its major components. 
 
Lee focuses on three recent efforts to categorise the major components of 
qualitative research undertaken by Coffey & Atkinson (1996); Marshall & 
Rossman (1995) and Maxwell (1996).  Marshall & Rossman (1995) according to 
Lee, limit their description of the major components of qualitative research to a 
grounded theory approach. Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Strauss (1987) are also 
proponents of grounded theory for qualitative research. 
 
Maxwell (1996) offers a five-part general model for the components of 
qualitative research. They are: 
 
(i) The purpose of the research; 
(ii) The conceptual contexts, i.e., what information guides or informs the 
study; 
(iii) The research question itself – what specifically is being answered by the 
study; 
(iv) The methods and tactics applied – identifying the data to be collected 
and the methods of data collection and analysis; and 
(v) The validity of the research to be addressed – particularly how the 
research might be wrong, and how potential alternatives might be 
discounted. 
 
Maxwell (1996) likens the connections between the five parts of his model to the 
flexibility of rubber bands. Maxwell argues that the rubber band metaphor is 
novel because qualitative research does not hold to rule-driven designs. 
 
Coffey & Atkinson (1996) argues that (a) qualitative research occurs in numerous 
forms; (b) qualitative researchers themselves cannot agree on what to call these 
forms, and (c) taxonomic approaches can become too easily misleading. They 
assert that it is difficult to describe major components of qualitative research 
because a variety of analytic strategies can be legitimately used within a single 
research project. 
 
To establish that qualitative analysis and designs are the best choice, Lee (1999), 
Marshall & Rossman (1995) and Miles & Huberman (1994) recommend that the 
researcher answers yes to one or more of the following questions enumerated in 
Table 11: 
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Table 11: Recommendations of Lee (1999), Marshall & Rossman (1995), 
Miles & Huberman (1994), to determine the qualitative nature of research. 
 
 
 
As all six questions can be answered in the affirmative, the study’s explicit 
purpose then becomes the defining issue. The study’s purpose is both exploratory 
(i.e., to investigate poorly understood phenomena, to generate preliminary 
hypotheses) and explanatory (i.e., to identify probable causes for the poor 
leadership qualities of Malays in business). 
 
As the study employs a clinical and psychodynamic approach, the research is 
categorised as interpretive organisational research within the field of social 
sciences using qualitative data and inductive method of analysis (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Gooijer 2009; Strauss, 1987).  
 
The study is subjective as it aims to study Malay leadership qualities through the 
history, experiences and performance of Malay leaders. A diagrammatic 
representation of the multi-disciplinary approach of the research is provided in 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: A multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the Malay 
leadership mystique 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Multi-method Approach 
 
This research is largely qualitative and therefore relies on grounded theory and, 
where relevant, experiential data and interpretive methodology. A limited amount 
of quantitative research is used, specifically in the application of five 360- degree 
feedback instruments. I also draw on empirical work on culture carried out by 
Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998), which 
incorporates data on Malaysian culture. 
 
4.3.1 Grounded Theory 
 
Strauss (1987) says the methodological thrust of the grounded theory approach to 
qualitative data is towards the development of theory, without any particular 
commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research or theoretical interests. So, 
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grounded theory is not really a specific method or technique. Rather; emphasises 
Strauss, it is a style of doing qualitative analysis that includes a number of distinct 
features, such as theoretical sampling and certain methodological guidelines, the 
making of constant comparisons and the use of a coding paradigm to ensure 
conceptual development and density. 
 
According to Larsson & Lowendahl (1996) and Lee (1999), grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss (1967), Strauss (1987) has been the dominant qualitative 
method used in studies published in the organisational sciences. That dominance, 
says Lee (1999), continues unabated. Lee notes the following key points, features 
and assumptions of grounded theory: 
 
 The main purpose of grounded theory is to generate new theory or 
conceptual propositions; 
 
 The main application of grounded theory techniques has been to the 
examination of phenomena that are not well-understood; 
 
 Grounded theory is important to researchers because of its broad 
applicability to many organisational issues and situations, and sheer 
prevalence; 
 
 An underlying assumption in grounded theory is that social phenomena 
are complex; therefore the specific steps taken to study them need to be 
flexible (i.e. reflexive); 
 
 That there are no hard-and-fast rules about how to conduct grounded 
theory research; there are only general guidelines. 
 
Marshall & Rossman (1995) are also strong proponents of grounded theory. Their 
description of the major components of qualitative research is mainly limited to 
the grounded theory approach. Marshall & Rossman depict five inter-related parts 
to the design of qualitative research based on grounded theory: 
 
(i) The qualitative researcher must organise all the data; 
(ii) The qualitative researcher must generate themes, categories and patterns 
from the data; 
(iii) The qualitative researcher must empirically test the generated themes, 
categories, and patterns with additional data; 
(iv) The qualitative researcher must discount potential alternative 
explanations; and 
(v) The qualitative researcher must prepare a research report. 
 
Although formally named as grounded theory only in the early 1960s and 
developed by Glaser & Strauss (1967) during a field observational study of the 
way staff in a hospital handled dying patients, works of eminent scholars and 
social scientists have all relied heavily on a very similar methodology; from 
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Freud, Jung, Klein and Lacan to more recent psychoanalysts and scholars such as 
Bion, Bridger and Jacques; and organisational consultants working in Tavistock 
tradition, Erikson and Kets de Vries. 
 
The grounded theory is suitable for this research because its methodological 
thrust is towards the development of theory, without any particular commitment 
to specific kinds of data, lines of research or theoretical interests. It is a style of 
conducting qualitative analysis that includes features such as theoretical sampling 
and certain methodological guidelines, such as making constant comparisons and 
the use of a coding paradigm to ensure conceptual development and density 
(Strauss, 1987).  
 
Grounded theory is also a way of thinking about data – processes of 
conceptualisation – of theorising from data, so that the end result is a theory that 
the scientist produces from data collected by interviewing and observing 
everyday life.  
 
Grounded theory, despite being developed only in 1967 by Glaser & Strauss, may 
now be the most commonly used qualitative research method. Originally 
developed and used mainly in the area of healthcare, grounded theory has since 
taken off in other social science disciplines such as education, business, family 
studies, cultural studies, social network and gender studies. The influence of 
grounded theory is now widespread and has made a major contribution to the 
development of social science. 
 
Grounded theory enables the identification and description of phenomena, their 
main attributes, and the core, social or psychological process as well as 
interactions in the trajectory of change (Morse, Stern, Corbin, Bowers, Charmaz 
& Clarke, 2009). 
 
Techniques and procedures are tools to be used as researchers see fit to solve 
methodological problems. They are not a set of directives to be rigidly adhered to. 
No researcher should become so obsessed with following a set of coding 
procedures that the fluid and dynamic nature of qualitative analysis is lost. The 
analytical process is first and foremost, a thinking process. It requires stepping 
into others’ shoes and trying to see the world from their perspective. Analysis 
should be relaxed, flexible and driven by insight gained through interaction with 
data rather than being structured and based on procedures. 
 
4.3.1.1 Grounded Theory – Strauss versus Glaser 
 
I am mindful of the divergence in strategy between the original proponents of 
grounded theory – Glaser and Strauss.  In their pioneering book, The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory (1967), they challenged the hegemony of the quantitative 
research paradigm in the social sciences and provided a persuasive intellectual 
rationale for conducting qualitative research that permitted and encouraged 
novices to pursue it (Charmaz, K (2009) – “Shifting the grounds: Constructivist 
Grounded Theory Methods” in Developing Grounded Theory- The Second 
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Generation. Eds Morse J.M, Stern P.N, Corbin.J, Bower.B, Charmaz.K and 
Clarke A.E. Left Coast Press, CA) 
 
In the 1990s however, differences of opinion between Strauss and Glaser began 
seriously to split the original concept of grounded theory. This occurred at a time 
when grounded theory was gaining a wider audience. Glaser was highly critical 
of Strauss & Corbin’s Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques (1990) and published his retaliatory Basics of 
Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence versus Forcing. With Glaser repudiating 
Strauss & Corbin, two camps emerged; Glaser took the positivist side while 
Strauss & Corbin leant towards a more pragmatist and constructivist approach 
(Charmaz, 2009).  
 
Another possible explanation for Strauss and Glaser to go separate ways could be 
that Strauss was a sociologist and his natural tendency was towards more 
subjective and constructivist approach; while Glaser holds a doctorate in 
descriptive statistics and therefore more aligned to objectivist approach. 
 
From this divergence, two theories evolved – Constructivist Grounded Theory 
and Objectivist Grounded Theory. 
 
On 24
th
 September 2007 in a symposium in Barnff, Alberta, major 
methodologists of the “second generation” students of Glaser and Strauss 
gathered for the first time to discuss grounded theory, its developments, its 
controversies and its forms. The Grounded Theory Bash (‘bash’ as in celebration) 
the result of the symposium was the publication of Developing Grounded Theory 
– The Second Generation (2009) co-authored by Morse, Stern, Corbin, Bowers, 
Charmaz and Clarke. In this book, Charmaz (Chapter 6, p. 127-147) provides a 
clear comparison and contrast of both the objectivist grounded theory with 
positivist underpinnings and constructivist grounded theory with a pragmatist 
underpinning. 
 
For the purposes of this research, based on the assumptions, objectives and 
implications for data analysis of both objectivist grounded theory and 
constructivist grounded theory, it is appropriate to select the latter, which leans 
more towards Strauss & Cobin’s methodology (see Tables 12 and 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 12> 
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Table 12: Epistemological underpinnings of Grounded Theory 
 
 
Positivist/ 
Objectivist 
  
Pragmatist/ 
Constructivist 
Method deemed 
appropriate for this 
research 
Reason for choice 
Assumes the 
scientific method 
Takes a problem-
solving approach 
Pragmatist The research attempts 
to understand the 
problems related to 
Malay leadership in 
business 
Presupposes an 
external reality 
Views reality as 
fluid, somewhat 
indeterminate 
Pragmatist The reasons for 
Malays lagging behind 
in business are not 
definitive at this stage 
Assumes an 
unbiased observer 
Assumes a situated 
and embodied 
knowledge producer 
Both Both methods seem 
applicable 
Assumes 
discovery of 
abstract 
generalities 
Assumes a search 
for multiple 
perspectives 
Pragmatist The research looks for 
multiple perspectives 
Aims to explain 
empirical 
phenomena 
Aims to study 
people’s actions to 
solve emergent 
problems 
Pragmatist The research is 
intended to shed some 
light on the Malay 
leadership issues in 
business 
Views facts and 
values as 
separable 
Sees facts and 
values as co-
constitutive 
Pragmatist It’s not practical to 
separate facts and 
values in this research 
Views truth as 
conditional 
Views truth as 
conditional 
Both _ 
 
Source: adapted from ‘Shifting the Grounds – Constructivist Grounded Theory’ by 
Kathy Charmaz in Developing Grounded Theory – The Second Generation, edited 
by Morse et al, 2009 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 13>
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Table 13: Objectivist Grounded Theory versus Constructivist Grounded 
Theory 
  
 
 
Source: adapted from ‘Shifting the Grounds – Constructivist Grounded Theory’ 
by Kathy Charmaz in Developing Grounded Theory – The Second Generation, 
edited by Morse et al, 2009. 
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This research therefore relies on constructivist grounded theory, which is a more 
appropriate methodology for an exploratory study of this nature. 
 
4.3.1.2 Suitability of Grounded Theory for this research 
 
Suddaby (2006) quoting Glaser & Strauss (1967) has provided a clear description 
of grounded theory when he reiterates that “the purpose of grounded theory is not 
to make truth statements about reality, but rather, to elicit fresh understandings 
about patterned relationships between social actors and how these relationships 
and interactions actively construct reality.” 
 
Grounded theory thus should not be used to test hypotheses about reality but 
rather, to make statements about how actions interpret reality. 
 
Concurring with Martin & Turner (1986), Suddaby observes that grounded theory 
is best used when no explicit hypotheses exist to be tested or when such 
hypotheses do exist but are too abstract to be tested in a logical, deductive 
manner. 
 
This is where grounded theory is most appropriate – where researchers have an 
interesting phenomenon without explanation and from which they seek to 
discover “theory from data” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
 
There can be no better rationale than what Suddaby concludes in support of this 
research for in this research too, I do not have any hypothesis to begin with but 
am exploring the reason for the Malays’ lack of success in business leadership.  
There are no pre-conceived ideas in the whole research but hopefully by the end 
of the research, some hypotheses could be identified to have a better 
understanding of Malay leadership qualities in business. 
 
In addition to grounded theory, interpretive and empirical methodologies are also 
included where relevant to give greater credibility to the research. 
 
4.3.2. Interpretive Methodology 
 
Gooijer (2009) has described interpretive methodology as follows: 
 
“Interpretative research aims to make sense of what has been learned during the 
research process. Denzin (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998) claims that in social sciences 
nothing speaks for itself, there is only interpretation.  Interpretive methods have a 
long tradition within the study of cultural practices and symbols (Geertz, 1993; 
Smircich, 1983) and the act of writing is often considered to be an act of 
interpretation itself (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Richardson, 1998).” 
 
In describing interpretive methodology, Janesick (2003) makes the following 
observation: 
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“A problem that concerns me in doctoral programmes is obsession with method. 
For example, many doctoral students take a number of statistics classes and, for 
whatever reason, hire others to do the statistics for their studies and in fact the 
analysis and interpretation. Qualitative researchers do not fall into this trap. The 
role of the qualitative researcher, like that of the dancer or the choreographer, 
demands a presence, an attention to detail and a powerful use of the researcher’s 
own mind and body in analysis and interpretation of the data. No one can dance 
your dance, so to speak. No one can choreograph your dance but you. No one can 
interpret your data but you. Qualitative researchers do not hire people to analyse 
and interpret their data.” 
 
Among the techniques employed for interpretation of qualitative data are clinical 
methods, ethnography and phenomenology. They are all used as and when 
appropriate in this research as part of interpretive methodology. 
 
4.3.3 Experiential Data 
 
Interpretive assessment refers to methods where not rule-bound observations but 
the insight of the researcher into the meaning of the respondent’s reaction, is 
central. 
 
Equally important is the use of experiential data, which consists not only of 
analysts’ technical knowledge and experience derived from research, but also 
their personal experiences. These experiential data should not be ignored because 
of the usual canons governing research (which regard personal experience and 
data as likely to bias the research), for those canons lead to the squashing of 
valuable experiential data. “Mine your experience, there is potential gold there” 
(Strauss, 1987). 
  
The crucial role of experience has been underplayed by philosophers of science, 
probably because they do not actually have a working knowledge of research, and 
by positively-minded if methodologically-reflective social scientists, who wish to 
rule out of court anything that smacks of “subjectivity” and who wish to minimise 
soft data in favour of hard (or “real”) data (Strauss, 1987). 
 
Strauss’ support for the relevance of subjectivity and soft data in social research 
is also emphasised by Kets de Vries (2001b) – The Leadership Mystique: A 
User’s Manual for the Human Enterprise. 
 
“Preoccupied with rationality and objectivity we seem to be interested only in 
‘hard’ data to analyse complex situations. The general tendency is to perceive 
intuition, emotion and subjectivity as being somewhere on the continuum 
between rather wishy-washy and dangerously-soft, not realising ‘soft’ matters can 
actually be ‘hard’.” 
 
To understand leadership (which is a complex study) we have to be willing to go 
beyond the directly observable. Attention needs to be paid to the presenting 
internal and social dynamics; to the intricate playing field between leaders and 
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followers; and to the unconscious and invisible psychodynamic processes and 
structures that influence the behaviour of individuals, dyads and groups in 
organisations. The complex clinical dimension in organisation analysis needs to 
be studied in-depth to understand what life in organisations is all about (Kets de 
Vries, 2001b). 
 
I draw on my experience of 30 years in banking, where I worked closely with 
several senior corporate leaders, entrepreneurs and senior civil servants in 
government and quasi-government agencies, to make comparisons with the expert 
panel interviews to identify the emergence of any common themes relating to 
Malay leadership qualities. 
 
I was able to reach out to senior politicians, civil servants and established 
entrepreneurs relatively easily for the expert panel interviews and focus groups 
discussion partly because of the position I hold in the banking industry.  A young 
researcher with not much industry experience embarking on a doctoral thesis 
would probably have had greater difficulty to access these people.  Whether 
ironically and unconsciously I am proving the (ascriptive) nature of our society is 
left to the imagination of the reader. 
 
Throughout, this research leans heavily on grounded theory, interpretive 
methodology and experiential data to formulate a conceptually dense and 
carefully ordered theory (Strauss, 1987).  
 
4.3.4 Empirical Research 
 
The nature and structure of this research are such that there is no emphasis or 
reliance on empirical research to provide a quantitative or numeric description. It 
is difficult to quantify the study of leadership. Most leadership studies by well-
known writers – Bennis (1989); Goleman (1998); V. Gupta (2004); Kets de Vries 
(2001b); Kouzes & Posner (2008), MacGregor Burns (2003); Northouse (2004); 
Schein (2004); Stogdill (1974) and Yukl, (1989) – are all primarily qualitative. 
This however does not mean that leadership studies are not amenable to empirical 
research.  Glynn & DeJordy (2010) has compiled abstracts of Empirical 
leadership articles totalling 151 from 1957 to 2007 that were published in three 
prominent OB journals [Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), Academy of 
Management Journal (AMJ) and Organisation Science (OS)].  
 
Therefore whether a research on leadership would rely on quantitative method or 
qualitative method would very much depend on the approach adopted for the 
research. 
 
For a research of this nature relying on a psychodynamic approach (with some 
multi-disciplinary input from history, sociology, anthropology and economics), 
my view is that empirical data may be useful but not critical.  This view is 
supported by Stech (2004) who says, “The psychodynamic approach takes the 
position that both leader and subordinate have needs and feelings; not all of 
 125 
which are consciously available, and their relationship will be a result of the mix 
of those needs and feelings” (p. 248). 
 
Another point emphasised by Stech is the universality of the psychodynamic 
approach.  Much of the theory underlying this approach in contemporary times 
according to him is based on a search for a universal truth in human existence, 
and this is done through a reliance on a study of myth. 
 
“Jung (1923, 1961) as well as Freud relied heavily on Greek myths to label 
psychological actions and reactions such as Oedipus complex.  Subsequently, 
Joseph Campbell (1968, 1988) spent his lifetime studying mythic stories from 
cultures around the world and he was able to show that there are basic themes 
underlying all the stories from all of the cultures he studied.  This work has been 
related to the concept of psychological archetypes that presumably are applicable 
across culturally” (p. 248). 
 
Effective leadership using psychodynamic approach is based on self-
understanding and empathy with the feelings and reactions of the follower.  
Therefore it encourages the leader to pursue a course of personal growth and 
development that can result not just in better leadership but also in a more 
rewarding life. 
 
This is one of the reasons that justify the use of the five 360-degree feedback 
instruments to understand the Malay leadership. 
 
The downside of this approach is that clinical paradigm could be construed 
subjective with the cultural biases of the researcher. 
 
This research where appropriate, draws on empirical research done by, for 
example; Hofstede & Hofstede and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, which 
contains data on Malaysia. The most relevant area where fresh empirical data are 
used relates to the five 360-degree feedback instruments used in this research as 
discussed in Chapter 6. Of these five instruments, three were developed by Kets 
de Vries and his associates at the INSEAD Global Leadership Centre (IGLC) in 
France. IGLC is the second largest leadership training centre after the Center for 
Creative Leadership (CCL) with training centres across the globe. The other two 
instruments were developed by the Hay Group, which has been involved in 
leadership and management development for more than 35 years. Its instruments 
are widely used in leadership development programmes. 
 
4.3.4(a) Usefulness and relevance of 360-degree feedback to this research 
 
The primary objective of this research is to assess the qualities of Malays as 
business leaders. In order to do this, it is necessary to conduct diagnostic tests in 
order to understand their strengths, weaknesses and development needs. This is 
where the usefulness of the 360-degree feedback instruments lies. Using 
leadership diagnostic tools as a starting point for observation and reflection 
enables the user to identify patterns of behaviour and action. The results of these 
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instruments can then be used to compare the Malays’ perceptions of themselves 
with feedback from the surveys. More importantly, the five instruments selected 
for the purpose of this research have been widely used by business executives 
around the world. Over the years, a database has been built by both INSEAD and 
Hay Group from the 360-degree feedback instruments. The 360-degree feedback 
exercise will provide information about the qualities, skills and competencies of 
Malay leaders and the areas where they need to improve their efficacy. But the 
database can be used to compare the leadership pattern of the Malays compared 
to the global business executives. From this comparison, it should be possible to 
identify at macro level the differences, if any, between Malay business leaders 
and others from different parts of the world. Without comparing the Malay 
leadership qualities with the international database, no meaningful analysis or 
conclusions could be arrived at. My relationship with both INSEAD and the Hay 
Group, a global HR consulting firm, made it possible for the comparative analysis 
to be made. 
 
This research is probably one of the first to use 360-degree feedback instruments 
at a macro level. Usually these instruments are used to assess the leadership 
qualities of an individual. However, they provide a very informative set of tools 
that could reveal useful data for this research; the aggregate database that has 
been compiled is available to be used at a group level. 
 
Kurt Lewin, the well-known German-American psychologist who coined the 
term “group dynamics” stated that an individual’s behaviour which can be 
predicted from a map of the life space also holds true for group behaviour. The 
map of the group life space will predict how the group will behave next 
(Agazarian & Peters, 1981). This statement by Kurt Lewin supports the validity 
of my using the 360-degree feedback instruments for this research at group and 
societal level. 
 
The advantages of understanding the 360-degree feedback instruments for this 
research to further understand Malay leadership strengths and weaknesses, and 
also to compare the Malay database with the global database, are summarised 
below: 
 
1) It has been found that most self-assessment instruments do not elicit 
honest feedback. Research clearly indicates that 360-degree feedback 
instruments give a much more accurate picture. There is a tendency for 
people to over-rate themselves, resulting in roughly 70% of executives 
believing that they are in the top 25% of their profession in terms of 
performance.  Many business leaders are genuinely unaware of the way in 
which their behaviour impedes functioning in their organisations; 
 
2) Properly designed 360-degree feedback questionnaires and assessment are 
useful because they facilitate an introspective journey and set into motion 
changes in behaviour; 
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3) 360-degree feedback instruments help us arrive at an understanding of 
individual character and leadership strengths and weaknesses by 
comparing self-perceptions of business leaders with the observations of 
colleagues or others who know them well; 
 
4) The results of a 360-degree feedback survey give ample insights for a 
constructive dialogue about the way the leaders function as well as those 
aspects of their implicit and explicit behaviour that need development; 
 
5) The 360-degree feedback instruments help in understanding a person’s 
strengths and weaknesses and go deeper into understanding a person’s 
inner theatre – the dramas and major scripts that play within every human 
being from birth; 
 
6) These instruments are leadership diagnostic tools for observation and 
reflection of business leaders, which enable us to identify behaviour and 
action patterns; 
 
7) Most leadership feedback instruments are not concerned about the 
psychodynamic processes that underlie leadership rationale. Since this 
research also uses the clinical paradigm to study Malay leadership, 360-
degree feedback instruments, which are based on a clinical orientation, are 
suitable for the research; 
 
8) The specially designed survey instruments and the feedback process are 
like peeling an onion – as the outer superficial layers come away, the core 
life experiences are revealed. With the new insight on participants’ 
leadership qualities, action plans for development can be made. In the 
research context for Malay leadership, these instruments are very suitable 
to be used for a deeper understanding of the Malay psyche. Based on the 
understanding of the Malay mind, future action plans for development 
could be designed; 
 
9) These instruments were designed with extremely rigorous psychometric 
properties after studying top executives from all over the world. 
 
(Adapted from Kets de Vries, Vrignaud, Florent-Treacy & Korotov, 2007) 
 
4.3.4(b) Selection process of the 360-degree feedback instruments 
 
There are several 360-degree feedback and multi-source feedback (MSF) 
instruments available in the field of leadership development
26
. The Mental 
Measurements Year Book (2010) produced by the Buros Center for Testing in the 
Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Nebraska claims to 
                                                 
26
  Several authors have used the terminologies of 360-feedback instruments as well as Multi-Source-
Feedback (MSF). Both these terms are interchangeably used throughout this research. 
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have a database that provides users with a comprehensive guide to over 3000 
contemporary testing instruments.  
 
Van Velsor, Leslie & Fleenor (1997) have outlined a comprehensive 16-step 
method for selecting appropriate feedback instruments. It must be admitted that 
the selection criteria for the five instruments selected for this research did not go 
through the rigorous vetting process recommended by the authors as ideal. The 
authors themselves acknowledge that not all steps are equal in complexity or 
importance. The most critical decisions ultimately rest with the users and the 
checklist is included for the convenience of the users. 
  
The five instruments selected for this research: the Global Executive Leadership 
Inventory; the Personality Audit; the Leadership Archetype Questionnaire; the 
Inventory of Leadership Styles and the Emotional and Social Competency 
Inventory, (GELI, PA, LAQ, ILS and ESCI) were selected primarily because of 
my familiarity with the instruments. During the journey of my personal 
leadership development, the three INSEAD instruments (i.e. GELI, PA and LAQ) 
have been used by me. I found them useful and therefore decided to select these 
instruments based on personal experience. The Hay Group instruments (ILS and 
ESCI) have been used occasionally in Malaysia in the private and public sectors 
for management development programmes. So the selection of these instruments 
was deemed a natural choice. Nevertheless, drawing from the recommendations 
of Van Velsor et al, the five instruments were also evaluated using the 16-step 
selection process as provided below.  
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 14> 
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Table 14: Sixteen steps of the selection process 
 
 
(Van Velsor, Leslie & Fleenor (1997), p.12-32) 
 
4.3.5  The Five (5) Leadership Feedback Instruments 
 
The five leadership feedback instruments used in this research are the Global 
Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI), the Personality Audit (PA) and the 
Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) – all developed by Kets de Vries et 
al, at the IGLC; and the Inventory of Leadership Styles (ILS) and the Emotional 
and Social Competency Inventory/Emotional Competency Inventory (ESCI/ECI), 
both developed by the Hay Group.  
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4.3.5(a) The Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI) 
 
The GELI is a 100-item, multi-rater 360-degree questionnaire that assesses 12 
dimensions of leadership (it also includes emotional intelligence, life balancing 
and executive stress).  
 
Participants complete the GELI Self form and then ask others – direct reports, 
peers, internal or external customers, superiors and family members – to complete 
the GELI Observer form.  
 
The GELI is based on a clinical orientation to the study of leadership. The 
objective of the instrument is to deepen the test-takers’ awareness of the 
importance of the 12 dimensions and to encourage test-takers to undertake a close 
examination of their own capabilities in each. 
 
The clinical orientation of GELI provides a more complete analysis of the inner 
theatre of the test-taker – what makes them tick – and measures the dynamic two-
way relationship between the leaders and followers. It seeks to deconstruct the 
major preoccupations of the executives and highlight the major themes that drive 
behaviour. This orientation goes beyond cognition and behaviour; it also focuses 
on emotion. The premise is that if leadership is to be a viable area of study, its 
research focus needs to be closely tied to observations of the behaviour and 
actions of individuals in leadership positions. 
 
The 12 dimensions of GELI are:- 
 
(a) Envisioning (g) Outside orientation 
(b) Empowering (h) Global mindset 
(c) Energizing (i)  Tenacity 
(d) Designing (j)  Emotional intelligence 
(e) Rewarding (k) Life balance 
(f) Team building (l)  Resilience to stress 
 
There may however, be cultural differences reflected in the participants’ answers 
as this research is based in Malaysia, whereas the GELI’s study involved over 40 
different nationalities, of which the sample of Malaysians was rather small. 
 
The GELI is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
4.3.5(b) The Personality Audit (PA) 
 
The PA is a 360-degree personality instrument given to the executive, spouse 
(good friends), a superior and a subordinate to look at behaviour in the public and 
private domain. It allows executives to compare their observations of their own 
personality with the perceptions of others, giving them an understanding of the 
way they function and insights into those aspects of their implicit and explicit 
behaviour that need further development. The PA, a relatively simple multiple-
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feedback tool (42 questions), is designed to assess seven personality dimensions 
important in human functioning: 
 
1) High / low self-esteem 
2) Trustful / vigilant 
3) Conscientious / laissez faire 
4) Assertive / self-effacing 
5) Extroverted / introverted 
6) High-spirited / low-spirited 
7) Adventurous / prudent  
 
The PA reports information given by the test-taker as well as the perceptions of at 
least three observers. The resulting insights can be used to formulate appropriate 
leadership development goals. 
 
The PA is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
4.3.5(c) The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) 
 
The LAQ is designed to present comprehensive confidential 360-degree feedback 
on an executive’s leadership behaviour patterns. Participating executives 
complete the LAQ self-assessment (66 questions). Participants then obtain 
feedback from at least four other people, subordinates, peers, bosses and others 
who know their leadership style. The feedback (the LAQ assessors’ scores) 
provides insights into how well participants manage up, down and sideways. 
 
The identification of leadership behaviour is critical to understanding the 
dynamics of organisational teams, and how to make these teams most effective. 
The studies at INSEAD identified a number of discrete styles of leading in a 
complex organisational environment that made a specific executive effective. 
Further observation led to the formulation of eight leadership archetypes: 
 
1) Strategist  
2) Change catalyst – the leader as an implementation/turnaround specialist 
3) Transactor – the leader as a deal-maker/negotiator 
4) Builder – the leader as an entrepreneur 
5) Innovator – the leader as a creative idea generator 
6) Processor – the leader as an efficiency expert 
7) Coach – the leader as a people developer 
8) Communicator – the leader as the great stage manager 
 
The LAQ is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 
 
4.3.5(d) The Inventory of Leadership Styles (ILS) 
 
The Inventory of Leadership Styles originates from Litwin & Stringer’s (1968) 
study on motivation and organisational climate, where “climate” is defined as the 
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sense of “how it feels to work here” or what Sumantra Ghoshal27, the late 
Professor of Strategy and International Management at the London Business 
School, would describe as “The Smell of the Place” as experienced by the 
workers and where the leadership style is suggested to be the primary driver for 
climate. Later studies have repeatedly linked climate to real world performance 
and demonstrated predictive validity. Climate has been found to correlate with 
key organisational performance measures including productivity, sales, profit and 
revenue growth etc. In different industry sectors, climate according to Litwin & 
Stringer (1968), who originally were involved in developing ILS, is a strong 
predictor of organisational performance because different climates stimulate or 
arouse different kinds of motivation. They generate distinct attitudes about a 
person’s relationships with others and they strongly influence both feelings of 
satisfaction and performance levels. 
 
The ILS is based on the pattern of behaviour of an individual manager. Based on 
their research, Litwin & Stringer have found that basically six leadership styles or 
behaviour patterns are applied by managers in the different situations they 
encounter. They are classified as:  
 
1)  Directive style;  
2)  Authoritative style;  
3)  Affiliative style;  
4)  Democratic style;  
5)  Pacesetting style; 
6)  Coaching style.  
 
Further details on the ILS are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.3.5(e) Emotional and Social Competency Inventory/Emotional Competency 
Inventory (ESCI/ECI) 
 
The ESCI is a 360-degree tool which traces its origin to an earlier instrument 
called Emotional Competency Inventory (ECI). After some changes were made to 
ECI to eliminate the competency scales that showed too high inter-correlations, 
the ESCI took shape as an instrument with an overall average reliability 0.63 (any 
instrument with a reliability of 0.6 to 0.7 or higher is considered acceptable). 
 
The ESCI is designed to assess the emotional competencies identified by Dr 
Daniel Goleman
28
 in working with Emotional Intelligence (1998) which was 
based on Richard Boyatzis’29 The Competent Manager (1982). 
                                                 
27
  Ghoshal, S. (The Smell of the Place, speech given by Sumantra Ghoshal at the World Economic 
Forum)  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUddgE8r10E 
28
  Daniel Goleman is well-known for his work on Emotional Intelligence (EQ). He is a psychologist and 
author of New York Times bestseller Emotional Intelligence and Social Intelligence: The New Science 
of Human Relationships.  
29
  Boyatzis is a professor of Organizational Behaviour and has written more than 150 articles and books 
on leadership, competencies and Emotional Intelligence. His notable books are Primal Leadership co-
authored by Daniel Goleman and Annie McKee and Resonant Leadership with Annie McKee. 
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Emotional intelligence is defined as the capacity for recognising our own feelings 
and those of others, for motivating ourselves and for managing emotions 
effectively in ourselves and others. An emotional competence is a learned 
capacity based on emotional intelligence that contributes to effective performance 
at work. 
 
The ESCI measures twelve competencies organised into four clusters: 
 
a) Self-awareness; which concerns knowing one’s internal states, 
preferences, resources and intuitions; 
 
b) Self-management which refers to managing one’s internal states, impulses 
and resources; 
 
c) Social awareness which refers to how people handle relationships and 
awareness of others’ feelings, needs and concerns; 
 
d) Relationship management concerns the skill or adeptness at inducing 
desirable responses in others. 
 
The 12 competencies organised into the four clusters are shown in Figure 13 
below: 
 
Figure 13: ESCI Model with the four clusters 
 
The ESCI measures both emotional competencies (i.e., those in the self-
awareness and self-management clusters) and social competencies (i.e., those in 
the social awareness cluster and the relationship management cluster). 
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The instrument has 72 questions and each competency scale has five items and 
most have an additional reverse-scored item. 
 
The items in each competency contain a key word or phrase to link all items in a 
scale. This is often related to the intent of the expressed competency or the central 
concept of the competency. This makes the instrument easier to understand and 
complete, enhancing the credibility and usefulness of participants’ feedback data. 
 
4.4        Fieldwork  
 
Fieldwork is scholarly work that requires first-hand observation, recording or 
documenting what one sees and hears in a particular setting; be it a market place, 
a rural community or the plush settings of a corporate head office.  It is generally 
defined as finding out what people actually do, how they actually think and 
behave and what they mean when they say something. 
 
The advantages of fieldwork are that people are closer to real world conditions 
and that the research can be designed in the best way to discover particular 
information required. 
 
Fieldwork involves the collection of primary data or information that is new.  
This is collected through surveys and questionnaires that are made out 
specifically for a purpose.  Fieldwork has long been regarded as the mainstay in 
anthropological research and sociology.  Mintzberg is credited with playing a 
crucial role in popularising fieldwork in management studies. 
 
Based on the multi-approach comprising grounded theory, interpretive 
methodology, experiential data and empirical research, the fieldwork for the study 
was carried out using: 
 
 roundtable discussions with focus groups 
 expert panel interviews; and  
 360-degree feedback questionnaire survey instruments 
 
4.4.1      Focus group discussions 
 
The term “focus group” is used to refer to group interviews where the topic is 
defined clearly and precisely and there is a focus on enabling and recording 
interactive discussion between participants (Carson et al, 2001). 
 
A typical focus group involves anywhere between four and 12 participants. For 
this research, three focus groups of 10 participants were selected from the official 
directory of 200 Malay corporate leaders and businessmen. A few additional 
members from the 30 were drawn from names recommended by other 
participants who were classified as “information rich”. 
 
Focus group participants are normally chosen using non-probability sampling, 
often with a specific purpose in mind. For many group interviews this is because 
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one can learn a great deal from “information rich” individuals (Krueger & Casey, 
2000). 
 
Locations for focus groups are recommended to be in a neutral setting. The 
roundtable discussion of the focus group for this research was held in the Crowne 
Plaza Hotel, a leading hotel in Kuala Lumpur.  Each focus group discussion 
lasted about three hours. Participants were served with tea and snacks or lunch, 
depending on the time of the discussion. Starting at 8 am, the first group ended 
around 11 am. The second group started with lunch and ended the discussion at 
around 2.30 pm. The third group started at 3 pm and finished at 6 pm. 
 
The participants were all given a brief note on the purpose of the group 
discussion at the time of their selection a few weeks prior to the actual meeting. 
On the day of the discussions, the participants were briefed about the research and 
asked to give their views on Malay leadership qualities in business. It was a semi-
structured and open-ended discussion where questions considered relevant were 
put forward and the groups were free to express their own opinions. The 
discussions were recorded using the hotel’s PA system. I acted as moderator and 
was primarily a listener, asking some probing questions relating to the theme of 
the research. Whenever it was felt that the discussions were digressing from the 
research question, I intervened to bring the discussion to within the scope of the 
study. 
 
Participants in the roundtable took their discussions seriously and passionately. 
There were instances where one or two people, as is common in group discussion, 
tried to dominate the proceedings. They were tactfully controlled by other 
members and the moderator. 
 
The taped discussions of the focus groups were transcribed and analysed for 
common themes that emerged from the three group discussions. 
 
A full description of focus groups is provided in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.2      Expert panel interviews 
 
As part of the methodology, 20 experts were selected for a one-to-one interview. 
These experts were defined as people who had direct experience in one way or 
another in the formulation of the NEP, its implementation, beneficiaries of the 
NEP who had succeeded as well as those who were successful for a brief period 
but derailed for various reasons, and others who have closely monitored the NEP. 
 
These experts shared their experiences with me in a semi-structured interview 
with open-ended questions pertaining to Malay character, culture and value 
system, leadership style and organisational practices. They included: 
 
 A former prime minister of Malaysia who was in power for more than 21 
years and largely credited for transforming Malaysia from an agro-based 
to manufacturing and services economy; 
 136 
 
 A former prime minister of Malaysia who stepped down in 2009; 
 
 A former deputy prime minister who was in civil service before becoming 
a politician and who was involved in the formulation of the NEP in the 
early 1970s; 
 
 A former finance minister who played a key role in setting up several 
state-owned institutions such as a bank, the national oil corporation and an 
investment holding company for the entrepreneurial development of 
Malays; 
 
 A former finance minister who was an entrepreneur in his own right 
before being appointed to the cabinet and was credited with creating 
several Malay entrepreneurs when he was finance minister; 
 
 A historian and professor emeritus who has researched and written 
extensively about Malay society; 
 
 A banker who is acknowledged as a successful entrepreneur who made it 
and became one of the richest men in the country without any government 
support; 
 
 Two entrepreneurs who were selected and favoured by the government in 
its quest to create a cadre of Malay entrepreneurs who enjoyed great 
success in their early years but faced difficulties during the Asian 
financial crisis. These two entrepreneurs then concentrated in overseas 
ventures and became successful in African and CIS countries; 
 
 A minister who was instrumental in the development of Malay 
professional managers through his idea of creating government-linked 
corporations, commonly known as GLCs; 
 
 A Minister of Trade and Industry who was formerly a civil servant in the 
Ministry of Finance; 
 
 A Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 A former Secretary-General from the Economic Planning Unit of the 
Prime Minister’s department; 
 
 An organisational consultant from a leading international human resource 
development consultancy with 20 years of experience training leaders in 
private and public sectors; 
 
 The Chief Secretary to the government, the number one civil servant who 
has worked in various government departments and ministries and who 
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has first-hand knowledge about various government policies and their 
implementation; 
 
 A journalist who has written extensively on government policies relating 
to the NEP; 
 
 A British planter now settled in Malaysia whose family founded one of 
the largest plantation companies in Malaysia; 
 
 A former civil servant who worked with the second prime minister in 
formulating the NEP 
 
 An NGO representative; and 
 
 A professor of economic anthropology who has written extensively about 
the Malays and their heritage. 
 
More experts could have been recruited but it was difficult enough getting these 
twenty to agree to the interviews (although worth the wait because of the richness 
of their interviews); further additions to the list would have considerably delayed 
the research. 
 
Detailed description of in-depth interview is provided in Chapter 6. 
 
4.4.3    360-degree feedback survey 
 
The 360-degree feedback survey, the final piece of fieldwork for the research and 
the only one that has an empirical element in the research project, consisted of 
five different survey instruments, (as described in Chapter 6) – the GELI, PA, 
LAQ, ILS and ESCI/ECI. These instruments make executives understand 
themselves better, the key words being “know thyself”. To be effective, 
executives have to understand the reasons for doing what they do. A 
psychodynamic and psychosocial approach to the study of personality exactly 
accomplishes this task, creating a richer appreciation of human behaviour by 
taking into account people’s relational world, paying attention to the forces of 
human development, and considering the dynamics of emotional management 
(Kets de Vries et al, 2006). 
 
Analysing the 360-degree feedback instruments of Malay executives and CEOs 
and aggregating the results of all of them would produce the graph and pattern of 
a typical Malay executive and his/her leadership style, strengths and development 
needs. The average of the aggregate results of each instrument would then be 
compared with the database of global executives available both at INSEAD and 
the Hay Group, to see how the Malays differ or are similar to other global 
executives. Based on this comparison, it may be possible to identify the 
behaviour pattern of Malay executives. 
 
 138 
 
The five instruments were answered by about 41 senior corporate executives out 
of about 90 who were approached to participate in the survey. These corporate 
executives comprised top management executives including CEOs, senior 
managers and vice-presidents of government-linked corporations (GLCs), private 
sector companies and senior civil servants. 
 
In the five instruments, the 41 participants had to answer in aggregate, about 350 
questions each. They also had to nominate at least three to seven observers or 
raters per instrument, which meant each participant, would theoretically have to 
find 12–15 observers each. The observers would include superiors, peers, 
subordinates or direct reports and friends or family (e.g., spouse or children of the 
participants). The same person nominated could also be an observer for a 
participant for all the five instruments in which case the participant would have 
only to get a minimum of five observers, on the assumption that the same five 
people would be answering all five instruments. 
 
The process of participants and their observers answering 350 questions in 
aggregate proved to be a difficult and unwieldy exercise. The total number of 
people to be monitored and followed up was in the region of 250–300. Each 
participant had a different number of observers, depending on the willingness of 
observers to answer one or more instruments. 
 
While my direct contact point was the 41 participants, I did not have direct 
contact with the observers. Although the five instruments were all to be answered 
online and prompts and reminders were sent to participants and observers by 
INSEAD and the Hay Group, the completion of the entire exercise took more 
than a year from the original targeted completion time of two months. Along the 
way, several participants opted out, for a variety of reasons, including heavy 
workload, travelling abroad, change of job and difficulty in obtaining an adequate 
number of observers. 
 
The need for observers or raters is important, as research has shown that “there is 
usually a serious gap between what people say they do and what they actually do 
– that is, between their self-perception and the perception other people have of 
them. Given the prevalence of this gap, a multiple feedback approach was seen as 
a necessary part of the instruments’ design. The multiple feedback will minimise 
the phenomenon known as ‘the social desirability factor’, which reflects the 
tendency among many people (consciously or unconsciously) to present 
themselves in a more positive light, distorting their response to achieve that 
effect” (Kets de Vries, 2003). 
 
4.5         Crystallisation or Triangulation? 
 
The research of Malay leadership relies on more than one method to reach an 
understanding of the subject studied.  Published works such as Malay Annals 
(Cheah, 2009) and Hikayat Abdullah (Abdul Kadir Munshi, A. 1796-1854); as 
well as others written by Alatas (1977); Andaya & Andaya (2001); Crouch 
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(1996); Harper (1999); Hashim (1992 English version as translated by Tate. M); 
Milner (2008); Roff (2009); Suwannathat-Pian (2011); Wheeler (1928); Winstedt 
(1961) were valuable sources for the historical accounts about Malays. 
 
The contemporary writers who wrote about Malays and their social and economic 
problems used in this study include but not limited to Cheah (2002); Husin Ali 
(2008); Leete (2007); Maaruf (1984); Dr Mahathir (1970, 2001); Musa (1999, 
2007); Omar (2003, 2006); Rahman, S.A (2004); Shome (2002); Sloane (1999); 
Wain (2009a) and Zamani (2003).  
 
In addition to these published works mentioned, I have also used focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews and 360-degree feedback instruments as part of 
the research methodology. Hence; this research relies on multiple sources and 
methods for adding richness to understanding the subject matter of research and 
fits in what is described as triangulation and more recently, crystallisation, to 
view the qualitative research design.  Crystallisation is viewed as a more 
inclusive design than triangulation which originally I thought my research may fit 
into.  However; after understanding the concept of crystallisation explained by 
Janesick (2003) crediting Richardson (1994) who originally developed the 
crystallisation concept, my view is that this research fits both the crystallisation 
and triangulation concepts. 
 
Briefly, triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the 
investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing 
findings.  Since much of social research is founded on the use of a single research 
method and as such may suffer from limitations associated with that method or 
from the specific application of it, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced 
confidence. – 
(Bryman A, www.referenceworld.com/sage/socialscience/triangulation.pdf ) 
 
In the 1970s, Denzin (1978) identified four basic types of triangulation:- 
 
1) Data triangulation which entails gathering data through several samplings or a 
variety of data sources; 
 
2) Investigator triangulation which refers to using more than one researcher to 
gather and interpret data; 
 
3) Theory triangulation which refers to the use of more than one theoretical 
position in interpreting data; and 
 
4) Methodological triangulation which refers to multiple methods to study a 
single problem or more than one method for gathering data. 
 
Based on the above description, this research could be classified in the category 
of Theory triangulation because it uses grounded theory, interpretive 
methodology and experiential data.  In addition, this research also uses four 
different cultural frameworks to understand the Malays. 
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The usage of focus groups, in-depth interviews and 360-degree feedback methods 
would fit in the methodological triangulation. 
 
Crystallisation is seen by Janesick (2003) as the more suitable idea for the new 
millennium and she credits Richardson (1994) for introducing crystallisation as a 
better lens through which to view qualitative research designs and their 
components.  Classifying crystallisation as a post-modern project, Richardson 
explains crystallisation as a design which recognises the many facets of any given 
approach to the social world as a fact of life. 
 
In crystallisation, the image of the crystal replaces that of the land surveyor and 
the triangle moving on from plane geometry to new physics. 
 
Quoting Richardson, Janesick refers to the crystal as one which “combines 
symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, 
transmutations, multi-dimensionalities, and angles of approach.  Crystals grow, 
change and alter but are not amorphous” (Richardson, 1994, p. 522). 
 
Crystals can give different views depending on whether we hold them up to the 
light or not.  Richardson continues, “Crystallisation provides us with a deepened 
complex, thoroughly partial, understanding of the topic.  Paradoxically, we know 
more and doubt what we know” (p. 522). 
 
Janesick (2003) thinks that “crystallisation incorporates the use of other 
disciplines such as art, sociology, history, dance, architecture and anthropology, 
to inform our research processes and broaden our understanding of method and 
substance.  For example; in the discipline of history, historians rely on documents 
and interviews almost entirely.  There is constant discussion of method, but this is 
connected to content.  We might learn a great deal from historians on this point 
alone.  Returning to the arts and choreography, just the awareness of the 
choreographer’s concerns with rhythm, tempo, the use of negative space, and 
action for example, may broaden our own views on our respective research 
projects. 
 
Too often, we become comfortable in our worlds and to paraphrase Goethe, 
sometimes the most obvious things are the hardest to see because they are right in 
front of our eyes.  Thus, I propose that we use the notion of crystallisation to 
include incorporation of various disciplines as part of multifaceted qualitative 
research design” (p. 67). 
 
As described by Janesick, this research project being a multi-disciplinary one 
could also be considered to fit the crystallisation notion in addition to 
triangulation as both notions are not mutually exclusive.  Crystallisation could be 
seen as a more inclusive method encompassing triangulation as well. 
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4.6        Caveats  
 
This study is quite akin to that of McClelland’s (1961) The Achieving Society. 
McClelland made a study for practical political reasons then, as well as to satisfy 
scientific curiosity, it has become of very great importance to understand some of 
the forces that produce rapid economic development. 
 
McClelland hypothesised that it should not be surprising to us that the forces of 
rapid economic development lie largely in ourselves – in our fundamental 
motives and in the way we organise our relationships with others. He made a 
serious attempt to see what modern psychology can contribute to an 
understanding of why some people concentrate on economic activities and are 
conspicuously successful at them. 
 
McClelland qualified his research by placing certain caveats such as:- 
 
a) Readers should not expect his study to provide all the answers. He reasoned 
that modern quantitative psychology is young (about 50 years old back in 
1961); 
b) Scientific studies of motives and values are even younger still; and 
c) His attempt should therefore be viewed as a first attempt by a psychologist 
interested primarily in human motivation to shed some light on a problem 
of historic importance. 
 
My study, using the Clinical Paradigm, fits nicely with the objective of 
McClelland’s original study together with its caveats. 
 
The basic difficulty, as with all racial theories remains that such assertions do not 
explain why one particular people is more energetic at times than others.  
 
Although this research concerns itself with the leadership qualities of the Malays 
in business and politics, which may prima facie appear to be very specific, it must 
be acknowledged that the study also involves the generalisation of the qualities of 
the Malay race through a multi-disciplinary approach using history, economics, 
sociology, anthropology, and psychoanalytic psychology. 
 
To this extent the research is also an attempt to answer general questions. It does 
not just probe a specific category of Malays, for example; those educated 
overseas or with tertiary education; it examines the factors underlying the 
leadership qualities of Malays in general.  
 
The research therefore runs the risk of being criticised for its generalisations and 
being accused of oversimplifying a complex social issue. 
 
While it is not possible to completely shield this research from such criticisms 
(any research involving social sciences using the qualitative approach is 
susceptible to them), the overall objective of this research is clearly articulated as 
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exploratory research, possibly a pioneering effort, to help understand Malay 
leadership qualities using the clinical paradigm. 
 
The research will enable us to draw some initial hypotheses about what lies 
behind the Malays’ lack of success in business. In order to do this, an 
understanding of Malays at group and societal levels as well as individual level is 
critical. At group and societal levels the study uses psychodynamic approaches of 
large-group theory, large-group identity and the social psychology of nationalism 
(Agazarian & Peters, 1981; Bion, 1961; Hirschhorn & Barnett, 1993; Kets de 
Vries, 2011a; Koenigsberg, 1977; Stapley, 2006; Volkan, 1997, 1999, 2001, 
2004, 2005, 2006b) to explore the dilemmas of Malays who are criticised by both 
the Malay political leaders and non-Malays in Malaysia for being poor business 
leaders.  
 
At the individual level, the psychometric approach using 360-degree feedback 
instruments developed by clinical psychologists and psychoanalysts come in 
handy to understand the Malay business leaders’ strengths, weaknesses and 
development needs. 
 
So, a parallel attempt is made to study Malay leaders, at the societal and 
individual levels by using the established theory that without an understanding of 
the beneath-the-surface activities of the individual, there could be no 
understanding of groups, organizations or institutions (Bion, 1961; Gould, 
Stapley & Stein, 2001; Stapley, 2006). 
 
Also, it is the individuals guided by the unconscious collective who provide the 
basis for large-group experiences. The large-group does not propel itself. 
Unconscious thoughts and feelings become aroused and evoked in large-groups 
through the participation of individuals (Schneider, 2003). The parallel study of 
Malays at societal and individual levels, leads to the convergence of the overall 
understanding of the Malay character that forms the basis for the research 
findings.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The research methodology which is qualitative in nature is based on a multi-
method approach using grounded theory supported by interpretive methodology, 
experiential data, fieldwork as well as empirical data. The multi-disciplinary 
approach research design suits this complex research. The methodology 
employed is straightforward, simple to grasp and non-controversial. There is 
considerable support in the literature for using interpretive methodology and 
grounded theory to study subjective experience and for adopting a clinical 
approach to organisational research. The research process was not based on hard-
and-fast rules but tailored to the needs of the research. This adaptation process 
resulted in sufficient richness for an in-depth analysis of a subject that has hardly 
been researched in the past. 
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The structure of this research is constructed such as to provide a deep 
understanding of the Malay psyche and culture from which the leadership pattern 
of Malays could be mined.  The term “mined” is consciously used because when 
digging for minerals in mines, no miner could confidently certify that an iron ore 
mine or tin mine has been 100% extracted leaving zero deposits of the mineral.  
There would still be deposits of minerals left in the mines but only the economic 
viability would dictate that the operations be ceased.  In a similar fashion, in 
trying to “mine” the human mind, no expert could claim or has ever claimed that 
he has fully understood a human phenomenon. 
 
In my aim to understand the Malays too, I try to extract the Malay mind as much 
as possible to understand their thoughts and inner theatre to provide some 
possible meaningful interpretation using my own “choreographed” methodology 
in the following manner:- 
 
1) Historical accounts of Malays written in the past mainly by foreigners such as 
Portuguese, Dutch and British during the colonial period.  There was one 
notable Malay writer then, whose writings also provided a great insight into 
the Malay character; 
2) Contemporary literature available about Malays; 
3) Discussions with focus groups; 
4) Expert panel interviews; and 
5) 360-degree feedback instruments. 
 
Each of the five steps providing a deeper understanding of the Malays is 
illustrated in the three diagrams (Figures 14 to 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see following pages for Figures 14 – 16> 
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Figure 14: Understanding Malays through the five different methods 
 
 
Figure 15: Five methods leading to the understanding of Malays 
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Figure 16: Five layers of understanding Malays 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined the reasons for the choice of qualitative approach 
as the appropriate methodology based on grounded theory and interpretive 
methods.  As the research relies on five different sources – historical and 
contemporary literature, focus group discussions, expert panel interviews and 
360-degree feedback instruments – it also has used triangulation and 
crystallisation approach to arrive at the findings discussed elaborately in  
Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 4> 
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Chapter 5 – A Deeper Understanding of Malay Leadership through Focus 
Groups and Expert Panel Interviews 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
After reviewing the historical accounts and what has been written about the 
Malays by indigenous writers and others, which was introduced and highlighted 
in Chapter 3, this chapter serves to provide an understanding about Malays from 
two important sources: focus group discussions and expert panel interviews. This 
would provide a rich basis for an understanding of the Malay leadership. It was 
explained in the previous chapter under Research Methodology, that to 
understand the Malays and their leadership qualities in business and politics, this 
research relied on the following sources: 
 
1) Historical accounts about Malays written mainly by foreign travellers and 
writers before independence of Malaysia; 
2) Published works on the Malays written by indigenous writers and others 
after independence of Malaysia; 
3) Focus group discussions; 
4) Expert-panel interviews; and 
5) Five different 360-degree feedback instruments answered by 41 Malay 
senior corporate and senior civil service executives and 200 observers. 
 
This chapter specifically looks at the focus groups and expert panel interviews to 
add further to a deeper understanding of the Malays in order to arrive at some 
conclusion regarding the Malay leadership in business. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
 
  After the introduction, a description of focus group, its rationale and 
usefulness and how it was applied to this research is detailed.  
 
  Following this, the chapter provides a full description of the three focus 
group roundtable discussions and the common themes that emerged from 
the discussions. 
 
The next section of the chapter moves on to look at the expert-panel interviews.  
Again in this section similar to focus group discussions, a detailed description of 
conducting in-depth interviews, their usefulness and their contribution to 
qualitative research is discussed before the expert panel interviews conducted for 
this research are explored and the themes that emerged are highlighted. 
 
After both the focus group discussions and expert panel in-depth interviews are 
explained, the chapter reaches its conclusion based on the findings of these two 
methods on Malay leadership qualities. 
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5.2 Focus Groups 
 
5.2(i) What is a Focus Group? 
 
Kitzinger (1994) describes focus groups as groups organised to explore a set of 
issues. It is “focused” in the sense that it involves some kind of collective activity 
such as debating a particular set of questions. Powell et al (1996) define a focus 
group as a group of individuals selected and assembled by researchers to discuss 
and comment on, from personal experience the topic that is the subject of the 
research. 
 
Among the most widely used research tools in the social sciences are group depth 
interviews or focus groups. Originally called ‘focussed’30 interviews (Merton & 
Kendall, 1946), this technique came into vogue after World War II and has been a 
part of social scientists’ tool kit ever since. Use of focus groups in social sciences 
started well in the 1950s and faded away in the 60’s and 70’s and re-emerged in 
the 80’s. 
 
Merton is credited for developing ‘focussed interview’ with groups. He used 
focused groups to not just analyse what the groups thought but how they thought 
and why they thought in specific issues. 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) also support group work, such as focus group, as 
invaluable for ‘grounded theory’ development – focusing on generation rather 
than testing of theory and exploring the categories which the participants use to 
offer their experience. Focus groups, says Kitzinger, (1994) are perfect for 
“filling in gaps” so often exposed by KAP (Knowledge, Attitude and Practice) 
surveys and are ideal for inductive approaches aimed at generating concepts and 
hypotheses. 
 
Merton reflecting on the historical continuities and discontinuities of focus group 
research explained that the basic purpose of the “focussed” interviews was to 
gather qualitative data from individuals who have experienced some “particular 
concrete situation” which serves as the focus of the interview. Merton also 
explains that “focussed” interview as a general qualitative research can be used in 
both individual and group interviews. It is to be noted that both methods are used 
in this research. By “particular concrete situation” it is meant an interview 
whether individual or group that will be relatively singular in focus. Again in this 
context this research has as its focus, the singular objective of understanding the 
lack of success in business by Malays and its probable causes. 
 
This element contrasts with the typical uses of survey research to gather statistical 
measures of numerous topics and variables, and this is why focus groups are 
commonly prescribed for research that is either exploratory, clinical and/or 
phenomenological (Calder, 1977).  
 
                                                 
30
  Merton used ‘focused’ with double “s” 
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Again, the focus group roundtable discussions fit in perfectly for this research as 
it is exploratory in nature, and uses the clinical method and phenomenology for 
the research. 
 
Examples of sociological and social psychological studies that have used focus 
groups include the exploration of lifestyles of working class of Latina women, the 
psychological aspects of widowhood and various specific aspects of interpersonal 
group dynamics and influences. Much clinical psychosocial group research 
maintains focus due to common practice of including individuals whose 
“particular concrete situation” centre around the same psychological condition 
(Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). 
 
Often many focus groups are “not… groups in the sociological sense of having a 
common identity or a continuing unity, shared norms and goals…” (Merton, 
1987). These non-groups should more properly be called ‘groupings”. 
 
On the other hand, focus group in sociology, clinical psychology and health 
sciences is likely to gather groups comprising individuals who do share some 
common identity and goals, as well as some common “concrete situation”. As in 
this research, Merton (1987) is of the opinion that homogenous groups are more 
productive and “work better”. 
 
Over the past decade focus groups and focus interviews have reemerged as a 
popular technique for gathering qualitative data, both among sociologists and 
across a wide range of academic and applied research areas (Morgan, 1996). 
 
5.2(ii) Characteristics of Focus Groups 
 
Krueger & Casey (2009) provide very clear and concise characteristics of focus 
groups all of which fit neatly into this research: 
 
1) Focus groups involve people – a focus group should comprise a group of 
about five to ten people and must be a group small enough for everyone to 
share insights, yet large enough to provide diversity of perceptions; 
 
2) People possess certain characteristics similar to each other in a way 
important to the researcher. Although it is usually recommended that the 
participants should be those who do not know each other, it is virtually 
impossible to locate strangers. It should be sufficient as long as 
participants are not close friends or family members; 
 
3) Focus groups provide qualitative data. The goal is to collect data that is of 
interest to research and a range of opinions from participants. The 
researcher then compares and contrasts data collected from at least three 
focus groups. The venue for the focus group discussions should be a more 
natural environment than an individual interview, because participants are 
influencing and being influenced just as they are in life. The researcher 
plays the role of moderator, listener and observer and eventually analyst 
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using an inductive process. An inductive researcher derives understanding 
based on discussions as opposed to testing a preconceived hypothesis or 
theory; 
 
4) Focus groups have a focused discussion. Questions for focus group 
discussion are phrased and sequenced so they are easy to understand and 
logical. Questions are mostly open-ended. Though the questions may 
seem to be spontaneous, they are developed through considerable 
reflection and input. The questions usually start generally and continue to 
become more specific and focused. In focus group discussions, there is no 
pressure to have consensus but attention is placed on understanding the 
feelings, comments and thought processes of participants; 
 
5) Focus groups work particularly well to determine the perceptions, feelings 
and thinking of people about issues. 
 
In summary, focus groups have a distinctive cluster of characteristics such as 
involving homogenous people in a social interaction with an aim of collecting 
qualitative data from a focused discussion. Focus group interviewing is a 
qualitative approach to information gathering that is both inductive and 
naturalistic. 
 
5.2(iii) Common myths about Focus Groups 
 
In supporting focus groups, Morgan and Krueger (Ed. Morgan) have also outlined 
some common myths about focus groups: 
 
a) Focus groups are cheap and quick. This is not true as focus groups take 
time to organise. Developing and creating effective questions, locating 
appropriate participants, transcribing, evaluating and analysing the 
discussions are all time-consuming and expensive; 
 
b) Focus groups require moderators with highly developed professional 
skills. This is again a misconception as it is not difficult to find a 
moderator within the research team. Paying overly attention to skills of 
potential moderator often gets the project heading in the wrong direction. 
Priority should on the other hand be given to whom the participants in the 
group should be and defining the purpose of the project. It is sufficient to 
find someone who has experience in working in groups; 
 
c) Focus groups must consist of strangers. This is a good example of a useful 
rule-of-thumb that has become an overly rigid restriction. It is not 
necessary to find total strangers as long as one is careful not to have 
groups who are too close friends or family members; 
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d) People will not talk about sensitive topics in focus groups. This is a myth 
based on common sense imaginings of what people might be willing to 
discuss in groups. In actual experience people readily talk about a wide 
range of personal and emotional topics, genuinely interested in learning as 
much as possible about their experiences and feelings; 
 
e) Focus groups are a natural means of collecting data. Rather than arguing 
about whether focus groups are natural, it is best to consider where they 
fit within a range of data gathering techniques.  
 
f) In terms of research methods, focus groups use more natural settings than 
some techniques (e.g. surveys). It is important not to confuse the use of 
natural settings with the larger goal of conducting naturalistic inquiries 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
 
g) Focus groups should not be used for decision-making. To determine 
whether focus groups are adequate for making a decision, the researcher 
should begin by asking how difficult it would be to obtain “better” 
information. When resources are scarce, the choice may be between 
making decisions based on focus groups versus no data at all. 
 
Another promising combination is the pairing of individual and group interviews 
within qualitative studies, but this is an area in which there has been surprisingly 
little research. 
 
Overall, there is every sign that combination of methods that celebrate the 
contribution of focus group will be continuing sources of new insights into when 
and why to use focus groups. 
 
The primary purpose of projects that rely on focus groups is to collect qualitative 
data to answer research questions. The basic goal in conducting focus groups is to 
hear from the participants about, and on the topics of interest to the researcher. A 
match between the researcher’s topics of interest and participants’ ability to 
discuss those topics is essential for successful focus groups. 
 
Selection of participants who have involvement and knowledge of the topic of 
research is critical to generate a free flowing and productive conversation on the 
topic.  Also, appropriate group but inappropriate questions may not contribute to 
the research objective. 
 
Another point for researchers to bear in mind is that when participants’ 
involvement with the topic is too high, it may lead to efforts of self-promotion or 
an obligation to know the answers. 
 
The best match between researchers and participants happen when they each 
share the same goals – “producing useful information”. 
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Focus groups are most suitable when one needs a friendly research method that is 
respectful and not condescending to the target audience. 
 
It is important to sustain an atmosphere that promotes meaningful interaction, 
conveys a human sensitivity and a willingness to listen without being defensive. 
Even in a conflict situation, friendliness of the focus group can be a major 
advantage. 
 
From the foregoing description on focus groups and its usefulness, it is not 
difficult to conclude that focus groups fit quite neatly as a research tool for this 
research. Let us now look at how focus groups were used for gathering qualitative 
data for understanding the Malay leadership qualities. 
 
5.2.1 Selection of participants 
 
Having decided that focus groups are useful and a practical method to gather data 
for this research, the first and foremost challenge is in the selection of appropriate 
members for the focus groups. The most effective way to select members was to 
get participants who were involved in a way that would contribute to 
understanding the research issue. 
 
To understand the Malay leadership qualities in business, the problems they 
faced, to understand the kind of affirmative action they received from the 
Government to achieve the NEP targets and every facet involved in this field, it 
was decided that participants who were entrepreneurs, professional managers and 
those who were involved in developing Malay entrepreneurs (professional 
trainers) should form the focus groups. 
 
It was also decided that there would be three groups of ten participants each in 
order to make the research broader rather than relying on one focus group. So the 
challenge was to find thirty members to form three groups. 
 
The selection of professional managers and entrepreneurs were made from an 
official directory of Malay corporate executives and entrepreneurs published by a 
quasi-government body. Members were selected by a combination of random 
selection as well as the researcher’s intuitive feeling that a particular person 
would be able to share an enriching experience. 
 
An example of such an intuitive selection was a lady entrepreneur who had 
successfully created a Malaysian brand of hot dogs known as ‘1901’. 
 
This lady entrepreneur had successfully created a local brand of hot dogs amidst 
competition from international brands such as McDonalds, Burger King, and 
A&W etc. Unfortunately when invited to join the focus group, she did not turn up 
on the day of the discussion although she had agreed to participate. So it also 
goes to prove the point of challenges in getting the participants as members of 
focus groups. 
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Through a combination of various methods such as random selection, intuitive 
selection as well as suggestions from some members who gave names of 
participants who, in their opinion would be useful participants to share their 
experiences, I wrote to about 100 potential participants before we got a number of 
about forty who agreed to be members of three focus groups. Out of the forty, 
several participants excused themselves, apologising for not being able to attend 
the focus groups discussions for various reasons, such as urgent business matters 
and travelling. Finally, we managed to get about 29 participants – ten in the first 
group, ten in the second group and nine in the third group. 
 
5.2.2 Identifying the major objective 
 
The major objective of the focus group discussion was identified as a discussion 
to focus on the performance of Malays as businessmen and entrepreneurs, the 
causes for their lack of success and why the targets of NEP as set by the 
government have not been met in spite of all the affirmative actions undertaken 
by the government. It was not difficult to identify the objective as it was the core 
theme of the research itself. 
 
5.2.3 Preparing for the Focus Group sessions 
 
Planning and preparation for the focus group sessions started during the research 
methodology stage when it was decided that focus groups would be one of the 
methods to be used to obtain qualitative data. 
 
It took a few months to identify and shortlist the members of the focus groups. 
Once the participants were identified, they were contacted both by e-mail and 
telephone. At the same time while identifying the participants, the preparation of 
the questions to be discussed by the focus groups, were made. 
 
5.2.4 Developing the key questions 
 
Simultaneously with the identification of the participants, the questions or more 
appropriately the topics relevant to the research question and objective of the 
focus group were identified and open-ended questions prepared. Keeping in mind 
that the discussions should be focused on the research topic and that too many 
questions may dilute the richness of discussions, six questions were identified to 
understand the Malays and their leadership performance as politicians and 
businessmen. 
 
These questions centred on six main topics: 
 
1) Malay traits, characteristics and culture; 
2) Malay businessmen versus Chinese businessmen; 
3) Business and politics affecting the Malays; 
4) The impact of religion on Malays; 
5) Education and its importance in developing Malays; and 
6) The Malay family system. 
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These were the main areas that were considered important and any other related 
issues were expected to naturally emerge during the discussions. 
 
5.2.5 Planning the sessions 
 
The sessions – three in all – were planned to be held for a whole day in a 
conference room of the Crowne Plaza Hotel, a five-star hotel in Kuala Lumpur. 
The selection of a conference room in a good hotel provided a good environment 
and arrangements of the tables were made in a rectangular shape by combining 
four tables which provided enough space for up to ten participants to be seated in 
a manner as to enable them to see each other and engage in discussions at close 
range. Seating was done in a way to provide sufficient space between participants 
so that they do not feel too crowded or too close to each other. 
 
Each session was planned to last three hours. Free flow of coffee, tea and snacks 
were arranged for participants to take short breaks. 
 
As the participants of each group arrived before the focus group discussions 
started, the moderator welcomed them, briefed them on the objective of the 
meeting and encouraged them to generate useful information.  
 
Members of the groups were introduced to each other before the start of the 
session.  The moderator then introduced the questions one by one giving 
sufficient time to discuss the main themes of the focus group discussions. 
 
The entire proceedings were recorded with a central public address system in a 
sound proof room and the hotel provided the CDs of the recording of the focus 
group proceedings. The CDs were then transcribed on to paper for coding and 
analysis
31. After each focus group’s proceedings were transcribed separately, then 
based on the subject matter (e.g. education, religion, comparison of Malays and 
Chinese etc.) the three transcriptions were merged to analyse common themes 
emerging from the three groups. The transcriptions and the themes which 
emerged from the three focus groups are described below: 
 
5.2.6 Transcription of Focus Group proceedings 
 
5.2.6a Focus Group 1: 
 
5.2.6a (i) Malay traits, characteristics and culture: 
 
The Malays do not persevere as the country is blessed with resources. They think 
they do not have to work hard and they could survive without hardship. 
                                                 
31
  The transcription of the focus groups’ proceedings were done by a research assistant, a graduate from a 
U.S. university, who was engaged by me for a period of six months to assist me in both focus group 
and expert panel interviews. The coding of both the focus groups and expert panel interviews were 
done by me in my capacity as researcher. 
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Arising from the above mentality, the Malays like to take an easy way out. They 
love immediate gratification rather than waiting for long-term benefit. The 
government gives the Malays licenses, hoping that they would build a successful 
business but they sell the licenses for a quick profit and disappear from the scene. 
They want profit immediately. But then, maybe the government is also giving 
them to the wrong people – the selection process could be flawed. 
 
Malays by nature are feudalistic. They respect the rulers without questions and 
follow them blindly even though they may not agree with their policies. This has 
since been carried on in the Malay culture, both at political and corporate levels, 
with people not questioning their political leaders and bosses in the business 
world. They do not openly disagree but they complain behind their backs. 
 
Similar feudalistic mindset is also played out with the religious teachers. Malays 
are taught never to question the authority (parents, teachers etc.). 
 
5.2.6a (ii) Chinese businessmen versus Malay businessmen 
 
The Chinese are able to separate the business and the person as two different 
entities. For the Chinese, business is not a profession but a way of life. The 
Chinese live and talk business whereas Malays tend to talk more about politics, 
religion and women. A person needs to have a passion for business and have to 
separate it as a different entity from himself. Some Malay businessmen seem to 
mix the two and they forget where the salary ends and business begins. When the 
business is successful, they feel comfortable in dipping into the till and that does 
not work.  
 
The Malays are neither interested nor passionate about business because they 
have never been taught about business. To instil this interest, they must start from 
school. 
 
The Chinese come from a hard-working background since their forefathers’ time. 
They have their clans and networking well-established to help their community in 
raising capital. 
 
The Chinese work hard, twelve to fourteen hours a day, but the Malays lack 
perseverance because their country is blessed with natural resources.  
 
The Malays are in an environment where they are always together. They tend to 
do better when there is a mix of races (Chinese, foreigners) than when they are in 
a Malay-predominant environment. 
 
5.2.6a (iii) Business and politics affecting the Malays 
 
Before independence, the general impression was that Malays were lazy and 
stupid. It is not true. Malays are willing to work hard when there is a purpose 
attached to it and they only do things that are culturally acceptable. 
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A good example of Malay determination to succeed is the Malayan Union in 
1945 when the British asked the Malay rulers and leaders to share their powers 
equally with the immigrants. This awoken the Malays who fought against the 
Malayan Union and were ultimately successful in making the British drop their 
plan. 
 
The Malays are accustomed to handouts from the government and this has 
worked against their competitiveness. Article 153 of the Constitution which 
provides special privileges to Malays make them feel that they are always 
protected and there is no need to be the best in school to succeed. 
 
Without this protection, maybe Malays would be able to compete better with 
other races on a more even basis. The subsidy mentality which some referred to 
as this, is internalised. 
 
Why is this system perpetuated? Both politicians and businessmen find this 
convenient to them. The politicians do not want the Malays to succeed and 
achieve the NEP target, because then they know the businessmen do not need the 
political handouts. The politicians want the businessmen to be dependent on them 
so that the businessmen would then support the politicians. There must be 
courage to put a stop to this patronage system. 
 
5.2.6a (iv) The impact of religion on the Malays 
 
Malays tend to pursue a purpose that is meaningful. They are prone to religious 
purposes and not so much attracted to economic or business pursuit on a long-
term basis. Way back then, you are frowned upon if you are successful and rich. 
In the old Malay films, rich people were portrayed as mean and tended to run 
down poor people. 
 
Historically, religious teachers were not well-educated. Therefore; not the right 
interpretation of religion was imparted to the Malays. Conflict arising out of 
balancing the world and the hereafter may explain values and attitude of the 
Malays towards wealth. To Malays, money and wealth are not everything. 
Interpretation of takdir (equivalent of fate) is a means of defence mechanism and 
self-justification. When a Malay fails, he accepts it as his fate and he is excused. 
Religion should be used to keep the Malays on the right track for success and not 
to be used as an excuse for failures. 
 
5.2.6a (v) Education and the Malays 
 
In school not much emphasis is given to cultivating businessmen and 
entrepreneurs. Most Malays aspired to finish school and to work in the civil 
service. Until recently (till the 80s) Malays were brought up to inculcate a notion 
that earning a respectable salary is a good thing and being a businessman was not 
respectable. 
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Environment of upbringing will influence a person’s way of thinking. Most 
successful Malay business leaders come from urban backgrounds as opposed to 
the kampung or rural backgrounds. Most urban Malays today work in a private 
sector (rather than in government) as opposed to urban Malays back then. Also 
most rural Malays (as opposed to urban ones) did not take appropriate courses 
such as finance and accounting that would enable them to move into the private 
sector. They took courses that were not relevant to business. Most of them took 
courses that would force them into the public sector. 
 
Malays lack exposure in different environments. Even when they were sent 
overseas, MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat), the government agency responsible 
for scholarships to educate Malays overseas, had ‘moral officers’ who made sure 
the overseas Malay students did not mix with the other races. They made sure that 
the students did not lose their ‘Malay-ness’. This caused the Malay students to 
stick with their own race and do ‘Malay activities’ and thus they were not 
exposed to different cultures even though they were studying overseas. They did 
not have the confidence to mix with others from different cultures. 
 
In order to educate the Malays, the government extended scholarships and places 
in local universities even to mediocre achievers in school. These ‘mediocres’ 
ultimately ended up in the civil service bringing down the quality of civil service. 
The over-generosity of the government has perpetuated a system of mediocrity.  
Scholarships are sometimes given to wrong people due to political influence. 
 
Too much emphasis on the Malay language has resulted in the Malays being 
isolated without having a chance to speak up their minds. 
 
5.2.6a (vi) The Malay family system 
 
There was a suggestion by someone that Malay children do not get as much love 
as their Western counterparts. An argument then took place as some disagreed, 
because they contended that they come from a loving and nurturing family 
background. So there was no clear-cut consensus on this point. 
 
The group then moved on to the problem of how Malay children feel inferior 
because they are being compared to one another. Also in some families, there is 
not much communication between parents/elders and children because children 
are not supposed to question their parents. But now, more children are able to 
speak their minds. 
 
5.2.6b Focus Group 2: 
 
5.2.6b (i) Malay traits, characteristics and culture 
 
Malays are in an environment where they are always together and in such an 
environment, they do not develop as much. They perform better in a mix of races. 
Malacca was a successful trading port and the Malays there were successful. Why 
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and how did the entrepreneurship disappear? While the question was raised, there 
was no clear-cut response in spite of attempts to elicit an answer. 
 
5.2.6b (ii) Chinese businessmen versus Malay businessmen 
 
The Malays started as a farming community without much emphasis on business. 
Malays teach their children how to buy as opposed to Chinese who teach their 
children how to sell things. 
 
The Chinese success factor was attributed to migration. Immigrants all over the 
world outperform the locals. Malays had everything they wanted. And they did 
not have to fight for a living compared to the Chinese who migrated to Malaya 
due to hardship in China. 
 
The discussion then turned to differences in the values of Chinese and Malays. 
The Chinese value education highly. If a Chinese had to work in two or three 
different jobs to send his children for the best education, he would take up the 
challenge but a Malay parent would not do the same. The Malays would use the 
extra money they earn to buy frivolities (example: new curtains for the house). 
 
The Chinese would use the extra income for their children’s education. The 
Malays would not save money for education because they know the government 
would support them for the education of their children. So, there is no pressure or 
anxiety for the Malays to save money for their children’s education. 
 
This mentality must change – “I do not need to excel as I will get to where I want 
because I am Malay”. 
 
Ironically, only proper education could eradicate this mentality. The Malays also 
do not invest for the long-term like the Chinese. Even in spite of policies that are 
put in place by the government to make the Malays successful, non-Malays are 
more successful. 
 
The Malays know they have to change but the political leaders need to keep the 
system intact for the dependency between them and the community, - you scratch 
my back and I scratch yours. 
 
5.2.6b (iii) Business and politics affecting the Malays 
 
Focus Group 2 puts the blame on political culture squarely for the lack of success 
of the Malays in business. 
 
They are of the opinion that Malays are spoon-fed by the government. They feel 
the affirmative action and economic help from the government to the Malays 
might weaken them in the long-term. 
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The Malays jump to grab these opportunities without any real interest or 
knowledge in a specific field, purely drawn by the attraction of making some 
short-term gains. 
 
Malays do not aim to compete with the world. They are comforted with the fact 
they ‘own’ the country and so everything has to work in their favour; always 
spoon-fed.  
 
Foreign firms see Malays as the face of concession and subsidies. The ‘subsidy 
mentality’ started with the Malay rulers when the British came to Malaya. They 
gave the rulers nice cars, monthly pensions etc. And in return, the rulers 
surrendered all their rights to the British. This mentality is passed down to the 
Malays until today. 
 
Malay dominance and control is in land matters, licenses and permits but they do 
not develop for the long-term. Many Malay businesses do not succeed because 
they are not given adequate training nor do they have the experience.  
 
They do not know even basic things such as managing the cash flow of the 
business which is critical to survival of business. 
 
Focus Group 2 strongly felt that Malays are what they are today because of their 
political leaders. The blame is not on the Malays themselves but on politics. 
Politicians give out licenses, contracts and scholarships to broaden their 
patronage. The system requires it to be that way because, were the Malays 
smarter and more independent, then the Malay political system would change and 
the Malays would not need the support of the politicians as much. Political 
patronage has damaged the will and ability of Malays because they all now 
depend on political parties. The Malay experience of having been poor, colonised 
and of being fearful of the economic dominance of the Chinese after 
independence, has been conveniently exploited by the political leaders to keep the 
Malays under their influence. 
 
Malays could overcome their dependence on political masters if they put their 
minds to it. As the country develops, politicians have also changed their game, 
using Malay businessmen and patronage to keep them in business in return for 
political loyalty. 
 
Political leadership should help the Malays by implementing affirmative policies 
in a more efficient, objective and transparent manner. 
 
5.2.6b (iv) The impact of religion on the Malays 
 
The Malays tend to mix religion and business. Once successful, a Malay thinks 
that he has to focus on religion as gratitude for his success. Then he starts to 
overly focus on religion, almost abandoning his earlier industriousness hoping at 
times naively, that the more he focuses on religion, the more successful he could 
be. 
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In Malay families, culture and religion are often blurred. It is difficult to say 
where religious teachings end and the Malay culture takes over – there is a 
complete intertwining between the two. 
 
In the last forty years, religion has overly influenced the development of the 
Malays to their detriment because of the lack of understanding the role of Islam 
from the business aspect. Prophet Muhammad had greatly encouraged trade and 
commerce. Because of the lack of proper guidance in Malaysia, a Muslim’s 
ambitions in business have been portrayed as in conflict with the religion. 
 
5.2.6b (v) Education and the Malays 
 
Greater attention should be given to rural Malays in education. Malay 
government officers responsible for educating Malays have made a blunder of 
sending too many Malay students to the same universities and kept the Malays to 
themselves in the mistaken belief that the Malay students would be negatively 
influenced by mixing with other races. They think that they could keep their 
culture and identity only by mixing among themselves. 
 
The group was also critical of wealthy Malays who obtain government 
scholarships for their children using their political influence, even though they 
could easily afford to pay for their children’s education. These well-to-do 
children deprive deserving poor children from getting government scholarships. 
The wealthy Malays justify this by saying that their children achieved academic 
success so they are eligible to get governmental scholarships. 
 
After 1987, the use of the English language was restricted in the education system 
and this has not helped to develop the Malays. Poor command of the English 
language has made them withdraw from mixing with others and keeping to 
themselves. 
 
Another observation made by the group is that many universities in Malaysia of 
late, have predominantly Malay academic staff. There could be greater benefits 
for Malays to learn from non-Malay academics as well. 
 
Greater exposure of Malay students to different global cultures would be more 
beneficial to Malays than sticking to their own kind. 
 
5.2.6b (vi) The Malay family system 
 
Malay families should invest more and give greater priority to their children’s 
education. Extended families in the Malay culture had a say in the children’s 
upbringing before but this has slowly changed now with children having greater 
freedom to make their own choices. 
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5.2.6c Focus Group 3: 
 
5.2.6c (i) Malay traits, characteristics and culture 
 
Malays are actually positive-oriented and are doing well except in terms of 
material wealth creation. They are lagging behind other races in wealth creation 
and economic equity ownership but Malays have great wealth in everything else – 
good culture, good people, good orientations and good value systems. Malays are 
good people and have been described as “nature’s gentleman” who do not hurt 
anyone’s feelings in a pluralistic society of Malaysia. 
 
They give more than they take and are accommodative and integrate well with the 
other communities. 
 
5.2.6c (ii) Chinese businessmen versus Malay businessmen 
 
Malays could focus on areas where they have strength. For example, Malays are 
better in fine arts, such as music, dancing and creative activities. They could 
concentrate on commercialising and promoting their activities where they have 
strengths. Malays’ love for artefacts and rituals make them good craftsmen. 
Malays by nature, enjoy doing creative things than the normal factory production 
type of activities. Economic activities centring on food, cultural activities, 
handicraft production and music are suitable for Malays. 
 
Malays generally lack knowledge of business. In order to gain experience in 
business, they must start from the bottom but they want to start at the top. They 
need to be trained in various aspects of business such as investment, marketing, 
accounting etc. 
 
Unlike the Chinese, Malays do not know how to take risks. They are afraid to 
take risks and they lack the gut instincts. Lack of perseverance also makes them 
fail halfway through their ventures. The newer generation of Malays is more 
hardworking but they lack help and support from others who are afraid to take 
risks. Only a selected class of Malays gets help – those with titles and 
connections. 
 
Malay businessmen are also not able to distinguish between need and greed. 
 
5.2.6c (iii) Business and politics affecting the Malays 
 
Malays are spoon-fed by the government. The government provides the Malays 
with too many opportunities and the Malays take on the ventures without 
sufficient understanding or knowledge of the specific field in which they are 
given the opportunities. 
 
Malay businessmen are also dependent on the government instead of standing on 
their own feet to engage in business. Only if they are able to do business without 
depending on the government would they get a sense of achievement and would 
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be able to survive in the long run. They need to understand and analyse their 
strengths and weaknesses to be able to succeed and lead in business. 
 
Malays have faith in God but they do not have faith in the environment that is 
created for them to be explored. 
 
The problem of the Malays lies with how the government policies that are used to 
help Malay businessmen are implemented. 
 
Corruption in the Malay society by some powerful leaders both in politics and 
business has seeped through which is undesirable. 
 
Malay leaders and Malaysian politicians stay in power through segregation of the 
various races. The political system does not allow the Malaysians to be integrated 
and segregation begins in schools. 
 
Power-based Malay ruler culture (feudalism is what the group meant to say) will 
last for a long time. The people need change in their mindset from this feudalistic 
mentality. 
 
5.2.6c (iv) The impact of religion on the Malays 
 
The Malay is a confused person and has trouble in balancing the worldly life and 
the hereafter. People are supposed to know their religious principles but some 
succumb to the worldly life of greed and power and others focus too much on the 
hereafter and neglect their duties expected of them in this world. 
 
The mosque which could be used as a centre of learning is only used to conduct 
prayers. Religious leaders who control the mosque administration lack education 
and intellectual outlook. 
 
The Malays do not practise Islam in the right form. They need proper religious 
education. They should be encouraged and trained to be strategic thinkers in their 
orientation at all levels using mosques as centres of excellence. There is a need to 
transform mosques to be a centre of Islamic values where economics, social 
activities and education could be practised. There needs to be a paradigm shift in 
the Malay thinking. They must do everything with justice and equity. Even 
affirmative actions should be equitable and available to the other races as well. 
The government should implant ‘spirituality’ into new entrepreneurship training. 
 
5.2.6c (v) Education and the Malays 
 
To prosper, Malays should master languages other than Malay language. 
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5.2.6c (vi) The Malay family system 
 
There was a feeling that children were spoilt by parents by giving too much face 
to them. (The term, “giving too much face to them” is used in the local context to 
mean “spare the rod, spoil the child”.) 
 
Changes need to start from the family, then schools, universities and finally, 
mosques. 
 
Training for children should start with family and guided by the school and 
students should be able to think for themselves by the time they are in the 
university. 
 
5.2.7 Major themes identified from the three Focus Groups: 
 
Based on the three focus groups’ discussions, certain clear themes could be 
identified. It should be noted that the themes identified here are from the six main 
topics which were discussed during the focus group discussions. 
 
5.2.7(a) Malay traits, characteristics and culture 
 
The feudalistic mindset of the Malays was mentioned by two groups quite 
strongly. “They follow the rules blindly even though they do not agree with 
them”; “Malays are taught never to question the authority” are the comments 
worthy of attention. 
 
The dependence culture and subsidy mentality and being spoon-fed were also 
mentioned as factors hampering Malay progress. 
 
5.2.7(b) Comparison with the Chinese businessmen 
 
All the three groups agree that the Chinese are hardworking and persevere to be 
successful but at the same time they also do not agree that Malays are lazy or 
incompetent. They do admit however; that the perseverance of Malays is not 
enough. They give up easily or halfway through. 
 
The influence of environment in the Malay land which is rich in resources is 
commonly cited as a reason for the lack of industriousness among the Malays. 
 
None of the groups however made any critical comments that are normally heard 
of about the Chinese such as they being selfish, greedy, unwilling to teach or 
share with the Malays their success in business. This kind of criticism and 
grudges some of which are not totally untrue, are usually heard in large groups of 
Malay gatherings and political platforms. The three focus groups mainly 
comprising educated businessmen and professionals however; did not resort to 
external criticisms but confined themselves to only internal issues with the 
Malays and their political leaders. 
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5.2.7(c) Business and politics 
 
Lack of experience was the clearest reason raised by the groups as the main cause 
for the Malays’ lack of success in business. This is a very valid observation as the 
Malays in general, have never been in business since the fall of the Malacca 
sultanate to foreigners. 
 
Lack of training was also raised by the groups which put the government in a bad 
light because contract and licenses were given out to the Malays without adequate 
training to ensure they could undertake such ventures. 
 
Again, the groups were critical of the implementation of the affirmative policies 
which resulted in failure of the NEP in the business sector. 
 
Dependency and subsidy mentality were also mentioned repeatedly by the groups 
and these are understandable when seen in the context of lack of experience. As 
Malays lack business experience, they could only cling on to the dependency and 
subsidy for their survival. 
 
One important and quite divergent view expressed by one group is worthy of 
noting; “Malays have great wealth in everything else – good culture, good people, 
good orientations and good value systems. They are “nature’s gentleman” who do 
not want to hurt anyone’s feelings”. 
 
The flip side of this good nature of the Malays is that some groups feel Malays 
should be more assertive. “Malays need assertiveness”; “Malays are not really 
aggressive people”; were some of the comments from the groups. 
 
The lack of assertiveness is also a consequence of the feudalistic mindset of the 
Malays. 
 
In spite of the fact that the government and Malay politicians have used 
affirmative actions to help the Malays in every facet of life such as education, 
business etc., all three groups are somewhat critical of the Malay political leaders 
for their implementation of the policies, though the policies themselves were not 
criticised. 
 
Key words that need attention are: “Malays are spoon-fed by the government”; 
“politicians want to perpetuate the handout system so that businessmen would 
always be dependent on them”; “if you support me, I will give you a contract”; 
“political patronage”; “seeping of corruption”. 
 
Almost all the comments made by the groups point to certain abuses of the 
affirmative actions taken by the government. 
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5.2.7(d) Influence of religion 
 
All the three groups were very clear that misguided religious beliefs due to lack 
of well-qualified religious scholars is a major reason for Malays not being able to 
achieve their full potential in life. The focus groups used the terms such as “not 
right interpretation”; takdir (fate); “religion has interfered with the development 
of Malays in the span of forty years”; (the reason one group used forty years is 
because the religious factor took an overly influential position with the Malays 
only in late 70’s and 80’s perhaps after the Iranian revolution). 
 
It should be noted however, that no one criticised Islam per se but only what they 
felt were misinterpretation of the religion. 
 
5.2.7(e) Education 
 
Another area that all the three groups were uniformly critical of is the education 
system. The educational system does not prepare Malays to be businessmen. 
Malays are not trained sufficiently to undertake business ventures. The focus 
groups also critically cited the fear of authorities that overseas education could 
make Malays lose their “Malayness”, and policies that discouraged Malays to 
mix with people of different cultures, as the main reasons for Malays not 
receiving the best overseas education. 
 
The overall feeling is that a change in the educational system is needed and that 
the Malays should be more proficient in other languages especially the English 
language. 
 
Key words that require attention are: “faculties with predominantly Malay staff”; 
“must make sure that students are exposed to different global cultures”; “Malays 
withdraw because of poor English”; “too much emphasis on Malay language that 
English has been isolated”, and “students so indoctrinated by Malay officers, they 
only mix among themselves”. 
 
A change in the education policy to improve the Malays and their confidence 
level was clearly reiterated by all the groups. 
 
5.2.7(f) Family system 
 
The only area in which the focus groups did not have a clear-cut opinion was in 
the family system. 
 
Each group seemed to have different views. One of the groups had very little 
comment to make on family system suggesting their struggle to have any opinion 
on Malay family system. 
 
The argument that “Malay children do not get enough love from parents” was not 
accepted. Inferiority complex of some Malay children was attributed to parents’ 
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habit of comparing their children with one another or with other children outside 
the family. 
 
There were however no clear thoughts on family system among Malays. 
 
5.2.8 Conclusion of Focus Groups 
 
Overall, the focus groups’ discussions were a very enriching experience which 
gave reasonably objective views from Malay businessmen and professionals who 
were part and parcel of the Malay business and professional community with 
many of them having benefitted from the NEP, at least in terms of education. 
 
Morgan (1996) says “Focus groups are currently used as both a self-contained 
method and in combination with surveys and other research methods, most 
notably individual in-depth interviews”. 
 
This research too incidentally, uses focus groups in combination with surveys 
(the 360-degree feedback instruments) and in-depth interviews. We will move on 
to in-depth interviews in the next section and then to the survey using 360-degree 
feedback instruments in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3 Expert Panel Interviews 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
Conducting one-to-one interviews is extremely time-consuming and requires 
careful planning. By time-consuming is meant the time required to select the 
panel of experts which would require time to sieve through a list of experts and 
finalise a list. Having finalised the list, a request has to be sent to all the selected 
experts providing a background to the research and asking for permission to 
interview them. Almost all the members selected for this interview are very high-
profiled individuals, ranging from two former prime ministers, a former deputy 
prime minister, former and currently serving cabinet members, very senior civil 
servants as well as some of the biggest and well-known businessmen and 
entrepreneurs in the country. 
 
One could imagine the mammoth task of contacting the offices of these extremely 
busy people who often travel overseas. Out of a list of 25 to 30 such individuals 
identified, I finally managed to interview twenty of them over a period of about 
twenty months. 
 
Before we look at the interviews, its contents and analyses, let us understand a bit 
more on conducting interviews which is necessary to understand this method of 
research. 
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5.3.1(a) What is in-depth interview (called expert panel interview for this research) 
 
An in-depth interview is a technique designed to elicit a vivid picture of the 
participant’s perspective on the research topic. 
 
Researchers make use of interviews when they wish to obtain more detailed and 
thorough information on a topic. During the interview, the researcher often 
follows a schedule of pre-prepared questions but is also able to deviate where 
necessary in order to maximise the information obtained. This method is also 
known as semi-structured interviews. 
 
The more structured the interview is, the less likely for a participant to feel at ease 
and reveal important and relevant issues. The downside of a less structured 
interview is that it is harder to analyse afterwards. 
 
In conducting an in-depth interview, the interviewee is the expert and interviewer, 
the student. 
 
The format of an in-depth interview can have different forms such as scenario-
led, reflective accounts or task-led. It is important to put participants at ease with 
general introductions and permission for interviewing and recording the interview 
for any study involving people. 
 
Details of confidentiality and also an assurance about anonymity of information 
and sensitivity concerning its later usage should be clearly communicated to the 
participants prior to the start of the interview. Brief background to the study and 
its objective should also be given to the participants. 
 
It is usual for the interviewer to get the full background of the interviewee but in 
this research it was not necessary as all participants chosen were public figures 
whose background and expertise were well-known. 
 
5.3.1(b) Stages of the interview 
 
With the participants, it is advisable to start with what is described as “letting off 
steam”. 
 
This refers to asking general questions which allow participants to share a set of 
key points they have in their mind that they want to tell (such as their likes and 
dislikes). If the interviewer does not allow the participant to unleash these issues 
from the beginning, these points will surface repeatedly in all the questions asked. 
 
Any issues that have not naturally been dealt through the “letting off steam” 
should now be introduced next. Also called “addressing the issues”, this stage 
could require further scenario prompting. The interviewer however must use 
prompting sparingly so as not to bias the respondent towards specific issues or 
responses. 
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If there are any sensitive issues, it is best to leave them till the end. This would 
enable trust to be built between the participants and the researcher making it 
easier for the participant to talk with more comfort about these issues. 
 
The concluding session of the interview is the “tying up or debriefing”. This 
refers to the rounding off of the session with a summing up of all the issues. 
However, this may not be possible in all cases in view of time constraints. 
 
It is always advisable to finally conclude with a brief reaffirmation of 
confidentiality and a brief for the aim of research and what it will be used for. 
 
Seven stages of conducting in-depth interviews 
 
Kvale (1996) provides details of the seven stages in conducting in-depth 
interviews which was a useful guide for the research: 
 
1)  Thermatizing – refers to clarifying  purpose of interview and description of 
the concept and investigation of the topic; 
2)  Designing – after deciding what you want to know, the design of interview 
should be in a way to elicit the information through interview; 
3)  Interviewing – conducting of the interviews by introduction, explanation of 
the study and putting respondents at ease. It is appropriate to obtain 
permission to audio-record the interview and also test the equipment if it is 
working. It is the main responsibility of the interviewer to listen and 
observe with a reflective approach to the knowledge sought; 
4)  Transcribing – creating a verbatim text of each interview by writing out 
each question and response. Interviewer’s notes could also be used in 
transcribing; 
5)  Analysing – involves re-reading interview transcripts to identify themes 
emerging from respondent’s answers; 
6)  Verifying – involves checking the credibility of information gathered 
through triangulation, i.e., using multiple perspectives to interpret a single 
set of information; 
7)  Reporting – communicating and sharing the findings and results from the 
in-depth interviews through a written report. 
 
5.3.1(c) Key characteristics of an in-depth interview 
 
It is important for the researcher to bear in mind the following key characteristics 
when conducting an in-depth interview (Guion, Diehl & McDonald, 2001; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest & Namey, 2005): 
 
a)  The questions should be open-ended with why and how; 
 
b)  The format should be semi-structured with questions pre-planned but the 
style should be conversational; 
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c)  The interviewer should seek understanding and interpret the interview with 
active listening skills to reflect on what the speaker is saying; 
 
d)  Recording of the responses should be with the help of audio equipment and 
could be complemented with recorded notes (field notes) by the 
interviewer. 
 
5.3.1(d) Attributes of an interviewer 
 
An interviewer should be one who is: 
 
i. Open-minded – quick judgement or criticism can act as barriers to 
communication so it is important to maintain openness during the 
interview process; 
 
ii. Patient – allow the respondents to speak freely and open up at a pace 
comfortable to respondent; 
 
iii. Flexible and responsive – acknowledging human interactions are 
complex, the interviewer should allow respondents to respond to 
challenges; 
 
iv. Observant – good interviewers are observant, picking up suitable facial 
expression, body language and tone of voice; and 
 
v. A good listener – interviewer should fully attend to what the speaker is 
saying, paraphrase what the speaker is saying to confirm to the speaker 
that the listener is listening and also reflect back to the speaker the 
emotions inherent in the message. 
 
Other points for the interviewer to pay attention to are: 
 
a) The choice of location – an interview should be conducted in a private 
location where participants feel at ease; 
 
b) Presentation to interview participants – first impression is important.  
Therefore, the interviewer should pay attention to the manner of greeting, 
manner of speaking, dressing and body language to create a favourable 
impression to the participants; and 
 
c) Length of interview – the interview should be a minimum of one hour 
and could stretch up to two hours depending on the participant’s time 
availability. 
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5.3.2 Suitability of in-depth interview for this research 
 
For a qualitative research of this nature involving the leadership qualities of a 
particular race, it is very important to have in-depth interviews with the leaders of 
the race who have played key roles both in politics and business to get their 
views. 
 
An in-depth interview is a qualitative technique that allows person-to-person 
discussions which can lead to increased insight into people’s thoughts, feelings 
and behaviour on important issues. 
 
Bearing in mind that in-depth interviews take much more time, it is not usually 
practicable to interview a large sample. The selection of small sample size must 
therefore mean that those selected for the in-depth interview must be people who 
are well-informed about the issue to provide appropriate information. 
 
The in-depth interview for this research reflected an interpersonal situation, a 
conversation between two partners of a theme of mutual interest (Kvale, 1996). 
 
Individual interviews are probably the most widely used method in qualitative 
research according to Ritchie & Lewis (2003). They are also particularly well-
suited to research that requires an understanding of deeply-rooted or delicate 
phenomena or responses to complex systems, processes or experiences because of 
the depth of the focus and the opportunity they offer for clarification and detailed 
understanding. 
 
In this research, I consider myself more an interpreter than a manipulator of data, 
concerned with capturing other people’s meanings, rather than testing hypotheses 
as described by Marshall (1984) and quoted by Bryman & Bell (2003). 
 
Generally, qualitative researchers use in-depth interviews as a methodology and a 
literature search on qualitative research greatly supports in-depth interviews as a 
suitable approach (Boyce & Neale, 2006; Bryman & Bell, 2003; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994; Guion, Diehl & McDonald, 2001; Kvale, 1996; Ritchie & Lewis, 
2005). 
 
Therefore; it was decided that in-depth interviews will add richness to this 
research. 
 
5.3.3 Preparing for in-depth interviews and selection of participants 
 
Preparation for in-depth interviews started almost at the same time as focus 
groups discussions during the planning of the research methodology for this 
research. Just as in the case of focus groups, selecting participants for in-depth 
interviews took several months. One major difference between the participants of 
focus groups and in-depth interviews was that the latter group comprised the 
cream of political and business community. Essentially, people who could not be 
assembled for focus group discussions by virtue of their profile and position in 
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the government or business sector were the ones who were targeted as suitable for 
one-to-one in-depth interviews. 
 
Another important criterion for selection as a participant for in-depth interviews 
for this research, was that the participants should have played a role one way or 
another either in the government, private sector, academic, journalistic or non-
governmental organisation as a policy maker, beneficiary or observer of the 
government’s affirmative policy. 
 
Based on these criteria, about 30 to 40 people were selected and finally we were 
able to get about 20 who agreed to grant interviews for the research. 
 
The twenty people who were selected and agreed for the interview are as follows: 
 
  Two former prime ministers; 
  A former deputy prime minister; 
  Two former finance ministers; 
  Two current cabinet ministers 
  Two Malay businessmen well-recognised in the country and region; 
  Three senior civil servants (two current and one former); 
  A former chief editor of a major publishing house; 
  A professor of history and expert on Malay history; 
  A foreigner whose family was involved in plantation business during the 
British rule; 
  A banker; 
  A Malay officer who was involved in the formulation of NEP under the 
second prime minister; 
  A director for Asia Pacific of a global HR consulting firm, who was 
involved in training and developing senior Malay corporate executives in 
the government and private sector;  
  An NGO representative from a well-known political family; and 
  An economic anthropologist 
 
5.3.4 Developing the questions 
 
The questions developed for in-depth interviews were not much different from 
those which were used for the focus group discussions. Bearing in mind an 
average interview time of an hour, the number of questions was confined to about 
twelve. 
 
The questions centred on the following areas and sought the thoughts, opinions 
and views of the experts: 
 
1)  The Malays being classified as lazy and not persevering, their strengths and 
weaknesses; 
 
2)  The Malays’ ability to compete with Chinese; 
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3)  The results so far of the assistance provided to the Malays under the NEP 
and NDP; 
 
4)  The reasons for Dr Mahathir and other political leaders’ criticisms of the 
Malays: 
 
5)  Malay characteristics that could have contributed to the failure of NEP; 
 
6)  Political skills/astuteness of Malays in managing the country after 
independence; 
 
7)  What should be done and how to improve Malay performance in economy 
to achieve targets set by the government; 
 
8)  Views on the implementation of affirmative policies such as the NEP and 
subsequently NDP. 
 
5.3.5 Planning the interview sessions 
 
Out of thirty or forty people initially identified, a further process of filtering the 
interview participants resulted in twenty experts who agreed to be interviewed for 
this research. 
 
Several others were simply too busy or were not available for the interviews. 
From the list of participants who were interviewed, it could be seen that the 
‘cream of who’s-who’ in the country generally agreed to the in-depth interviews. 
Several experts congratulated the researcher for embarking on such a complex 
research question and wished him well adding that a research of this nature is 
very timely and greatly needed for the country.  
 
While the agreement in principle was obtained from the twenty experts, to get 
them to commit to the interview session on a specific date and time was not easy. 
Understandably; - as most of them are very busy with government positions and 
even those who had retired, being prominent, were holding very senior positions 
as chairmen or advisers in various government or private sector corporations. The 
researcher was well aware that their intentions were there to meet him but it was 
their busy schedules that made it difficult to commit them to an agreed date. The 
interviewer himself was also equally busy holding chairmanship and directorship 
in banking institutions and was undertaking this research on a part-time basis for 
five years before he decided to resign all his positions to focus on the research 
only towards the end of 2010. 
 
In all, it took more than twenty months in total to complete the twenty interviews 
– averaging one interview per month.  
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5.3.6 Interview sessions 
 
The date and time for individual interviews were agreed and arranged with the 
office of the interviewee through his or her secretary or personal assistant. Almost 
all interviews were held in the office of the interviewee. Being very senior 
politicians, government servants or businessmen every one of them had a very 
spacious office, in a relaxed environment conducive for the interview to be held. 
 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim subsequently. Every 
one of the interviewee gave the interviews in a relaxed atmosphere. After all, for 
these seasoned experts, one-to-one interviews were nothing new or unusual. 
 
It must be stated here that every single interviewee gave the interview with 
utmost frankness, not once showing any unease, emotions of anger, nor any sort 
of negative emotions were displayed both in verbal and non-verbal 
communications, showing their passion for the topic of research and at times their 
despair that they could not implement some of the policies as they had planned. 
Almost all of them had answered the questions with great passion and seriousness 
as all of them believed that the research question touched on the nerve of a very 
important and sensitive issue that has not found a satisfactory resolution for a 
long time. Every one wished that this piece of research could provide some 
enlightenment or greater understanding for the issues the government has been 
grappling with since the 1970’s. 
 
5.3.6 (i) Audit to ensure the credibility and validity of focus groups and expert panel 
interviews 
 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) recommend audit trails as one of the principal techniques 
for establishing the ‘confirmability’ of qualitative findings. Janesick (2003) also 
supports Lincoln & Guba’s suggestions to cross-check our works through 
member checks and audit trails. There is no one best method to carry out cross-
checks of the qualitative researcher’s works; so long as the qualitative researcher 
decides what forms of checks to undertake to establish the credibility of his 
research from personal biases, both conscious and unconscious.  
 
For the cross-checking of my work for this research, I engaged an assistant to 
transcribe all the proceedings of the focus groups as well as the interviews of the 
twenty expert panel members. After transcriptions were completed, I analysed 
and coded the transcriptions for the completion of this chapter on focus groups 
and expert panel members. Once the chapter was completed, the research 
assistant, who was not involved in the analysis or compilation of the findings, 
was asked to review the entire chapter to confirm that my analysis and findings 
were consistent with the transcriptions done by her earlier. 
 
Upon reviewing the chapter on focus group discussions and expert panel 
members’ interviews, the research assistant came up with 25 observations for 
corrections and additions. All the corrections and additions as recommended by 
the research assistant were made and the research assistant had to further review 
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the revised chapter to ensure that the required corrections and additions were 
incorporated. This cross-checking made independently by the research assistant 
meant that this research complied with an independent audit of the chapter 
involving focus groups and expert panel interviews. This process also helped in 
eliminating, or at least, in minimising the researcher’s own unconscious biasness 
towards the research findings.  
 
5.3.6 (ii) Theoretical saturation 
 
With twenty expert panel interviews, I had a sense of having reached theoretical 
saturation as the answers of the expert panel members, though rich and 
informative, was beginning to become redundant with very marginal additional 
information being available by the time I completed the twentieth interview. This 
is supported by Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge (2007), who are of the view 
that as a rough guide for interview studies analysed, the theoretical saturation will 
probably be reached after 20 to 60 interviews. 
 
5.3.7 Analysing in-depth interview responses 
 
All the twenty interviews which were audio-taped were fully transcribed into hard 
copies through a research assistant who heard the audio tape with a headphone 
and transcribed the interviews on to a personal computer. Hard copies of the 
interviews were printed for the researcher to comb through the interviews 
carefully. All the interviews were read at least three times and key themes and 
important issues that emerged from the interviews were highlighted using 
coloured highlighters. The notes were organised using both by question and 
themes. 
 
In the early stage of exploration, nothing beats a thorough reading and pawing of 
data. This approach is recommended as suitable by Ryan G.W. and Bernad H.R. 
in an article published as a part of a National Science Foundation Grant on 
“Methods for conducting Systematic Text Analysis” (SRB 9811166).  
 
Analysing in-depth interviews is no doubt challenging and time-consuming but 
presumably there is no shortcut to this process and the disadvantage of time 
consumed far outweighs the advantages associated with in-depth interviews such 
as uncovering valuable insights and openness of respondents. The in-depth 
interviews, centered on the eight areas were identified earlier in Section 5.3.4.  
From these areas a total of about twelve questions were proposed and used in a 
semi-structured form during the interviews. 
 
The following process was followed in analysing the in-depth interviews: 
a)  Each interview was numbered from 1 to 20; 
b)  Every question or topic was categorised with a new paragraph; 
c)  Sub-categories were assigned codes; and 
d)  After categorising every comment from each respondent, the document was 
saved with a back-up copy; 
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All the points and comments were then grouped into categories and sub-
categories and summarised. 
 
The fundamental task of both in-depth interviews and focus groups is theme 
identification and this is what was aimed at in this research process as well. 
 
The findings of the in-depth interviews and the themes that emerged during the 
interviews are discussed in the following pages. 
 
5.3.7(a)  Myth of the lazy Malay 
 
In order to establish the causes for the Malay’s lack of success in business, the 
interview usually started with the question of Malays being classified as lazy and 
indolent during the colonial era. What the experts felt about this branding of the 
Malays in the early days of the British rule would enable the research to look at 
the other possible reasons. 
 
Every one of the twenty interviewees rejected the notion of calling Malays lazy, 
incompetent or indolent. Several of the interviewees put forth very similar 
arguments pointing out that Malays were traditionally farmers and fishermen and 
people engaged in these activities could hardly be described as lazy because 
farmers and fishermen have to wake up early in the wee hours of morning to start 
work. 
 
Malay rubber smallholders too have to tap rubber very early in the morning. So 
how could such people be classified as lazy? This line of argument has already 
been put forth by Alatas (1977) and most of the participants in the in-depth 
interview would have also read the book by Alatas. So it was not surprising that 
similar arguments were used by several participants. Only one or two agreed it 
could be partly true. 
 
A few of them did reason out that Malays need not have to work too hard though, 
as the country is blessed with plenty of natural resources and rainfall. Things 
grow very easily in the tropical land and there was plenty of food both on land 
and water for everyone to be fed adequately. The Malays did not have to push 
themselves too hard to lead a comfortable life. “Comfortable” used here is a 
relative term meaning having enough to eat on a daily basis without having to 
hoard too much for the future. 
 
The interviewees were also able to rationalise the stereotyping of Malays as not 
hardworking because of the following reasons: 
 
Malays work hard but they are not ambitious. When they have enough for them 
and the family, they would call it a day. There is a Malay proverb “kais pagi 
makan pagi, kais petang, makan petang” literally meaning ‘work in the morning 
for the morning meal and work in the evening for the evening meal’. This was 
interpreted by one participant as, because the Malays do not have to store or 
hoard the food as in other climatic conditions, they get enough to eat after the 
 175 
morning work and enough to eat after the evening work. The proverb, he 
emphasised, does not convey a hand-to-mouth policy as interpreted by many. “If 
you take a fishing rod to the river in the morning, you get enough fish for the 
family and if you do the same in the evening you get enough to feed the family in 
the evening. So I think that the proverb does not reflect the poverty of the Malays 
as is commonly interpreted but it reflects the bountiful nature of the Malay 
surroundings”. 
 
One participant remarked, “Malays really work hard but unfortunately they work 
in non-productive sectors and because of that they do not seem to acquire wealth” 
… It was the British who wrote that Malays are lazy but they are ones who 
wanted the Malays to be lazy so that they could exploit the resources of this 
land”. 
 
Another participant observed, “There is some truth in it because environmentally, 
the Malays have been led to believe that they are well-provided for and they feel 
that they live in a country that is blessed. In fact, it is a blessed country because if 
you throw anything on the ground, it grows without fertilizer; without nurturing 
it. It is a life that could lead you to be content because you have everything and 
you are not subjected to the vagaries of the weather…. You are not subjected to 
calamities or earthquakes and volcanic eruptions… we are also told because of 
our religious teachings to be content with what we get and we should feel 
blessed… To that extent, Malays are very happy and contented. Some people say 
they are lazy but what is there in life other than the pursuit of happiness anyway? 
They are happy with their family, relatives, and environment”. 
 
The almost unanimous response to this question of Malays being lazy was they 
are not but they could be a bit laidback because of the bounty of natural resources 
and the religious belief to be moderate and be contented.  
 
One participant illustrated an interesting example to confirm the Malays’ 
moderate needs. When he was an accountant in a transportation company which 
leased taxis to Chinese and Malays on a daily basis, he observed that the Malays 
would stop work as soon as they felt they had enough collection for their day’s 
needs; whereas the Chinese would drive the taxi all day to earn as much as 
possible. These examples are however a good thirty or forty-year old stories. The 
younger generation of Malays is proving to be more hardworking as will be seen 
in the later parts of this chapter. 
 
Several participants also pointed out to the Malays in civil service and the Malay 
CEOs in the government-linked corporations (GLCs) as examples to challenge 
the notion of Malays being classified as lazy. 
 
As one non-Malay participant concluded, “The achievements since independence 
indicate that Malaysia is capable of producing a sufficient cadre of competent 
individuals who are able to run the country”, sums up the case to reject the notion 
that Malays are lazy. 
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The reason for raising this question early in the interview is to rule out being 
“lazy” as a possible cause for Malays not being successful in business. 
 
In the event, the participants agreed that it was the case, then it would be the 
obvious reason for Malays lack of success and the research then need not dig any 
further. 
 
5.3.7(b)  Are the Malays able to compete with the Chinese? 
 
Following from the first point and confirming that the views of the participants 
were strongly unanimous in rejecting the notion that the Malays are lazy, the 
natural question that followed then was: “Are the Malays able to compete with 
the Chinese?” By Chinese in this context, we mean the Malaysian Chinese and 
not Chinese from China or elsewhere. This distinction has to be made clear 
because the contention of the whole research is why the Malays are not as 
successful as the Chinese in Malaysia. Whether there are any differences between 
the Malaysian Chinese work ethics culture and productivity and other overseas 
Chinese is not a matter of concern to us in this study. So we only focus on the 
Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. 
 
By the very fact that this research attempts to understand the Malay leadership 
qualities in business and the causes for their lack of success in business is already 
an implicit admission that the Chinese have an upper hand in business. That is the 
main reason for the introduction of the NEP to narrow the economic gap between 
the races, to eradicate poverty and the identification of race with an economic 
activity. 
 
The question to be answered in this instance is therefore; what the differences are 
between the Chinese and Malays in the business and work culture that makes the 
Chinese more successful. 
 
The answer for this question by the participants fell into different categories and 
it could be seen, especially among the Malay respondents, some form of defence 
mechanism in answering this question. 
 
The first defence mechanism is that Malays had been successful historically 
during the Malacca sultanate. Only with the advent of colonisation did the Malay 
participation in business declined and disappeared finally. 
 
The second defence mechanism is that the Malays have had a comfortable life 
without having to push themselves too hard in the Malay land. By virtue of their 
contentment and religious upbringing they only had modest and moderate needs 
compared to the immigrant races that came from countries where there was 
hardship and famine. The immigrant theory was brought up by several 
respondents pointing out that immigrants are usually the more hardworking 
people anywhere in the world and are usually more successful than the locals. 
Examples of the success of Indians in the UK as compared to the locals were 
cited. 
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Some without openly admitting that Malays have not measured up to the level of 
the Chinese, expressed the opinion that Malays can compete with Chinese but it 
takes time. “Malays have lived happily in a comfortable environment, whereas 
the Chinese and Indians came to Malaya because life was a lot harder in their 
countries. Their cultural background and practices of their homelands certainly 
made them successful overnight”. 
 
They came to escape poverty and this country gave them an instant opportunity to 
be better off. 
 
Some respondents did admit that Malays have a problem with business because 
they do not have a history of business culture. This was emphasised by one 
respondent who agreed that even during the golden era of the Malacca Sultanate, 
the ordinary Malays were not really involved in business. “If you go by history, 
money was made by Malay aristocrats, by farming out mining rights to the 
Chinese. They did make fortunes by their system. I suspect during the Malacca 
times it was probably not broad-based. The principal players in the trade were 
Indian Muslims, Arab Merchants and Chinese. Of course the Sultan plays a 
pivotal role in the whole thing…” 
 
The respondents overall tacitly agreed and some openly pointed out that the 
Malays  lack experience in business and are therefore not able to compete with 
the immigrant hardy races such as the Chinese and Indians. It is not that they are 
not capable, but they never had the opportunity to be businessmen from the 
feudal system. Now with greater exposure and experience the Malays are able to 
compete much better and the gap is narrowing. 
 
There are certain cultural traits of the Chinese that make it extremely difficult for 
the Malays to compete with them. Through the clan and kongsi system, the 
Chinese are able to control the entire supply chain in business because of their 
early involvement in business in Malaya. Real business by the Malays only 
started after the NEP was introduced. The Malays do not have the advantage of 
being able to control the supply chain which places them in a great disadvantage. 
As an example, let us say that a Malay contractor gets a government contract to 
construct a building. The entire supply chain in the construction industry is in the 
hands of Chinese businessmen – cement, steel, electrical and mechanical items 
etc. The Malay is therefore, at the mercy of the Chinese who may take advantage 
of the situation to charge high prices. The Malay, having no choice but to be 
dependent on the Chinese, may find it extremely difficult to control his 
construction cost. Coupled with his lack of business experience he may run into 
difficulties in completing the project on time resulting in not only losses for him 
but also the government. There is a chain reaction to this failure. Money lost, and 
bad reputation to the Malay businessmen and the government unable to launch its 
project on time resulting in criticism by the people.  
 
The respondents therefore pointed out to the complexity of making the Malays 
successful not because the Malays are not capable, but often factors which put 
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them at a great disadvantage. It is therefore not inappropriate to conclude that 
whatever the reasons may be, the Malays are still not able to compete with the 
Chinese on the various business sectors. 
 
5.3.7(c)  The NEP and the Malays 
 
Moving on from the second question that the Malays are unable to compete with 
the Chinese for various reasons, then naturally the question of affirmative action 
and NEP crops up in the interview.  
 
So as the interviewer, I posed the question of NEP in a broad perspective to open 
up discussions with the participants.  
 
The one thing that every participant emphasised was the need for the NEP to help 
the Malays who as a race have been left behind in their own country compared to 
the immigrant races. There were mixed responses to the other aspects such as the 
success of NEP, its impact on developing the Malays as well as the 
implementation of the affirmative action, all of which are discussed in this 
section. 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, NEP was developed as a result of the 
racial riots in 1969. The Malay leaders were searching for the solution after the 
racial riots and engaged experts, both local and foreign, on how to bring the 
multi-racial population together. 
 
The need for affirmative action for the Malays according to one participant was 
realised even when the British were still in the country. So the British made some 
special efforts to educate the Malays to make them employable in junior 
government positions as clerks and administrators. After independence, there was 
so much expectation that the Malay position would change for the better 
especially with the political power firmly entrenched in the hands of the Malays. 
In the early days after independence, the Malays felt confident that positive 
change to their economic plight would take place with the transfer of political 
power. Being a race that is patient with the sabar and budi complex they waited 
for almost twelve years before violent eruptions broke out after the 1969 general 
elections. Even then, they became violent only when the election results of 1969 
shook the very foundation of their political power. For the first time since 
merdeka the Malays felt politically threatened in their own country. The double 
impact of losing political power and the negligible change to their economic 
position over twelve years since independence, threatened the Malays and drove 
the polite, well-mannered and ‘nature’s gentleman’ to violence. 
 
Only then did the Malay leaders in Government realise the seriousness of the 
Malay dissatisfaction. Because of their respect and loyalty to their leaders, the 
Malays had waited patiently hoping that their leaders would bring about change 
to their economic position. After this incident, the Malay leaders were jolted to 
react in order to pacify the majority people of the country. According to Dr 
Mahathir (1970) there were several symptoms pointing to the simmering of 
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Malay disillusion to their continued economic disparity vis-à-vis the non-Malays, 
but the government of the day chose to ignore them till it was too late. 
 
Was the NEP a success is the natural question that would arise in anybody’s mind 
since it was introduced more than forty years ago. 
 
The interviews showed that results were mixed. Certainly, it was a clear success 
in some notable areas such as education and professional development but it fell 
short on economic targets that were set at the introduction of NEP. There are no 
clear-cut agreements to the measuring of the economic success of NEP between 
the various races. The Chinese feel that the Malays have achieved NEP targets 
and therefore NEP should no longer be applicable and must be withdrawn. The 
Malays think otherwise. The reasons for these divergent views would be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Let us first look at some of the arguments in favour of NEP’s success. As one 
cabinet minister pointed out, “At the time of merdeka, 75% of the Malays were 
poor but just in two generations; the poverty level of the Malays has been almost 
eradicated to around 3%. Children of the farmers and fishermen have become 
businessmen. So the upward mobility of the Malay race could be number one in 
the world. The intergenerational mobility had become extremely well, so how is 
it a failure? We have also successfully educated the Malay students who have 
come back and worked as professionals and they uplifted their parents’ positions. 
There may be pockets of failure here and there but generally it is successful”. 
 
Every participant lauded the government’s efforts in building a professional class 
of Malays in the fields of engineering, medicine, law, architecture etc. Malays 
were less than 5% in the membership of professional groups such as architects, 
accountants, engineers, dentists, doctors, surveyors and lawyers in 1970. By the 
year 2005, Malays made up around 40% in all of professions except for 
accounting in which their percentage was 20. These statistics reflect the success 
of NEP in the educational field (the detailed statistics are provided in Appendix 
8). 
 
Why have the Malays not succeeded in achieving the target of 30% equity in the 
corporate sector over the 20-year period as originally envisaged by the NEP? And 
why have they generally failed to make an impact as being successful in the 
business sector drawing criticism from the Malay leaders? 
 
Various reasons were given by the participants but most of them point to the 
misinterpretation and poor understanding and implementation of the NEP. A 
former cabinet minister says, “The policy itself is very normal. It is not to help 
the Malays but it is to help the unfortunate who have been left behind. But along 
the way, there were many interpretations of the policy until the focus was on the 
Malays and the Bumiputras, while ignoring (but not completely ignoring), the 
other races”. 
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Another former cabinet minister who was closely associated with the NEP in its 
formative years commented, “It was not designed to help any particular race. It 
was to help everybody and the primary objective of NEP was to bring about 
unity… I do not think it is bad or good but if there was anything lacking, this was 
because of the lack of understanding of NEP. The Malays and Chinese do not 
appreciate this fully. The Chinese think that this is a chance for the Malay leaders 
in government to take this opportunity and get everything for the Malays. This is 
not true….. I am closely associated with NEP from the word go but I think the 
NEP was to correct the imbalance all the way, not just economic wealth but also 
education, social programmes; that people should be looked after in the 
kampungs (villages) and in the towns in order to bring about the balance and 
unity”. He blamed the politicians who lacked the appreciation of NEP and its 
objectives and the abuse of the policy meant to correct the imbalance. 
 
The people who know those in power took advantage of the situation to take as 
much as possible. The politicians in power, in order to be popular, gave in to the 
wishes of some. 
 
Everyone interviewed admitted to the NEP being abused by both politicians and 
influential Malays alike. The interview was conducted with very senior 
politicians from the time of introducing the NEP to the present day. While the 
interviewees did not mince words when admitting to the abuse of the NEP, no 
one seemed to take responsibility – everyone blaming the others, usually their 
successors. 
 
The general conclusion about the NEP was that it was a success in creating a 
class of Malay professionals from almost negligible level to around 40% over a 
period of 35 years. However, it was generally a failure in creating a successful 
class of Malay businessmen largely due to the process of abuse in implementation 
of the NEP and lack of training accorded to the Malays to become entrepreneurs 
and businessmen. 
 
5.3.7(d)  The selection process in NEP 
 
Closely associated with the NEP was the question of how the selection process to 
identify Malay businessmen who were to be the beneficiaries of large government 
businesses and contracts, was decided by the government leaders. If there was 
any criticism that was almost universal with the participants of the expert panel 
interviews, it was relating to the abuses in the selection process of the so-called 
“winners” as one participant described it. 
 
One participant did accept the criticism but also questioned how to choose the 
best. Some of the criticisms of the NEP’s selection process are: 
 
 “NEP process was upset by greed and corruption. Malays also think NEP 
is only for selected few. It was never designed that way”. 
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 “Mahathir Mohamad and Daim (the then Prime Minister and the then 
Finance Minister respectively) took the view that they wanted a small 
number of extremely successful Malay businessmen and they piled far too 
much on their plates and most of them collapsed one way or another”. 
 
 Selection process of giving licenses to wrong people without experience 
and proper training”. 
 
 “NEP is a social contract. But a lot of flaws in implementation of NEP. 
Because of linkages, specific people benefitted. A lot of wastage. 
Overnight millionaire mindset came in”. 
 
 “NEP was really meant to give the man the fishing rod but a lot of people 
see it as ‘give me the fish’. Along the way the people got lost. It became 
race-based rather than policy-based. NEP should work towards its demise. 
If we keep extending, it then basically means you are a failure”. 
 
 “NEP will stand for a long time in terms of the theoretical foundation. In 
terms of implementation, this is where it was not a glorious record simply 
because it was haphazardly implemented. A lot of leakages especially in 
allocation of shares went to the elite. NEP was hijacked by vested 
interests inconsistent with the original objective as formulated by Tun 
Razak. NEP got a bad name while these fellows got the benefit”. 
 
These are selected quotes from the expert panel who were all involved in the NEP 
process one way or another. It shows the general feeling among even the experts 
about the weaknesses in the selection process in determining the beneficiaries or 
businessmen who were to be given government contracts, licenses and allocation 
of equity at preferential terms. 
 
It is interesting to observe that while everybody is critical, no one assumes 
responsibility in spite of the fact that several of the eminent panel of experts had 
served in the government at one time or another. 
 
5.3.7(e) Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s criticisms of the Malays 
 
As everyone criticised the NEP implementation, the discussions during the 
interviews naturally moved on to Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s criticism of the 
Malays. It is appropriate to recapitulate here that this research was the result of Dr 
Mahathir’s criticism of the Malays as a failure in business. Why is Dr Mahathir’s 
criticisms taken so seriously? 
 
It is because he is seen as the architect of transforming Malaysia from an agro 
economy to a manufacturing and services-based economy during his almost 22 
years as Prime Minister of Malaysia. It was during his administration that the 
major NEP restructuring and privatisation which provided ample opportunities 
for Malays to climb up the economic ladder as envisaged under the NEP, began 
(Bakri, 1999; Shome, 2002; Sloane, 1999; Wain, 2009a). 
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So it was natural that the interview should turn to Dr Mahathir criticising the 
Malays for their lack of perseverance, opting for quick gains rather than long-
term business development and wealth creation. 
 
As the critic himself was one of the participants for this interview and his views 
are public, he did not mince his words in his criticisms of the Malays for this 
interview. In a one-to-one in-depth interview held with him, he expressed his 
views which I have quoted verbatim to give the reader the full impact of his 
frustration. 
 
The Malays unfortunately have a poor value system. They are easily 
satisfied. When they came to Malacca they were very poor. They set up 
the Malacca Sultanate and they worked hard and they reached a certain 
level of prosperity – trading, collecting jungle products, exchanging 
goods etc. Then Malacca became a port and it grew and became an 
empire. Then they became satisfied and they refused to work hard 
anymore. They want to depend on others and as a result they developed a 
culture which is based on maximizing returns with minimal effort. One of 
the things that I talk about is the behaviour of Malay sultans. We were 
not conquered. The British did not invade us, only the Portuguese did. 
Then the Portuguese lost to the Dutch. The Dutch did not attack us, they 
attacked the Portuguese. Then of course Malacca was exchanged with 
Batavia. But the Malay states surrendered completely to the British 
because the British offered an easy life. They said, “You hand over the 
administration of your country to us and we will give you political 
pension”. This is something that has not been heard of; a political 
pension which means that you will receive money without having to do 
any work. The British will do the work for you. And then of course this is 
to play out the Malay love for ceremony: they were given yellow 
umbrellas, Rolls Royce, a palace. This mentality is the same mentality we 
find among the Malays now. If they can get something easily, why work? 
Doesn’t matter what is going to happen in future. In the case of the 
sultans when they accepted this political pension they actually 
surrendered their independence. They are prepared to give up the 
independence just for these little things and because of that they 
endangered themselves to the point where after the war (referring to 
World war II) the British proposed to just forget about the sultans and 
make them into head chiefs and the British wanted to colonise the whole 
country, and that was the Malayan Union. So when you give up your 
responsibility in order to enjoy life, you run the danger of losing 
everything. They would have lost everything but for the fact that the 
Malay public rose and demanded the British to respect the Malay rights 
of the country. We were able to get rid of the Malayan Union and then 
we became independent. When we became independent we had the 
political power which is a huge leverage and that political power is 
again used to get things easily. The reason why Malays are good in 
politics is because they think this is the lever that will give them wealth 
for nothing and now we are talking about money politics. I tell them if 
 183 
you sell your rights, one day you would lose everything. It is difficult to 
penetrate them. They cannot understand why they should not accept 
bribes but again this is the same mentality – an easy life without work. 
 
It is reflected in all other activities; in business it is the same. They would 
be a sleeping partner and they will accept being directors of various 
companies where their function is minimal. They do not even bother to 
learn about the business and as a result they are always dependent. 
When we give them license and permits, they will sell them all for quick 
profits. They do not want to struggle. People who received these Aps
32
 
(approved permits) for imported cars were mostly from UMNO 
headquarters. Previously the minister was giving away (the Aps) very 
freely. When I became minister, I said, “No, I cannot give this to you 
unless you have evidence that you are going to do business”. And they 
wanted to organize a demonstration against me. Of course not all of them 
were like that; people like Naza
3 33
 have come up. I must say quite 
unfortunately the majority of Malays still have that “why must I work 
hard when I can get things easily”. … There is no sense of responsibility 
and there’s no interest in work. They do not have discipline of the work 
place and the sense of responsibility. They do not have the patience to 
wait for some time before they can really succeed or became skilful. 
There is no commitment and all the other good values like hard work, 
that you must be diligent, must learn – they do not have all these thing. 
 
None of the rest of the nineteen interviewees rejected Dr Mahathir’s criticisms 
outright, which meant they at least agreed with his criticisms in the overall 
context of NEP targets not being fulfilled. 
 
One former cabinet minister remarked that after sometime, Dr Mahathir felt 
frustrated. He blamed the political party members as people who asked for the 
contracts and they kept coming back. It became a political culture. According to 
him, very few took the opportunity to build a long-term business. He also 
mentioned Naza as a rare exception. 
 
Another former cabinet colleague observed that it is the nature of the man 
(referring to Dr Mahathir) that he lives by provocation. “And he lives guided by 
Sun Tzu’s art of war to provoke people to seek a fight and to fight is to win… He 
is also genuinely concerned and he knew how to use his position to provoke 
people to be angry yet accepting the facts as true”. 
                                                 
32
  AP’s refer to approved permits which are given to Malay entrepreneurs to import cars to encourage  
then to be involved in the motor vehicle distribution trade. Most Malay businessmen who obtained APs 
sold them to Chinese businessmen for quick profits instead of setting up a motor vehicle distribution 
centre.  Only one Malay businessman Tan Sri S.M Nasimuddin (deceased), also known as Naza, who 
set up a successful automobile manufacturing and assembly plant and successfully developing 
backward integration business model, from a mere importer to manufacturer and assembler of motor 
vehicles.  
 
33
  The footnote reference (Naza
3
) here is taken from excerpts of an interview done earlier. 
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Several participants remarked that Dr Mahathir is half-right implying that while 
Malays did take the easy way out to make money frustrating the government’s 
efforts to build a long-term success for themselves, the government is also not 
blameless for the loopholes and weaknesses in the implementation of the NEP. 
One respondent observed that the government is guilty of pampering Malay 
businessmen too much when they gave up to 30% of the contract sums upfront 
even before the work had started. This was intended to help the Malays kick-start 
their projects without any cash flow problems for their mobilisation costs because 
the Malays had little access to bank loans then. The end result however was that 
with 30% being paid up front, the Malay businessmen more often than not, 
considered this payment as their profits and ran into problems of completion. This 
is the reason several experts pointed out that the Malays have no clue of even 
basic cash flow management, boiling down to lack of training and experience 
again. 
 
Dr Mahathir’s criticisms of the Malays are generally true, admitted by many 
albeit only grudgingly. Many writers however; such as Bakri (1991, 2007); Omar 
(2006); Sloane (1999); Wain (2009); and Zamani (2003), have also pointed out to 
similar criticisms about the Malays. 
 
5.3.7(f) The Chosen Few 
 
While experts were highly critical of the selection process of the Malays in 
awarding government contracts, they were quite divided when asked for their 
views on the same people being given contracts repeatedly even before their 
management and business skills were proven. 
 
A group of five experts who were against the practice of the government giving 
away too much to too few described this as “cronyism”. 
 
Under each prime minister, there were different groups of people who were 
influential and secured major government contracts. “They are pushed by 
succeeding politicians and new cronies appear” said one. 
 
The reasons given by various respondents for supporting the selection of the same 
group of people for the award of major projects or contracts are: 
 
1)  Shortage of qualified and competent businessmen whom the government 
could trust; and 
2)  It is easier to control or manage a few businessmen that the government 
personally knew instead of having many that they do not know. 
 
One of the respondents, who was among the ‘chosen few’, remarked that it was 
symptomatic of the preconceived notion of who the winners will be. In ordinary 
course of things everywhere, the successful ones will chart their own course. In 
Malaysia among Bumiputras, their courses have been charted by the political 
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masters. According to him at least two major businessmen said to him “do not 
worry, if the government asks you to do, just do it because they cannot afford to 
let you fail”. So the respondent concluded, “When you have notions like that bred 
into a businessman’s response system, of course accidents are going to happen”. 
 
The intention of the government selecting a few Malay businessmen was 
originally to create a cadre of successful Malay tycoons who would then provide 
opportunities to other Malays. As one minister pointed out, “I think there was a 
time when the government was quite keen to develop a number of Malay 
individuals to become billionaires because there are very few Malays who are 
successful in business whom we can call billionaires. So the government at that 
point of time had this strategy of building a number of Malays running 
businesses. So that was an unwritten policy. That being the case, those who were 
considered to be successful in one or two projects that had the ability were given 
more opportunities in the hope they become billionaires. But I think unfortunately 
these Malays weren’t able to sustain the business partly because of the financial 
crisis of 1997/98. You can put the blame on that crisis but I think it’s not just the 
crisis. I think they have not been able to sustain and they haven’t got the skills to 
manage the huge number of businesses they were involved in.” 
 
5.3.7(g) Impact of the Malay culture and characteristics on the NEP 
 
The question of Malay culture and characteristics and their impact on NEP was 
naturally important because it was pointed out in earlier chapters that culture 
plays an important role in the development of a country and this view is 
supported by several studies (Harrison & Huntington, 2000; Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). 
 
The one aspect of Malay culture that was mentioned by a majority of the 
respondents was the Malay respect for elders and loyalty to the leaders (and 
bosses) and the Malay reluctance to speak against their superiors even if the 
subordinates disagree with their superiors. Closely tied to Hofstede’s PDI in 
which Malaysia ranked number one globally, this attribute of Malays though 
mentioned by almost all, had differing interpretations. 
 
Most of the experts, except for the three non-Malay participants and three Malay 
participants, think that is a good quality and a virtue of the Malay culture. Many 
of them justified this attribute as not just Malay but generally found in Asian 
culture. While there may be some disadvantages to growth and development 
because of this attribute, generally the Malay respondents are supportive of this 
quality of Malays. 
 
Those who were against, agreed that this is a weakness associated with the feudal 
past and the Malays should no longer behave this way. One participant who had 
worked closely with Dr Mahathir said both he and Dr Mahathir had modern 
outlook and went against this aspect claiming that they were the pioneers in 
modern Malaysian history. 
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One of the strongest comments came from a Malay entrepreneur who said, “We 
may be into our fifty-second year of independence but feudalism is getting 
stronger and stronger. In Malaysia, if a Minister does something good, we must 
praise him. Doing something good is his duty and is expected from him but if he 
does the wrong thing and we point it out to him, he gets very upset”. 
 
A similar comment was made by another who said that government leaders treat 
people as their subjects. 
 
Non-Malay respondents were quite forthright about this attribute and viewed this 
as the cause of “the endless sort of Malay behind the scene politicking in which it 
seems to me many people spend far more time that is good or necessary for 
them”. 
 
Most Malay respondents except for a couple saw this as generally as a good 
Malay characteristic, reinforcing the unconscious feudalistic mindset in them. It is 
an attribute most Malays would like to retain. 
 
Moving on from the respect for authority and elders, the participants were asked 
for the other Malay characteristics that contributed positively or negatively to the 
Malay success or failure as the case may be in business. These are what could be 
classified as the strengths and weaknesses of the Malays. 
 
A list of positive and negative traits as pointed out by the respondents is 
summarised in the Tables 15 and 16 below. 
 
Table 15: Positive attributes of Malays identified during the focus group 
discussions and expert panel interviews 
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Table 16: Negative attributes of Malays identified during the focus group 
discussions and expert panel interviews 
 
 
 
The common attributes which many listed related to the Malays being courteous, 
polite, tolerant, friendly, fair-minded, trustworthy, humble, gentle, 
accommodative, open and inclusive. While these are positive attributes and 
reflected well on Malays being described as ‘nature’s gentleman’ by the British 
during the colonial days, many respondents did however point out that the other 
races have generally taken advantage of the Malays’ good nature. So it is a sort of 
a double-edged sword which also ends up being detrimental to the Malays in the 
real world of business where greed, selfishness and aggression may become the 
necessary evils required for success. 
 
On the negative side, attributes such as attitude for short-term gains; rentier 
mentality and commission agent mentality; jealousy and envy arising out of 
communitarian attitude where everyone is expected to be equal; overdependence 
on government; naiveté and trusting; laidback, and lack of perseverance were 
identified by the respondents. 
 
5.3.7(h) What needs to be done? 
 
Coming almost to the last leg of the interview, the participants were asked the 
inevitable question of what needs to be done in the light of their own views and 
published records and the political leaders’ criticisms of the Malays’ lack of 
success in business. 
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Eleven out of twenty participants pointed their fingers to education first, followed 
by the lack of appropriate training. It was interesting to review some of the 
comments which are reproduced below: 
 
 “We must give them the right education. The problem is we are producing 
Malays whom the market does not want. If they want to do business they 
must be trained from a young age in school. Teach them about profits and 
losses. Malays are good in arts, music and films – so whatever they want 
to be, be the best. Success does not mean making money. If you are 
successful in your field, you will get satisfaction and then money will 
flow. But with the Malays they want money first.” 
 
 “Education and business is the only way; we need to prioritise exposure 
and education. There are no more handouts. There is nothing to give away 
anyway. You cannot have another NEP again… because of the 
misinterpretations and abuse in the past which people now are not 
prepared to accept.” 
 
 “The education policy is bringing down the Malays. Now we are creating 
elite Malays who are rich enough to send their children to elite schools but 
the majority of the Malay children go to government schools and they do 
not speak good English. We are sort of creating Malay Brahmins – the 
elite society but the rest of the Malays are still backward.” 
 
 “It looks to me that the government education is in tatters. It is hopelessly 
politicised and almost the wrong mixture of subjects being taught.” 
 
 “I suppose we have to start from the schools. Education is the most 
important thing. Education system should emphasise on business 
education.” 
 
 “Must have continued training and exposure and encourage Bumiputras to 
go into private sector. The best Bumiputras are in the government sector 
and the best Chinese are in the private sector.” 
 
 “This comes back to education. If they are not properly educated, they 
will feel inferior about themselves and they will feel uncompetitive… The 
quality of Malays is getting lower and lower… as time goes by they are 
getting worse. They are not learning the right things. This thing has been 
done at the expense of people because of political convenience.” 
 
 “We must send them to best schools put them through GLCs and after a 
few years we put them in the open to get them to compete with each 
other… The problem right now is we provide them with opportunities 
without adequate grounding and not enough preparation is given.” 
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The message on what needs to be done is loud and clear – education system needs 
a total revamp to produce Malays who could be competitive in the business 
world. 
 
5.3.7(i) Time Frame for the NEP 
 
The time frame originally set for NEP was twenty years, from 1971 to 1990. 
Even until today after forty years, the NEP targets have not been met. Extensions 
had to be made by different names such as National Development Policy which 
was to last for ten years until 2000 and the National Vision Policy until 2010. As 
one participant commented, “under any name the NEP will continue to exist but it 
must be adjusted to the present day needs”. 
 
Though hypothetical, participants were asked if on hindsight they thought a 
twenty-year period originally envisaged for NEP in 1971 was sufficient to 
achieve the targets set. This question was asked because since the expiry of the 
first term for NEP in 1990, both the government and Malays have been placed in 
a defensive situation. When originally implemented, the Malays started the policy 
on an offensive note. 
 
After the 1969 riots the government realised that the economic plight of the 
Malays had not received the attention it deserved after independence. So when 
the policy was introduced, it gave an upper hand to the Malays that NEP was the 
answer to their neglect all the while by the government. In that enthusiasm and 
over-zealous attempts to help the Malays, the original intention of NEP to help all 
irrespective of race to eradicate poverty was somewhat conveniently forgotten or 
neglected. The Malays received the full attention as shaken Malay political 
leaders wanted to redeem their shattered image after the racial riots. 
 
Since 1990, the policy has been extended no doubt, but the voices of the other 
races have become louder in recent years as there seems to be no end to the 
affirmative policy in favour of the Malays. It was against the background of this 
context that the question was raised to the expert panel. 
 
Eleven out of the twenty interviewed agreed that twenty years was too short to 
accomplish the targets of NEP which were seen as rather ambitious (an example 
to increase the Malay equity participation from under 2.6% to 30 % in the 20-year 
period). 
 
How did the participants who agreed that the twenty-year time frame was too 
short react? 
 
 “I think those who did the planning were not businessmen. They were 
politicians and economists who thought it could be done. They did not 
know how complex the business is. You cannot be a manager overnight… 
If NEP was left open-ended, at least there could be no criticism.” 
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 “I suppose the advice given to him (referring to the then Prime Minister) 
then, twenty years was a good time frame to work on or probably if 
twenty years was not sufficient it could be extended.” 
 
 “We should not just stick to 30% equity. We have to look at the wider 
prospect. There are capable Malays running all sorts of businesses, we 
must aim to attain equity in every level not just the corporate sector. We 
must aim a higher percentage and we should have no fixed term.” 
 
 “Certainly I think it was a mistake to give a time frame. The policy itself 
was very good… of course looking back now, after a twenty-year period, 
it comes back to haunt the policy makers, the implementers, the Malays.” 
 
 “I personally feel the loss cannot be redeemed within twenty years. It is 
dynamic. Others too are moving – twenty years is not enough…” 
 
 “As I said NEP should not be removed.  As a principle it should stay. 
Maybe it could be modified now and then but do not have a time frame. 
Even for the U.S and U.K, for them to rise to the industrial age it took 
them centuries. So why should we put a time limit?” 
 
 “Yes it is true but you had to get the agreement of the Chinese and Indians 
for the NEP. If you say it is indefinite they will not agree. That is why 
they put a time limit of twenty years. At that time of course there was no 
in-depth calculation done. When you say 30% in twenty years, the 
economy would have grown very big in twenty years and 30% of that 
economy is now thirty times more than what you had twenty years ago… 
But de facto it is indefinite.” 
 
 “Yes I think it’s short but on the other hand it’s too short because the 
Malays were not ready. It’s impossible to change the Malay mindset – 
within twenty years so we need a bit more time… However having said 
that, how long do we need those crutches? To be able to sell this policy, 
there’s got to be a definite timeline.” 
 
 “Hundreds of years of subservience and discrimination, you cannot turn it 
around in one generation…Because the economy is not static; it is 
dynamic.  So to answer your question twenty years may be too much to 
expect.” 
 
Apart from the non-Malay experts who generally agreed that twenty years should 
have been enough, a couple of Malays also felt the same way as quoted below: 
 
 “I never thought so.  At the time twenty years was a long time and when 
we arrived at it, it was considered a short time but I think it was sufficient. 
When I look back in some ways, NEP was a negative factor that made the 
Malays to be overly dependent on the government but the education part 
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and the part they are being pushed by the NEP during the last twenty 
years are good.” 
 
 “Never give them open-ended, having a deadline is important and it 
should be short because if you give them too much time they will take it 
easy.” 
 
Generally the Malay leaders felt that twenty years for the implementation of NEP 
targets were short as the recession of the 80’s and the financial crisis of the 90’s 
set the clock backwards for the Malays and these external factors were beyond 
their control. 
 
5.3.7(j) Government-linked corporations as an alternative methodology 
 
When the Asian financial crisis swept through South-East Asia in 1997/98, 
almost all the Malay entrepreneurs who were nurtured by the government’s 
affirmative policies had their wealth wiped out leaving behind huge liabilities. 
 
It was during this period that the government decided to take over various 
companies with strategic assets which were privatised and faced the risk of 
collapse. The various companies were taken over by the government through its 
investment arms such as Khazanah Nasional Berhad (the equivalent of Malaysia’s 
sovereign wealth fund) and other agencies. These companies taken over by the 
government agencies came to be collectively known as government-linked 
corporations or GLCs. 
 
From the previous modality of privatising state assets to Malay entrepreneurs, 
now professional Malay managers were appointed to manage these large listed 
conglomerates which owned and managed critical assets like highways, bridges, 
telecommunications, energy and other infrastructure companies. 
 
The switch from ownership to professional management by qualified Malay 
professionals has been the modus operandi for the state assets since early 2000. 
Over the last ten years, GLCs have become a major force in the business sector, 
accounting for almost 26% of the total market capitalisation in the Malaysian 
stock market in 2012. 
 
In this research, the success of Malay professional management in running the 
GLCs is also seen as a success of Malay leadership in business. In order to assess 
that success, the participants were asked for their opinions on GLCs and their 
success in general. 
 
(Only thirteen participants were familiar with the GLC concept to answer the 
question. In some interviews, this question did not form part of the interview as 
discussions on other issues had taken much of the time allocated leaving little 
time for this question.) 
 
Of the thirteen who answered, four did not agree with the GLC concept. 
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The strongest view against the GLC concept was expressed by one participant 
who said the GLCs should be closed down and he thought it did not fit the 
country at all to have GLCs because of the likelihood of mismanagement due to 
political interference. 
 
The second participant who did not view GLCs favourably classified GLCs into 
two types – one with government mentality, Malay and very bureaucratic, and 
referred to Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). The other type; very gung-ho, 
and he specified Khazanah as an example of the second type. What the GLCs 
want, they get. He said he attended the meeting of the twenty GLCs with the 
Prime Minister and when asked for his opinion, he gave them the perception and 
reality. He referred to GLC as a ‘dirty word’ because they are having it very easy. 
There is nothing in GLCs that will enable us to be global and competitive. “We 
have majority shareholders and we call ourselves public-listed companies but 
every year most of us have to write to the authorities to get exception from the 
public spread of 25%”, he complained. 
 
Two other respondents who also expressed their cynicism for GLCs were of the 
opinion that the government is in no position to manage business. If there is no 
ownership and entrepreneurship spirit in the company, it is not going to do well. 
They also mentioned that GLCs are too close to the government in the way they 
operate and would not be able to make swift decisions and have a severe 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other public-listed companies. 
 
Eight of the participants who favoured the GLC approach mentioned the 
following factors in support of GLCs: 
 
The earlier version of NEP was to create multi-billionaires like Tan Sri Halim 
(one of the prominent entrepreneurs before the Asian financial crisis). The 
government thought there will be a trickledown effect but it didn’t work out 
because these people were given huge assets and had to take huge borrowings to 
service their liabilities and pay dividends. There was not sufficient cash flow to 
repay loans. In the business cycle, if the asset value goes down, the liabilities 
remain. So this derails the businessmen. The new model gives the Malays a 
management role and gives good packages with share option. The Malay 
professionals running GLCs should be given equity slowly in order to give 
incentive for them to manage instead of going for large borrowings. The next step 
for the government is for the smaller companies within GLCs to be sold to 
promising people with entrepreneurial skills. 
 
One participant while supporting GLCs as a good way to nurture a new kind of 
business leadership, said it is still in transition and too early to make a judgement. 
 
Two of the participants while agreeing on the GLC method as one way to create 
super managers, concluded that the new approach of GLC is valid as long as you 
are clear in your mind of what you are setting out to do. 
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If the emphasis is on managing public assets, it is fine to create a breed of very 
competent and skilled managers and continue to keep this in public domain. Give 
them the necessary incentives to perform as super managers. But on the other 
hand if you are trying to create a larger private Malay share, that programme can 
still co-exist alongside this. 
 
5.3.7(k) How Malay leadership has politically managed the country since merdeka 
 
This question was addressed in Chapter 2 and my conclusion is that the Malays 
have managed the country well since taking over from the British after 
independence in 1957. I thought it is best to get my hypothesis tested by the 
expert panel as well by posing the question to them during the interview. 
Although during the interview this question was asked to the panel earlier, in 
order to ensure the flow and structuring of this chapter, this question appears here 
as if it is the last question of the interview. 
 
Out of the fifteen who were asked this question, twelve agreed that Malays have 
managed the country successfully on the political front. Some of their thoughts 
and points are given below: 
 
 “Everybody said they have done well until Pak Lah came along (Pak Lah 
refers to the fifth prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who 
succeeded Dr Mahathir Mohamad). They managed to run a multiracial 
society but we have failed to have a united Malaysia. … I think the 
mistake Pak Lah made was making too many promises but did not deliver. 
He just wanted to be popular. He wanted to undo what Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad had done so that people see that he is a new leader. … He has 
disturbed the peace between the races. The fear is that this will reach 
instability. It has not reached there yet, but anytime, anything can happen. 
Unfortunately, UMNO has lost faith in themselves. If only they changed, 
people will come back to them. Lack of leadership, poor quality 
leadership by Pak Lah has destroyed the Malay image of good 
politicians”. 
 
These are very strong statements and very forthright criticisms of Malay political 
leadership. Other comments supporting the Malay political leadership as 
successful touched on the following points: 
 
1) Generally speaking, astuteness of the Malays in politics has almost been 
ingrained in them as their personality since the beginning because this was 
Malay land. The Malays had their own political system and established 
institution with the Sultan as de facto government. The feeling of oneness 
and nationality was there. When independence came, they took pride over 
the fact that it was them who negotiated with the British, and it was them 
who were active and that was natural. It went on because the other races 
were apolitical. They came in and followed along. Even this observer who 
agreed with the Malay astuteness in politics was critical of Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, the successor to Dr Mahathir Mohamad. He had this to 
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say of Pak Lah, “then we had Badawi who was another Malay gentleman 
similar to Tun Hussein Onn (the third prime minister and predecessor to 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad), a good man, well-intentioned and qualities of a 
typical Malay. But he was not a man who could organise and work but he 
was idealistic. You cannot base progress simply based on morality. And 
that was the weakness of Badawi. He was incompetent as a Prime 
Minister in the sense of delivery – he could not deliver. He was too 
trusting of the goodness of the people”; 
 
2) The political skills of the Malays have been more than successful. When 
the country gained independence everyone expected the Malays to be a 
failure. They thought that the country could not survive but all the prime 
ministers were sincere, well-educated, open and matured in leadership and 
they were brave to take unpopular measures to help nation-building. The 
Malays were fortunate to have the right prime ministers at the right time; 
 
3) Generally it has been successful given the fact that this is a multi-racial 
country. The Malays have the vertical and administrative power but they 
do not have the economic power. Suggesting that he does not want to be 
critical, this participant concluded that unless the Malay leadership 
improves their integrity and vision, the Malays themselves will not have 
confidence in the Malay leadership; 
 
4) The Malays make good leaders as the traditional structure of leadership in 
the country is based on the Malays all along right from the Malacca 
Sultanate days. Without the Malay leadership the rest will crumble. The 
Malays have traditional leadership from the kampungs (villages) where 
they have the penghulu (headman) right up to the Sultan. So the social 
leadership and traditions are built in the Malay community but not with 
the Chinese because when the Chinese came here, a large number of them 
worked in tin mines and private sectors, so the leadership was not there. 
The leadership of Malays is quite good on the political side; 
 
5) Three interviewees, while agreeing on the Malay political leadership’s 
ability, cautioned about corruption seeping into the system and 
unanimously pointed the fingers at the Chinese as the source for the 
corrupt practices in Malaysia. 
 
Two respondents only agreed partially to give credit to the Malay political 
leadership in the country. One of them said ‘yes and no’. Rationalising that you 
cannot entirely attribute to politics because this is political economy that you are 
managing, he felt slighted when he looked at how others perform compared to 
Malaysia giving the example of Singapore. He compared Singapore with a small 
population of three million with no natural resources to Malaysia with a 
population of twenty six million endowed with oil, gas, palm oil, timber and 
rubber, but their per capita income is three to four times higher than Malaysia. 
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“Where are the leakages”, he asked, adding, “I am ashamed of myself. Do I think 
the people of Singapore are cleverer than us? I do not think so. We have better 
businessmen here”. 
 
The other respondent, who begged to differ with the question that the Malays 
have politically managed the country successfully, was very strongly against the 
Malay culture of making a great leader with a strong personality as a God-king 
and also felt that the Malay race now is more feudalised than before. He called 
himself “a rare personality who do not consider personalities as an important 
equation in defining leadership”. 
 
5.3.8 Conclusion of Expert Panel Interviews 
 
The interviews with twenty experts almost all of whom are who’s-who in the 
Malaysian society with many of them directly involved in the formulation, 
implementation, modification and monitoring of the NEP, was a great experience. 
I managed to gather a lot of insights into the thought processes and the ideal 
objectives of NEP as originally planned and the reality and difficulties 
encountered in implementing them. 
 
As Kets de Vries (2001a) observes, almost all the participants save for one or two 
seemed to rely on the illusion of rational human action – the idea that human 
beings can be ‘managed’ around simple stimulus or response models. As will be 
seen in the following chapters, this is taking a simplistic and almost a naïve 
approach which also becomes unfortunately, the source of frustrations to many of 
those interviewed, both as experts and focus groups.  
 
By taking such a mechanical two-dimensional view of humanity, the intra-
psychic world of the individual, the richness of a person’s inner theatre or mental 
map is either oversimplified or totally disregarded. Yet every individual like a 
black box is a highly complex person, whose ways of dealing with processes such 
as perception, learning and memory are highly variable (Kets de Vries, 2001a). In 
the case of the Malays’ lack of success in business leadership and the various 
interpretations we have seen so far too, is the result of reducing human beings to 
simple machines of pain and pleasure leading to an incomplete explanation of 
human behaviour and action. 
 
We shall see the emerging patterns on the surface level based on the expert panel 
interviews and focus groups first and offer an explanation to understand what is 
happening inside the human box by casting our net beyond the traditional 
behaviour paradigm using the psychodynamic approach to understanding the 
Malay leadership mystique.  
 
5.3.9 Major themes identified from the Expert Panel Interviews 
 
The next step from the analysis of the expert panel interviews is to sieve through 
them for any common themes that could be identified. As a matter of fact, the 
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entire interview process with all the experts did not have major disagreements or 
opinions which were varied or split.  
 
This does not mean to imply that there was total unanimity on the range of issues 
and questions asked to the participants. While there were differences of opinion 
with very strong divergence at times, a majority view however could be identified 
for each question. And that’s what is taken as a meaningful interpretation or 
opinion for each question. Based on the majority view, the following themes are 
identified from the panel: 
 
5.3.9(a) Myth of the lazy Malay 
 
The first and foremost to emerge from the interviews, is the rejection of the 
notion that Malays are lazy and incompetent. This was totally rejected and 
explanations given for this perception included putting the blame squarely on the 
foreigners especially the British. 
 
A few of the experts, agreed that Malays appear to be laidback because of 
bountiful supply of food and resources available to the Malays with little effort in 
their land. The whole purpose of human effort is to seek the basic needs of food, 
clothing and shelter. When these were available to the Malays easily, it is natural 
for them to take life easy. To foreigners coming from lands where life was not so 
easy because of the vagaries of nature, extreme climatic conditions and limited 
arable or fertile lands – and they had to seek far and wide to feed themselves, it is 
no surprise that the Malays seemed so laidback and so, classified as lazy.  
 
Clear explanation and defence to this perception has already been given by 
various people, the most notable of whom is Alatas (1977). 
 
5.3.9(b) Ability of the Malays to compete with the Chinese 
 
There can be no doubt that the Chinese are extremely hardworking, frugal and 
have a saving mentality. Although real household incomes have risen markedly 
for all communities since 1957, Malay-Chinese per capita income disparities 
remain at much the same level as they were in 1970 (Leete, 2007). This implies 
that, notwithstanding the huge advantages reaped by the Malays since 1970’s, the 
Chinese have kept their per capita income always higher than the Malays. 
 
The experts feel that the Malays would be able to compete with the Chinese only 
on certain conditions being fulfilled like adequate training and education. For 
hundreds of years, the Malays were never exposed to business having led simple 
rural lives of farming and fishing to cater to their day-to-day needs. Concepts of 
business were alien to them until recently. As some experts pointed out, the 
Malays have a problem with business because they do not have business culture 
and they were not owners of businesses. 
 
The Malay children never had the chance to help their parents in business like the 
Chinese. The Chinese have their own family business, so it is a natural training 
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ground for them; they get the concept of saving and investing at an early age. The 
Malays have no clue about cash flow. 
 
Most experts were reluctant to accept that the Malays cannot compete with the 
Chinese and therefore gave various reasons; some legitimate as to why the 
playing field is not level. The conclusion to this question is, as of now, the 
Chinese still have an upper hand but the gap is narrowing and when the level is 
even, the Malays would be able to compete with the Chinese. 
 
5.3.9(c) NEP and the Malays 
 
NEP as a policy was very useful and pragmatic to narrow the gap between the 
Malays and other races and also to eradicate poverty irrespective of race. So as a 
policy it was absolutely necessary. 
 
To the question of the success of the policy, most respondents divided the NEP 
into three segments:  
 
a)  education, training and development;  
b)  eradication of poverty; and 
c)  creating a successful clan of Malay entrepreneurs and business leaders and 
increasing the corporate ownership of Malays to 30%. 
 
The policy was a major success in terms of (a) and (b) above but was not a 
success in creating Malay entrepreneurs and equity ownership of Malays within 
the given time frame and until today, it has not achieved its objective in this 
regard. 
 
The NEP’s equity ownership and entrepreneurship plans were not successful 
because of several weaknesses and abuses in the implementation of the policy. 
This was clearly agreed to by almost all the participants. 
 
Because the policy was wrought with several weaknesses in its implementation, it 
could not achieve its objective as envisaged over a twenty-year period. Most 
respondents also agreed that the policy was too ambitious to be implemented over 
twenty years and agreed for a need to extend the time frame. Those of the 
interviewees, who were politicians, did admit that the policy in practice would 
continue for as long as is necessary. 
 
The selection process of identifying the right candidates to be awarded major 
business contracts received serious criticism from the participants, some 
criticising that only the elite and selected few were the beneficiaries of the NEP. 
 
5.3.9(d) Malay culture and characteristics 
 
The Malay experts mainly from the political and government backgrounds are of 
the opinion that the Malay culture of respecting the elders and leaders/superiors, 
and not opposing the superiors, is a virtue. 
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Only a couple of the Malay experts from the private sector thought that this was a 
weakness in the Malays. 
 
The interviewees also gave a long list of Malay attributes that were positive as 
well as several negative attributes. Overall, the feeling of the experts is that the 
good nature of the Malays has been taken advantage of by the non-Malays, 
placing the Malays in a detrimental position in dealing with the non-Malays in the 
field of commerce and business. 
 
Three respondents also said that corruption was introduced to Malays by the non-
Malays especially the Chinese and the Malays were at a loss as to how to handle 
this issue. 
 
Looking holistically at the Malay culture, the majority view is the appreciation of 
the Malay culture but at the same time they feel that certain elements such as the 
feudalistic mindset, dependency culture and being too ‘gentlemanly’, may have to 
be modified (not completely forsaken) in order to cope with the demands of the 
modern world. 
 
5.3.9(e) Need for change in education 
 
Next to rejecting the notion of the myth that Malays are lazy and incompetent, the 
need for change in the education system was considered the most urgent factor 
that received unanimous support of the experts. 
 
Almost everyone felt that the present education system has “produced graduates 
that the market does not want”. 
 
Hand in hand with the change in the education system, many also felt the need for 
appropriate training and exposure to create Malay entrepreneurs. They were 
critical of giving out licenses and contracts to the Malays who do not understand 
even the basic tenets of doing business such as cash flow management. 
 
5.3.9(f) Government-linked corporations as an alternative methodology to creating 
Malay entrepreneurs 
 
The general feeling among the experts (except for a few) was that GLCs have so 
far produced a positive impression of creating a cadre of Malay professional 
managers. By this method however, the government may be able to produce 
super managers but there were doubts expressed whether the GLC method could 
create Malay entrepreneurs. Therefore; the government should adopt both the 
GLC method to produce world-class managers and also continue to support the 
creation of Malay entrepreneurs. 
 
It was noticed that in response to the question of leadership in politics and other 
questions, not surprisingly, the politicians who have retired were more forceful 
and forthright in their views than serving politicians and civil servants. Also the 
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Malay experts from the private sector, who formed the interview panel, were 
willing to give responses that were more challenging to the status quo, cautioning 
that changes need to be made to the leadership style in Malaysia for the continued 
success of the nation. 
 
The following quote would sum up the feeling of several interviewees’ view for 
change in style: 
 
“I do not know whether you can generalise over 54 years. At different stages, we 
have had different skills which have worked very well. Now, though things have 
changed, the skill-set has not changed. People are seeing the things the same way 
without realising the world has changed. They are not adapting. The stupidities 
that we do go around the world and it creates an impression that we are totally 
incompetent and useless. They do not seem to have any grasp at all on how to 
handle these problems. I do not know what the political plan is. The ground has 
shifted underneath them and they do not seem to get it”. 
 
The following points are where the focus groups and expert panel members 
agreed upon: 
 
1)  Both strongly disagree that Malays are lazy and incompetent; 
 
2)  Both strongly agree that education needs to be revamped to make Malays 
more competitive and improve their leadership skills in business; 
 
3)  Failure of education, training and management exposure are the main 
causes for the Malays’ lack of success in business; 
 
4)  NEP as a policy was necessary but it’s implementation was flawed and a 
cause for failure; 
 
5)  NEP is considered a major success in the development of professionals in 
various sectors; 
 
6)  Malay culture and misguided religious values do have some negative effect 
on Malay performance in business leadership; 
 
7)  Malays have the capacity to compete with the Chinese provided they are 
given the right exposure and training; and 
 
8)  Malay political leaders have managed the country successfully since 
merdeka, but adjustments in leadership skills may be needed to continue 
with the success. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
Based on the focus group discussions and the expert panel interviews, certain 
common conclusions could be identified from both groups i.e., focus group as 
one group and expert panel as the other group. 
 
It must be noted however that while the major themes for the questionnaires 
prepared for focus groups and the expert panel interviews were similar, specific 
questions were not identical. By the very structure and nature of expert panel 
interviews which involved more personal and one-to-one interviews, certain 
topics involving GLCs and Malay leadership in politics of the nation were more 
deeply discussed with the expert panel than in focus groups. 
 
The key points including some of the positive and negative attributes of the 
Malays as identified by the focus groups as well as expert panel members 
revolving around the Malay leadership in business are summarized in Figures 17 
and 18 and Table 17 below: 
 
Figure 17: Key points relating to Malay leadership in business as identified 
by the focus groups 
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Figure 18: Key points relating to Malay leadership in business as identified 
by the expert panel   
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Table 17:  Criticisms and positive features identified during the focus groups and 
expert panel interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 5> 
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Chapter 6 – Malay Leadership from the eyes of 360-degree Feedback 
Instruments 
 
“Whatever happens the results now obtained will eventually dispose of the fiction that the 
Malays are not capable of being instructed.....” 
Wilkinson R.J (1905) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, we went through an exploration about the Malays – their 
culture, religion, education, NEP and their issues – which threw some light on 
appreciating some of the issues the Malays face and some stated reasons and 
explanations for their poor performance in business. These were all views 
expressed by the focus groups which were entirely made up of Malays and the 
expert panel which comprised mainly Malays except for a few non-Malays. 
 
In this chapter, we arrive at the fifth level of understanding the Malays; the other 
four which we have seen so far are the historical accounts about the Malays, the 
contemporary writings about the Malays, focus group discussions and expert 
panel interviews.  The objective of each stage was to go deeper and deeper in 
understanding the Malay mind to appreciate primarily, the causes for their lack of 
success in business leadership. 
 
The fifth level to understand the Malays is through the five different 360-degree 
feedback instruments (see Figure 19 below).  
 
Figure 19: Five levels for understanding Malay leadership qualities 
 
            
 
Before we look at the 360-degree feedback, let us briefly see the origin of 
psychological testing which led to the birth of 360-degree feedback.  
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6.2 Psychological testing and the birth of the 360-degree feedback instrument 
 
Psychological testing in its modern form originated a little more than one hundred 
years ago in laboratory studies of sensory discrimination, motor skills and 
reaction time. The British genius Francis Gatton (1822-1911) is credited as the 
first to invent a battery of tests – an assortment of sensory and motor measures. 
James McKeen Cattell (1860-1944) who studied with Gatton in his classic paper 
“mental tests and measurements” proclaimed the modern testing method. It is 
said that Cattell’s conjecture that “perhaps” tests would be useful in “training, 
mode of life, or indication of disease” is certainly one of the prophetic 
understatements of all time. Psychological testing over the years has emerged to 
be a big business and a cultural institution that permeates modern society.  
 
Personality tests in a form resembling the contemporary appearance emerged 
after World War I. Robert S. Woodworth (1869-1962) is credited to have 
invented personality testing when he developed an instrument for detecting army 
recruits who were susceptible to psychoneurosis.  
 
Almost all modern personality inventories, schedules and questionnaires owe 
their debt to the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet (WPDS).  
 
The next major development was an inventory of neurosis, the Thurstone 
Personality Schedule in 1930 by L.L Thurstone & T.G Thurstone closely 
followed by Bernreuter’s Personality Inventory in 1931 by R.G Bernreuter. 
  
The Allport-Vernon Study of Values (SOV) was also published in 1931 by G.W 
Allport & P.E Vernon. This test differed from others because it measured values 
instead of psychopathology. The test was devised such that test-takers were 
required to make choices between six values in specific situations. 
 
Then came in 1940, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory known as 
MMPI by S.R Hathaway & J.C McKinley and subsequently MMPI-2. 
  
The first known use of a multi-source feedback which is now well-known as 360-
degree feedback was during World War II, by the German military where soldiers 
were evaluated by peers, supervisors and subordinates to provide insight and 
recommendations on how to improve performance.  
 
Esso Research and Engineering Company is credited to be the first organisation 
to use 360-degree feedback in the 1950s. (Shane Thornton).  
 
The concept of 360-degree feedback grew in popularity after the invention of the 
typewriter; before typewriters and computers, feedback was handwritten and 
anonymity was difficult which undercut the entire value of 360-degree feedback. 
  
The 360-degree feedback was adopted by many companies after Jack Welch 
successfully used it in General Electric. 
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The popularity of 360-degree feedback in the new millennium has grown even 
more and it is estimated by Forbes that 90% of all Fortune 500 companies use 
some sort of multi-rater feedback.  
 
Let’s first understand the instruments and how they could facilitate us to 
understand the Malays better. 
 
6.3 What is a 360-degree feedback instrument? 
 
Diverse terms are sometimes used to describe the methods or systems which 
provide executives with information about themselves based on ratings made by 
multiple sources.  Also called Multisource Feedback (MSF), this method which is 
referred to hereafter also as the 360-degree feedback, is one of the most popular 
and remarkable innovations in leadership development over the past twenty years 
(Hazlett, 2008;  Hernez-Broome & Hughes, 2004). 
 
The term 360-degree feedback rightly implies that managers receive a full circle 
of feedback from those with whom they work – superiors, peers, and subordinates 
as well as themselves (Foster & Law, 2006; Tornow, 1993). 360-degree feedback 
also has been used where managers are also rated by others such as customers, 
suppliers, and significant others like spouses or children. 
 
Hazlett (2008) in her study of 360-degree feedback says that on average, the 360-
degree feedback instruments have been associated with positive though limited, 
leadership development. She associates the limited impact of the instruments of 
leadership development to challenges in design, the psychometrics of the 
feedback instruments, implementation missteps and substantive factors captured 
in theoretical models of development. 
 
However, the reliability and validity of the instruments are high.  Walker & 
Smither (1999) have generally found that the reported values of the reliability and 
validity of the feedback instruments generally do not have the criteria of desirable 
values. 
 
Generally, these studies suggest that with multiple MSF administrations, leaders 
will improve performance. However, it was noted that not all leaders improve.  
“Atwater et al (2000) found that only half of leaders receiving feedback improved 
significantly after one year and one feedback session” (Atwater, Brett & Charles, 
2007). Results vary from study to study. For example; the Kluger & DeNisi’s 
(1996) review found improvement in only one-third of the cases, and in another, 
one-third performances actually declined following feedback. The general 
conclusion though is that; over time, MSF results improved leader ratings from 
other sources and more accurate self-ratings. 
 
Researchers have also recommended to expect only modest positive improvement 
with MSF as it is not a quick-fix but a process that over time can have a 
significant impact on organisations.  
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Positive changes in a leader’s performance orientation also translate to positive 
employee engagement. MSF can be a useful method for improving leader 
behaviours and ultimately, employee attitudes in a positive way. If leader 
behaviours improve, we can expect employee attitudes to improve.  
 
Studies which have found positive linkages between leaders’ development 
following the receipt of feedback are those conducted by Atwater & Brett (2006); 
Atwater, Brett & Charles (2007) and Smither & Walker (2006). 
 
Tyson & Ward (2004) in their research on evaluation of 360-degree feedback also 
support that 360-degree feedback instruments have generally been positive in the 
personal development of managers and the significance is greater at more senior 
levels. 
 
The early literature on 360-degree feedback sought to evaluate the process 
itself, with studies on its reliability (McEvoy & Beaty 1989) and validity 
(Rubin 1995; Pollock & Pollock (1996).  While in earlier research the 
validity of 360-degree feedback was called into question because of low 
inter-rater reliability, except for the subjects’ peers (Greguras & Robie 
1998), in their comprehensive review of research, Fletcher & Baldry (1999) 
examined reliability, convergent validity, predictive validity and bias for 
self-ratings, subordinate ratings, and peer ratings, with positive comments 
on the whole.  They highlight the lack of consistency in some earlier studies 
and go on to conclude that on balance, self-ratings are useful, have high 
predictive validity and are not especially biased.  Subordinate ratings 
improve reliability when the number of subordinates increases; similarly 
convergent validity improves with ratings from a variety of sources, and 
subordinate ratings have acceptable predictive validity.  In discussing peer 
rating, they quote the Wexley & Klinoski (1984) conclusions that peer 
ratings are potentially the most accurate judgements of employee 
behaviour.  Peer ratings’ inter-rater reliability and temporal stability (over 
two or more different time periods) were also said to be at an acceptable 
level.  Peer evaluations were also quoted to be among the best predictions 
of performance. (Tyson & Ward, 2004, p. 206-207). 
 
Tyson & Ward are of the opinion that the 360-degree feedback process itself was 
perceived by all stakeholders to be successful and as a tool for evaluation. 360-
degree feedback also offers considerable scope for evaluating management 
development techniques in organisational change. Its specific characteristics as 
both an intervention method and an evaluation tool mean it is a potent device for 
enquiring into the complex social realities at the heart of development and 
change. 
 
6.3.1 The 360-degree feedback in the context of Malay leadership 
 
While 360-degree feedback over the last twenty years has gained wider 
acceptance as a useful method for leadership development in organisations, it is 
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natural for anyone to question the relevance of the 360-degree feedback in 
assessing or analysing Malay leadership. It is true that the 360-degree feedback so 
far has been used as a developmental and analytical tool for individuals. In this 
research however; it is being used to assess and benchmark Malay leadership 
qualities with an international database. Perhaps it is the first time ever that these 
instruments are used for research at the group or societal (macro) level instead of 
at the individual level. Whether this is feasible and applicable would be a natural 
question that would arise in anyone’s mind. As a researcher, I concluded that the 
usage of the 360-degree feedback is possible to evaluate and compare Malay 
leadership with others based on two factors: 360-degree feedback at group level, 
and constructing the Malay leadership profile, which are both discussed below.  
 
6.3.1(a) The 360-degree feedback at group level 
 
First and foremost, I must answer the question: if something is applicable at an 
individual level, would it also hold true at a group or societal level? 
 
Available research in psychoanalysis seems to suggest that it is possible to predict 
group behaviour from an individual level. Kurt Lewin’s “Field Theory” 
postulates that an individual’s behaviour can be predicted from knowledge of his 
life space, which represents the person with his psychologically perceived 
environment (Agazarian & Peters, 1981, p. 36). 
 
To know the life space is to be able to predict what the person will do next. 
In other words, behaviour is a function of the life space; therefore 
behaviour is a function of the transaction between the person and his 
perceived environment. In the theory of the invisible group, we use Lewin’s 
life space construct to represent both the individual and group-as-a-whole.  
(Agazarian & Peters, 1981, p. 36). 
 
Agazarian & Peters further reiterate that “by using our inductive reasoning we 
arrive at general principles or laws by establishing a proposition about the class of 
phenomenon (group) on the basis of our observations of a number of particular 
facts (facts about individuals). We argue from the particular to the general: from 
particular individuals’ behaviour in the group to the group. Through our 
‘inductive eyes’ we collect as much information as we can about the way people 
are behaving in the group, and see if we can find ways of explaining it that makes 
sense. Our explanations become our hypotheses, and a series of these 
explanations or hypotheses lead us to theories or laws of group process” 
(Agazarian & Peters, 1981, p.30). 
 
The view that individuals form the basis for understanding groups is also 
supported by Stapley (2006) when he says “We may speak for convenience, 
about the individual and the group, but in practice these two can never be 
separated and should not be considered even theoretically in isolation” (p. 149). 
Stapley views group as a construct and that without individual human activity, the 
construct of the group-as-a-whole simply would not exist. 
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In this research, based on both Agazarian & Peters (1981) and Stapley’s 
hypotheses which support that group behaviour can be predicted from individual 
behaviour, I have taken a similar position. I have also aggregated the results of 41 
senior Malay executives who have completed the five different 360-degree 
feedback instruments to arrive at a pattern of Malay leadership. In other words, 
from the 41 individual Malay executives’ results, I attempt to construct a Malay 
leadership profile. Having constructed this profile of Malays, I compared it with 
the global leadership profile available in the databases of INSEAD and Hay 
Group. The results of the patterns that emerged are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
6.3.1(b) Constructing a Malay leadership profile 
 
The second factor that gave me the confidence that with the 360-degree feedback 
we could get a typical Malay leadership profile is based on how these instruments 
are used in executive development programmes. In most executive development 
programmes, the facilitators of 360-degree feedback instruments always start with 
the average group score before looking at individual score or rating. 
 
As I have personally done the three INSEAD 360-degree feedback instruments 
and found them to be a useful assessment to understand myself, I feel confident 
that this method could be a useful tool to understand the Malay business and 
public sector executives’ leadership profile. And over the years, both INSEAD 
and Hay have built a database of the average of all the participants who have used 
these instruments. Therefore, a meaningful comparison could be made by 
comparing the Malay average with the global average to form a good idea of how 
Malay executives compare with their global counterparts. 
 
It is to be noted that the global databases of INSEAD and Hay Group both have a 
profile of very senior executives from diverse cultures across the world. So the 
average from these databases is an average of highly successful executives who 
are sent for various executive programmes; both company-specific and general 
executive programmes. 
 
The profile of the Malay executives and their comparisons would be seen later in 
this chapter. 
 
6.3.2 Benefits of the 360-degree feedback as a leadership development tool 
 
Several writers including Antonioni (1996), Bernardin & Beatty (1987), Hoffman 
(1995), London & Beatty (1993), London & Smither (1995), and Morgeson, 
Mumford & Campion (2005), have researched extensively on the various benefits 
of 360-degree feedback of which the key point is that it offers the opportunity for 
subordinates and others who are in a good position and most suitably qualified, to 
observe and evaluate managerial performance.  It is a psychometric axiom that 
multiple assessments can increase reliability and validity. 
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The following are considered as positive points of 360-degree feedback:- 
 
(i)  Multiple views by employees add to the organisational philosophy of 
employee involvement and commitment; 
(ii) Through the 360-degree feedback, open and candid views about undesired 
work behaviours which were the sole concern of supervisor evaluation 
could be broadened to peer and subordinate evaluation; 
(iii) There is greater increase in formal and informal feedback; 
(iv) Management learning is enhanced; 
(v) Skill development and goal setting is improved; 
(vi) Improvement to focus on customer service; 
(vii) There is a better opportunity to change corporate culture; and 
(viii) Important performance dimensions hitherto neglected are brought up to 
open discussions. 
 
All of the above advantages contribute to an improvement of managerial 
behaviour and effectiveness. 
 
The downsides of the 360-degree feedback from the literature point to costs and 
time taken by both management and employees for the exercise.  The most 
damaging could be the feedback might not be truthful and honest and can 
sometimes hurt; resulting in untoward anxiety and tension between managers and 
raters. 
 
Morgeson et al (2005) based on their research, have answered the questions: 
whether the 360-degree feedback works, and why it does work.  To the first 
question, they provided the following answers.   
 
The long-term outcomes of 360-degree feedback are:- 
 
a) Managers who received upward feedback about their supervisory 
behaviour significantly improved their behaviour and improved 
subordinate ratings of managerial performance; 
b) Employees were favourably disposed to peer evaluation; 
c) Subordinate ratings of leadership were significantly higher following 
feedback from subordinates; 
d) Performance of managers with low and medium ratings improved but 
high performers declined over time.  Some of these results were due to 
regression to the mean but not all of it;   
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e) People who gave higher ratings to themselves than the ratings the 
subordinates gave them tended to improve over time; and 
f) Over a five annual administrations of upward feedback, managers’ 
upward feedback improved over time and managers who initially had the 
worst ratings improved the most (and this was not attributable to 
regression to the mean).  
 
It was also found that improvement in subordinate ratings was greater for 
managers who discussed the previous year’s feedback with subordinates than for 
managers who had not discussed ratings.   
 
Finally, managers improved more in years they held feedback meetings than in 
years that they did not. 
 
According to Morgeson et al, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that upward 
feedback can improve job performance, especially for those with initially low 
levels of performance. 
 
Johnson & Ferstl (1999) predicted that when managers receive ratings lower than 
their self-ratings; they would be motivated to improve performance and reduce 
the discrepancy between how they perceive themselves and how others perceive 
them.  If feedback is consistent with self-perceptions, managers may not be 
motivated to improve even if their performance is low.  Also, if managers have 
subordinate ratings that exceed their own ratings, they would not be motivated to 
improve.  Each of these explanations has received some empirical research 
support. 
 
6.3.3 Limitations and criticisms of the 360-degree feedback instruments 
 
Some of the limitations of 360-degree feedback as provided by Waldman, 
Atwater & Antonioni (1998) are as follows: 
 
a) Imitation 
 
Institutional theory suggests that organisations make attempts to imitate both their 
competitors and non-competitors. This suggests that the choice to adopt 360-
degree feedback is a response to environmental pressures rather than for 
developmental objectives.  Such conformity gives an organisation a sense of 
external legitimacy. 
 
b) 360-degree feedback as part of Performance Appraisal 
 
There are pressures to make 360-degree feedback for evaluative purposes rather 
than developmental because companies want to get their money’s worth.  In 
theory, the use of 360-degree feedback for evaluative purposes seems logical.  
Unfortunately, problems exist that may negate the possible benefits of 360-degree  
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feedback if it is made evaluative.  Employees may rebel and try to sabotage the 
programme.  For example; in the case of upward feedback, implicit or even 
explicit deals could be struck with subordinates to provide high ratings in 
exchange for high ratings.  Such manoeuvring is less likely when feedback 
provided is used strictly for developmental purposes. 
 
c) Using 360-degree feedback for political purposes 
 
A third reason for companies to engage in 360-degree feedback is politics.  
Individuals or groups may try to impress higher level management or board 
members with their innovative ideas and plans.  Also, a company as a whole may 
adopt 360-degree feedback to manage an ‘impression’ – an impression of 
openness and participation to clients, recruits or other stakeholders when in 
reality, this is not a genuine reflection of an organisation’s culture.  Political gains 
from impression management may be valuable when innovations themselves may 
not be very successful in some organisations. 
 
d) Potential drawbacks of using 360-degree feedback 
 
In a research by Stahl, Björkman, Farndale, Morris, Paauwe, Stiles, Trevor & 
Wright (2012), the authors noted that “another debate in the talent management is 
the use of 360-degree feedback systems, which allow subordinates, peers, 
superiors and sometimes, even outside business partners to evaluate a manager’s 
performance.”     
 
The authors said that the companies in their sample used 360-degree feedback 
and cautioned that 360-degree feedback may do more harm than good depending 
on its implementation (e.g., DeNisi, Kluger (2000); Peiperl (2001).  Several 
controversial issues thus remain: Should 360 degree feedback reviews function at 
all levels of a company or only at the most senior levels?  Should this tool be used 
to identify training needs or also a basis for promotion or compensation 
decisions?  How can firms manage the process to promote personal development, 
rather than a sense of anxiety? Finally, how should companies adopt their use of 
360-degree feedback to different cultural and institutional environments? 
 
Stahl et al (2012) agree that despite these many questions and potential 
drawbacks, companies continue to use the 360-degree feedback quite 
aggressively and often for purposes other than those for which 360-degree 
feedback were initially developed. 
 
6.3.4 Important considerations for a successful 360-degree feedback process 
 
To make an MSF process more successful and effective, the following 
considerations are important (Atwater, Brett & Charles, 2007):  
 
a) The role of human resource professionals in introducing and 
implementing MSF process to ensure positive relationship between 
attitudes toward using the feedback and reactions; 
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b) Reactions to negative feedback were not transitory mood states with 
minimal implications for leadership development, but rather influenced 
subsequent behaviour; 
 
c) Leaders who improved were more likely to see subsequent changes in 
employee attitudes. This result indicates that with regard to organisational 
outcomes, MSF can do more than just develop leaders. It can have a 
positive ripple effect upon others in the organisation.  So the question now 
is; it is not that MSF does not work, but under what conditions and for 
whom does MSF work; 
 
d) The role of organisational context is critical to the success of MSF. It is 
important for the organisation to create an environment and culture that 
supports feedback. 
 
6.4 The five 360-degree feedback instruments used in this research 
 
We have seen the brief introduction to 360-degree feedback, its values and some 
possible limitations.  For this research, in order to make the 360-degree feedback 
a useful method to understand the Malay leadership, I decided to use five 
different instruments instead of the usual one or two. 
 
Because this research uses five different instruments for its data rather than 
relying on one to arrive at its findings, this research is classified as one that has 
fulfilled the triangulation as well as crystallisation methods as explained under 
section 4.5. – “Crystallisation or Triangulation?” in Chapter 4.  
 
The five instruments used for this research have been described briefly in  
Chapter 4.  We re-visit these instruments with a deeper perspective. 
 
6.4.1 The Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI) 
 
GELI is classified by INSEAD as an in-depth development tool that offers 
guidance for understanding one’s leadership abilities and shows one how to take 
steps to improve. The Inventory has been developed to help executives to 
evaluate their performance in carrying out twelve primary leadership tasks that 
are implicit in the executive role. GELI has been designed as a 360-degree 
feedback instrument allowing leaders to compare their self-perceptions to the 
perceptions of others. The GELI consists of 100 action and behaviour questions 
which are designed to measure leadership competency within the twelve 
dimensions or primary tasks: 
 
Visioning: articulating a compelling vision, mission, and strategy with a multi-
country, multi-environment, multi-function, and multi-gender perspective that 
connects employees, shareholders, suppliers and customers on a global scale.  
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Empowering: giving workers at all levels, a voice by empowering them through 
the sharing of information and the delegation of decisions to the people most 
competent to execute them. 
 
Energizing: motivating employees to actualize the organization’s specific vision 
of the future.  
 
Designing and aligning: creating the proper organizational design and control 
systems to make the guiding vision a reality, and using those systems to align the 
behaviour of the employees with the organization’s values and goals. 
 
Rewarding and giving feedback: setting up the appropriate reward structures and 
giving constructive feedback to encourage the kind of behaviour that is expected 
from employees. 
 
Team building: creating team players and focusing on team effectiveness by 
instilling a cooperative atmosphere, building collaborative interaction, and 
encouraging constructive conflict. 
 
Outside stakeholder orientation: making employees aware of their outside 
constituencies, emphasizing particularly the need to respond to the requirements 
of customers, suppliers, shareholders, and other interest groups, such as local 
communities affected by the organization.  
 
Global mindset: inculcating a global mentality in the ranks – that is, instilling 
values that act as a sort of glue between the regional and/or national cultures 
represented in the organization. 
  
Tenacity: encouraging tenacity and courage in employees by setting a personal 
example in following through on reasonable risks.  
 
Emotional intelligence: fostering trust in the organizations by creating, primarily 
through example, an emotionally intelligent workforce whose members know 
themselves and know how to deal respectfully and understandingly with others.  
 
Life balance: articulating and modelling the importance of the need for life 
balance for the long-term welfare of employees. 
 
Resilience to stress: paying attention to work, career, life and health stress issues, 
and balancing appropriately the various kinds of pressures that life brings. 
 
(Kets de Vries, Vrignaud, Florent-Treacy & Korotov, 2007, p. 10-11).  
  
6.4.2 The Personality Audit (PA) 
 
The PA is a quantitative personality assessment tool which provides test-taker a 
deeper understanding of him- or herself and how he or she interacts with others. 
Based on a psychodynamic approach to leadership, the PA assesses the test-taker 
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in seven personality dimensions and to identify personal blind spots. Appropriate 
leadership development goals can be formulated from the resulting insights of the 
PA. The seven personality dimensions presented as polarities are: 
 
1)  High self-esteem / Low self-esteem 
 
High self-esteem: Feels attractive, liked, respected, valued in one’s 
activities, confident, self-assured; is self-reliant and interested in presenting 
a positive image. 
 
Low self-esteem: Feels unattractive, disliked, disrespected; belittles oneself; 
feels criticised in one’s activities; doubts oneself, is self-deprecating, self-
abasing and not interested in presenting a positive image. 
 
2)  Trustful / Vigilant 
 
 Trustful: Warm, empathetic, caring, affectionate, kind, friendly, open, 
considerate, agreeable, naïve. 
 
 Vigilant: Wary, watchful, bothered by feelings of misgiving and disbelief, 
sceptical, contrary, prudent, guarded, dissonant, and argumentative. 
 
3)  Conscientious / Laissez-faire 
 
Conscientious: Scrupulous, principled, earnest, exact, hardworking, detail-
oriented, dedicated, reliable, dependable, thorough, orderly, meticulous, 
perfectionist. 
 
Laissez-Faire: Laidback, happy-go-lucky, casual, carefree, undirected, 
untroubled, unrestricted, free-and-easy, unworried, easy-going. 
 
4)  Assertive / Self-effacing 
 
Assertive: Controlling, competitive, ambitious, dominating, mastering the 
situation, overshadowing, commanding, overpowering, ruling, overseeing, 
dictating, supervising. 
 
Self-Effacing: Submissive, accommodating, yielding, agreeable, assenting, 
unassertive, compliant, deferential, unpretentious.  
 
5)  Extroverted / Introverted 
 
Extroverted: Outgoing, outwardly directed, sociable, congenial, amicable, 
people-oriented, approachable, gregarious, unreserved, easy-going. 
 
Introverted: Self-observing, self-scrutinising, reserved, a loner, a brooder, 
shy, timid, quiet, unapproachable, remote, aloof, distant, unreachable, 
stand-offish, self-contained, self-reliant, private, withdrawn. 
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6)  High-spirited / Low-spirited 
 
 High-Spirited: Optimistic, ebullient, exhilarated, vivacious, sparkling, 
excited, enthusiastic, lively, cheerful, bubbly, buoyant, light-hearted, 
animated; has élan, gaiety and passion. 
 
 Low-Spirited: Pessimistic, sombre, unhappy, sad, melancholic, blue, heavy, 
disheartened, glum, cheerless, solemn, dejected, disconsolate, discouraged, 
depressed. 
 
7)  Adventurous / Prudent 
 
Adventurous: Inquisitive, searching, venturesome, curious, eager for 
knowledge, original, nonconformist, creative, exploratory, daring, 
incautious. 
 
Prudent: Conventional, conformist, conservative, rigid, prosaic, 
methodical, habitual, careful, orthodox, pedestrian, cautious. 
 
(Kets de Vries, Vrignaud, Florent-Treacy & Korotov, 2007, p. 14-15). 
 
6.4.3 The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) 
 
“Personality theorists recognize that certain constellations of character traits –
archetypes – recur on a regular basis. A leadership archetype characterizes the 
way in which leaders deal with people and situations in an organizational context. 
These archetypes represent prototypes for ideas, a template for interpreting 
observed phenomena and understanding behaviour.” 
 
(Kets de Vries, Korotov & Florent-Treacy, 2007, p. 91). 
 
In order to help executives and human resource (HR) professionals 
evaluate the behaviours and styles that could be considered best 
leadership practices in specific contexts, the team that developed LAQ 
decided to develop a 360º survey instrument that would conceptualize 
leadership as a distributive process illustrated by leadership archetypes. 
In their terms, an archetype is the quintessence of a specific behaviour 
pattern, and a model by which people can be described and compared. An 
archetype-based tool can be a part of the effort in organizations to create 
teams with well-balanced leadership competencies, as they give people a 
practical way to implement a change in mind-set from leadership as status 
ascribed to one individual, to leadership dispersed through the 
organization in the form of some, or many, individuals acting in concert. 
It is a way to describe, rather than prescribe, effective leadership. The 
originators of the instrument started their journey toward developing the 
Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) with this goal in mind.  
 
(Kets de Vries, Vrignaud, Agrawal & Florent-Treacy, 2010, p. 2850) 
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The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) is a 360-degree survey 
instrument designed for organisational leaders to identify their own style of 
leadership and formulate appropriate development objectives. The LAQ is based 
on the following eight leader-archetypes: Strategist, Change catalyst, Transactor, 
Builder, Innovator, Processor, Coach and Communicator. 
 
1) Strategists are good at dealing with developments in the organization’s 
environment. They provide vision, strategic direction and outside-the-
box thinking to create new organizational forms and generate future 
growth. 
 
2) Change catalysts love messy situations. They are masters at re-
engineering and creating new organizational “blueprints.” 
 
3) Transactors are great deal-makers. Skilled at identifying and tackling 
new opportunities, they thrive on negotiations. 
 
4) Builders dream of creating a new organization and have the talent and 
determination to make their dream come true. 
 
5) Innovators are focused on the new. They possess a great capacity to 
solve extremely difficult problems. They like to innovate. 
 
6) Processors like an organization to be a smoothly running, well-oiled 
machine. They are very effective at setting up the structures and systems 
needed to support an organization’s objectives. 
 
7) Coaches are very good at developing people, to get the best out of them. 
They create high-performance teams and high-performance cultures. 
 
8) Communicators are great influencers, and have a considerable impact on 
their surroundings. 
 
(Kets de Vries, Vrignaud, Florent-Treacy & Korotov, 2007, pp. 17-18) 
 
These archetypes are deemed representations of ways of leading in a complex 
organisational environment. 
 
6.4.4 The Inventory of Leadership Styles 
 
The ILS originates from work begun at Harvard University by psychologists 
Litwin and Stringer. Over several decades of research and the use of multi-rater 
surveys amongst organisations worldwide, Hay Group identified six most 
effective ways of leadership: 
 
Directive: emphasis on immediate compliance from employees 
Visionary: emphasis on providing long-term vision and leadership 
Affiliative: emphasis on creative harmony 
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Participative: emphasis on group consensus and generating new ideas 
Pacesetting: emphasis on accomplishing tasks to high standards 
Coaching: emphasis on professional growth of employees 
 
The ILS which has 68 questions consists of a feedback report of two profiles i.e.: 
 
Self-Profile: how the leader thinks he is behaving; 
 
Feedback Profile: how the team experiences the style of the leader. 
 
The two sets of data bring into focus how the leader actually comes across versus 
how he intended to come across. 
(Hay Group 2006) 
 
6.4.5 The Emotional and Social Competency Inventory/Emotional Competency 
Inventory (ESCI/ECI) 
 
The ESCI is a 360-degree feedback instrument designed to differentiate an 
outstanding and effective leader from an average one. Developed jointly by Dr 
Richard Boyatzis and Dr Daniel Goleman with research at Hay Group, the ESCI 
is a 360-degree tool which avoids the distortion of self-assessment questionnaires. 
It describes 12 competencies that are designed to differentiate outstanding 
performers with average ones. 
 
The 12 competencies are clustered under four headings: 
 
a) Self-Awareness: 
(i) Emotional self-awareness 
 
b)  Self-Management: 
(i)  Achievement Orientation 
(ii) Adaptability 
(iii) Emotional Self-Control 
(iv) Positive Outlook 
 
c) Social Awareness: 
(i)  Empathy 
(ii) Organisational Awareness 
 
d) Relationship Management 
(i) Conflict-Management 
(ii) Coach and Mentor 
(iii) Influence 
(iv) Inspirational Leadership 
(v) Teamwork 
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6.5 Results and analysis of 360-degree feedback instruments 
 
Having seen the description of the five different 360-degree feedback 
instruments, let’s look at the results and analyses of the five instruments of the 
Malay executives.  
 
6.5(i) The INSEAD Instruments 
 
6.5(i-a) The Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI) 
 
The purpose of GELI is to investigate what it means to be a world class leader 
and what kind of behaviour and actions make for leadership effectiveness. 
 
The GELI allows the test-taker to rate his or her own performance and compare 
his or her personal rating with that of a group of observers. Observers who 
usually are superiors, direct reports, co-workers or others – respond to the online 
questionnaire anonymously, excepting the test-takers’ superior(s). 
 
In this section, we review how our database of 41 Malay leaders corresponds with 
the global database.  Table 18 below provides the list of the major countries of 
the respondents who make up the global database.  
 
Table 18: Global database of GELI respondents 
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Table 19 below provides the summary of statistics for the twelve leadership 
dimensions measured by the GELI instrument which compares the aggregate 
score of Malay leaders with those of the global leaders. 
 
Table 19: Mean and Standard Deviations of the Malay database, compared 
to the Global GELI database (N = 8124) 
 
Leadership 
dimensions in 
GELI 
Global 
Self’s 
Global 
Observers 
Malay Self’s 
Malay 
Observers 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Visioning 45.9 4.7 43.9 6.8 47.0 5.8 45.4 8.0 
Empowering 44.9 5.1 42.2 7.2 46.2 5.3 44.2 7.1 
Energizing 45.6 5.1 44.6 7.1 49.0 5.6 45.9 7.9 
Designing and 
aligning 
37.4 5.6 37.4 6.4 42.2 5.1 40.1 6.6 
Rewarding and 
feedback 
44.2 5.7 42.1 7.8 46.6 6.2 44.0 8.5 
Team building 61.3 7.1 58.4 10.0 65.2 8.7 61.8 11.0 
Outside 
orientation 
27.8 4.0 27.8 4.4 30.4 3.8 29.9 4.1 
Global mindset 44.4 6.7 43.7 7.5 45.4 6.2 44.2 7.7 
Tenacity 29.5 3.4 29.0 4.2 29.9 3.6 28.9 4.7 
Emotional 
intelligence 
65.4 8.6 63.3 11.6 70.0 10.1 66.5 11.8 
Life balance 49.8 7.5 55.9 8.6 55.6 8.7 56.7 9.0 
Resilience to 
stress 
33.9 10.7 41.7 17.6 45.0 16.6 47.5 19.7 
 
The summary statistics tells us that in some dimensions there are statistically 
significant differences between the Malay leaders compared to those of the global 
leaders. The differences are not only at the level of the Self’s but also at the level 
of the respective observers.  
 
In our subsequent analysis, we test for significant differences between the Malay 
and the global leaders, when we control for factors such as age, sex and industry. 
Note that the analysis of data from a cultural perspective for a 360-degree 
instrument presents some challenges. First, the observers are related to the Self’s, 
and we need to control for the effects of this nesting. Second, the Self’s were 
rated from the 360-degree instrument – that means we have four kinds of 
observers – superiors, subordinates, co-workers and other external/internal 
stakeholders. Since observers are clustered in Self’s, observations for the same 
Self will likely be correlated because of unobserved self-level effects. To adjust 
for this, we used multilevel or hierarchical modelling of data. The unobserved 
self-level effects were considered as fixed parameters. Thus, we have 12 different 
equations, one each for each dimension of leadership, and these dimensions are 
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our dependent variables. We report standard errors that have been adjusted for 
within self-correlations. Overall, we test the twelve dimensions of leadership for 
significant differences between the Malay and the global leaders, controlling for 
age, sex and industry background of participants, and also controlling for the 
nested structure of the data. 
 
The results in Table 20 show the coefficients for the variable Malay on the 
twelve dimensions of leadership. 
 
Table 20: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, 
industry, observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered 
Standard Errors (N = 8124) 
 
 
We see that the Malay is highly significant for the five dimensions of Designing 
and aligning, Team building, Outside orientation, Emotional intelligence, and 
Resilience to stress dimensions.  Significant differences where the Malays are 
higher than the global leaders are also seen in the dimensions for Empowering, 
Energizing, Rewarding and feedback, and Life balance. Only the Global 
mindset and Tenacity dimensions show that the variables are not significant. In 
the dimension of Visioning, the Malay score is moderately significant compared 
to the global leaders.  
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to 
“Malay” results in a higher rating in ten out of twelve dimensions of leadership.  
The positive coefficient on the Resilience to stress means that Malay leaders are 
less resilient to stress compared to global leaders because GELI codes the 
question for this dimension in the reverse. 
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On the remaining two dimensions i.e., Global mindset and Tenacity, the 
Malaysian leaders are no different than the other global leaders. 
 
Figure 20 below shows the graphic measurement for the twelve dimensions as 
measured by Malay Self’s, Malay Observers, Global Self’s and Global Observers. 
 
Figure 20: GELI – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus Global 
leaders 
 
 
 
          
Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
 
To understand how Malay leaders compare with other cultures, we now review 
the comparison and contrast of Malay leaders with other Asians on my 
assumption that Asian cultures are closer to the Malay culture. 
 
Table 21 provides the data regarding the countries from which the ‘Asian’ 
category was selected; the list below is a sub-set of the data from Table 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 21> 
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Table 21: Asian database of GELI respondents 
 
 
 
Based on the analysis similar to that in the previous section, we test the twelve 
dimensions of leadership for significant differences between the Malay and Asian 
leaders as detailed in Table 22: 
 
  
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 22> 
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Table 22: Mean variables measured against the Asian leaders (N=1358) 
 
 
 
Figure 21 below shows the graphic measurement for the twelve dimensions as 
measured by Malay Self’s, Malay Observers, Asian Self’s and Asian Observers.  
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 21> 
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Figure 21: GELI – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus Asian 
leaders 
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We now perform the analysis similar to that in the previous section. We test the 
twelve dimensions of leadership for significant differences between the Malay 
and the Asian leaders, controlling for the age, sex and industry background of 
participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data. The results 
in Table 23 below show the coefficients for the variable Malay on the twelve 
dimensions. 
 
Table 23: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, 
observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard 
Errors (N= 1358) 
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There are some changes when we restrict our attention to Asian leaders.   
 
First, we see that the variable Malay is still highly significant for the Designing 
and aligning and Outside orientation dimensions, and significant for Visioning, 
Empowering, Energizing, Team building, Life balance and Resilience to stress.  
The Malay variable is now also significant for the Tenacity – this variable is not 
significant when the comparable set is that of global leaders.  So, we can 
conclude that Malay leaders are higher on the dimension of Tenacity compared to 
other Asian leaders.  The variable on Global mindset remains insignificant as 
earlier. 
 
In conclusion, we have the following observations on Malay versus Asian 
leaders:- 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher scores on seven dimensions i.e. Visioning, 
Empowering, Energizing, Designing and aligning, Rewarding and feedback, 
Team building and Outside orientation dimensions of leadership.  They are 
different from Asian leaders, as well as global leaders on all these dimensions. 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher Tenacity scores compared to Asian leaders, but not 
when compared to global leaders.  They are more like global leaders, but different 
from other Asian leaders on this dimension. 
 
Malay leaders are less Resilient to stress compared to global leaders, and even 
when we compare them to only their Asian counterparts, we see that Malay 
leaders continue to be significantly different on this dimension. 
 
6.5(i-b) The Personality Audit (PA) 
  
The PA has seven dimensions of personality assessed by two anchor points per 
dimension as given in Table 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 24> 
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Table 24: Seven dimensions of the Personality Audit   
 
 
 
The Personality Audit database has data of 2,727 leaders from across the globe.  
In this section, we compare the database of 41 Malay leaders with global leaders 
first and Asian leaders subsequently to see how the Malay Self’s and their 
Observers perceive Malay leadership from these seven dimensions. 
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Table 25 lists the major countries of the respondents. 
 
Table 25: Global database of PA respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 228 
The summary of statistics comparing Malay leaders with those of global leaders 
is provided in Table 26 below: 
 
Table 26: PA - Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Global leaders  
(N= 2727) 
 
 
 
Table 26 above tells us that in some variables there seems to be significant 
differences between the personality of Malay leaders compared to that of global 
leaders. 
 
Our analysis in this research is not focused on the revalidation of the seven 
dimensions of the PA instrument; rather, we focus on isolating the differences on 
these dimensions between the Malays and the rest of the world.  While responses 
from individuals cannot provide reliable estimates about cultures, they can supply 
information about differences between these cultures. 
 
We now perform a multilevel regression analysis on the PA data, similar to what 
we did in GELI. We test the seven personality variables for significant 
differences between the Malay and the Global leaders, controlling for the age, sex 
and industry background of participants, and also controlling for the nested 
structure of the data.  Table 27 below shows the results for the variable Malay on 
the seven dimensions of personality:- 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 27> 
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Table 27: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, 
observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard 
Errors (N= 2727) 
 
                   
 
We see the variables where the Malay is highly significant are for the Self-
esteem, Vigilant/Trustful, and Laissez-faire/Conscientious dimensions of 
personality.  The variables are not significant for the other four dimensions.  
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to 
“Malay” results in a higher rating on these three dimensions on an average. 
 
Overall, we can see that Malay leaders exhibit higher Self-esteem, are more 
Trustful and more Conscientious than their global counterparts.  In the other four 
variables of Assertive, Extrovert, High-spirited and Adventurous, there are no 
significant differences. 
 
The graph in Figure 22 shows the measurement for the seven dimensions 
comparing Malays and the global leaders. 
  
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 22> 
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Figure 22: PA – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus Global 
leaders 
 
 
Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
 
To understand how Malay leaders compare with other cultures, a comparison 
between Malays and other Asians was made.  This comparison was made on my 
assumption that Asian cultures are closer to the Malay culture, since Malaysia is 
part of Asia. Therefore; our expectation was to find more similarity with Asian 
leaders compared to global leaders.  
 
Table 28 provides the countries from which the 315 Asian leaders were selected.  
These 315 Asian leaders form a sub-set of the global database provided in Table 
18 earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 28> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
Table 28: Asian database of PA respondents 
 
 
 
Table 29 shows the mean variables measured against the Asian leaders as 
provided. 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 29> 
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Table 29: PA – Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Asian leaders (N=315) 
 
 
 
Based on the table above and the analysis performed similar to the comparison 
with the global leaders, we tested the seven dimensions of Personality Audit for 
significant differences between the Malay and Asian leaders. 
 
We now perform an analysis similar to that in the previous section for assessing 
significant differences between the personalities of Malay and the global leaders, 
controlling for the age, sex and industry background of participants, and also 
controlling for the nested structure of the data.  Results in Table 30 show the 
coefficients for the variable Malay on the seven dimensions of Personality Audit.  
We see that the variable ‘Malay’ is highly significant for the Laissez-
faire/Conscientious dimension and moderately significant for Self-
effacing/Assertive dimension.  The variable is not significant for the other five 
dimensions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 30> 
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Table 30: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, 
observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors 
(N= 315) 
 
 
 
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to 
‘Malay’ from within the Asian cluster results in a higher rating on these two 
dimensions, on an average.   
 
Overall, we can say that the Malay leaders’ score for the dimension of 
Conscientious is higher than their Asian counterparts. This finding is also 
consistent with the global aggregate tests, and seems to be a specific 
characteristic of Malay leaders. 
 
Interestingly, the data also shows that on an average, Malay leaders exhibit a 
higher degree of assertiveness compared to their Asian counterparts.  We note 
that the dimension of Self-esteem is no longer significant, indicating that self-
esteem is a personality dimension that is similar in Malay and other Asian 
leaders. 
 
Overall, the Malay leaders are in three ways similar to or different from Asian 
leaders. 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher levels of Conscientious behaviour compared to 
global as well as Asian leaders.  They are different from Asian leaders, as well as 
global leaders on this dimension. 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher Self-esteem and are more Trustful compared to 
global leaders, but not when compared to leaders within Asia.  They are more like 
Asian leaders on this dimension. 
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Malay leaders exhibit higher levels of Assertiveness compared to Asian leaders, 
but are near to global leaders on this dimension.  They are more like global 
leaders (and different from Asian leaders) on this dimension. 
 
The Personality Audit graph in Figure 23 below exhibits the comparison between 
Malay and Asian leaders.  
 
Figure 23: PA – Graphical comparison of Malay and Asian leaders 
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6.5 (i-c) The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) 
 
Personality theorists recognise that certain constellations of character traits – 
archetypes – recur on a regular basis.  A leadership archetype characterises the 
way in which leaders deal with people and situations in an organisational context.  
These archetypes represent prototypes for ideas, a template for interpreting 
observed phenomena and understanding behaviour. 
 
The eight leadership archetypes included in the LAQ are: Builder, Change 
catalyst, Coach, Communicator, Innovator, Processor, Strategist, and 
Transactor. 
 
The LAQ database has data of 1,349 leaders from across the globe.  Please refer 
to Table 31 below for the major countries of the respondents.  In this section, we 
again, as in the previous two instruments, diagnose how our 41 Malay leaders 
compare with the global database of LAQ.  LAQ is also a 360-degree feedback 
instrument with data points of observations from the observed leaders (we denote 
them as Self’s) and from observers including superiors, co-workers, 
spouse/partners and direct reports. 
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Table 31: Global database of LAQ respondents 
 
 
 
Table 32 below provides the details of statistics for the eight archetypes of 
leadership traits measured by the LAQ in the global database and compared with 
the Malay database. 
 
Table 32: LAQ Leadership archetypes (N =1349) 
 
 
 
The statistical summary provides us with archetypes which have significant 
differences between Malay leaders and global leaders.  The differences are both 
at the level of Self’s and at the level of observers. 
 236 
In our analysis, we do not focus on the revalidation of the eight archetypes; 
rather, we focus on isolating the differences on the various dimensions between 
the Malays and the rest of the world. 
 
We now perform a multilevel regression analysis on the LAQ data, similar to 
what we did in the GELI and PA. We test the eight leadership archetypes for 
significant differences between the Malay and the global leaders, controlling for 
the age, sex and industry background of participants, and also controlling for the 
nested structure of the data. The results in Table 33 show the coefficients for the 
variable Malay on the eight leadership archetypes.  We notice that the variable 
Malay is highly significant for five out of eight archetypes of leadership, 
significant for one and moderately significant for one, meaning the Malays are 
rated higher than the global leaders for seven dimensions. The only dimension 
that has similar rating between the Malays and the global leaders is the Coach 
dimension. 
 
Table 33: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, 
observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors 
(N = 1349) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 provides the comparative graph rating between Malays and global 
leaders: 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 24> 
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Figure 24: LAQ – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus Global 
leaders 
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Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
 
As with the previous two instruments, GELI and PA, we also compared Malays 
with Asian leaders based on the assumption that Asian culture is closer to Malay 
culture and may show more similarities than the global leadership data. 
 
Table 34 gives the data regarding the countries from which the Asian category 
was selected.  It should be noted that the Asian list is a sub-set of the global data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 34> 
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Table 34: Asian database of LAQ respondents 
 
 
 
The results of the comparisons between Malay leaders and Asian leaders are 
indicated in Table 35 which shows the mean variables for the variable Malay on 
eight archetypes of leadership. 
 
Table 35: LAQ – Mean variables between Malay leaders and Asian leaders 
(N=206) 
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We now perform an analysis similar to that in the previous section for assessing 
significant differences between the leadership archetypes of the Malay and the 
Asian leaders, controlling for the age, sex and industry background of 
participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data.  Table 36 
below shows the comparative ratings of Malay leaders and Asian leaders: 
 
Table 36: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, 
observer status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard 
Errors (N= 206) 
 
 
 
It could be seen that the variable Malay is highly significant for the Strategist and 
significant for Builder, Communicator, Processor and Transactor, and 
moderately significant for Change catalyst archetypes.  The variable is not 
significant for Coach and Innovator archetypes.  These results indicate that the 
Malays have higher rating on six archetypes on an average and no significant 
difference on two archetypes. 
 
The LAQ graph in Figure 25 below shows the comparison between Malay and 
Asian leaders. 
 
Figure 25:  LAQ – Graphical comparison of Malay leaders versus Asian 
leaders 
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6.5(i-d) Summary of results with the 3 INSEAD Instruments of GELI, PPA and 
LAQ 
 
Table 37 below shows the 27 dimensions between Malays versus global and 
Malays versus Asians. 
 
Table 37: Summary of comparison between Malay, Asian and global leaders 
 
 
 
The results show some very interesting rankings. The Malays have ranked 
themselves higher than the global leaders in 19 out of the 27 dimensions and 17 
out of 27 dimensions when compared to Asian leaders. 
 
Both Asian and global leaders rank higher than Malay leaders in only one 
dimension each. 
 
Global leaders and Malays have no significant differences in seven dimensions 
while Asians and Malays have no significant difference in nine dimensions. Since 
Malays and Asians have nine dimensions where there are no significant 
differences against only seven for global leaders, it confirms my assumption that 
Malays being Asians have less significant differences with Asian leaders than 
with global leaders.  
 
Bearing in mind that the people who represent the global and Asian leaders are all 
very successful executives who attended various executive development 
programmes in INSEAD and that their average scores would already be high, the 
scores achieved by the sample of Malay leaders does imply prima facie that the 
Malay leaders consider themselves among the highest rated in the world. 
 
Let’s look at the different dimensions where the Malays are ranked higher. 
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The nine GELI dimensions where the Malays rank higher than the global leaders 
are:- 
 
 Visioning 
 Empowering 
 Energizing 
 Designing and alignment 
 Rewarding and feedback 
 Team building 
 Outside orientation 
 Emotional intelligence 
 Life balance 
 
The three PA dimensions where Malays rank higher are: 
 
 Self-esteem 
 Trustful 
 Conscientious 
 
The seven LAQ dimensions where the Malay rankings are higher are as follows:  
 
 Builder 
 Change catalyst 
 Communicator 
 Innovator 
 Processor 
 Strategist 
 Transactor 
 
6.5(i-e) Critical reflections on the results of the instruments – GELI, PA and LAQ 
 
There are two things that would be immediately noticeable when comparisons are 
made between Malays and global leaders and Malays and Asian leaders. First; 
one would notice the higher ratings by the Malays (both Self’s and observers) 
compared to the global leaders and Asians and their respective observers. Second; 
the ratings are higher in 19 out of the 27 dimensions (reflecting higher rating in 
70.3% of the dimensions) in comparison to global leaders. 
 
What are the factors or reasons that contribute for the Malays to have rated 
themselves so high uniformly across all the dimensions of the 360-degree 
feedback instruments? The most simplistic answer of course is to argue that the 
Malay leaders who responded to the survey are better than the global and Asian 
leaders. As a researcher accepting such a simplistic answer does not seem 
convincing and I have no doubt that anyone reading this research would be able 
to accept it without raising any doubts either.  
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It is therefore necessary to look at the results of the three instruments’ surveys in 
depth to explore the underlying reasons for the Malays ranking themselves higher 
than the global average. Although there is no literature available that answers this 
question directly, there is however, sufficient literature that addresses the lack of 
congruence between Self and others’ ratings probing the causes for incongruence, 
for example: Ashford (1989); Hassan & Rohrbaugh (2009); Warr & Bourne 
(1999); Yammarino & Atwater (1993). The same literature is used to provide an 
understanding of the higher rating by Malays compared to ratings of the global 
leaders. 
  
“Research on 360-degree feedback mainly has focussed on the psychometric 
properties of multi-source ratings, especially on the nature, sources and practical 
implications of rating incongruence. Rating incongruence is defined as the degree 
to which ratings from multi-sources are dissimilar to each other (Mersman & 
Donaldson, 2000)” (Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 2009, p. 423). 
 
Research has shown for example; that self-ratings can be affected by self-esteem 
and positive self-image (Alimo-Metcalfe, 1998; Baird, 1997; Gioia & Sims, 
1985; Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 2009; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993), leniency  (Fahr 
& Dobbins, 1989; Fox & Dinur, 1988; Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 2009), social 
desirability (Hassan & Rohrbaugh 2009; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), attributional 
biases (DeVader, Bateson & Lord, 1986; Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 2009) and the 
phenomenon of defensiveness in self-perception (Alimo-Metcalfe, 1998; Steel & 
Ovalle, 1984). It is probable that these factors could have contributed to the high 
self-rankings of the Malays involved in this research. 
 
Cross-cultural researchers have also found that “personality tests developed and 
applied in Western cultures have not proven to adequately capture their assumed 
underlying constructs in non-Western cultures” (Cheung et al, 2011, p. 595).  
 
Self-assessment is often seen as a threatening situation for many individuals and 
therefore cognitive factors such as self-protection (Wohlers & London, 1989), 
self-concept maintenance (Atwater & Yammarino, 1992) and self-presentation 
pressures (Ashford, 1989) can induce individuals to overestimate their own 
performance in an effort to maintain a positive self-image (Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 
2009). Such pressures are cited as reasons that can lead to self-rating 
incongruence. 
 
Hassan and Rohrbaugh (2009) have also indicated that a variety of studies have 
shown that situations also arise in which respondents (managers) underestimate – 
rather than overestimate – their own performance.  Such a situation also leads to 
incongruity between Self’s and others and, in our case, between the Malays and 
other global leaders.  There is evidence to support that managers who 
underestimate their own performance have been found to be more effective than 
those who appear to inflate their self-ratings. 
 
According to Hassan & Rohrbaugh (2009), Van Velsor, Taylor & Leslie (1993) 
found that over-raters (i.e. those with self-ratings above other ratings) received 
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the lowest subordinate ratings on managerial roles compared to under-raters (i.e. 
those with self-ratings lower than other ratings). 
 
In the survey of Malay leaders, though both the Self’s and the observers 
(including subordinates) have consistently over-rated the participants, pushing 
their general rating in most categories to be higher than the global and Asian 
average. 
 
Atwater et al (1998) have also been quoted by Hassan & Rohrbaugh (2009) that 
effectiveness was lowest for managers who over-estimated their performance.  
These results are consistent with the current socio-psychological research which 
indicates that highly competent people will under-estimate their own performance 
(Burson, Larrick & Klayman, 2006; Kruger & Dunning, 2006). 
 
There have been some suggestions that under-raters tend to be effective and 
successful managers as they have a tendency to over-estimate their weaknesses 
and under-estimate their strengths (Ashford 1989; Atwater et al, 1998; 
Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). 
 
While the research on the over-raters versus under-raters may point to some 
probable explanations for people to overrate themselves, over and above the 
general literature reviewed here, we also need to look for some explanation which 
could be specific to our situation of the general over-rating by Malay leaders. 
 
In the Malay leaders’ over-rating of themselves, the following factors could have 
a bearing: 
 
a) Most business leaders are less exposed to 360-degree feedback instruments 
and may not be familiar about them compared to their global counterparts.  
They could have therefore reacted in the same way as pointed out in the 
literature search earlier such as maintaining positive self-image and self-
esteem, social desirability and the phenomenon of defensiveness in self-
perception. 
 
b)  We have seen earlier in Chapter 3, of the sixteen Malay traits, malu or 
shame is one of them.  The shame culture of the Malays arouses fear and 
reluctance towards any form of self-exposure. 
 
Kets de Vries (2011b) describes shame as the dread of being condemned or 
thought badly of by other people; evoking feelings of self-loathing, self-
exposure, embarrassment and extreme vulnerability: 
 
“Shame and a low sense of self-esteem are intimately related as both are 
associated with negative perceptions of self.  Such self-conscious feelings 
can be extremely painful and ugly to deal with so it is little wonder that 
shame-prone people will do anything in their power to protect themselves 
by hiding these feelings from others.  A common tactic is withdrawal from 
public settings.  Another is lashing out, or making fun of others, as a way of 
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denying similar feelings inside themselves, behaviour that can be quite 
disruptive, particularly in a team context” (p. 97-98). 
 
Therefore it is also possible that the Malay executives have rated 
themselves higher to overcome the feeling of ‘shame’ and to look good in 
the eyes of the others. 
 
c)  Another possible reason for the high rating by the Malays could be due to 
the high confidence level they may have about themselves as every one of 
the 41 participants who took part in the survey come from very senior 
positions in the private sector, the GLCs or the public sector.  Given that 
they are “crème de la crème” of the business leaders as well as public sector 
employees, they may have considered themselves as the best in the country 
and awarded themselves very high rating. 
 
Similarly, their observers whether they are peers, subordinates or significant 
others, could have also ranked the participants highly because of the Malay 
culture which has a high power distance and feudalistic mind, supporting a 
high rating for the participants (i.e. the ratees). 
 
d) Many Malay CEOs and senior executives have often been put on a fast lane 
and given top positions in major corporations as there is a lack of qualified 
Bumiputras to fill those positions.  Often, these no doubt bright and 
successful individual nevertheless could feel fraudulent and imposturous.  
Kets de Vries (2009a) describes this “as the flip side of giftedness and 
causes many talented, hardworking and capable leaders – men and women 
who have achieved great things – to believe that they don’t deserve the 
success” (p. 98).  
 
“These executives often experience a feeling of a fake or an imposter.  Such 
people are unusually sensitive to experiences of rejection, excessively 
afraid of social failure and suffer from lingering dependency needs…….In 
many instances they may suffer from generalized forms of anxiety, lack of 
self-confidence and depression” (p. 99-100). 
 
Kets de Vries (2006) also talks of “another characteristic common among 
people who suffer from the impostor syndrome is the constant dread of not 
living up to expectations. The behaviour of many self labelled impostors is 
driven by, and also evaluated against, perfection” (p.167). Many such 
impostors hold such high standards of self-evaluation, and are so self-
critical, that they are intolerant of any shortcoming. When such a feeling of 
being a fake or as an impostor surfaces, executives wanting to appear 
perfect are likely to give themselves high scores, and because of their 
intolerance for any shortcoming, could have created a situation whereby 
their observers are also placed with no choice but to give high ratings to 
such executives.  
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e)  Cultural differences are also cited as possible causes for differences in 360-
degree feedback rating. If we look at the Malay culture, it seems possible 
that the earlier mentioned factors such as self-esteem etc., could have 
contributed to a higher rating by Malays in comparison to global as well as 
other Asian leaders. In our understanding of “The Inner Theatre of The 
Malays” (Chapter 3), it was seen that in the Malay society, hierarchy, status 
and rank were of great importance and carefully regulated. The general 
acceptance of status, rank and hierarchy is still prevalent in the Malay 
society (Maaruf, 1984; Bakri, 1999; Zamani, 2003). Given that the people 
who participated in this exercise are all top managers and senior civil 
servants occupying positions of influence, it is important both from the 
Self’s and their observers that they are seen to score the best results. This 
view of scoring the highest results would not only be in the minds of the 
Self’s but also the observers who would take pride to show that they have 
the best leaders. This is not to say that the participants and their observers 
do not have any differences of opinion in their day-to-day working lives. 
There may be internal strife and problems but the order of the hierarchy and 
power distance is so powerful and internalised that the respondents would 
naturally give a higher score to their superiors. 
  
This then raises the question of peers and superiors who fall in the category 
of observers who have also given a higher rating to the participants. A 
possible explanation could again be drawn when we look back to “The 
Inner Theatre of The Malays”. We noted that the Malays were collectivist 
in nature as well as particularist and communitarian in approach. Power 
distance and collectivism are dimensions that appear to have definitive 
impact on 360-degree feedback.  Malays are strong in both power distance 
and collectivism and these could have a bearing on their rating feedback.  
“Atwater et al (2009) explored self and subordinate ratings of leadership in 
963 managers from 21 countries based on assertiveness, power distance and 
individualism or collectivism. Self and other ratings were more positive in 
countries characterised as high in assertiveness and power distance.”  
(Mashihi, 2013). 
 
This observation also supports the case for Malay leaders’ high rating of 
themselves as will be seen later in this chapter in the Inventory Leadership 
Styles (ILS), another feedback instrument used in this research, ‘directive’ 
(which is equivalent of assertive) is the preferred style of 76% of Malays 
and is considered the most dominant style compared to others. 
 
There are other possible explanations that come to my mind. The setting in which 
these surveys were conducted among the participants was not a normal setting. 
Usually 360-degree feedback surveys are conducted in an organisation where 
several participants are drawn from the same organisation. In such instances, they 
are given adequate introduction and the climate in the organisation is prepared in 
advance for both participants and observers to take part in the survey. Adequate 
instructions are given by the Human Resource department or consultant/facilitator 
on the importance of giving the appropriate feedback. 
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For the purpose of this research, I selected some of the key executives from large 
Malaysian organisations who were senior enough and willing to participate in the 
survey as part of a research for Malay leadership. As such, not more than one 
participant came from any organisation. It therefore raises the possibility that the 
randomness of the survey selecting one participant per organisation, could have 
meant that insufficient introduction was made to the observers on the survey 
questionnaire other than the electronic instructions from the institutions (INSEAD 
and Hay Group) directly to the participants and their observers. In addition, the 
fact that this survey was done for a research on Malay leadership could have 
influenced the participants and observers to be lenient, resulting in high ratings 
across most dimensions.  
 
Having seen the three INSEAD instruments and the Malay ratings, let us look at 
the two Hay Group instruments – ILS and ESCI. 
 
6.5(ii) The Hay Group Instruments 
 
6.5(ii-a) The Inventory of Leadership Styles (ILS) 
 
The Inventory of Leadership Styles originates from Litwin and Stringer’s (1968) 
study on motivation and organisational climate, where ‘climate’ is defined as the 
sense of “how it feels to work here” or what Sumantra Ghoshal, the late Professor 
of Strategy and International Management at the London Business School, would 
describe as “The Smell of the Place” as experienced by the workers, and where 
the leadership style is suggested to be the primary driver for climate.  Later 
studies have reportedly linked climate to real world performance and 
demonstrated predictive validity. Climate has been found to correlate with key 
organisational performance measures including productivity, sales, profit and 
revenue growth etc., in different industry sectors. Climate, according to Litwin 
and Stringer (1968) who originally were involved in developing ILS, is a strong 
predictor of organisational performance because different climates stimulate or 
arouse different kinds of motivation.  They generate distinct attitudes about a 
person’s relationship with others and they strongly influence both feelings of 
satisfaction and performance levels. 
 
Research findings indicate that just as climate is one of the major determinants of 
motivation, the manager is one of the major determinants of climate. In their 
Harvard Business School experiment, Litwin and Stringer (1968) confirmed the 
researchers’ hypothesis that a different organisational climate could be created by 
influencing the leadership style inputs. 
 
The ILS traces its origin to the 1970s when it was known as Managerial Style 
Questionnaire (MSQ).  The MSQ consisted of 36 force choice items that provided 
respondents with one dominant managerial style.  Subsequently, in the mid-
eighties, the MSQ was re-designed and named the Managerial Style Inventory 
(MSI).  The MSI was developed into ILS in 2002 and has two versions of the 
instrument; one for self-rating and one for employees to rate their managers. 
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ILS is based on the patterns of behaviour of an individual manager.  Based on 
their research Litwin and Stringer have found that basically six leadership styles 
or behaviour patterns are applied by managers in the different situations they 
encounter.  They are classified as:- 
 
i) The Directive style 
 
 Primary Objective: Immediate compliance 
 
The primary objective of the Directive style is immediate compliance. This style 
relies on “directives” rather than “direction”, and uses very little dialogue. Close 
monitoring is supported by negative, corrective feedback with an implied, if not 
explicit, threat. Efforts to motivate are focused mainly on the consequences of 
non-compliance. 
 
The Directive style is most effective 
when applied to relatively straightforward tasks; in crisis situations; when 
deviations from compliance will result in serious problems; with problem 
employees, when all else has failed. 
 
The Directive style is least effective 
when applied to tasks that are not straightforward – the more complex the task, 
the more ineffective this style becomes possibly provoking rebellion over the 
long term with self-motivated, capable employees. 
 
ii) The Visionary style 
 
Primary Objective: Providing long-term direction and vision for employees 
 
The Visionary style provides long-term direction and vision. This style relies on 
dialogue with others as well as the manager’s unique perspective on the business 
to establish a vision. The manager keeps others engaged by assuring them that the 
direction is in the long-term best interests of the group and the organisation, and 
by monitoring performance toward the established goals with balanced feedback 
to employees. 
 
The Visionary style is most effective  
when a new vision or clear direction and standards are needed; when the leader is 
perceived to be the “expert” or “authority”, and when there are new employees 
who depend on the leader for guidance. 
 
The Visionary style is least effective 
when the leader does not develop employees; when the leader is not perceived as 
credible, and when the leader is trying to promote self-managed work teams and 
participatory decision-making. 
 
 
 248 
iii) The Affiliative style 
 
Primary Objective: Creating harmony among employees and between the 
manager and employees 
 
The primary objective of the Affiliative style is to create harmony and avoid 
conflict. A manager utilising the Affiliative style spends a lot of time cultivating 
relationships with employees. This style tends to reward personal characteristics 
and avoid performance-related confrontations. 
 
The Affiliative style is most effective 
when used as part of a repertoire including the Visionary, Participative, or 
Coaching styles; when giving personal help (e.g. counselling), and in getting 
diverse, conflicting groups to work together harmoniously. 
 
The Affiliative style is least effective 
when employees’ performance is inadequate; in crises or complex situations 
needing clear direction and control, and with employees who are task-oriented or 
uninterested in having a friendship with their manager. 
 
iv) The Participative style 
 
Primary Objective: Building commitment among employees and generating new 
ideas 
 
The primary objective of the Participative style is to build commitment through 
consensus. This style relies on the ability of team members to establish their own 
direction and to resolve their conflicts constructively. It is typically characterised 
by a lot of meetings, a lot of listening, recognition of adequate performance, and 
little criticism of low performance. 
 
The Participative style is most effective 
when employees are competent; when employees must be co-ordinated, and in 
instances where a leader is unclear about the best approach. 
 
The Participative style is least effective 
in crises, when there’s no time to hold meetings, and when employees are 
incompetent, lack crucial information, or need close supervision. 
 
v) The Pacesetting style 
 
Primary Objective: Accomplishing tasks to high standards of excellence 
 
The primary focus of the Pacesetting style is task accomplishment to high 
standards of excellence. Leaders utilising the Pacesetting style tend to lead by 
modelling. They establish themselves as the standard and are apprehensive about 
delegating. Their concern with the immediate task accomplishment makes them 
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disinclined to collaborate with their peers, except when they need to obtain or 
exchange resources. 
 
The Pacesetting style is most effective 
when employees are highly motivated, competent and know their jobs; when 
managing individual contributors (e.g. scientists in R&D, SOCO); in making the 
organisation move fast, and in developing employees who are similar to the 
manager. 
 
The Pacesetting style is least effective 
when the manager cannot do all his/her work personally, and when employees 
need direction, development, and co-ordination. 
 
vi) The Coaching style 
 
Primary Objective: Long-term professional development of employees 
 
The primary objective of the Coaching style is the long-term development of 
others. A manager using the Coaching style helps individuals identify their 
unique strengths and weaknesses. This typically involves sitting down with the 
employee and conducting a candid, mutual assessment of the employee’s 
strengths and weaknesses in light of his or her aspirations. The manager helps the 
employee to establish a development plan, and provides on-going support and 
feedback. 
 
The Coaching style is most effective 
when employees acknowledge a discrepancy between their current level of 
performance and where they ideally would like to be, and when employees are 
motivated to take initiative and seek professional development. 
 
The Coaching style is least effective 
when the manager lacks expertise; when employees require much direction and 
feedback, and when in crises. 
 
(Hay Group, 2006, pp. 6-8). 
 
Interpretation 
 
The ILS feedback consists of two profiles – the leadership style the participants 
intend and the leadership style experienced by the participant’s raters. 
 
The self-report measures the managerial styles (expressed by behaviours) that the 
participant believes he or she demonstrates in the workplace. These are the 
participant’s intended styles but may not be what others experience. These scores 
are sometimes interpreted as indicating the styles that the participant values. 
 
The Climate Experience Profile measures the managerial styles (expressed by 
behaviours) that the participant’s raters see the participant demonstrate in the 
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workplace. This is how the participant actually comes across versus how he or 
she intends to come across. 
 
Below we provide the two figures with bar charts. Figure 26 provides the bar 
chart of how the 38 Malay participants see themselves with the different 
leadership styles. Figure 27 provides the bar chart of how the 115 direct reports 
of the 38 Malay leaders see the leadership styles as demonstrated by their bosses. 
 
Figure 26: Inventory of Leadership Styles (Malay participants, n=38) 
 
 
Figure 27: Inventory of Leadership Styles (direct reports, n= 115) 
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Figure 28 below compares the results of both the Malay leaders and their direct 
reports. This figure shows how the participants view their leadership styles as 
compared to how their observers (making direct reports) view the participants’ 
version.  
 
Figure 28: Inventory of Leadership Styles – Comparison between Malay 
participants and their direct reports 
 
 
 
The ILS consists of two profiles – the intended leadership styles of the 
participants and the leadership style experienced by the raters of the participants. 
 
The participants’ report (Figure 26) measures the leadership styles (expressed by 
behaviour) that the participants believe they demonstrate in their organisations. 
These are the participants’ intended styles or what they believe they are 
demonstrating in their workplace. They may not be what others necessarily 
experience. 
 
The leadership style experienced by the observers (or raters) measures the 
leadership styles (expressed by behaviours) that the observers see the participants 
demonstrate in the work place. In other words, this is how the participants 
actually come across in the eyes of the observers, versus how the participants 
intend to come across. 
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On the graphs above, data is represented in the form measured by the height of 
the bars. Scores above the 66
th
 percentile are considered to be dominant styles. 
These are the styles that appear to be used most frequently. Scores between the 
50
th
 and 65
th
 percentile reflect back-up styles. These are styles that are used to 
complement the dominant styles, or when the dominant styles do not work. It is 
not unusual for a person to have more than one dominant or back-up style or no 
back-up style at all.  
 
If we look at the bar charts of the participants, we can see that Directive style is 
the most dominant among the Malays with Affiliative, Visionary and Coaching 
as back-up styles. Directive style is selected as the dominant style by 74% of the 
participants. Visionary, Affiliative and Coaching are seen as the back-up styles 
with Pacesetting as the least used style. 
 
The observers also agree with the participants in that the dominant style of the 
Malay leaders in our sample is Directive. Unlike the participants, however, the 
observers feel that the participants also use Affiliative as a dominant style. 
Pacesetting and Participative are the least used styles and both the participants 
and their observers agree on ranking Pacesetting and Participative styles as the 
least used styles. The observers feel that their leaders are somewhat more 
‘Visionary’ than how the participants themselves feel. The Coaching style is also 
seen as a strong back-up style by both the participants and the observers. 
  
It is quite clear that as viewed by both the Malay leaders and their observers, the 
preferred leadership style among the Malays is the Directive style. This does not 
come as a surprise in the Malay society where as we have seen repeatedly in 
earlier chapters, the deep influence of feudalism and hierarchy. This is further 
supported by the power distance in Malaysia which ranks as number one in the 
world for Power Distance Index in Hofstede’s study.  
 
6.5(ii-b) The Emotional and Social Competency Inventory (ESCI) 
 
The fifth 360-degree instrument which was used for this research is the ESCI. 
The ESCI measures twelve competencies organised into four clusters: 
 
a) Self-awareness: recognising and understanding our own emotions; 
 
b) Social awareness: recognising and understanding the emotions of others; 
 
c) Self-management: effectively managing our own emotions; 
 
d) Relationship management: applying emotional understanding in our 
dealing with others.  
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ESCI was completed by 40 participants and 200 observers (five observers per 
participant). In fact, 48 participants completed the ESCI but eight were rejected 
because of insufficient data. The results of ESCI and the summary of the four 
competencies of the participants are provided below.  
 
Using the report, the report is colour-coded with green, yellow and red. The 
colours represent the following:  
 
Green signifies that the criteria have been met or exceeded. 
Yellow signifies that the criteria are close to being met. 
Red signifies that the criteria have not been met and that a significant investment 
will have to be made to reach the criteria.  
 
Data is presented in a bar in Figure 29 below displaying all three colours. The 
total length of the bar represents 100% of the group. The length of each of the 
colours represents the proportion of the group meeting the criteria for a 
competency. 
 
Figure 29: Summary results of participants’ four ESCI competencies 
   
 
 
For example; in the bar above, 50 of the individuals met or exceeded the criteria, 
25 of the individuals were close to meeting the criteria and 25 of the individuals 
needed significant development to meet the criteria.  
 
This report summarises the results of the 40 individual assessments. In addition to 
rating, each individual was rated up to five observers comprising direct reports, 
peers, superiors and others (including client/customer).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 30> 
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Figure 30: ESCI results of 40 participants 
 
 
 
 
 Emotional Self-Awareness: 
This cluster is the weakest among the Malays where only one out of 40 
has reached the required competency level with 33 close to achieving the 
level of competency. Six (15%) need substantial development in this area. 
 
 Achievement Orientation: 
27 (67.5%) have exceeded and 13 (32.5%) have almost met the required 
competency level. 
 
 Adaptability: 
Except for one the rest has exceeded or almost met the required level.  18 
(45%) has exceeded, 21 (52.5%) almost met the required level. Two (5%) 
need development. 
 
 Emotional Self-Control: 
19 (47.5%) have exceeded the competency level and another 19 nineteen 
(47.5%) has almost reached the level of competency. Two (5%) need 
development  
 
 Positive Outlook: 
62.5% (25) has met or exceeded the level of competency, 35% (14) has 
almost reached the level of competency. 2.5% (one) needs development. 
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 Empathy: 
Eight participants (20%) have achieved the required competency level, 30 
(75%) are close to meeting the criteria. Two (5%) need substantial 
development.  
 
 Organizational Awareness: 
In this area 25 participants (62.5%) have the required competency level, 
15 (37.5%) demonstrate the criteria that is close to be met.  
 
 Conflict Management: 
The participants demonstrate a weak competency with only five (12.5%) 
meeting the required competency level, with 34 (85%) almost reaching 
the level needed. One person (2.5%) requires substantial development.  
 
 Coach and Mentor: 
13 people, representing 22.5% are in the green zone, demonstrating the 
required level of competency; 60% (24 people) have reached the level that 
is close to be met; three people (7.5%) need to improve their competency 
level substantially.  
 
 Influence: 
15 people, representing 22.5% of the group, have demonstrated the full 
competency level with 24 (60%) showing to be close to the required 
competency level. One person requires substantial development.  
 
 Inspirational Leadership: 
50% of the participants have achieved the required level of competency, 
with 47.5% almost reaching the required level of competency. 2.5% (one 
person) needs substantial development. 
 
 Teamwork: 
This is the area where we have the maximum number of 28 people 
representing 70% of the group having attained the competency level, and 
another 30% almost attained the required level. 
 
Teamwork and Achievement Orientation are the strongest traits among the 
Malays, with Positive Outlook as the third trait demonstrated by the Malays. 
Inspirational Leadership, Emotional Self-Control and Adaptability are also 
reasonably strong among the Malays. Conflict-Management, Empathy and 
Emotional Self-Awareness in that descending order are the three weakest 
competencies requiring more attention for development among the Malay leaders 
in our sample.  
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Overall, from the sample study, we could conclude that the Malays are: 
 
 Strong in the following traits:  
Teamwork; 
Achievement-Orientation; 
Positive Outlook and Organizational Awareness.  
 
 Reasonably well-developed in: 
Inspirational Leadership; 
Emotional Self-Control and  
Adaptability.  
 
 Somewhere in the middle in  
Influence and  
Coach-Mentor dimensions.  
 
 In need of development of 
Emotional Self-Awareness,  
Empathy and  
Conflict Management.  
 
In terms of the four clusters, Malays are strongest in the Self-Management 
cluster followed by Relationship Management. They are moderately weak in 
Social Awareness and considerably weak in Emotional Awareness.  
 
6.6 Findings from the five 360-degree feedback instruments 
 
We have so far seen the five 360-degree feedback instruments which 41 Malay 
senior business and public sector executives completed with observers exceeding 
200. The summary of the findings of the 360-degree feedback instruments are 
provided here in two separate parts – first; the three instruments of INSEAD i.e. 
the GELI, PA, and LAQ and second; the HAY instruments of the ILS and ESCI.  
The ILS was completed by 38 executives and 115 observers and ESCI by 40 
executives and 200 observers. 
 
In the INSEAD instruments of GELI, PA and LAQ which measured in total 27 
different dimensions of leadership and personality, we found that Malays had 
ranked themselves higher in 19 of the 27 dimensions when compared to the 
global database; and 17 dimensions when compared to the Asian database. We 
have also seen the probable reasons why Malays could or may have ranked 
themselves higher than the rest. What is striking though – in the graphs of the 
different instruments – is the similarity of the patterns between the Malays and 
the rest, be it the global or Asian leaders.  
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Figure 31: Comparison of the GELI Leadership Dimensions between Malay 
leaders and their observers, and global leaders and their 
observers 
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Figure 32: Comparison of the GELI Leadership Dimensions between Malay 
leaders and their observers, and Asian leaders and their 
observers 
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In the case of the GELI graph (Figure 31) one can see the pattern of similarity 
between the Malay and global leaders. For example; in Visioning (A), both the 
Malays and global Self’s fall between the 80th and 90th percentile, although 
Malays are higher. Then one can see the dip in Empowering (B), where both 
Malays and the global leaders consider the dimensions of empowering to be 
lower. Then in Energizing (C), we can see that both the Malays and global 
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leaders show an increase in their rankings. In G (Team building) too we can see 
the similarity in the spike in the graph. The dimension of Emotional intelligence 
(J), presents a peak for both the Malay and global leaders with a downward spiral 
for both in Life balance (K) and Resilience to stress (L).  
 
In the case of the GELI – Malays versus Asians (Figure 32), it is also clearly 
noticeable that even though Malays are consistently higher in the ranking, both 
Malays and Asian leaders follow a quite similar pattern.  
 
Similar patterns are also seen in PA as shown in Figures 33 and 34 below: 
 
Figure 33: Personality Audit – Graphical comparison of Malay versus global 
leaders 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Personality Audit – Comparison of Malay versus Asian leaders 
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In the PA, we can see almost identical graphs between the Malay and global 
leaders except that the gap is wider in the Conscientious dimension where the 
Malays have ranked themselves higher. 
 
The PA graph comparing Malays and Asians also displays a strikingly similar 
pattern of highs and lows except again in the Conscientious dimension wherein 
Malays have a higher ranking than the rest of Asians.  
 
The LAQ graph (Figure 35) of the Malay and global leaders; again, displays a 
very similar pattern except for the archetype of Processor where there is a greater 
divergence between the Malay and global leaders. In the dimension of Processor 
Malays are markedly higher than the global leaders.  
 
When we compare the LAQ graph of Malays and Asians (Figure 36), again we 
see a very harmonious pattern except in the Processor archetype similar to global 
leaders where Asian leaders show a greater divergence compared to Malay 
leaders.  
 
Figure 35: LAQ – Comparison of Malay versus global leaders 
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Figure 36: LAQ – Comparison of Malay versus Asian leaders 
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Based on the comparison of graphs for the three instruments i.e., GELI, PA and 
LAQ between the Malay and global leaders and the Malay and Asian leaders, we 
see a very similar pattern between the Malays and the rest, with the exception that 
the Malays have generally rated themselves higher in almost all the dimensions. 
Disregarding the higher rating, if we were to compare the pattern of leadership 
between the Malays and the rest, we can see a very positive correlation in all the 
dimensions; save for one or two, such as Conscientious under PA and Processor 
under LAQ. It is rather surprising to observe the strikingly similar patterns in the 
six graphs presented above which seem to indicate some sort of congruence in the 
various leadership dimensions of the Malays compared to the global and Asian 
leaders. Taking these similarities and the general congruent pattern of the graphs 
into account, there is a possibility that an average Malay leader is in many 
respects quite akin to either an average global leader or an average Asian leader 
from the available database. We shall deal with this question in the overview of 
the findings and results.  
 
Let us make a similar comparison with the Hay Group Instruments between the 
Malays and Asians. For ILS of Hay group, I was not able to have access to the 
global database, but only to the aggregate summary for Asia. For ESCI, no 
comparable charts – either for Asia or global – were available and hence no 
comparison could be made for this instrument.  
 
For the ILS, Hay Group was able to provide aggregate bar charts of 3909 
Malaysians and 43,344 Asians who have completed the ILS between 2008 and 
2010. These versions were the Direct Reports version which means the version 
completed by the observers rather than the Self’s.  
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Provided below are the figures with bar charts of the ILS comparing the Malays 
with Malaysians (which includes Malaysian Malays, Chinese, Indians and other 
races of Malaysia) and the Malays with Asians.  
 
Figure 37: The Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports Version) for 
Asians 
 
 
 
Source: Hay Group Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 38> 
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Figure 38: The Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports Version) for 
Malaysians 
                                           
    
Source: Hay Group database 
 
 
Figure 39: The Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports Version) for 
Malays based on the participants of this research 
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What we notice in the bar charts comparing Malays with other Asians as well as 
other Malaysians (Figure 40), is the striking similarity in ranking in the 
leadership styles adopted by the Malays with rest.  
 
Figure 40: The Inventory of Leadership Styles (Direct Reports Version) – 
Comparisons between Malays, Malaysians and Asians 
 
 
 
Source: Database from Hay Group and participants of this research 
 
Malays, like other Asians and fellow Malaysians, use Directive style of 
leadership as a dominant style except that for the Malays, the Directive style is 
more pronounced at 73 percentile compared with Malaysians as a whole at 71 
percentile, and Asians at 66 percentile. 
  
Malays also use Affiliative as a dominant style at 70 percentile compared to 
Asians and Malaysians, who use Affiliative as a back-up style. It seems quite 
natural that Directive is the most dominant style among the Malays, because the 
Malay society is a hierarchical one with the greatest Power Distance Index in the 
world based on Hofstede’s study (2005). Affiliative style, which is the second 
preferred style among the Malays, is based on the Malay society’s cultural 
attributes of being harmonious and conflict-avoidant. Malays are the only group 
who have two dominant styles of Directive and Affiliative even though Directive 
is more pronounced than Affiliative. Visionary is also a very strong back-up style 
of the Malays, almost bordering on the dominant style, whereas other Malaysians 
and Asians are not strong users of Visionary as a style. Coaching is used as a 
strong back-up style by all the three – the Malays, Malaysians and Asians. 
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Participative style is a back-up style for all the three groups, with the Malays 
using it as a strong back-up style at 57 percentile in comparison to Asians at 51 
percentile, and Malaysians at 49 percentile. Pacesetting is the least used by all the 
three groups with the Malays at the lowest – 34 percentile; Malaysians 38 
percentile and Asians 44 percentile.   
 
6.7 Overview of the findings and results 
 
The aim of this chapter was to understand Malay leadership through the five 360-
degree feedback instruments. The five instruments are rather comprehensive with 
a total of 320 questions and each instrument was answered by the participants 
who numbered 41 for the three INSEAD instruments and 38 for the Hay Group 
instruments. A majority of the 41 participants also completed the Hay Group 
survey and vice versa. There was a handful that did either the INSEAD or Hay 
instruments. These executives, being very senior people running some of the 
largest corporations in Malaysia, could not be forced to do beyond what they 
could handle and were given the freedom of doing all the five or just three from 
INSEAD or two from Hay Group.  
 
The whole research on The Malay Leadership Mystique itself is an exploratory 
one and within this exploratory research, I introduced another exploratory section 
of using the five 360-degree instruments. There might be; but I am not aware of 
any research using so many multi-source feedback or 360-degree feedback 
instruments in any one research. I ventured to do it because of my confidence in 
the usefulness of these instruments to understand Malay leadership qualities. 
Moreover, I used these five instruments for a totally different purpose than what 
they are usually intended for. These instruments are used globally for helping us 
arrive at an understanding of individual character and leadership strengths and 
weaknesses. Kets de Vries et al (2007) say that the 360-degree feedback 
instruments “are not diagnostic or navigational tools in an empirical sense, but 
they provide a useful way for leaders to compare their perceptions with the 
observations of colleagues or others who know them well” (p. 77).  
 
I am however using the five instruments in this research as a kind of diagnostic 
tool to arrive at some observable pattern of Malay leadership. This is where 
further exploration within the explorative research comes in. All this while, the 
various 360-degree feedback instruments have been used only at an individual 
level but I have taken the courage to test it at a larger group level. The findings in 
this section may or may not be accepted by all, but the fact remains that my 
method of using these instruments at a macro level to understand Malay 
leadership, has shown some very interesting and surprising patterns that warrant 
further in-depth research. 
 
Just as aspirin; (also known as acetylsalicylic acid, a salicylate drug) which was 
originally used to relieve minor aches, pains and fever, was subsequently 
discovered useful to reduce the risk of heart attacks and strokes while increasing 
the chances of surviving them, the 360-degree feedback intended for individual 
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leadership development could be a useful tool for understanding leadership 
qualities of large-groups.  
 
This exploratory exercise of using 41 Malay executives to draw conclusions may 
not be a perfect or a conclusive method but it justifies further research in 
understanding leadership qualities at a large-group level.  
 
What I have done with the top Malay leaders could be tried out at different levels 
of Malay managers and perhaps with a larger sample size to give us even more 
useful insights into Malay leadership or any other group for that matter.  
 
Being an exploratory research, the findings from this survey cannot be used in a 
very conclusive manner. Therefore, I have been cautious not to make any 
exaggerated claims.  
 
To summarise; based on the findings of the five 360-degree feedback instruments 
tested on 41 senior Malay executives for the three INSEAD instruments of GELI, 
PA and LAQ, and 38 senior Malay executives for the Hay Group instruments of 
ILS and ESCI, we could make the following preliminary conclusions which need 
to be verified by further research: 
 
The Malays have ranked themselves higher than the global leaders in 19 out of 
the 27 dimensions and higher than the Asians in 17 out the 27 dimensions 
measured by GELI, PA and LAQ. Based on these findings, it is not appropriate to 
form a simplistic conclusion that Malays are better than the global and Asian 
leaders. Looking deeper into the Malay cultural attributes and the Malay context, 
we can conclude that the Malays could have overrated themselves because of the 
following factors:- 
 
self-esteem and positive self-image; social desirability; feudalist mindset 
and hierarchy leading to high power distance; leniency and kasihan 
factors.  
 
While we could agree that all or some of the above factors could have been 
contributory to the Malays being rated higher than the global leaders, we also 
need to look at the similarity of patterns in all the graphs relating to the GELI, PA 
and LAQ which are strikingly similar between the Malays, global leaders and 
Asian leaders.  
 
In addition to the graphs of the GELI, PA and LAQ being strikingly similar, we 
also saw that in the ILS, the Malays and Asians display very similar dominant 
leadership styles. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain data for global leaders 
using the ILS to make a comparison with the Malays.  
 
Based on the similarity of patterns we see in the four 360-degree feedback 
instruments – GELI, PA, LAQ and ILS - between the Malay, global and Asian 
leaders, there is prima facie evidence to suggest that these senior Malay leaders 
who participated in the survey are not very different from those in the database of 
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global and Asian leaders. In other words, Malay leaders who reach the level of 
senior positions should be able to take on any position similar to a global leader 
in the database of INSEAD and Hay Group.  
 
This view is also confirmed by Dr Mahathir (2011), the former prime minister,  
 
The past 30 years have also seen many Malays appointed as senior 
executives in major foreign companies and banks. They have done very 
well, exuding self-confidence and are accepted as equals by their 
European and other Asian colleagues. (p. 231). 
  
As much as I am tempted to draw a quick conclusion that the Malay leaders are 
similar to global leaders and Asian leaders based on the similarity of patterns in 
the three instruments of GELI, PA and LAQ, we have also seen that there are 
significant differences in the rating where the Malays are higher in 19 out of the 
27 dimensions in the ratings by Malay and global leaders and 17 dimensions 
where they are higher than the Asian leaders. Therefore; further research is 
needed to establish more conclusive evidence on the similarity of Malay leaders 
with either global or Asian leaders. 
  
For now, since the Malay leaders and global leaders do have differences in ratings 
in several dimensions of the GELI, PA and LAQ, we can but say, that there are 
definitive differences between the Malays and global leaders as well as between 
the Malays and Asian leaders. 
 
Needless to say this is a very preliminary finding in an exploratory research 
which does have some limitations to the sample size and the setting in which it 
was conducted. Whether this preliminary finding could stand the test of time 
would depend on further, deeper and more conclusive research being undertaken.  
For the purpose of this research, based on available evidence, it is not 
inappropriate to assume that given the right opportunities, a Malay is capable of 
being developed into a global business leader similar to those in the INSEAD and 
Hay databases.  
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 41> 
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Figure 41 below gives a dashboard view of the preliminary findings using the 
five 360-degree feedback instruments. 
 
Figure 41: Summary of preliminary findings using the five 360-degree 
feedback instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 6> 
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Chapter 7 – Unveiling the Malay Leadership Mystique through the Clinical 
Paradigm 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter entitled “Unveiling the Malay Leadership Mystique through the 
Clinical Paradigm” I shall deal with the crux of the entire research question of 
why the Malays have not been successful in business leadership in spite of the 
government providing them with education, opportunities, licenses, funding 
through both government and commercial loans at preferential rates, as well as 
almost everything else that is needed in the eyes of the government and political 
leaders to make them ‘successful’. The definition of ‘successful’ is the equivalent 
to Malays achieving in aggregate a 30% share in the economy of the nation, 
primarily measured as equity ownership. This was one of the primary objectives 
of the NEP that was formulated after the 1969 racial riots. 
 
The frustrations of the government and the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad were so great that the longest serving prime minister of 
the country who served as the leader of the nation for the 22 out of 55 years of its 
independence (equivalent to 40% of the country’s post-independence era) began 
to openly admit his failure in trying to change the Malays to be successful in 
business and started criticising them out of his frustration and anger. This 
outpouring by Dr Mahathir is what triggered this research.  
 
Some research has been done both by the government as well as by Malay 
intellectuals and researchers outlining the Malay problem. This research has also 
relied on some of the previous works done by writers like Alatas (1977); Husin 
Ali (2008); Dr Mahathir (1970, 2011); Musa (1999); Omar (2006); Rahman, 
(2004); Zamani (2002), and others.  Many of these writers did touch on some 
important issues such as colonialism, feudalism, lack of experience, lack of 
opportunities, lack of capital etc., and provided some suggestions to redress the 
important issue of the majority race in the country being economically weak. In 
spite of its political hold on the country, however; none of the solutions seem to 
have even half-solved the problem. In this whole episode the critics as well as the 
victims are the same people – Malays. Although the critics undoubtedly included 
non-Malays, their voice was usually somewhat muted because of the special 
privileges accorded to Malays under the Constitution. Of late however, even the 
non-Malays have begun vocal criticisms of both the Malays and the government 
because the NEP which was originally intended for a period of twenty years 
(1971-1990) has been extended through various other policies until today. The 
younger generation of non-Malays who have little or no knowledge of the 
background to the NEP and the historical context of Malay backwardness all 
through the colonial period until even after merdeka, staunchly criticise both 
Malays and the government for the continued extension of the affirmative 
policies. 
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This situation has placed a large segment of the Malay population in a difficult 
and defensive position. In short, the Malays have been criticised by several 
quarters – the government and Malay political leaders, the non-Malays and the 
non-Malay political parties, and a small percentage of successful Malays who 
having succeeded through NEP, look down scornfully on the vast majority of the 
Malays who have not been as successful. What really is missing is that no serious 
and holistic attempt has been made to understand the Malay psyche and the 
Malay inner theatre so that at least below-the-surface issues could be understood 
on the challenges in making the Malays successful businessmen and 
entrepreneurs. In other words, no proper diagnosis has been made to appreciate 
and understand the Malay problems; whatever little diagnosis that has been done 
to-date is based on the rational models of looking at problems relating to the 
Malays. But dealing with humanity requires different means of verification. In 
spite of what philosophers of science like to say about this subject, no causal 
claim in clinical psychology (similar to history and economics, for that matter) 
can be verified in the same way as can be done in empirical sciences such as 
experimental physics or astronomy.  As Kets de Vries (2008) observes that 
looking from the world of psychotherapy, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, he has 
learned that often there is more to a problem than meets the eye.  Frequently, the 
real crux of the problem turns out to be invisible. 
 
Leadership after all, is about human behaviour. It revolves around the highly 
complex interplay between leaders and followers, all put into a particular 
situational context. Leadership is about understanding the way people and 
organisations behave, about creating and strengthening relationships, about 
building commitment, about establishing a group identity, and about adapting 
behaviour to increase effectiveness.  
 
What the clinical orientation to the study of leadership demonstrates more clearly 
than other conceptual frameworks, is that leaders need to recognise that people 
differ in their motivational patterns (Kets de Vries, 2006a, 2007a).  Good leaders 
see their followers not as one-dimensional creatures but as complex and 
paradoxical entities; people who radiate a combination of soaring idealism and 
gloomy pessimism, stubborn short-sightedness and courageous vision, narrow 
minded suspicion and open-handed trust, irrational envy and greed and 
unbelievable unselfishness (Kets de Vries & Engellau, 2008). 
 
The fact that after all the attempts made by the government to help the Malays 
achieve economic success have not been successful, we can only suspect that 
either there is something wrong with the prescription or something more serious 
with the patient than seen from the surface.  
 
It is with an open mind to dig a little deeper into the Malay mind that I embarked 
on this research project. By no stretch of the imagination however, do I expect to 
find all the solutions to the problem at hand. If I am able just to point to the 
direction that may lead us to identify and deepen our knowledge in at least 
appreciating that the problem at hand needs a more thorough and in-depth 
 270 
analysis – rather than making repeated futile attempts to find simplistic solutions, 
reminding us of Einstein’s famous quote “Doing the same thing over and over 
again and expecting different results” – I would consider my research a success. 
 
I had already mentioned in Chapter 1 and in the subsequent chapters that, because 
of the repeated failures of the Malays in the business world there is a need to 
study the Malays from a different angle other than the rational model. Although I 
had from the beginning, identified that psychoanalytic themes and theories 
relating to large-group is the most appropriate area for this research, I was fully 
convinced about using Clinical Paradigm after listening to a speech by an 
American psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan, who is of Cypriot Turkish origin, when 
he presented his keynote address on “Large-Group Identity, Regression and 
Chosen Trauma” in June 2010 at the Annual Meeting of the International Society 
for the Psychoanalytic Study of Organizations (ISPSO) in Helsinger, Denmark.  
 
The goal of applying clinical paradigm is to help people to revisit past 
experiences and to become more aware of their choices and how they 
behave in the here-and-now. It is essential for healthy functioning that we 
do not remain strangers to ourselves. We need to free ourselves from the 
bonds of the past-experience to be able to explore new challenges in life. 
  
 (Kets de Vries, 2011b, p. 86). 
  
It is with this aim that I concluded that I would understand the Malay mind better 
through the lens of Clinical Paradigm. 
 
 7.2 What is Clinical Paradigm?  
 
Clinical Paradigm is a concept grounded in not taking-for-granted what is directly 
observable. Based on the findings of clinical research on human behaviour as its 
conceptual base, Clinical Paradigm helps in understanding all forms of behaviour 
however irrational these may appear to be. Clinical Paradigm uses concepts from 
psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, developmental psychology, family systems 
theory and cognition to understand people. Often behaviour concepts used to 
describe processes such as individual motivation, leadership, interpersonal 
relationships, collusive behaviour, group and inter-group processes and 
transformation are based on behaviourist-models, with a sparingly small dose of 
humanistic psychology thrown in the equation for good measure (Kets de Vries & 
Engellau, 2008).  While this approach has its merits, unfortunately it is 
insufficient to untangle the knotty problems we encounter in the organisational 
world (Kets de Vries & Engellau, 2008). This approach is described as a two-
dimensional way of looking at the world of work by Kets de Vries (2002).  
 
Far too many people – both in business and politics, including scholars – often 
are firm believers that behaviour of human beings concerns only conscious, 
mechanistic, predictable, easy-to-understand phenomena.  
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“The more elusive processes that take place in organizations…phenomena that 
deserve rich description are conveniently ignored.” (Kets de Vries & Engellau, 
2008, p. 4).  
 
Over the years, Kets de Vries has conducted extensive research on Clinical 
Paradigm which he says consists of five premises which are briefly described as 
follows: 
 
a)  Perception isn’t reality. 
 
The world around us is more complex than it looks to be on the surface. 
Much of what happens is beyond conscious awareness. The traditional 
approach to leadership development tends to focus only on objective 
elements that are clearly visible. The clinical paradigm on the other hand, 
explores and identifies what lies below the surface. We can draw on the 
analogy using the iceberg. The traditional approach only sees what is above 
the surface, whereas the clinical approach identifies that which is hidden, 
making the subjective side of people visible.  
 
The Clinical Paradigm is therefore based on out-of-awareness and 
unconscious motivation which refers to aspects of each person’s character 
that are outside of conscious awareness. Many people though, are 
uncomfortable with this premise as most people want to be in complete 
control of their thoughts and actions. A lack of awareness on aspects of one’s 
personality is disturbing and often perceived as a weakness. Whether we like 
it or not, some of the things individuals do and process, are outside their 
conscious awareness (Kets de Vries, 2009a). And as rightly pointed out by 
Brown (1985) who says that there is one word which if we only understand 
it, is the key to Freud’s thought –“repression”. The whole edifice of 
psychoanalysis is based upon the theory of repression. Brown (1985) further 
mentions that: 
  
…the crux of Freud’s discovery is that…..dreams and errors of 
everyday life, do have meaning….Since the purport of these purposive 
expressions is generally unknown to the person whose purpose they 
express, Freud is driven to embrace the paradox that there are, in a 
human being, purposes of which he knows nothing, involuntary 
purposes, or in more technical Freudian language, “unconscious 
ideas.” From this point of view a new world of psychic reality is 
opened up, of whose inner nature we are every bit as ignorant as we 
are of the reality of the external world, and of which our ordinary 
conscious observation tells us no more than our sense organs are 
able to report to us of the external world. (p. 4). 
  
b)  A rationale can be found within every irrationality. 
 
All human behaviour even in its oddest or most deviant forms has a rational 
explanation. Under this premise, we need to acknowledge and deal with the 
 272 
concept that people are not always a paradigm of rationality. We experience 
in our daily lives that even well-intentioned plans and well-thought-out plans 
could derail. This is because of out-of-awareness forces that influence 
behaviour. The boiling cauldron of diverse motivational needs that is the 
human unconscious takes whatever outlet it can find – even if that means 
sabotaging a plan. Our unconsciousness therefore plays a tremendous role in 
determining our actions, thoughts, fantasies, hopes and fears. The areas 
outside our direct rational observation and understanding are enormous, 
although they have a direct impact on what happens in the so-called rational 
domain of our actions. Unless some attempt at least is made to grasp the 
context of our irrational domain, it is unlikely that we can do anything with 
it. Unconscious can hold people as prisoners of their own past, not letting 
them get rid of things that become a hindrance to their development and 
growth as leaders and human beings. (Kets de Vries, 2001a). 
 
Volkan (2006a) also supports the view that not every human action is 
resultant of rationality: “As a psychoanalyst I must accept that in large-
groups often our mind functions in a more “primitive” way than many wish 
to acknowledge. Political scientists, on the other hand, seem to assume when 
it comes to modern diplomacy, we function in a far more “civilized” manner 
where rationality is dominant.” (p. 190).  
 
Observations that are critical in understanding human action as seen by 
Sigmund Freud are the linkages between many aspects of the human psyche 
which he termed as ‘linkages between reason and irrationality’. For example, 
he recognised continuity between childish and adult behaviour, between 
waking and sleeping thought, and between health and pathology. 
 
If we acknowledge these continuities and have the patience to follow their 
winding trail, we would understand all forms of behaviour, even that which 
appears irrational.  If we do not understand a particular behaviour pattern in 
ourselves or others, we can try to determine its origins. In this research for 
example, we try to determine the origins or context for understanding the 
behaviour pattern of why the Malays are not successful in business in spite of 
repeated government attempts to help them. If we can gather enough 
background and contextual information, even the most incomprehensible 
behaviour makes sense.    
 
c)  We are influenced by our basic human needs and emotions. 
 
Our emotions can be said to contribute to our identity and behaviour. 
Throughout our life we acquire different ways of expressing and regulating 
emotion and in parallel; our cognitive thinking side becomes sophisticated. 
Cognition and emotion together eventually determine what we do and what 
we don’t do i.e., our behaviour. By exploring our emotions we can access the 
more hidden parts of our identity: the type of emotion we express when 
doing certain things, imagining certain events or dealing with certain people 
explains in part, who we are. Emotional awareness also allows us to predict 
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what kind of situations we naturally seek or avoid, and what kind of people 
we prefer or loathe (Kets de Vries, Korotov & Florent-Treacy, 2007).  
 
d)  We are all products of our past and past is the lens through which we can 
understand the present and shape the future. 
 
All of us are nothing more than a developmental outcome of our early 
environment modified by our genetic endowment. Essentially, our past 
determines significantly who we are throughout our lives. Our earliest life 
experience over which we obviously have no control of, have a deep lasting 
impact on our personality and the patterns of our behaviour and relationships. 
  
Through early interactions with significant people in our lives; essentially our 
caretakers, we develop patterns of responses to the actions, desires and 
emotions of others. These responses become engrained in us and last until we 
die. These responses, however, though they work in those early situations, 
may no longer be adequate or appropriate later in life (Kets de Vries, 2001a, 
2006).  
 
e)  We all have blind spots. 
 
There are many things we do not want to know about ourselves. We all have 
a shadow or dark side. To avoid problematic aspects of our experiences, we 
resort to defensive processes and resistances. Many people get derailed due 
to the blind spots in their personality. Exploring the avoidance of distressing 
thoughts and feelings gives us another snapshot of our own personality and 
that of others. These resistances come to the fore because of conflicts within 
ourselves. We need to accept that inner dissonance is part of the human 
condition (Kets de Vries, 2011b, p. 84-85). 
 
Clinical Paradigm can be described metaphorically as a way of exploring a 
person’s “inner theatre”. Behind the curtain, all of us have rich tragic-comedy 
playing out on our inner stage, with key actors representing the people we have 
loved and hated, feared and admired. Our early experiences are re-enacted over 
and over again. Some are extremely painful and others fill us with a sense of 
wellbeing. These unconscious forces affect not only love, friendship and certain 
artistic expression but also patterns of relationships with people we encounter in 
our daily lives (bosses, colleagues, and subordinates; management styles; 
decision-making; and many other aspects of the work-related parts of life). 
Dysfunctional behaviour arises when we try to keep the curtain closed (Kets de 
Vries, 2001, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Kets de Vries & Engellau, 2008 ; Kets de 
Vries, Guillen, Korotov, Florent-Treacy, 2010; Kets de Vries, Korotov, Florent-
Treacy, 2007; Kets de Vries, Shekshnia, Korotov & Florent-Treacy, 2004).   
 
7.3 Acculturation and intercultural relations in the Malay context 
 
Three approaches to the study of personality in its cultural context can be 
distinguished: the cultural-comparative, or etic approach; the indigenous, or emic 
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approach; and the approach that combines elements of both etic and emic studies 
(Cheung, Van de Vijver & Leong, 2011, p.593). This study is consciously 
undertaken primarily based on the emic approach. However, in Chapter 3 where 
the four cultural models are discussed as well as in Chapter 6 where the 360-
degree feedback instruments make comparisons between the Malays and others, 
the research shifts to the etic approach in a limited way. 
 
According to Berry et al (2002), the terms ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ were coined by Pike 
(1967) in analogy with phonetics and phonemics. In the field of linguistics, 
phonetics refers to the study of general aspects of vocal sounds and sounds 
production; phonemics is the study of the sounds used in a particular language. 
Emic and etic are said to be the two dominant ways of looking at the interaction 
of personality and culture.  
 
One way is to compare measures of personality across cultures. Such studies 
which make comparisons are called ‘etic’ studies. The goal of such studies is to 
address the universality of established Western personality models by examining 
the level of cross-cultural invariance of the personality structure. The second 
method to look at personality and culture is through in-depth analyses of 
personality in a specific cultural context, called the ‘emic’ studies (Cheung et.al 
2011). 
  
The following table provides the emic and etic approaches:  
 
Table 38: The emic and etic approaches 
 
 
Many qualitative researchers are of the opinion that behaviour in its full 
complexity can only be understood within the context of culture in which it 
occurs. In the emic approach an attempt is made to look at phenomena and their 
interrelationships (structure) through the eyes of the people native to a particular 
culture, avoiding the imposition of a priori notions and ideas from the 
researcher’s own culture (if he is from a different background) on the people 
studied. This point of view Berry et al (2002) say, finds its origins in cultural 
anthropology where via the method of participant observation, the researcher tries 
to look at norms, values, motives and customs of the members of a particular 
community in their own terms. This is what this research has attempted to do. 
Except for the views on the Malays from foreigners’ perspectives provided in 
Chapter 3, “The Inner Theatre of the Malays” (which had to be included because 
 275 
of scarcity of literature written by Malays during the historical era except for 
Abdullah), this research almost entirely takes an emic approach.  
 
As Berry et al (2001) have rightly observed “the danger of an etic approach is that 
the concepts and notions of researchers are rooted in and influenced by their 
cultural background. They are working with “imposed” etics (Berry, 1969, p. 
124), or “pseudo” etics (Triandis, Malpass & Davidson, 1972, p. 6)” (p. 291).  
 
Rather than the etic or cultural comparative approach; emic or indigenous 
approach; Cheung et al (2011) proposed a third approach which they label as the 
combined emic-etic approach “…for advancing our understanding of personality 
in a culturally inclusive and integrative model…” (p. 593). 
 
For a multi-cultural and multi-religious country like Malaysia this combined 
approach will be useful provided there is ample literature available on the emic 
approach. Then, the next step could be to advance to a combined approach.  
 
These three approaches are quite similar to the three approaches identified by 
Berry et al (2002). The first two approaches to understanding how culture and 
behaviour may be related are cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology. 
The third perspective that is being recommended by Berry et al and useful in the 
Malaysian context for future research is that of inter-cultural psychology. Based 
on their view that “intercultural work in plural societies differs from the cross-
cultural and cultural perspectives” (p. 345), they have developed a detailed 
concept derived from anthropology and call it acculturation. Acculturation is 
suitable for the Malaysian context where a culturally plural society in which a 
number of different cultural groups reside together within a shared social and 
political framework (Skelton & Alten, 1999 in Berry et al, 2002, p. 346). Future 
research in Malaysia involving the different races could be based on this 
approach.  
 
7.4 Tracing the origins of the Malay problem 
 
Taking the cue from one of the premises of the clinical paradigm that we are all 
products of our past, I started my search to trace the Malay problem from the 
early history of the Malays. Although the premise that we are all products of our 
past is meant at an individual level, it may also be hypothesised true at societal 
level as we shall see in this chapter.  
 
As I was going through the history of the Malays from the establishment of the 
Malacca Sultanate, I discovered that several writers had described the Malays as 
facing immense pressure and were depressed as a race. I have provided a broad 
picture of the Malay situation since the founding of Malacca Sultanate in the 
1400s to the time when Hikayat Abdullah was finished in 1843 but published 
only around 1874, and their subsequent position until the attainment of merdeka. 
The essence of the Malay situation from 1400s to 1969 is recapitulated below: 
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 The Malay civilisation is fairly young in historical terms, as its surviving 
written history is only about six hundred years old beginning with the 
founding of the Malacca Sultanate in the early 1400s.  
 
 Between 1511 and 1957 when the Federation of Malaya was granted 
independence, for more than 450 years, the Malays were under the control 
of foreigners – the Portuguese (1511-1640), the Dutch (1640-1795) and 
finally the British (1795-1957).  
 
 Malays were divided broadly into two classes – the upper class which 
included the royalty, aristocracy, nobility, and the lower class which 
comprised the Malay commoner, classified as either the freeman or the 
slave. The common Malay was hardly involved in commerce or trade. It 
was the prerogative of only the upper class at the pleasure of the Sultan.  
 
 The Malay ruling class was a willing and collusive partner whenever 
foreigners took control of the Malay states except for the first conquest of 
Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511. The common Malays were as 
neglected under the foreign control as they were under the Malay rulers.  
 
Both past and contemporary writers identified some form of psychological 
problems with the Malays, which are quoted as follows:  
 
According to Raffles (1835), the Malays did not achieve a high intellectual stage 
of development. “From the comparative rude and uncivilized character of the 
Malay nation, learned disquisition is not to be looked for but simple ideas, simply 
expressed, may illustrate character better than scientific or refined composition” 
(Alatas, 1977, p.38).  
  
Alatas (1977) also mentions of one John Crawford, a British resident at the court 
of the Sultan of Java, who like Raffles also endorsed the sociological explanation 
of what he considered as the intellectual backwardness of the Malay and 
Indonesian peoples.  
 
Clifford (1896): “Malays were as a whole, capable of developing a psycho-
pathological disorder called latah. In the state of latah, which can be elicited by 
any sudden noise, shock, or surprising command, the subject appears unable to 
realize his own identity, or to do anything but imitate, often accompanied by the 
use of vulgar language. Anyone who attracts his attention can make him do any 
action by simply feigning it. The condition can last for hours until the subject 
drops down in exhaustion, after which recovery to normal consciousness takes 
place. Only adults are known to have such a disorder.”  
 
Clifford concluded that any Malay is capable of developing into a typical case of 
latah if he is sufficiently persecuted, teased and harassed (Alatas, 1977, p. 48). 
  
Clifford has described Malays as capable of developing a psychopathological 
disorder. To that extent, his observations could be taken as correct. But Clifford 
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himself is no psychologist. Therefore, whether the Malays only suffered from 
latah or had some other problems is difficult to be analysed at that point of time 
in history. Only on hindsight we are able to associate the Malay psychological 
problem with large-group regression using the psychoanalytic approach.  
 
Clifford sympathised with the Malays thus:  
 
What we are really attempting, however, is nothing less than to crush into 
twenty years the revolutions in facts and ideas which, even in energetic 
Europe, six long centuries have been needed to accomplish. No one will, 
of course, be found to dispute that the strides made in our knowledge of 
the art of government, since the thirteenth century, are prodigious and 
vast, nor that general condition of the people of Europe has been 
immensely improved since that day; but, nevertheless, one cannot but 
sympathize with the Malays, who are suddenly and violently translated 
from the point to which they had attained in the natural development of 
their race, and are required to live up to the standards of a people who 
are six centuries in advance of them in national progress. If a plant is 
made to blossom or bear fruit three months before its time, it is regarded 
as a triumph of the gardener’s art; but what, then, are we to say of this 
huge moral-forcing system which we call “Protection”? Forced plants, 
we know, suffer in the process and the Malays, whose proper place is 
amidst the conditions of the thirteenth century, is apt to become morally 
weak and seedy, and to lose something of his robust self-respect, when he 
is forced to bear nineteenth century fruit. (Alatas, 1977, p. 46).  
 
Alatas (1977) says: “The impact of British rule on traditional Malay society with 
its negative as well as positive traits, as an explanation of the change in Malay 
character, is one which derives much support from sociological and 
anthropological analysis.”  
 
In addition to citing the phenomenon, Clifford stressed the need to understand 
Malays by viewing matters from their standpoint, an attitude which he considered 
as “the common European inability” (pp. 46-47). 
 
Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (circa 1843): The point had been reached at which 
their hearts had become like soil which no longer receives its nourishment, and 
wherein therefore nothing at all can grow. Industry, intelligence and learning 
cannot flourish among them and they are simply like trees in the jungle falling 
whichever way the wind blows. I noticed that they were always ruled by men of 
other races, small fry whose only value it is to provide food for the big fry. (p. 
310, as translated by A.H. Hill, 1969).  
 
Dr Mahathir (1970) also explains elaborately on the Malay psychological 
problems that drive a Malay to a constant internal struggle and restraint which is 
unnatural. Because of the constant internal struggle, the Malay begins to 
withdraw to himself and his race. It is difficult for a Malay to be frank especially 
in a situation where he has to disagree with someone from outside his community 
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and race. He is only frank with those whose sympathy he can rely on absolutely. 
And he feels he can only rely on his own people absolutely. Because his natural 
tendency is not to displease people, his opinions as expressed to those not of his 
own kind would be different from those expressed to his own kind. This is so 
only in instances when what he has to express to others is unpleasant or 
unpalatable. When his true opinion does not create any unpleasantness or 
animosity, he is frank with everyone. In other words, the Malay by nature is 
overly concerned with hurting the feelings of others especially those of other 
races. So he resorts to suppressing his true feelings when he has to disagree with 
or object to actions of others he does not approve of. It is therefore fallacious to 
accept the Malay at face value. To understand a Malay truly, one has to pay 
careful attention to his politeness and abhorrence of unpleasantness. Situations 
where he is unable to openly display his displeasure or disagreement create an 
internal conflict within him which is potentially dangerous. It is perpetually 
seeking expression.  
 
‘Amok’ is a Malay word which is now universally understood and there is no 
other single word that can quite describe amok. Amok describes yet another facet 
of the Malay character. Amok represents the external physical expression of the 
conflict within the Malay which his perpetual observance of the rules and 
regulations of his life causes in him. It is a spilling over; an overflowing of his 
inner bitterness. When a Malay reaches a stage of amok, “it is the rupture of the 
bonds which bind him. It is a final and complete escape from reason and training. 
The strain and restraint on him is lifted. Responsibility disappears. Nothing 
matters. He is free. The link with the past is severed, and the future holds nothing 
more. Only the present matters. To use a hackneyed expression; he sees red. In a 
trance he lashes out – indiscriminately. His timid self-effacing self is displaced. 
He is now a Mr Hyde – cruel, callous and bent on destruction. But the transition 
from the self-effacing courteous Malay to the amok is always a slow process. It is 
so slow that it may never come about at all. He may go to the grave before the 
turmoil in him explodes” (Dr Mahathir, 1970, pp. 117-118).  
 
Today amok is rather uncommon as the Malay has learnt with civilization to be 
able to better control it. But it still remains latent and is an essential part of his 
make-up, a basic part of his character.  
 
Dr Mahathir explains that his examination of certain aspects of the Malay 
character is merely to illustrate that the Malay problem is more explosive than the 
evidence seems to indicate. It is to drive home the point on the peculiarity of the 
Malays in suppressing their discontent.  
 
We can now understand why, throughout history, the Malays appear to be 
contended to step further and further into the background. They gave up 
apparently, politely, almost every vestige of power and authority in their 
own land. (Dr Mahathir, 1970, p. 118).   
 
Dr Noordin Sopiee, the former Chairman and Chief Executives Officer of 
Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) from 1997 to 
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2005, believes that four hundred years of external or colonial rule created a sense 
of powerlessness, “psychologically crippling” Malays who used to be “in awe of 
the many feats achieved by their colonial master, the British, and even the New 
Zealanders who became the first people to encounter Mt. Everest (as quoted in 
Kennedy, 2002, p. 19). 
 
My aim to use the Clinical Paradigm to understand the Malay mind was purely as 
a result of the admission by Dr Mahathir of the government’s failure in achieving 
the NEP targets. “The government has implemented the NEP and made other 
efforts to ensure the meaningful participation of Malays. Unfortunately, after 
trying for more than thirty years, we have yet to own 30% of the country’s wealth 
as outlined in the NEP… After 43 years of struggling, after allocating billions of 
ringgit, after establishing several banks and a variety of funds, the achievement of 
the Malays today in trade and industry is still below expectation” (Dr Mahathir, 
2001, p. 23).  
 
When I was reading the historical and contemporary writings about Malays after I 
had started my research and stumbled upon the Malay psychological issues raised 
even as early as in the nineteenth century by Abdullah, Clifford and Raffles and 
similar arguments by contemporary writers such as Dr Mahathir, Alatas and 
Sopiee, it appeared to me that I was on the right track and my decision to use the 
clinical lens to get a better understanding of the Malays was a step in the right 
direction. 
           
After combing through the literature on the Malays and using the four cultural 
models, it was concluded in Chapter 3 (“The Inner Theatre of the Malays”) that 
feudalism and colonialism (including the influx of foreign immigrants) were the 
two main sources of the Malay psychological problems. Let us first look at these 
problems through the clinical lens and then try to address the other issues raised 
by the focus groups and expert panel members. 
 
7.5 The problems of the Malays as a race 
 
In Chapter 4, we saw that it is possible to apply the psychoanalytic lens to study 
large groups.  
 
Having established that I could study the Malay behaviour through this method, I 
was searching for the right lead to provide me with the impetus to undertake the 
study. Although vast literature was available, most studies and researches in 
psychoanalysis focused on individuals and groups in an organisational or 
therapeutic setting. Although I was introduced to Volkan’s works, I discovered 
that there was not much literature at societal, ethnic or national levels, and I had a 
feeling of ‘being stuck’ until I heard Volkan. The whole experience energised me 
and I realised that the ‘feeling stuck’, understood as the manifestation of an 
impasse carrying a negative connotation (much like in everyday language), 
needed to be worked at as a roadblock to overcome. As explained by Petriglieri 
(2007), normally, “stuckness” may constitute a developmental opportunity. I felt 
that using Volkan’s theory of large-group offered me a developmental 
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opportunity, both for me personally and for my research, and perhaps ultimately 
for the Malay society as a whole. 
  
The ‘aha’ moment and what convinced me that I was pursuing the right course 
was the psychoanalytic conference in June 2010 which I attended.  I had heard 
Volkan’s delivery of his keynote address on “Large-Group Identity, Regression 
and Chosen Trauma”, and I came away from the conference feeling very strongly 
that the Malay situation could be better understood using Volkan’s 
psychoanalytical concepts and themes. 
 
So far we have established – based on the writings of Abdullah (1874); Alatas 
(1977); Clifford (1896); Dr Mahathir (1970); Raffles (1835) and Sopiee (2002) 
that the Malays indeed have, as a race, some psychological problems. In order to 
understand the nature of the problem, I propose to use Volkan’s “Large-Group 
Identity and Chosen Trauma” (2005) and apply it to the Malay situation. First, in 
order to appreciate the problem at hand, it is appropriate that we understand or 
grasp the terminologies of: 
 
a) Large-group identity; 
b) Large-group regression; 
c) Chosen glory; 
d) Chosen trauma; 
e) Time collapse; 
f) Tent analogy; and 
g) Transgenerational transmission 
 
a)  Large-group identity 
 
“One’s large-group identity (i.e. ethnic, national or religious) is intimately 
connected with one’s core personal identity. Unlike character and personality, 
which are observed and perceived by others, identity refers to an individual’s 
inner working model – he or she not an outsider, senses and experiences it” 
(Volkan, 1999a, p. 460).  
 
Erikson (1956), a psychoanalyst who focused on identity described it as “a 
persistent sameness within oneself… [and] a persistent sharing of some kind of 
essential character with others” (p. 57).  
 
In everyday life an adult individual can typically identify numerous aspects of his 
or her identity related to social or professional status – one may simultaneously 
perceive oneself as a mother or father, a physician or anthropologist – or someone 
who enjoys specific sports or recreational activities. These facets of identity may 
also fit with Erikson’s definition. But Volkan (1999b) does not believe that such 
specific manifestations of what we perceive as our unique identity truly reflect a 
sense of persistent sameness within oneself in psychoanalytic terms. If a person’s 
social or career identity is threatened, the individual may or may not experience 
anxiety. “Anxiety is more likely to occur if the threat is connected, most 
unconsciously, to the four internal danger signals originally described by  
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Freud (10); losing a loved one (mother); or her love, a body part – (castration) or 
self-esteem” (Volkan, 1999a, p. 459). 
 
“Identity which individuals are terrified of losing and are driven to replace – 
differentiates it from other social or profession related (sub)identities, is 
individual identity otherwise also called core identity. Not to have a core identity, 
a subjective experience of persistent inner sameness is intolerable” (p. 459). 
Volkan (2004) equates it to “psychological death” (p. 33).  
 
Following Erikson’s description of individual identity, Volkan (1999b) defines 
“large-group identity whether it refers to religion, nationality or ethnicity – as the 
subjective experience of thousands of millions of people who are linked by a 
persistent sense of sameness while also sharing numerous characteristics with 
others in foreign groups…The individual’s core identity is intimately connected 
with his or her large-group identity.   
 
Both the individual and group facets of core identity evolve in childhood, become 
intertwined and crystallized during the adolescent passage (Volkan, 1988, 1997, 
1998) and become the fabric of one’s adult perception and experience of oneself. 
Therefore, serious threats to large-group identity are perceived by members of 
that large group as if they are individually wounded and in danger; they may 
induce a collective response of anxiety and dread and shared defenses (mostly 
primitive ones such as introjections, projection and splitting
34
  against the 
fragmentation of the self” (p. 32-33).  
 
“Because of clinical interests, psychoanalysts have focused more on small groups 
and the psychodynamics involved when seven to fifteen individuals gather for a 
series of meetings. Wilfred Bion’s20 35 work is among the best known of such 
studies. A “small group” with a definite leader, a structured task, and an 
awareness of time evolves as a “work group” and performs its task with an 
adaptation to reality. Bion describes how, when such a group’s security is 
threatened or when it is not given a realistic and structured task, it begins to 
function according to certain “basic assumptions” which are familiar to 
psychoanalysts.” (For further reading on Bion’s work on groups, refer to 
Experiences in Groups and other papers by W.R. Bion 2009).  
 
In the psychoanalytic literature the term “large group” often refers to 30 to 150 
members who meet in order to deal with a given issue… I refer to tens, hundreds 
of thousands or millions of individuals – most of who will never meet during 
their lifetimes – who belong to a large-group from childhood on. I use the term 
large-group identity (i.e. an ethnic identity) to refer to a shared permanent sense 
of sameness.  
 
                                                 
34
  For explanation of these terms, please refer to Appendix 10 
 
35
  Wilfred Bion’s20  The footnote attributed to Bion is an extract from Volkan’s. 
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The psychodynamics of ethnic, national, religious or ideological large groups are 
different from the psychodynamics of “small groups, “large groups” (composed 
of 30 or 150 individuals or “crowds”. For example, a “crowd” in a football 
stadium becomes “basic assumptions” of a group and remains so, just before, 
during and perhaps soon after the sports event. On the other hand, let us consider 
an ethnic or religious large group, like Greeks or Catholics. The membership in 
these large groups begins in childhood” (Volkan, 2006b, p. 3-4).  
 
 Seven “threads” composing large-group identity 
 
Volkan (2004) identified seven threads that, when woven together compose large-
group identity. Briefly the seven “threads” are described in the table below.  
 
Table 39: Seven threads composing large-group identity 
 
Thread Description 
1. Shared, tangible 
reservoirs for images 
associated with positive 
emotion 
The first thread is woven into the core of the individual quite 
early in life through contact with the external world. Both 
individual and large-group identity begin to form in earnest at 
around 36 months of age when the child has accomplished the 
task of integrating his or her sense of self. In this process some 
images of the self and others (“objects”), both “good” 
(associated with the child’s own sense of peak pleasure) and 
“bad” (associated with his or her sense of peak aggression) 
remain un-integrated and the child must develop ways of 
coping with the thread that may destabilise the child’s recently 
established core identity. 
 
Among the various psychological mechanisms children 
employ for this purpose, externalization (an early form of the 
more familiar mechanism of projection, or putting unwanted 
images from one’s own mind onto outside objects) is both 
critical and ubiquitous. An example would be when a child 
falls down and does not want to be thought clumsy; the child 
says, “I did not fall down; it was my doll that fell.” This child 
has externalised his or her injured self-image onto the doll, and 
the doll thus becomes a reservoir for some component of the 
child’s own image. This process is simply a part of personal 
development experience, formally mutable and changing 
frequently. (Volkan, 2004, pp. 37-38). 
2. Shared “good” 
identifications 
“Shared reservoirs are closely related to the second thread of 
which the cloth of large-group identity is woven. 
Identifications with individuals in the immediate environment 
who belong to the specific religious, ethnic, or national groups 
also play a significant role in incorporating elements of large-
group identity into each child’s personal core identity. Robert 
Emde’s study on the evolution of the infant mind suggests the 
existence of a psychobiological potential for “we-ness” and 
group-related behavior. Because the environment of an infant 
or a young child is restricted to parents, siblings, relatives and 
family friends, the extent of “we-ness” in infancy does not 
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directly include a dimension of large-group identity. The adults 
in any child’s environment do, obviously, belong to specific 
large-groups. But the infant or young child, mentally unready 
to comprehend large-group affiliation or to differentiate any 
one such affiliation from any other with which it has no 
intimate contact, identifies with whatever he or she sees, 
touches, hears, smells, experiences; because the child identifies 
with his or her caretakers as individuals, he or she comes to 
identify with the specific set of cultural practices –including, 
especially, the language – that the caretakers observe and share 
with others outside the child’s immediate surroundings.” 
(Volkan, 2004, pp. 40-41) 
 
“Over time, individual children within a large group tend to 
acquire inclinations and capacities shared by all children in that 
group: the same language, similar food preferences, and shared 
nursery rhymes, songs and dances. During the Oedipal phase 
of life –as well as during latter phases – more sophisticated 
identifications enlarge the child’s mental life and his or her 
associations with large-group identity. Especially in 
adolescence, identifications with teachers, religious authorities, 
peer groups, and community and large-group leaders cultivate 
children’s investments in religion, ethnicity, and nationality 
and nurture their sense of differentiation from those who are 
unlike the group and/or inimical to it.”  (Volkan, 2004, p. 41) 
3. Absorption of others’ 
“bad” qualities 
“Although the two “threads” we have examined so far link an 
individual’s personal core identity with his or her primary 
large-group identity, a group’s identity never exists in a 
vacuum – it always adjoins the identity of another group. Thus 
the third thread in the canvas of an ethnic, racial, national, or 
religious identity is produced by the interactions between two 
neighboring groups. Like a child who identifies with the way 
his or her mother (mostly unconsciously) perceives him or her, 
members of a large group may themselves weave into the 
fabric of their shared identity a thread originally placed there 
by a dominant opposing group. In order to understand this third 
thread, picture two large-group tents side-by-side. Individuals 
in the first tent throw mud, excrement, and refuse – that is, 
externalize their “bad” images of themselves and others and 
project their own unwanted thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and 
expectation –onto the canvas of the second tent. For example, a 
child of Polish-Jewish peasant origins living in America, far 
from the dangers of the old anti-Semitic world, is taught to spit 
three times when passing a Catholic Church: “This may be 
dismissed simply as target of externalization. It is easier to give 
up targets of externalization in an atmosphere of comparative 
safety, but memories of them linger on.” 
 
If the individuals in the first tent dominate those in the second, 
and if their externalization and projections are backed by 
economic or other physical force, what they throw onto the 
second tent to some extent saturates its fabric and is absorbed 
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into the existing threads of the second group’s identity. That is, 
the negative externalization and projection may evolve as a 
permanent part of the subjugated group’s identity; because the 
“stain” is composed of “bad” or undesirable elements 
originally belonging to the dominant group, the recipient group 
may experience anxiety over this large-group marker and may 
develop defensive signs and symptoms to conceal it.” (Volkan, 
2004, p.44) 
4. Absorption of 
(revolutionary or 
transforming) leaders’ 
internal worlds 
“The fourth thread is woven into the cloth of large-group 
identity by certain types of leaders. A “transforming” or 
“charismatic” leader, such as Vladimir Lenin, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Mao Tse-tung, and, most recently, Osama bin Laden, 
brings hundreds of thousands or millions of people out of 
political isolation and into a new kind of political participation, 
which can either be adaptive or destructive. Such leaders often 
do something else as well: driven to meet the requirements of 
their own internal worlds, they reshape the external world and 
the psychosocial and political identity of their large group. In 
order for large-group identity to bend to the psychic 
organization of its leader in this way, however, the large group 
must be in a state of what psychoanalysis terms “regression.” 
 
“Transforming or charismatic leaders reflect the group’s 
sentiments in the opinions that they express, their public 
appearances, the speeches that they deliver, their avowed likes 
and dislikes, and even the way that they dress. Combined with 
externalizing and projecting aspects of their personal 
psychologies, these elements influence followers; create new 
political ideologies; inflame or tame religious, national, or 
ethnic sentiments; and sometimes create “new” or modified 
suitable reservoirs for externalization.” (Volkan, 2004, p. 46) 
5. Chosen glories The mental representation of a historical event that induces 
feelings of success and triumph is defined as a “chosen glory” 
which can bring members of a large group together. Usually 
such triumphs are deserved victories over another group. The 
adjective “deserved” is necessary here because some events 
that may at first seem triumphs are later seen as humiliating. 
(Nazi Germany’s “triumphs”, for instance, were perceived as a 
criminal by most of the succeeding generations of Germans). 
Chosen glories are reactivated as a way to bolster a group’s 
self-esteem….they become heavily mythologized over time. 
(Volkan, 1997, p. 81). “Chosen glories” is further described 
later in this chapter. 
6. Chosen traumas “Chosen trauma” is described as the collective memory of a 
calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors. It is, of course, 
more than a simple recollection; it is a shared mental 
representation of the event, which includes realistic 
information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and 
defenses against unacceptable thoughts (Volkan, 1997, p. 48). 
“Chosen traumas” is further described later in this chapter. 
7. Formation of symbols that 
develop their own 
“The seventh thread of a group’s identity is the symbol that 
functions to tie together some or all of the other threads. 
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autonomy Though such a symbol may originally stand for any one of the 
six threads already described, it eventually develops its own 
autonomy as a component of the large-group tent. Before we 
observe how symbols function as part of the fabric of large-
group identity, however, let us review briefly the classical 
psychoanalytic understanding of the symbol more generally. In 
everyday life, certain symbols – such as the red octagon that 
symbolizes “stop” – function on the force of convention. In 
psychoanalysis, the concept of a symbol is rather narrower; 
psychoanalysis is most concerned with how and why symbols 
originate in an individual’s unconscious and function in his or 
her internal conflicts. Freud, in Interpretation of Dreams and 
many other subsequent writings, argued that symbols repress 
unacceptable wishes and ideas and therefore function to reduce 
anxiety; an individual is aware of the symbol itself, but 
unaware of what it symbolizes. If someone dreams of a snake, 
for instance, he or she actually sees an image of a snake, but 
does not consciously perceive the penis that the snake may 
represent. Initially, Freud believed that symbols representing 
body parts, body functions, birth, death, sexuality, and 
childhood intimate relationships with parents or siblings are 
universal, included in a kind of phylogenetic memory. This 
belief “has now been largely replaced by the assumption that 
recurrence of such symbols across cultures has to do with the 
similarity of human beings’ experience and interests from 
infancy onward and of the cognitive processes involved in 
symbol formation.”” (Volkan, 2004, pp. 52-53).  
 
“Large-group symbols tend to be unique, but when many 
groups deploy the same symbol, each tends to attach minor or 
major differences to it to specify the common object’s 
particular significance to that group.” (Volkan, 2004, p. 53). 
 
 
b) Large-group regression 
 
Large groups, like individuals, regress under shared stress; they fall back on 
primitive ways of behaving. They may see the environment as more dangerous 
than it is, while expecting others to be more powerful than they are. Freud’s 
explanation of the leader-follower relationship in the army or church is applicable 
to the study of the psychology of ethnic or national groups when they are 
threatened and regressed.  
 
When a large-group identity is threatened by various things such as the group’s 
enemies, the large group (i.e. ethnic, national or religious) regresses. When a 
majority of group members share certain anxieties, expectations, behaviours, 
thought patterns and actions, then the group is said to have regressed. Large-
group regression takes place after a society has faced a massive trauma – 
involving drastic loss of life, poverty, or prestige, and sometimes humiliation by 
another group (Volkan, 2004).  
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“When a regressed large group has a strong leader, the signs and symptoms of its 
regression expresses themselves differently than when there is no such leader. A 
strong leader and his or her entourage reinforces the group’s symptoms and may 
encourage the followers either to remain in a regressed state or to make attempts 
at progression. By contrast, when a large group without a leader becomes 
regressed, chaos ensues” (Volkan, 2004, p. 59).  
 
When we speak of large-group psychology, says Volkan (2004, p. 59), we cannot 
categorise societies as “primitive” or “advanced” according to their shared mental 
mechanisms. All large groups use shared “primitive” defence mechanisms 
regularly, just as all large groups are subjected to regression. When in regression, 
large groups will use certain shared thoughts, feelings, and activities to protect 
their large-group identity and differentiate their identity from the identity of 
“others”.  
 
As the psychoanalytic developmental model is universally applicable, any large 
group is subject to episodes of regression under certain historical conditions. 
Also, to be in a regressed state is not the natural or necessarily permanent state of 
any society or identity group. 
 
Psychoanalysts have identified certain signs and symptoms of this regression 
such as blind rallying around a leader, group members’ loss of individual identity 
and the development of a “shared morality” and the group’s increasingly 
primitive and absolutist belief system. The persons perceived to be in conflict 
with the group are labelled “them” (versus “us”) creating a sharp division 
between the group and the enemy.  
 
c) Chosen glories 
 
‘Chosen glories’ refers to the celebrations like Independence Day, and in 
Malaysia, events like Prophet Muhammad’s birthday and in India for example; 
Ghandi’s birthday etc. “All large groups have ritualistic recollections of events 
and heroes whose mental representations include a shared feeling of success and 
triumph among large-group members. Such events and persons appearing in them 
are heavily mythologised over time, and these mental representations become 
large-group markers called chosen glories. Chosen glories are passed on to 
succeeding generations through transgenerational transmissions made in 
parent/teacher-child interactions and through participation in ritualistic 
ceremonies recalling past successful events. Chosen glories link children of a 
large group with each other and with their large-group; and the children 
experience increased self-esteem by being associated with such glories. It is not 
difficult to understand why parents and other important adults pass the mental 
representations of chosen glories to their children; the mental representations of 
chosen glories are saturated with derivatives of the libidinal drive; it is 
pleasurable to share them with succeeding generations. 
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For example; each November, Americans celebrate Thanksgiving, a national 
holiday that commemorates a feast held by the European immigrants (Pilgrims) 
of the Plymouth settlement in Massachusetts after their first successful harvest in 
1621. Today, Thanksgiving is a celebration that focuses on the eating of special 
foods such as turkey and pumpkin pie and the commemoration of a wide range of 
things that Americans are thankful for. Some families invest the holiday with 
Christian religious significance, while others do not; some use the occasion to do 
charitable work while others primarily watch football on the television. But 
regardless of how the holiday is celebrated on an individual level, it is an 
effective ceremony marking American togetherness and group identity, and 
recalls the heroic achievements of American ancestors.  
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest however, that many of the notions that 
Americans believe to be the historical facts of the first years of Pilgrim life in 
North America, have been significantly altered or replaced by myths over the 
centuries (Furman, 1998). Thanksgiving thus represents a type of chosen glory 
that idealises the “birth” of the American nation. The Pilgrims were in fact brave 
pioneers, but some of their aspects have been exaggerated in popular history and 
culture so as to highlight and reaffirm the continuity of and commitment to 
certain core principles of American group identity. There are many other 
examples of chosen glories that include past victories in battle, or great 
accomplishments of a technological or artistic nature; virtually every large group 
has tales of glory associated with their creation. The shared importance of such 
events, whether recent or ancient, real or mythologised, helps to bind together the 
individuals in a group. 
 
In times of stress or warlike situations, leaders reactivate the mental 
representation of chosen glories to bolster their group’s identity. During the Gulf 
War, Saddam Hussein depended heavily on chosen glories and even associated 
himself with Sultan Saladin who had defeated the Christian crusaders in the 
twelfth century. Through the reactivation of a past event and a past hero, Saddam 
aimed to create the illusion that a similar triumphal destiny was awaiting his 
people and that, like Saladin, he was a hero. It did not matter to Saddam that 
Saladin was not an Arab, but a Kurd, and ruled from Egypt rather than Iraq.  
 
A leader’s reference to chosen glories excites his followers simply by stimulating 
an already-existing shared large-group marker. Although no complicated 
psychological processes are involved when chosen glories increase collective 
self-esteem, the role of a related concept, chosen traumas, in supporting large-
group identity and its cohesiveness is more complex” (Volkan, 1999b, pp. 45-46).  
   
d) Chosen traumas 
 
A ‘chosen trauma’ is “a large group’s mental representation of a historic event 
that resulted in a collective feeling of helplessness, victimization, shame, and 
humiliation at the hand of ‘others’ and typically involves drastic losses of people, 
land, prestige and dignity” (Volkan, 2006a, p.173).  
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“Understanding chosen trauma – the mental representation of an event that has 
caused a large group to face drastic losses, feel helpless and victimized by another 
group, and share a humiliating injury – is key to discerning the process of 
transgenerational transmission of past historical events” (Volkan, 1999a; Volkan 
& Itzkowitz, 1994). 
 
Although some have taken exception to the term “chosen trauma” since a group 
does not consciously choose to be victimised or suffer humiliation, Volkan 
believes that, like an individual, a large group can be said to make unconscious 
“choices”. Thus the term “chosen trauma” accurately reflects a large group’s 
unconscious “choice” to add a past generation’s mental representation of a shared 
event to its own identity. While large groups may have experienced any number 
of traumas in their history, only certain ones remain alive over many years – 
indeed, often over a period of centuries. The chosen trauma makes thousands and 
millions of people designated – “chosen – to be linked together through shared 
mental representation of that trauma. A chosen trauma reflects the traumatized 
past generation’s incapacity for or difficulty with mourning losses connected to 
the shared traumatic event as well its failure to reverse the injury of the group’s 
self-esteem (“narcissistic injury”) and humiliation inflicted by another large 
group, usually a geographic neighbor” (Volkan, 2005, pp. 5-6).   
 
e) Time collapse 
 
‘Time collapse’ is a term used by Volkan (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2005) “to denote 
the conscious and unconscious connections between past trauma and 
contemporary threat that typically emerge when a chosen trauma is drastically 
reactivated. The reactivation of shared anxieties, expectations, fantasies, and 
defenses associated with the chosen trauma naturally magnifies the image of the 
current enemies and current conflicts. If the large group is now in a powerful 
position, the sense of revenge may become exaggerated, even ennobled. If the 
large group is in a powerless position, a current event may reanimate a shared 
sense of victimization. Time collapse may lead to irrational and sadistic or 
masochistic decision-making by the leadership of a large group; in turn members 
of the large group may become psychologically prepared for the sadistic or 
masochistic acts, and, in the worst case scenario, perpetrate otherwise monstrous 
cruelty against others. The conscious and unconscious aim of such decisions and 
acts is to protect the group’s shared identity (Volkan et al 1998)” (Volkan, 2005, 
p. 7). 
 
The destruction of the Babri mosque in India several years ago is an example of 
such time-collapsed chosen trauma reactivation.  
 
f) Tent analogy 
 
In the course of his examination of large groups, Volkan has come up with an 
analogy of a large canvas tent which can be helpful for understanding of a large-
group identity (Volkan, 1992; 1997; 1998). 
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“Think in terms of learning to wear, from childhood onward, two layers of 
clothing. The first layer, which belongs to the individual who wears it, fits snugly. 
It is one’s core personal identity that provides an inner sense of sustained 
individual sameness. The second layer is a loose covering made of canvas of the 
large group’s tent, (the large-group identity) through which the person shares a 
persistent sense of sameness with others in the group – it provides comfort, 
belonging, and protection. But because both are worn every day, the individual 
hardly notices them under normal circumstances. At times of collective stress, 
however, such as an economic crisis, drastic political change, social upheaval, or 
war, the garment made of the tent canvas may take on greater importance, and 
individuals may collectively seek the protection of their large-group tent which is 
held erect by the group’s leader (the tent pole). This metaphor of a canvas tent is 
obviously not a psychoanalytic construction – it simply illustrates an idea.” 
(Volkan, 1999b, p. 36). 
 
g) Transgenerational transmission 
 
“…the phenomenon of transgenerational transmission is not just a theory, but 
actually is visible in human nature when studied under a psychoanalytic 
magnifying glass. Similar phenomena are also evident at the large group level 
through what I term as chosen trauma. A chosen trauma is a large group’s mental 
representation of a historic event that resulted in collective feelings of 
helplessness, victimisation, shame and humiliation at the hand of “others” and 
typically involves drastic losses of people, land, prestige and dignity…. 
 
….Members of a traumatized group deposit their injured selves, and internalised 
images of others who were hurt during the traumatic event, into developing selves 
of children in the next generation. These children are also given certain tasks, 
such as reversing helplessness, shame and humiliation, and turning passivity into 
activity and assertion. Another task that is passed to the next generation relates to 
completing the shared mourning process. 
 
When all these images of the historic event and the tasks associated with it are 
deposited into the next generation, it forms an invisible link among its 
individuals. If this next generation does not have the political, economic or 
military power to conduct its inherited tasks, they may end up transmitting the 
unassimilated images and unfinished tasks to the children of the generation that 
follows them. As decades and centuries go by, the large group unconsciously 
“chooses” to consider the mental representation of the ancestor’s traumatic event 
as a significant element in their contemporary large-group identity. Their chosen 
trauma symbolises their sense of we-ness…” (Volkan, 2006a, p. 173) 
 
7.6 Large-group identity in the Malay context 
 
We saw in the preceding section a broad brush description relating to Volkan’s 
theory of large-group identity. In this section, we shall look at the Malay position 
in the context of large-group identity. 
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In order to do that, we have to revert to Malay history and the founding of the 
Malacca Sultanate. In Chapter 3, I had provided a historical background about the 
Malays from the establishment of the Malacca Sultanate in the early 1400s and 
we saw how Malacca – which was a thriving and successful port – was conquered 
by the Portuguese in 1511.  This meant that the young Sultanate of just over a 
hundred years since its modern civilisation began, was colonised first by the 
Portuguese (1511-1640), then the Dutch (1640-1795), and finally, the British 
(1795-1957). The fall of the rich and thriving Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511 
marked the decline of the Malays. 
 
Alatas (1977) further adds, “As a matter of fact the Malays were the most 
harassed people. No region in South-East Asia had been attacked and occupied by 
so many forces from so many parts of the world. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the 
Siamese, had all attacked and occupied certain parts of the Malay Peninsula. We 
may also mention the attack of Acheh and Bugis raids” (p. 117). 
 
Within one hundred years of its existence, Malacca was described by Tome Pires, 
a Portuguese, as “of such importance and profit that it seems to me it has no equal 
in the world” (Andaya & Andaya, 1982, p.39).  “According to Duarte Barbosa the 
Portuguese found it “the richest sea-port with the greatest number of wholesale 
merchants and abundance of shipping that can be met in the whole world” 
(Winstedt, 1961, p. 37).  
 
Malacca’s great success and its honoured place in Malay history were not only 
due however, to its prosperity and renowned as a trading centre. Building upon an 
illustrious past, the pattern of government and lifestyle of the subsequent Malay 
kingdoms was based on Malacca’s traditions and customs (Andaya & Andaya, 
1982). Several writers (Hashim, 1992; Husin Ali, 2008; Khoo, 2001) have 
credited the Malacca Sultanate for the formal establishment of a set of traditions 
which form the basis of the “political culture” of the Peninsula Malays. Milner 
(2008) says any discussion of the ‘golden age’ in Malaysia is usually focused on 
Malacca and the Sultanate is presented as an inspiration for modern state builders, 
and a model of what ‘Malay’ people can achieve. Based on the references above, 
we could reasonably conclude that what Volkan (2006b) refers to as the ‘chosen 
glory’ in the case of the Malays, was their ‘golden age’ from the 1400s to 1511. 
   
One could imagine the psychological shattering of the Malays when their thriving 
kingdom was conquered by the Portuguese. This conquest then marks the 
beginning of the ‘chosen trauma’ of the Malays. Under the section describing 
“chosen trauma” earlier, we saw Volkan’s definition of chosen trauma as “a large 
group’s mental representation of an historic event that resulted in a collective 
feeling of helplessness, victimization, shame and humiliation at the hand of 
‘others’ and typically involves drastic losses of people, land, prestige and dignity” 
(Volkan, 2006a, p. 173).   
 
Since the fall of Malacca in 1511 until the British granted Malaya its merdeka in 
1957, Malays have been under foreign rule for a period of about 450 years. This 
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“drastic loss of land, prestige and dignity” must have been a severe blow to the 
Malay ego and self-esteem.  There might even have been a fear that they may 
disappear from the face of the earth, prompting the Malays to often remind 
themselves of the famous quote by Hang Tuah – the loyal legendary Malay 
warrior of Malacca during the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah – who was reputed to 
have said that the Malays will never vanish from the face of this earth.  
 
Some chosen traumas are difficult to detect because they are not simply 
connected to one well-recognised past historical event. If we compare the Malay 
situation with that of the Estonians, we will see a striking resemblance.  Volkan 
(2006a) who has helped with a project aimed at helping Estonia separate 
peacefully from the Russian Federation, has this to say about the Estonians’ 
mindset at the time of their independence: “What we found was that Estonians 
suffered from an underlying shared anxiety that they would ‘disappear’ as an 
ethnic group, with their unique culture, language and identity ceasing to exist. 
With the exception of a brief period of independence from 1918 to 1940, 
Estonians have lived under the domination of others during their entire 5000-year 
history. When at last they regained their independence, they shared an 
unconscious fantasy that they would once again be swallowed up by a 
neighbouring large group (Russians in this case). This shared fantasy contrasted 
with the surface reality that they were happy to be independent” (p. 200).  
 
I’ll discuss merdeka and the Malay fantasies later but for now we will focus on 
the large-group regression of the Malays.  
 
First, let me provide some description of the psychoanalytical meaning of 
regression which would give us a better appreciation of large-group regression.  
 
“Of all the defenses, regression is the one that clearly reveals Freud’s intense 
sense of the importance of historical past. ‘To regress’ means literally walk back, 
to retrace one’s steps” (Galatariotou, 2005, p. 23). The theory of regression in 
psychoanalysis is based on the understanding that human development follows a 
preordained path which takes us through specific psychosexual stages. At each of 
the stages children pass through, one part of the body and the activities related 
with it, take on particular importance. The pleasure provided by that part of the 
body is one aspect of it. The various stages described by Freud are:  
 
 The oral period (from birth to about 18 months) 
 The anal period (from 18 months to about three years) 
 The phallic period and the Oedipus Complex I (from three years to about 
seven years) 
 The latency period (from seven years to puberty) 
 Oedipus Complex II (at puberty) 
 The genital period (from puberty on) 
 
(Galatariotou, 2005; Kahn, 2002) 
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As Kahn (2002) explains, these stages do not end and begin sharply in a person’s 
life; rather each tends to fade into and overlap with the next. At best it is an 
approximate timetable and tends to vary from one person to another. In addition 
to the overlapping of the stages, these stages also persist unconsciously and 
remain hidden, as an on-going background to subsequent stages. 
 
We all experience regression in its non-pathological form when we fall sick. 
When we are sick we tend to regress to an earlier stage of development, wanting 
to be cared for; rather like a small child.  
 
“When Freud emphasized that the past remains forever with us, he was referring 
not only to the individual but also to society: for in both ‘the primitive stages can 
always be re-established; the primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the 
word, imperishable’ (Freud 1915d, p. 286). Collective regression is especially 
apparent in war, when whatever stage of civilization has been reached suddenly 
gives way and regresses to a much earlier, savage, primitive stage” (Galatariotou, 
2005, p. 23).  
 
Based on the brief description of regression, we could conclude that the Malay as 
a race went into a stage of what Volkan calls ‘large-group regression’. This is 
supported by observations made by Clifford, Raffles
36
 and Abdullah (1996).  
 
Here, it is useful to recall Abdullah’s rather despairing comment about the 
Malays – “as time went on, so far from becoming more intelligent, they became 
more and more stupid.” – a typical symptom of regression where one regresses to 
an earlier stage in life. We must credit Abdullah for his observation of the state of 
mind of the Malays without any knowledge of psychoanalysis which was not 
even existent then. Even descriptions of the Malays by Dr Mahathir which I 
quoted earlier in this chapter, point to the large-group regression of the Malays. It 
is most probable that the regression of the Malays must have started when their 
‘chosen trauma’ befell them with the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese.  
 
After Malacca was conquered and its rulers dethroned, the successors to the 
Malacca Sultanate and its dynasty became “the progenitor of a royal patrilineage, 
members of which were to rule Pahang, Perak and Johor” (Khoo, 2001, p. 6). 
These successors to the Malacca Sultanate also brought the Malacca political 
system to the other states in Malaya – the foremost of this system was the Malay 
feudal system (Husin Ali, 2008). 
  
The Malay feudal system in its earlier days and subsequently when the British 
effectively took administrative control of various states in Malaya, is also a major 
perpetrator of the large-group regression among the Malays.  
 
We have seen earlier in Chapter 3 how the Malays withdrew into the interior and 
with the influx of the Chinese and Indian immigrants, the Malays were displaced 
almost entirely in the urban areas except for a small number of Malays with 
                                                 
36
  As quoted by Alatas 1997. 
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mixed parentage (Indian-Muslims and Arabs mainly). This scenario of Malay 
withdrawal into the interior and keeping to themselves, not benefitting much from 
the British rule which brought much development to Malaya, are all clear 
evidence that the large-group regression of Malays continued for several 
centuries. 
   
The Malay leadership under the rules of various splintered states did not help 
their subjects much. On the contrary, they were also a contributory source to the 
prolonging of the regression as can be seen from the following description of 
Winstedt (1961):  
 
Civil war, tyranny and bad administration had taken the heart out of the 
peasant…Newbold has noted how in the ‘30s of the 19th Century the 
population of Muar was reduced to 2400” through the misgovernment 
and apathy of the feudal sovereign, owing to which perpetual broils exist 
among the petty chiefs, causing insecurity of person and of property, and 
eventually driving out of the country all the cultivating and trading classes 
of the community. 
 
The honest peasant, in many instances, is compelled from sheer necessity 
to turn robber; and the coasts, instead of being crowded with fishermen, 
swarm with pirates. These remarks indeed may be extended to the whole 
of the Peninsula. (p. 120) 
 
In a large-group regression, it is natural for the group to look for a leader so that 
they can rally behind him. “When looking at large groups in regression, the role 
of the leader is a crucial factor. When a regressed large group has a strong leader, 
the signs and symptoms of its regression express themselves differently than 
when there is no such leader. A strong leader and his or her entourage reinforces 
the group’s symptoms and may encourage the followers either to remain in a 
regressed state or make attempts at progression. By contrast, when a large group 
without a leader becomes regressed, chaos ensues. Malignant large-group 
regression under a central leader can occur only where there is (or has been) 
individual regression on the part of the leader as well as regression of the group. 
By “malignant” regression, I mean that the regression results in ruining the lives 
of many people, or killing people” (Volkan, 2004, p. 59).  
 
Based on Volkan’s observations above, there is every likelihood that the rulers 
themselves might have also been in individual regression as they had to face 
either foreign colonialists or regional enemies all the time attempting to 
overthrow them. A description below by Winstedt quoting Abdullah provides an 
example: “Writing at the same period Munshi Abdullah has left a worm’s eye 
view of similar conditions in Trengganu. Four or five fellows came and invited 
me to talk…and they begged me to take them for my servants, since they could 
no longer endure the tyranny of Malay rule. ‘Every day’, they said, ‘we have to 
work for the Raja at our own cost and without food being supplied to ourselves or 
our families. Our boats, crops, and live-stock are liable to be seized by the Raja 
without payment. If the Raja wants our property or our daughters, we cannot 
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withstand them. If we object, we are stabbed to death. Try to emigrate and we are 
killed, if caught, and our property confiscated’” (1961, p. 120). 
 
We also must bear in mind that as in individual regression, many survivors of 
traumatised society continue to function like mature adults in some ways, even as 
they are experiencing regression in others. Regression is not an all-or-nothing 
experience and is typically accompanied by attempts to adapt; sometimes these 
efforts to cope with the trauma will take the shape of artistic creativity (Volkan, 
2004, pp. 58-59).  
 
Also, while there is sufficient evidence to accept that the Malays were as a 
society in large-group regression, it must also be admitted that the trauma of the 
Malays is not as severe or catastrophic as the survivors of the Holocaust or 
Hiroshima; it was a trauma nevertheless, to a much lesser degree. It must also be 
emphasised here that the large-group regression triggered by the chosen trauma 
after the fall of Malacca to foreigners and the continued savage treatment of the 
Malays by their own rulers is largely unconscious but shared by almost all the 
Malays.  
 
Major regressions are usually temporary unless of course, the cause of the anxiety 
in us results in a stubborn, or even malignant, psychological process within us. 
How long a person will remain in a regressed state, depends on several factors 
especially on the person’s psychological make-up before regression and on the 
severity and the length of the threatening event or events. It is also not unusual 
for a person to internalise the impact of an external event and continue to remain 
regressed even after the circumstances change (Volkan, 2004). In the Malay 
situation, all symptoms of how the Malays have internalised the continued 
foreign rule from the Portuguese to Dutch to British and the manner in which the 
rulers treated the Malays, seem to indicate that as a race the Malays were in 
regression for a very long period.  
 
7.7 Psychological phenomena of trauma 
 
Based on Volkan’s pioneering exploratory work on large groups and his 
experience in addressing political conflicts in several countries, he has identified 
that when a society becomes a deliberate target of “others” aggression, the 
victimized group has to deal with five inter-related psychological phenomena and 
others related to them. 
 
“The five major psychological phenomena are:  
 
1)  A shared sense of shame, humiliation, dehumanisation and guilt – The 
experience of shame, humiliation and dehumanisation (which were inflicted 
on the Malays both by foreign colonialists and Malay rulers) is 
psychologically unbearable, and affected individuals to resort to various 
mental mechanisms to defend themselves from the influence of these 
affects; 
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2)  Inability to be assertive – A person living under a totalitarian regime or 
under the guidelines of apartheid experiences (not identical but quite similar 
to the Malay experience of upper-class and lower-class in the early days), 
the blocking of motor activities (such as being barred from certain 
locations), as well as mental activities (one cannot raise one’s voice against 
the authorities because to do so is dangerous). This increases the sense of 
helplessness and causes an inability to be assertive. Even after traumatising 
conditions are removed, the inability to be assertive may continue for a long 
time; 
 
3)  Identification with the oppressor or aggressor – This is one of the best 
known defences. It describes how the attempt to master the anxiety 
generated in the victim by a perceived or real aggression can take the form 
of identifying with the aggressor (Galatariotou, 2005). A practical and real 
life example of identifying with the aggressor among the Malays is pointed 
out by Husin Ali (2008) but without the author realising that in the Malay 
situation, his example is identification with the aggressor. “There are 
leaders who shout slogans about national independence and sovereignty, 
but who actually sell out the country to imperialists, neo-colonialists or big 
capitalists. This type of leadership is certainly unacceptable. Nor do we 
want leaders who talk only about poverty and development, while at the 
same time encouraging politics whereby the rich can freely exploit the poor 
and plunder the wealth of the country.” (p. 48); 
 
4)  Difficulty or inability to mourn – “large-group mourning” is a key concept 
in societal processes in everyday life during a post-trauma period. Sharing 
shame humiliation, dehumanisation and guilt, inability to be assertive and 
identification with the aggressor complicate group mourning and in turn 
become the main reason for transgenerational transmission of trauma;  
 
5)  Because of the continuation of shame, humiliation, dehumanisation, guilt 
and helpless rage and identification with the aggressor, the mourning 
process of the large group becomes complicated and unending; and 
 
6)  Transgenerational transmission of trauma – A lot of research has been 
conducted on transgenerational transmission of trauma. Clinical 
observations and empirical research have shown that the consequences of 
traumatic events are not limited to persons immediately exposed to the 
event and that they often affect significant others in their environment such 
as family, friends and caregivers (Dekel & Goldblatt, 2008). Most of the 
research in relation to transgenerational transmission of trauma relates to 
the wars (the World Wars and the Vietnam War) and the Holocaust (Braga, 
Mello & Fiks, 2012). The Japanese have also conducted research on the 
Japanese soldiers involved in the World Wars and the trauma of Japanese 
soldiers who returned home after Japan’s surrender in World War II and 
have concluded that trauma is also transmitted from generation to 
generation (Muramoto, year unknown). While the Malay situation of 
trauma is not identical, available literature supports the view that the 
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distress faced by Malays is inextricably linked with the processes taking 
place in the social and cultural environment. 
 
Understanding of transgenerational transmission of trauma at a societal 
level owes a great deal to studies made on the second and third generations 
of Holocaust survivors (Volkan, 2006c). According to Volkan (2006c), 
“There are many forms of transgenerational transmission. Besides anxiety, 
depression, elation or worries, there are various psychological tasks that one 
person may “assign” to another. The well-known phenomenon of the 
“replacement child” (Poznanski, 1972; Cain and Cain, 1964) illustrates the 
transmission of psychological tasks. A child dies; soon after, the mother 
becomes pregnant again, and the second child lives. The mother “deposits” 
(Volkan, 1987) her image of the dead child – including her affective 
relationship with the child – into the developing identity of her second 
child. The second child now has the task of keeping this “deposited” 
identity within him or herself, and there are different ways for the child to 
respond to this task. The child may adapt to being a replacement child by 
successfully “absorbing” what has been deposited. Alternately, the child 
may develop a “double identity,” experiencing what we call a “borderline 
personality organisation.” Or, the second child may be doomed to try to live 
up to the idealized image of the dead sibling within, becoming obsessively 
driven to excel.  
 
Similarly, adults who are drastically traumatised may deposit their 
traumatised self-images into the developing identities of their children. A 
Holocaust survivor who appears well-adjusted may be able to behave 
“normally” because he has deposited aspects of his traumatised self-images 
into his children’s developing selves and has given the children “tasks” to 
deal with these images” (Brenner, 1999). His children then, are the ones 
now responding to the horror of the Holocaust, “freeing” the older victim 
from his burden. As with replacement children, such children’s own 
responses to being carriers of injured parental self-images vary because of 
each child’s individual psychological make-up that is independent of the 
deposited images” (p. 27-28). Over generations, the Malays may have also 
deposited their traumatized self-images into the developing identities of 
their children continuing the large-group regression at the same time 
enabling them to behave “normally”.  
 
7.8  Defence mechanisms of regression 
 
When a group experiences regression, it may reveal widespread use of primitive 
defence mechanisms such as externalization, projection, splitting, excessive 
idealisation and excessive devaluation (Volkan, 1999a; Volkan, 1999b).  
 
Externalization and projection are similar except that projection is deemed as a bit 
more of a sophisticated process and is associated with adults while externalization 
is used for children (Volkan, 1999a).  
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“Externalization is commonly used by children as they integrate their internal 
world and develop the foundation of core identity to maintain a more realistic and 
balanced self-representation, it is necessary to externalize both “bad” and “good” 
self- and object-images. For example, a child may fall and then say, “I did not fall 
down, it was my doll” (Novick & Kelly, 1970). Or a child’s uncle or aunt may 
become a reservoir to receive a child’s un-integrated “good” images and this 
relative rather than the child himself or herself will become more idealized. Later 
in life the child may re-internalize and integrate some of what was externalized 
onto the aunt or uncle and develop a more realistic view of him or her. Therefore 
childhood externalizations are temporary; others may continue to be utilised for a 
long period.  
 
Personal and large-group identity becomes intertwined when the reservoirs that 
receive the children’s “good” un-integrated self- and object have two 
characteristics: 
 
1) They are shared by all children in the large group;  
2) They are constant.” (Volkan, 1999a, p.38) 
 
These are what are known as “suitable reservoirs of externalization.” They 
include for example a cowboy hat for an American boy. In the case of a Malay 
child the Malay attire (Baju Melayu) and cap (songkok) when he goes for a Quran 
class at an early age of around five years onwards, are examples of “suitable 
reservoirs of externalization”. Individual children become allied to other children 
in a large group through the common suitable reservoirs of externalization that 
absorb the un-integrated ‘good’ self and object images of all and subtly initiate 
the children’s ethnic, national and religious identity.  
 
As the child’s mental capacities enlarge, interaction with adults in his or her 
environment who are of the same large group, and identifications with their 
images also help the child to form more sophisticated ideas about large-group 
membership. The more abstract concepts of Finnishmen, Scottishmen, 
Jewishness; or Georgianness slowly become associated with the suitable 
reservoirs of externalization which are, indeed, at the foundation of large-group’s 
identity.  
 
Projections of “good” thoughts, perceptions and feelings that are more 
sophisticated than more “good” self- and objects images increasingly accompany 
externalizations into suitable reservoirs. For example specific notions of 
Malayness are concurrently internalized; they are now felt or sensed, both 
consciously and unconsciously, as part of the core identity of the individual, and 
the feeling of “we-ness” is more clearly established as something “inside” the 
person.  
 
A child’s investment in his or her large group depends on what factors the adults 
in a large group collectively perceive as most important: ethnicity (I am a Malay), 
religion (I am a Muslim), nationality (I am a Malaysian) or a combination of 
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these. Malay children for example, would focus on religious/cultural and 
ethnicity issues as they develop a large-group identity because Malay adults 
define their dominant large-group identities according to religious and ethnicity 
affiliation.  
 
It is similar with the other races in Malaysia. The Chinese and Indians for 
example, identify on ethnic bases first, then national identity in their own large 
groups.  
 
In the psychoanalytic term, projection refers to protecting oneself from anxiety by 
repressing a feeling and misperceiving another person as having that feeling. An 
example of projection is when one is angry, one represses the anger and blames 
the other as being angry.  
 
Having established that the Malays as a race were in large-group regression 
because of two factors that gave them a sense of shame – humiliation (i.e., the 
conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese which resulted in a 450-year foreign rule 
and the ill treatment of the Malays by their rulers) and helplessness mainly – let 
us reconstruct the Malay history from the psychological perspective.  
 
Daulat 
 
One of the most burning and pertinent questions that will arise in anyone’s mind 
is how the Malays could give so much importance to “daulat” and the institution 
of “raja” (monarch) in spite of their poor and scant treatment in the hands of the 
rulers. Khoo (2001) provides a clear picture of the concept of “daulat” when he 
says that during the Malacca Sultanate, under the reign of Sultan Muhammad 
Shah (1424-1444) the establishment of a political order was proclaimed. At the 
top of the hierarchical order was the ruler called ‘raja’ and it was supplemented 
by an elaborate list of regulations served to emphasise the gap between the ruler 
and his subjects. “Such symbols had a distinct function; they served to impress on 
the minds of the subject class the sanctimonious position of the ruler” (p. 23). The 
idea obviously was to perpetuate the institution of the monarchy, and the 
authority and control vested in a particular royal patrilineage. Though the 
patrilineage was only partially successful, the institution has survived. Also the 
aura of sanctity, known as daulat, that was built around the institution of “raja” 
was not removed. The concept of daulat is explained as:  
 
 ..daulat as a concept of general Malay tradition, comprised several 
related ideas. Daulat was the supreme expression of the quality of the 
“majesty” and its possession of a ruler constituted divine sanction of his 
reign. It was a stable, impersonal quality, beyond the influence of its 
holder’s character or abilities. It could act arbitrarily and offensively to 
protect the ruler, his command and his dignity, and enabled him to 
accomplish acts of great magic. In short, daulat was a foundation of the 
ideology of legitimation. (p. 23) 
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This view on the sanctity of the ruler is also supported by Winstedt (1961). “The 
Sultan though still entitled sri paduka was no longer an incarnate Hindu god but 
the shadow of Allah upon earth, and to compensate for this declension 
Muhammadan missionaries invented for Malay royalty a pedigree going back to 
that hero of Muslim folk-lore, Alexander the Great of the pseudo-Callisthenes. 
Muslim tracts taught the Malay sovereign that he was a servant of Allah and 
exhorted him to pursue justice and righteousness” (p. 70).   
 
So we can see that the ruler was considered as the representative of Allah (Divine 
sanction) and it was beyond the influence of its holder’s character and abilities. 
Malays, being devout Muslims, are highly respectful of anything that is related to 
the Creator. Then, the ruler is also one who could accomplish acts of great magic. 
Before Islam reached the Malay Peninsula, the religion of nearly all the Malays 
was a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism, animism and shamanism. Many of the 
rituals from these pre-Islamic practices have remained strongly with the Malays; 
one such is their strong belief in magic. The association of magic with the ruler 
created a fearful respect for the ruler. Then the fear of the people incurring the 
ruler’s anger and facing punishment for them and their families if they were to be 
disloyal also ensured that the Malays remained loyal to the rulers.  
 
From the psychoanalytical point, this kind of fear transformed to love and respect 
is known as reaction formation. This could also be due to an identification with 
the aggressor. Through the culmination of reaction formation, identification with 
the aggressor and the phenomenon of transgenerational transmission, the Malays 
till present-time have kept the concept of daulat and respect for authority alive. 
This strong cultural attribute of the Malays as we saw in Chapter 3 is the main 
contributing factor for making Malaysia strong in power distance with global 
ranking of number one in Hofstede’s study.  
 
The institution of monarchy became such an effective instrument of control of the 
Malays that when the British began their intervention in the Malay states, they 
fully exploited its efficacy (Khoo, 2001). This is what I referred to as the 
collusion between the Malay rulers and the colonialists in Chapter 3. Roff (1967) 
supports this view of collusion between the British and the Malay rulers when he 
comments how the rulers were well taken care of financially by the British. 
“Provided with a privy purse and with substantial personal allowances, increased 
from time to time as the propensity of the state grew, the rulers lived in elaborate 
palaces erected at state expense” (p. 15).  
   
This collusive behaviour of the rulers and the colonialists was also a major 
contributing factor for the prolonging of the regression of the Malays.  
 
The deep feudal loyalty of the Malays prevented them from opposing the colonial 
powers because in the eyes of the Malays they (the colonial masters) were in their 
land with the approval of the rulers, who greatly benefitted from what Dr 
Mahathir (2011) termed as “political pensions”.  
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7.9 Foreigners and their psychological impact on Malays 
 
When Malacca fell into the hands of the Portuguese, the resulting unconscious 
“chosen trauma” was the beginning of the Malay regression which was 
perpetuated both by the domination of Malacca by successive foreign powers – 
the Dutch and then the British – who slowly took control of the entire Malay 
Peninsula and took advantage of the largely poor leadership of Malay rulers to 
entrench their control in the country. 
 
While the Malays were somewhat ‘willing’ to suffer in the hands of their rulers 
because of their respect, loyalty and fear for the monarchy, the steady flow of 
foreigners which started from Malacca’s glorious days in the 1400s mainly with 
the settling of traders from various parts of the world such as Portugal, India and 
China, and the heavy influx of Chinese and Indians under the British rule, created 
a severe psychological impact on the Malays.  
 
Consequent to large-group regression the Malays must have suffered from 
defensive reactions such as envy, splitting, projection, reaction formation and 
repression.
37
 
  
Starting with envy which is ‘the angry feeling that another person possesses and 
enjoys something desirable, often accompanied by an impulse to take it away or 
spoil it’, it leads to splitting. Splitting is a matter of holding things apart as ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’. The Malays see the foreigners as ‘bad’ and taking advantage of the 
‘goodness’ of their rulers. Severe splitting which is destructive to mental progress 
hampers development and creates extreme anxiety leading to the fragmentation of 
the ego. The splitting leads to an “us” versus “them” feeling; their rulers as their 
ideal and the foreigners as the devil. All the ‘bad’ things that happened to the 
Malays is then ‘projected’ on to the foreigners leading to projection which as 
mentioned earlier, is the process whereby qualities, feelings, wishes or even 
“objects” which one refuses to recognise or rejects in himself are expelled from 
the self and located in another person (Frosh, 2012; Kets de Vries, 2001b).  
 
Under the British rule, the influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants further 
intensified the Malays’ psychological problems as they saw their country being 
literally taken over by these immigrants. They assumed this was happening with 
their rulers’ blessings and approval when in reality, the rulers had no other choice 
but to collude with the foreign colonialists in order to maintain their status and 
privileges. This led to helplessness among the Malays as they could not oppose 
their rulers’ wishes. Because of the manner in which their country was taken over 
by the foreigners, the Malays retreated into the interior and kept to themselves. 
As the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ feeling was strong, a sense of cohesiveness developed 
among the common Malays.  
 
“When large groups regress and become preoccupied with “who are we now?”; 
“how are we different from them?” and “what will become of us?” the result is 
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  For description of the various defence mechanisms, please refer to Appendix 10. 
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often a tense and unstable social and political atmosphere in which the group 
attempts to maintain its sense of a cohesive identity” (Volkan, 1999a, p. 462).  
 
The birth of this strong cohesive identity is the origin of the Malay society’s 
cultural attributes of “Collectivism” and “Communitarianism”, which led to their 
gotong royong (cooperative) way of life. We saw in Chapter 3, how collectivism 
and communitarianism are strong in the Malay culture. As they saw themselves 
helpless in the onslaught of the foreigners taking over their country, a strong 
sense of collective feeling to help one another also known as gotong-royong is 
seen as a strong cultural attribute of the Malays till today.  
 
The scenario of the Malay marginalisation by both the Malay ruling class and the 
foreigners who ruled the Malay states continued and worsened when the British 
took over the Malay states. The Malays refused to collaborate or cooperate with 
the British because of their projection of foreigners in their land as bad.   
 
Also, the Malays are generally sensitive to insults and did not like the attitude of 
the foreigners treating them with least respect like coolies to work in the mines 
and plantations. This was elaborated in Chapter 3. 
 
The British then encouraged the Chinese and Indians to settle in the Malay states 
in order to develop tin mining and rubber plantations and followed the divide-
and-rule policy by keeping the three races separate under their respective 
captains. After a long time and realising that the Malays were completely kept out 
of the fast developing country with rich tin mines and rubber plantations, the 
British realised that they needed to help the Malays. The magnitude of the Malay 
isolation from tin and rubber industries can be seen from the statistics provided 
by Winstedt (1961) in which he says that in 1937 there were 300,000 Indians, 
200,000 Chinese and only 30,000 Malays employed in these industries. One 
could then imagine the extent to which the Malays isolated themselves from the 
mainstream of the economy or were isolated by the others from participating in 
the main economic activities of the country.  
 
As was pointed out in Chapter 3 earlier, the main benefits to the common Malay 
from the British rule were restoration of law and order and the abolition of the 
“sumptuary laws of Hinduized courts made it possible for the Malay to own a 
good house, have well-stocked rice-barns and buy jewellery for his woman folk – 
without fear of confiscation” (Winstedt, 1961, p. 134).  
 
While the Malay situation under the British rule did not transform the position of 
the Malays drastically, some changes did take place generally in law and order, 
health care and education. “Between the First and Second World War there was a 
genuine interest among an influential section of the colonial administrators to 
improve the condition of the native population…” (Alatas, 1977, p. 237).  
 
Though the country was being transformed with better transport and 
communication, the Malays being primarily in the rural and interior parts of the 
country, did not benefit as much as the Chinese, Indians and the small percentage 
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of the urban Malays who were mainly of mixed percentage from Arab and Indian 
Muslims. This scenario is well-illustrated by Dr Mahathir: 
 
“The British kept the three races apart. While the Malays were immersed 
in peasant rural areas, the Chinese were concentrated in urban centres and 
the Indians in rubber estates. Malay peasants were reluctant to leave their 
kampung homes to take up wage labour under the unrewarding and 
difficult conditions that destitute imported Indian labour had to accept. 
Not unreasonably, they preferred to remain in the countryside, earning 
cash from rubber cultivation when they could, otherwise be growing and 
subsisting on rice cultivation and fishing. This choice made immediate 
short-term sense for every individual Malay farmer and Malay family. But 
in the long-run, it meant that Peninsular Malay society became ever more 
side-lined from development. Socially and culturally, not just 
economically, the Malay peasant would become a backwater. In time, 
Malays became outsiders not only to advancing modernity but to the 
desire to acquire its benefits and to master new skills and knowledge” 
(2011, p. 65). 
 
7.10 Malayan Union – The revival of Malay chosen glory? 
 
The Malay large-group regression continued for several centuries from around 
1511 till the 1940s, a period of over four hundred years. A glimpse of hope came 
when after World War II, the British attempted to form the Malayan Union which 
was vehemently opposed by the Malays. A description of the events leading to 
Malayan Union and the British backing down on the proposal was provided in 
Chapter 1 under the ‘Political Position of the Malays’ (Section 1.3.2). 
 
As mentioned earlier, after the British realised that the Malays were isolated in 
their own country, the British made some efforts in terms of educating the 
Malays; again primarily the ruling class and the elite, and built a college to 
educate the sons of Malay chiefs (which is the Malay College which till today is 
considered the school for the Malay elite). Through the establishment of schools 
around the 1850s, for the first time, formal schooling system was introduced in 
Malay states.  
 
By early twentieth century, more attention was given to educating the Malays and 
the immigrant children. Through this process, a clan of educated Malays, largely 
from the elite class, began to appear in the Malay society. Some of them were 
also sent to England for further education. So by the time the British government 
decided to implement ‘Malayan Union’ which would have made the Malays, and 
more importantly their Sultans, weak and powerless in their own country, there 
were enough educated Malays who realised the danger and rose against the 
British for the first time in the Malay history. “By refusing point blank to accept 
the Malayan Union proposed by the British, the apolitical, easy-going Malays 
broke with tradition and banded together for the first time in history to fight for 
their rights. Previously they had always been loyal to their respective Sultans, 
never questioning their actions or rebelling against them. But this was different. 
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The British proposal amounted to dispossessing them of their Tanah Melayu, 
their Malay land…The Malayan Union proposal can be said to have changed the 
culture and character of the Malays completely” (Dr Mahathir, 2011, p.96). The 
anti-Malayan Union led by the educated Malays who naturally had got 
themselves out of regression can be said to be the revival of the Malay chosen 
glory. 
 
7.11 The Re-birth of the Malay chosen glory 
 
The re-birth of the Malay “chosen glory” also led to the birth of Malay 
nationalism and formation of UMNO, the main Malay political party which in 
coalition with the Chinese and Indian parties – the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – and some other 
regional parties, has been ruling Malaya initially and subsequently Malaysia, 
since the attainment of merdeka.  
 
Once the opposition to the Malayan Union was successful, the chosen glory of 
the Malays was magically reactivated. By this time there were also educated 
Malay leaders to organise the largely regressed Malays who naturally ‘rallied 
behind their leader’. For the first time, Malay nationalism was born and the 
Malay aspiration of achieving merdeka for Tanah Melayu would become a 
reality, they thought. In the eyes of the Malays, Tanah Melayu meant that only 
Malays would live in their homeland. With the independence and the withdrawal 
of the British from Tanah Melayu, their fantasy was that the other races which 
had almost equalled them in number would also pack up and leave for their 
respective home countries like China, India, Ceylon etc.  
    
The British however, compelled Malay nationalists to strike a formula of inter-
racial cooperation, unity and harmony among the various races in the country 
before independence could be granted (Cheah, 2002). Even the proposed name of 
Federation of Malaya was not popular with the Malays who preferred Tanah 
Melayu (Malay Land) which was far more attractive to the Malays (Harper, 
1996). Malaya, in the eyes of the Malays was associated with ‘non-Malay’ 
interests.  Therefore; contrary to the expectations of the Malays that Tanah 
Melayu will be exclusively theirs after merdeka, Tanah Melayu however, became 
a ‘synthetic nation’ known as the Federation of Malaya. 
         
The first leader of UMNO, Onn Ja’afar was replaced by Tunku Abdul Rahman 
when Onn Ja’afar tested the idea of admitting non-Malays as members of UMNO 
instead of UMNO remaining exclusively a Malay political party. The Malays 
accused Onn Ja’afar of “selling out” Malay rights (Cheah, 2002). 
         
So the Malays were in fact arm-twisted by the British into accepting the other 
races and granting them citizenship in return for independence.  “Nevertheless, 
the atmosphere of 1957 was full of hope” (Dr Mahathir, 1970, p.8).  
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The announcement of merdeka was first made by the Malay leader, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman – who was to become the first Prime Minister of Malaya – in Malacca, 
the historical place where the first ever chosen glory of the Malays took place. 
 
Countries like Malaya, formed out of agreements involving different races, is 
what Volkan describes as synthetic nations – nations “born” by different means 
(Volkan, 2004). Volkan credits historian Peter Loewenberg for creating the term 
“synthetic nation”. “Synthetic nations – such as the United States, Brazil and 
Indonesia – are “invented” when people otherwise diverse in ethnicity, race 
and/or religion transcend their differences within a particular geographic space… 
Since nations are “born” differently, the degree of inclusion and exclusion, of 
grievance and entitlement, differ from one particular nation to the next” (Volkan, 
2004, p. 27). In this sense, Malaya and later Malaysia also fits the definition of a 
“synthetic nation” where the indigenous people included almost 50% of “others” 
to form a nation-state. “Synthetic” nation building is, as Volkan admits, a difficult 
process. 
  
Even though after merdeka, the Malays expected Tanah Melayu to be theirs, it 
however ended up in a different way with the creation of a “synthetic” nation, 
known as the Federation of Malaya. The Malays, being a race that is 
accommodative, accepted the ‘trade off’, albeit with some dismay, of having to 
live with two other large groups in exchange for merdeka and some special 
privileges accorded to them. Even though power sharing was to be with the 
Chinese and Indians, the Malays had a definitive control of political power in 
their hands. 
  
 Dr Mahathir has an apt description of the Malay situation which is worth noting. 
“In Malaysia, or more specifically in Malaya, the Malays are faced with a 
personal problem. It is a problem which concerns their real, innermost attitude 
towards Malaya and Malaysia, towards sharing the land of the Malays with 
others. It concerns their hopes when merdeka was achieved and the dashing of 
some of these hopes on the rocks of reality. The Malays themselves have shunned 
any open statement of the problem because it embarrasses them, and is an 
embarrassment to others. They, more than anyone else, have been responsible for 
keeping this peculiar Malay problem suppressed. 
 
On the surface, the deliberate avoidance of discussion seems good. It preserves 
the atmosphere of tranquillity which is mistaken for racial harmony in Malaya… 
But the actual situation beneath this seeming tranquillity and harmony is fraught 
with danger. Every community, whether Chinese, Indian or Malay, clinging 
tightly to racial loyalties, keeps on sparring with this Malay problem…this 
sparring tends to build up tensions which could boil over… The situation could 
become uncontrollable. There could be disaster” (p. 115).  
 
Even though these observations by Dr Mahathir were made in 1970, (almost forty 
years ago), the situation remains very much the same even in present time, as we 
will see later in this chapter. 
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After Malaya was given independence by the British in 1957 and the subsequent 
formation of Malaysia in 1963 with the inclusion of three states initially – 
Singapore (which left the federation in 1965) and the two Borneo states of 
Sarawak and Sabah, the Malay political leadership led by UMNO and supported 
by its other coalition partners, were ruling the country. 
    
The prosperity and development of the newly-independent Malaya continued 
after merdeka was achieved but the economic position of the Malays remained 
very much the same. We saw in the introductory chapter how in spite of wresting 
political control, the Malays continued to remain economically backward and 
how after the 1969 general elections which saw the Malay political position being 
threatened, there were racial riots as a result of which the government was jolted 
out of its complacent attitude towards the Malays. The NEP was the result of the 
change in the government’s policy to create new economic opportunities for the 
Malays to raise their economic quality of life comparable to others while 
eradicating poverty irrespective of race.  
   
I’ll not dwell too much on the details of the racial riots of May 13 1969, except to 
say that it was “only the tip of the iceberg of a far more serious and deep-seated 
problem of a structural nature confronting the society arising from Malaysia’s 
past…Malay aspirations to improve their economic status vis-à-vis non-Malays 
did not materialize as expected” (Faaland, Parkinson & Saniman, 2003, p.13).
   
We have seen throughout in this research, how the Malays’ good nature has been 
taken advantage of by other races in the past. The much expected economic 
change to their (the Malays) position did not take place. Although the Malays 
were willing to bear with it, they could not bear with the 1969 general election 
results which shook the very foundation of Malay political power, the only hope 
for Malays in their homeland. I have mentioned in Chapter 1 that the Malays will 
not tolerate any risk to what I called the 3Rs – rulers, race and religion.  
 
In the 1969 election, their race was being threatened through the possibility of 
losing power which they had just attained after more than 450 years of 
colonisation. Therefore; for the second time around, the Malays feared that their 
freedom might be lost to the non-Malays. Hence, a combination of frustration 
from the economic front and the threat of losing the political power both triggered 
the May 13 1969 riots. Although all Malaysians like to repress May 13 from their 
thoughts and consider it a chosen trauma, the Malays unconsciously consider 
May 13 as the reactivation of the chosen glory of independence which had lost its 
glow. It was after this unfortunate event that Malays began to take an active part 
in the economy of the nation, thus seeing the birth of a new era in which 
revivalism of the Malay entrepreneurship started. Cruel as it may sound, the 
reactivation of the chosen glory of Malays took place only after May 13. This is 
one of the reasons that Malay leaders off and on, remind the other Malaysians of 
May 13 when politically-sensitive questions are raised by non-Malays. It is the 
Malay way of keeping their chosen glory in memory, though not in the normal 
way of celebration.  
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To quote Volkan (2004): Regressed large groups are prone to reactivate what I 
have dubbed their chosen traumas and chosen glories. Many leaders know 
intuitively how to stimulate chosen traumas and glories as well as to bring the 
emotions pertaining to these past events to present issues, thus magnifying both 
fears and the defenses against them (p. 71).  
 
7.12 The birth of NEP and Malay economic development 
 
Sloane (1999) provides an appropriate description of the birth of the NEP as 
follows: “May 1969 became emblematic of the urgent need to accelerate Malay 
economic development, and, indelibly connected to the idiom of ethnic conflict 
and redress, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched – a massive 20-year 
plan to reduce economic inequity and ensure cohesion throughout the troubled 
nation. Proposing multi-ethnic policy aimed at overall poverty reduction, social 
restructuring, and the creation of what the government called ‘national unity’, 
NEP actually took shape as a highly interventionist economic and affirmative 
action programme directed exclusively at Malays. It replaced the essentially 
laissez-faire economic framework established in Malaysia upon independence 
(Jesudason, 1989). NEP was (and is – while its 20-year time-frame ran out in 
1990, it has been reinstated indefinitely) a set of policies and strategies that 
provided the state with the means to help the Malays, called Bumiputera
38
 or 
‘sons of soil’, to take greater control over the nation’s economic resources, and to 
do so in the name of national stability and national development” (p. 5).  
 
Over the last forty years, the Government has tried various means and methods to 
achieve the NEP target of 30% ownership and participation in all industrial and 
commercial activities. Every Malay had been so charged to become an 
entrepreneur that in the 80s and 90s almost every Malay in Kuala Lumpur 
claimed to be an entrepreneur, trying to get some kind of government contract 
through his or her networking. In a way, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the prime 
minister who sparked this energy among the Malays, had helped to bring a large 
segment of the Malays out of their regression to progression. 
 
It was during the administration of Abdul Razak, the second Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, that NEP was formulated. He and the young educated Malays in 
UMNO had realised the frustration of the Malays much earlier than 1969 before 
the eruption of the racial riots. But the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, underestimated the feelings of the Malays. Being a Tunku (prince) from 
the ruling family of Kedah and quite used to taking for granted the daulat concept 
and the docile mindset of the Malays (who were in any case in regression), he 
never imagined that a situation like May 13 could ever happen in Malaysia. 
Therefore; it was a rude awakening for him which also marked the end of his 
prime ministership. 
                                                 
38
  The term “Bumiputera” carries the same meaning as “Bumiputra” used throughout this research.  Its 
further meaning can be found on page 12 (Section 1.3 – “The historical background of 
Malaya/Malaysia”) of this research. 
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The Malay frustrations of their continued backwardness in economy was 
triggered by two important factors – a) merdeka that had put the political power 
in Malay hands; and b) Malay education which since the beginning of the 
twentieth century had slowly begun the process of bringing the Malays out of 
their regressive mode.  
 
7.13 Racial relations in Malaysia 
 
We saw earlier, Dr Mahathir’s comments about the race relations in Malaysia and 
how the tranquillity among the races is mistaken for harmony.  
 
In October 1987, the scene was set perfectly ripe for a replay of May 13 which 
was averted through quick police and government action. Dr Mahathir calls this 
“a permanent blot on my time in office.” In Malaysia, the three major races –
Malays, Chinese and Indians – live as three large groups, as described by Volkan, 
in three large tents of their own. Above these three large tents, there is a bigger 
tent, the national tent. Most of the activities in Malaysia however take place only 
in the three separate tents with the national tent only serving as a symbolic tent of 
the synthetic nation. And Volkan (1999c) mentions, “…there are also rituals that 
take place between large groups (Volkan, 1999a). No large group tent stands 
alone in isolation; there are always neighbors. Rituals between large groups are 
usually in the service of enhancing various elements of large-group identity and 
tend to be governed by two general principles: 
 
1)  Opposing groups need to maintain their identities as distinct from each 
other (principles of “non-sameness”);  
 
2)  Opposing groups need to maintain an unambiguous psychological border 
between them. 
 
Both principles relate to the fact that persons under one tent have a tendency to 
externalize and project certain unwanted elements onto the other, as if they were 
throwing mud on the other’s canvas… At other times the mud gets thrown back 
at the sender” (p. 12). 
 
Even minor differences become major ones in order to maintain the distinction 
between the two groups. If the stress continues, one group may begin to perceive 
the other as less human so that it becomes more suitable for absorbing 
externalizations and projections. “Animal symbols are used in a pathological way 
to dehumanization of an enemy (Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl, 1973)… In such 
cases, one large group regresses and begins to utilise protosymbols of the enemy 
as their shared “bad” suitable reservoir (Volkan 1997; 1999a). First the enemy is 
demonized but still is perceived as retaining human qualities, although they are 
predominantly negative human qualities.” 
(Volkan, http://www.austenriggs.org/images/uploads/ANIMALS%20AS%20LARGE.pdf, 
p. 6) 
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Dr Mahathir (2011), in describing the 1987 October incident known as Operasi 
Lalang (translated roughly as Operation Weeding) relates how, when his 
government was perceived as weak with the resignation of his then Deputy Prime 
Minister Musa Hitam and UMNO was split, extremists were tempted to test the 
government’s determination during the time when the economy was also not 
doing well.  
 
In this situation, extremists promoting Chinese language culture and education 
raised various contentious issues; at times provocatively triggering Malays to 
react angrily, holding rallies against the Chinese demands. Describing the tense 
situation, Dr Mahathir (2011) wrote: “A Malay march through the Kampong Baru 
area of Kuala Lumpur, the scene of many of the worst clashes of May 1969, 
raised Malay temperatures and non-Malay fears. Both PAS
39
 and UMNO began 
to accuse Christian churches of the mass conversion of Malays. UMNO prepared 
to stage a mass rally of 500,000 people on 1 November 1987 to demonstrate the 
strong support that the government enjoyed, but, wary of the deteriorating 
situation, we chose not to permit the rally. Tensions increased even further when 
a Malay soldier, for reasons that still remain unknown, ran amok and fired his M-
16 in Jalan Chow Kit in Kuala Lumpur, killing a Malay and two Chinese. In these 
rapidly deteriorating circumstances, the police felt that a repeat of the May 13 
riots of 1969 was more than likely” (pp. 553-554).  
 
The incident of 1987 is described above to show that what Dr Mahathir wrote in 
1970 about the pseudo harmony between the races in Malaysia was also true in 
1987 and also largely holds true till today.  
 
In examining how large groups function, Volkan says “one can identify certain 
rituals used to shore up or strengthen the large-group identity. These include 
celebrating anniversaries of symbolic glories and other historical events. When a 
large group comes under stress, it may enhance or recreate an old symbol to 
strengthen the group’s cohesion. When the tent shakes, the group members under 
it will also tend to rally around their leader (the pole) and identify more tightly 
with each other, as described by Sigmund Freud (1921)” (Volkan, 1999c, p. 12). 
 
In the quotation above, we can see that the Malay students marching on the same 
road in Kuala Lumpur where the racial riots took place in 1969, is an attempt to 
“…recreate an old symbol to strengthen the group’s cohesion…” (Volkan, 1999c, 
p. 12). And UMNO wanting to gather 500,000 members to stage a mass rally 
reflects the situation that the Malays were rallying behind their leader reminding 
that when “…the tent shakes, the group members under it will also tend to rally 
around their leader (the pole)…” (Volkan, 1999c, p. 12). Other rituals that may 
take place is what is known as purification. Purifying language, purging 
cemeteries, and erasing symbols of other cultures (destroying churches, or 
mosques for example) are all instances of a group strengthening its identity 
through purification in the wake of conflict with neighbouring group (Volkan, 
1999c, p. 12).  
                                                 
39
  PAS is an opposition Islamic Party in Malaysia 
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What are the “beneath-the-surface” issues that have kept the large groups in 
Malaysia in their separate tents? We need to go back again to history and see the 
context under which the Chinese and Indians came to Malaya. These two groups 
came to Malaya during the British rule brought by the British. It was not the 
Malays who invited them to their country. In a situation where the Malays were 
already upset that foreigners were ruling their country, the influx of large 
numbers of Chinese and Indians with a combined population of almost equal to 
the Malay population (at times in history the immigrants outnumbered the 
indigenous Malays) must have certainly aggravated and upset the Malays. But the 
Malays were then helpless to stop this influx. The Malays had then never 
imagined that these pendatang (immigrants in Malay language; Malays still refer 
to the other races as pendatang) would one day become citizens of Tanah Melayu 
enjoying similar status as them. They must have thought at worst, these 
pendatang would one day return to their homeland. So the Malays as the 
indigenous people never had given their blessing or approval for the Chinese and 
Indians to settle in Tanah Melayu. It was a historical misfortune as far as they are 
concerned. That is why there was a lot of resistance from the Malays during 
negotiations with the British for the independence of the Malaya to accept such a 
large population of foreigners in their land.  
 
Dr Mahathir (1970), when referring to the ways the Malays treat the Chinese, has 
described that the Malays considered the non-Malays as guests. “It is bad 
manners to embarrass your guest and the non-Malay is always a guest to the 
Malay, a guest in his country” (p. 116). The very description of non-Malays being 
regarded unconsciously or consciously as guests by Malays implies that they are 
expected to return to their homes someday. No guest lives permanently in another 
person’s house. As the ‘guests’ have overstayed their welcome, relations have 
become strained deep down in the minds of the various races. 
 
In his book called “The Psychoanalysis of Racism, Revolution and Nationalism”, 
Koenigsberg (1977) provides an interesting psychoanalytic perspective of how 
the country is viewed by its people. 
 
His assumptions are: 
 
1)  That people tend to possess “an absolute faith in the reality of the nation”; 
and 
 
2)  In a democratic culture, people may differ with respect to the stance which 
is to be taken in relation to the nation – “the country may be “loved” or 
hated; perceived to be “healthy” or sick; “strong” or weak. But whatever 
stance is adopted, persons are united within the framework of the culture of 
nationalism it would appear, by their absolute faith in the reality  of this 
entity, and by their belief that this entity constitutes a fundamental 
determinant of the nature, and of the quality, of their daily lives” (p.1). 
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Based on these assumptions, Koenigsberg identified three core phantasies which 
are: the phantasy of the nation as a suffering mother; the phantasy of the nation as 
an omnipotent mother; the nation as a projection of infantile narcissism.  
 
Of these three phantasies, except for “the nation as a projection of infantile 
narcissism”, the other two were present in the Malays in Tanah Melayu in a latent 
form though the Malays as a group were in regression. 
 
The image of the nation as an omnipotent mother is described by Koenigsberg by 
quoting Michelet
40
 who described the French nation as “a living person which the 
child touches and feels on every side. He cannot embrace her, but she embraces 
him, warms him with her great soul throughout that multitude, and speaks to him 
by her monuments… (1846, p.180).” (p.6).  
 
As a “living person” that “embraces and warms” the individual, the nation may be 
characterised then as a protective mother:  
 
(The citizen of a nation should) not only see and learn his country, but feel her as 
Providence, recognize her as mother and as nurse, by her strengthening milk and 
vivifying warmth.  (Michelet, 1846, p.181) 
 
If thou are naked and hungry, hither, my son; the gates are wide open, and France 
on the threshold with open arms to receive thee. Never will this great mother be 
ashamed to attend thee as nurse; with her own heroic hand will she make thee the 
soldier’s soup. (Michelet, 1846, p. 182) 
 
As a mother that is shared in common by the citizens of the nation:  
 
We have all one common mother, - men, women, children, animals, plants, all 
that has life, - a tender mother who always feeds us, and is invisible yet present… 
Let us love her, dear child, let us embrace her with all our heart. (Michelet, 1846, 
p. 179) 
 
There is one place in which you all meet and that is your common Mother … 
That is not merely a division of land but it is a living thing. It is the mother in 
whom you move and have your being. (Aurobindo
41
, 1952a, p. 115)  
(Koenigsberg, 1977, p. 7).  
 
Koenigsberg has argued the case of the country as a projection of infantile 
narcissism based on the hypothesis of the shared narcissism of an entire group of 
persons. According to this view, the belief in the “greatness”, “power”, “beauty” 
etc., of the nation arises out of a people’s belief in its own greatness, power, 
beauty etc. The nation in short may be viewed as a symbol of the narcissistic ego, 
a narcissistic ego which is shared in common by a nation’s citizens.  
                                                 
40
  J. Michelet (1798-1874) was a French historian and author of “Histoire de la Révolution française”  
(History of French Revolution” (1847).  
41
  Aurobindo (1872-1950) was an Indian nationalist, freedom fighter, philosopher, yogi, guru and poet  
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This element of shared narcissism viewed as a symbol of the narcissistic ego was 
not present among the Malays until merdeka was achieved. It slowly took shape 
after merdeka but was only clearly visible during Dr Mahathir’s era as prime 
minister when he consciously provoked the Malays to believe in their own 
greatness, power and beauty to strengthen the nation.  
 
The Malays also believed in the wish to maintain the purity of the nation as 
explained by Koenigsberg.  
 
It is the wish to purify the nation which is expressed as “anytime a particular 
condition or situation is identified as the source of the “badness” which exists 
within the boundaries of the nation; and anytime it is believed that the 
maintenance or the restoration of the “goodness” of the nation is contingent upon 
the “removal” of this condition or situation. Thus according to this view, the wish 
to “purify” the nation is expressed, typically: in the desire to eliminate “pollution” 
from within the environment” (p.11).  
 
This strategy to maintain the purity of the nation involves the “identification” of a 
particular class of persons within the boundaries of the nation as the source of the 
nation’s “badness” and of the belief that, if the “goodness” of the nation is to be 
maintained or restored, this particular class of persons must be “removed” from 
within the nation’s boundaries.  
 
The conception of a nation as a living organism has also been used by 
Koenigsberg (1977) “and the nation may be susceptible to disease i.e., to the 
possibility that germs, infections, cancers etc., may invade its body and cause it to 
become ‘ill’…. The source of the nation’s disease may be a particular class of 
persons lying within the body of the nation…” (p. 13). 
  
Koenigsberg summarises this phantasy as “the nation is a living organism”; this 
organism is suffering from a “disease”, the source of which is a particular class 
of persons lying within the body of this organism; in order to cure this disease, 
and thereby to “save the nation,” it may be necessary to remove this class of 
persons from within the body of the nation” (p. 15).  
 
As we can see, these psychoanalytical concepts describe the unconscious feelings 
of Malays with regard to foreigners in Tanah Melayu. As emphasised in several 
places and confirmed by historians, the Malays were not happy to grant 
citizenship to Chinese and Indians and it was only agreed to by the Malays after a 
hard bargain with the British who were adamant that the Chinese, Indians and 
other minority races should be given citizenship in exchange for independence. 
On paper the Malays have accepted but in effect they still have not fully accepted 
the immigrant races as a “legitimate” part of Tanah Melayu.  
 
The reality of the interethnic relations that exist in Malaysia is described by 
Zamani (2002) as coy and jovial on the surface but deep-rooted resentment and 
prejudice are common traits even though the various races have lived side by side 
for more than a century.  
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The race relations in Malaysia could be illustrated clearly by using Schein’s 
levels of culture (2004). In Chapter 3, we saw Schein’s levels of culture being 
divided into three levels.  
 
At the surface level is the level of artefacts which includes all the phenomena that 
one sees, hears and feels. Artefacts include the visible products of the group, such 
as architecture of the physical environment, products, artistic creations, its style 
embodied in clothing, manners of address, emotional displays and visible 
behaviour of a group’s members. Artefacts also include explicit culture, the 
observable reality of language, food, buildings, houses, monuments, agriculture, 
shrines, markets, fashion and art. 
 
The second level is the “espoused values and beliefs” which refers to a group’s 
values – religious, moral and other values reinforced by members of a group.  
 
The third level is “basic underlying assumptions” which are strongly held values 
in a group which are non-confrontational and non-debatable and hence extremely 
difficult to change. 
  
In Malaysia, the two major races (i.e. the Malays and Chinese) have a lot of 
overlap in the artefacts level. They enjoy each other’s food and attend functions 
and celebrations of each other. For example; the Chinese inviting the Malays for 
their New Year celebrations, Chinese women wearing Malay dress as their 
working attire in offices and all the races enjoying various common celebrations 
etc. Similarly, Malays invite the other races to their homes during their religious 
festivals such as Eid, marking the end of Ramadan. This could be represented as 
in the diagram (Figure 42) below: 
 
 
 
As we move down to the espoused values and beliefs, there is still some overlap 
where both races have common values and beliefs such as respect to elders, belief 
in hierarchy, some common superstitious beliefs and other common values 
propagated by Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism.  
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This could be shown in the diagram (Figure 43) below:  
 
 
 
When we move to the third level which is the basic assumptions, then there is 
total divergence between the two races as shown in Figure 44 below: 
 
 
 
Some of the examples of divergent basic assumptions could be the following:  
 
a)  The Malays consider themselves as the rightful people of the country, 
Malaysia and others as immigrants. The Chinese on the other hand also feel 
that they have lived in Malaysia for several generations and Malaysia is 
their country too.  
 
b)  The Malay feeling is that the Chinese came to their country penniless and 
made themselves wealthy from the rich resources of their homeland. The 
Chinese look at this in a different way. They came to Malaysia without 
anything and through sheer hard work and industriousness they became 
wealthy and the Malays are envious of them.  
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c)  The Malay assumption that if the Chinese really believe they are also the 
real people of Malaysia they must only learn Malay and not give 
importance to Chinese language; while the Chinese assumption is that it is 
part of my culture and my right to learn my language and you have no right 
to prevent me.  
 
These are some illustrations to show how fundamentally, the Malays and Chinese 
have different basic assumptions and the uniformity is only seen visibly at the 
artefacts’ level and somewhat less at the espoused values and beliefs’ level.  
 
At a dining table conversation in a Malay home, the chances are, if the topic of 
discussion is about Chinese, then the adult members of the family are more often 
likely to talk negatively about the Chinese and their behaviour. When children 
from young onwards listen to such conversations, the ‘we-ness’ in them is further 
strengthened. There is of course the other side of the coin. In a ‘Chinese only’ 
environment, the discussions are also more likely to be centred on the Malay 
negative traits. These are passed on consciously through observable behaviour 
and unconsciously through transgenerational transmission from one generation to 
the other. In this regard, Isaacs’ (1975) observation of the Malay Chinese 
relations in Malaysia is worth noting: 
  
Although Chinese racial and cultural chauvinism is a well-known fact, its 
particulars have been little studied….In the conflict between Chinese and 
Malays in Malaysia, for example, the racial issue- and any expression of 
it bearing on skin color, in particular –is quite marginal compared to the 
cultural, historical, economic, and political issues that lie between the two 
groups. But even so, the powerful and highly chauvinistic Chinese cultural 
self-image reinforces itself by views of others expressed, as Chinese 
feelings so often are, in physical terms. While the most common local 
Chinese term for Malays is probably malai-kwai, or “Malay devils”, 
another common one is bla-chan, literally, “prawn-paste”, a way of 
referring to the Malays as “brown” with the additional suggestion of dark 
and unattractive.  
 
The Chinese term for Indians in Malaysia is tousee-kwai, tousee meaning 
a kind of black bean, the literal rendering thus becoming “black bean 
devils” (pp. 61-62).  
 
Pye (1985) has the following observation about the racial relations between 
Malays and Chinese in Malaysia: 
 
At a deep psychological level the extreme contrasts between the ways in 
which the two cultures handle anxiety are not only different but 
profoundly antagonistic. And even on the surface these cultures present 
numerous cultures of conflict that make Chinese and Malays scornful of 
each other. The Chinese are urban people, interested in money and 
market activities, and they are committed to self-improvement and have 
strong family ties. The Malays are rural, are contemptuous of merchants, 
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prefer service careers in the army and the police, are more easy-going in 
social relations, and are tolerant of divorce. The Chinese are at home in a 
“tightly structured” society; the Malays have a “loosely structured” 
society. With respect to religion and customs, the two rub each other the 
wrong way: Malays practice Islam in varying degrees but they universally 
abhor the pig; Chinese have vaguer religious identity and are fond of 
eating pork (p. 250).  
 
Earlier I had referred to Volkan’s (1997; 1999b) description of animals being 
used as symbols in a pathological way to dehumanisation of an enemy. The 
Malays, who abhor the pig (as it is forbidden in their religion), associate the 
Chinese with pigs as the latter love to eat pork and consider the pig as a symbol 
of prosperity.  
 
Therefore; a major divergence of the basic assumptions of the Malays and the 
Chinese has created a feeling of ‘us’ and ‘them’ at a deeper and unconscious 
level. On the surface levels, both at artefacts and espoused values however, there 
are some basic similarities acquired over time which creates the feeling of 
harmony. A classic example of artefact in recent times is the symbol of 1Malaysia 
we see everywhere we turn in Malaysia. While the concept of 1Malaysia is an 
excellent attempt to unify the various races in Malaysia, it must however be 
realised that its effect and affect will only be at the artefacts level and not at a 
deeper level.  
 
We shall see later in the chapter, how the race relations in Malaysia has a bearing 
on the Malay entrepreneurship and business leadership.  
 
7.14 The NEP and its impediments to Malay success in business leadership 
 
The NEP in its original formulation can be considered as one of the best 
strategies anywhere in the world to uplift the economically backward segment of 
a country’s population without meddling too much, the existing economic 
structure. In newly-independent countries in Asia and Africa, the temptation 
usually was to nationalise the successful industries in the hope of re-distributing 
wealth through the state. This methodology of nationalisation has been a recipe 
for disaster everywhere because nationalised industries were never able to 
compete with the private sector. This policy was abandoned in countries like the 
United Kingdom and India and by the 1980s the reverse (i.e. privatisation) had 
become the trend.  
   
Malaysia to its credit and long-term vision of its good political leaders never 
resorted to nationalisation to re-distribute wealth but relied heavily on 
restructuring society in a more pragmatic manner through the following 
principles which had two major goals or prongs for NEP: 
 
1)  To reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and 
increasing opportunities for all Malaysians; and 
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2)  To accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct 
economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function.  
 
It was assumed by the policy-makers that the disparity between the economic and 
social position of the Malays on the one hand and the non-Malays, especially the 
Chinese on the other, had been the root cause of racial tensions and, was the 
major threat to political stability in the future.  
 
As part of the restructuring of the society under the NEP some benefits 
exclusively for the Malays and other indigenous communities were promised – 
employment in the various sectors of the economy and employment at all 
occupational levels should reflect the racial composition of the country by 1990; 
ownership of productive wealth should be restructured so that by 1990 the 
Malays and other indigenous people own and operate at least 30% of the total 
(Crouch, 1996).  
 
The NEP was not about the expropriation of existing wealth and its transfer from 
old to newcomers. The NEP therefore, has to be divided into three parts when 
reviewing its success: 
 
1)  eradication of poverty; 
2)  employment at all occupational levels; and 
3)  30% ownership of productive wealth. 
 
When people talk about and criticise the failure of NEP nowadays, it is only 
related to item 3 above, i.e. 30% ownership of productive wealth. It must be 
admitted and admired that the government has succeeded in the first item above 
as the poverty level in Malaysia is estimated to be less than 2%. There is hardly 
any hard-core poverty which means no Malaysian is starving for food like many 
parts of the developing world in Africa and Asia. 
 
The NEP has also succeeded in the employment structure generally. There may 
be pockets of non-fulfilment here and there but overall, over the last forty years 
since NEP was introduced, we have seen a more than satisfying growth in the 
professional class of Malays in all fields, such as financial services, education, 
health care, real estate, law and engineering. 
 
The government must be credited for its success of NEP in the first two 
categories above.  
 
However, it is with achieving a 30% target in equity ownership of the productive 
wealth of the nation that the Malays, in spite of every possible help accorded to 
them, have repeatedly failed. This became a big concern of the government and 
the leaders because of the time-frame allotted to achieve the target was only 
twenty years initially and after even forty years, the target has not been met. In a 
dynamic and growing economy once the target is not achieved it will be 
increasingly difficult to catch up.  
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So what are the factors that have impeded the development of Malays as 
successful businessmen under the NEP? 
 
Thus far, we have seen the clinical aspects of the Malays which hampered their 
development because of large-group regression for more than 450 years. This is 
the major impediment for the Malays to be developed as successful businessmen. 
 
The NEP in its objective was a great instrument that the Government used rather 
unconsciously to bring the Malays out of regression to progression. But because 
the Malays have been in regression for a long period of time, it is not possible to 
bring them out of regression so easily. After a nation or large-group emerges from 
a crisis or break-up of a political system (in our case colonisation), a period of re-
stabilisation typically follows and the group remains for some time, in a regressed 
state (Volkan, 2004).  
 
After merdeka, the Malays were allowed to continue in a regressed state for far 
too long and after the 1969 racial riots, the government in its hurry to bring about 
changes to the economic position of the Malays, seems to have made several 
wrong assumptions primarily in the area of developing the Malay businessmen 
and entrepreneurs.  
 
I will elaborate on the fundamentally flawed assumptions which were obstacles 
for the successful implementation of an otherwise great plan.  
 
i) First and foremost, the planners of NEP who were all educated Malays and 
some non-Malay experts grossly underestimated the period needed to 
transform the Malay society in its regressed state to be an entrepreneurial 
society like the Chinese in Malaysia. 
  
Twenty years was too short a time-frame to transform a society that has had 
little commercial experience in the previous 450 years. The Malays who 
were in the government responsible for the planning of NEP, probably 
underestimated the time-frame needed to develop the Malays. It must be 
remembered that this elite class of Malays in the government was most 
likely a part of the small percentage of fortunate Malays who either were 
not in regression or had got themselves out of regression through good 
education. As no one then understood the full psychological impact that had 
affected the Malays over generations, they could have assumed that the 
entire Malay race could be transformed to become a progressive society 
within a period of twenty years. No one then could understand the 
psychological complexity that had affected the Malays. This ignorance of 
the psychological problem could be excused then as even Volkan’s large-
group identity and large-group regression theory was formulated only in the 
1990s. That the government had underestimated the time-frame required for 
NEP was clearly evident during the focus group discussions and expert 
panel interviews. Most members of the focus groups and expert panels 
agreed that on hindsight, a twenty-year time-frame was rather too short and 
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ambitious. This is one of the reasons for the government to keep extending 
the NEP through various different policies such as NDP and now NEM.  
 
ii) The Government took an overly simplistic approach and underestimated the 
complexity involved in the transition process to transform the Malays from 
their traditional occupations of farming and fishing to become successful 
businessmen. They only focused on the lack of opportunities and lack of 
financial resources and miscalculated and underestimated the challenges 
that one has to go through, from being a son of a farmer or a fisherman to 
being an entrepreneur.  
 
It is a major transition for the Malay as an individual and the society as a 
whole and involves several phases of development. The psychological 
issues of managing transition and the human dimension to handle the 
change were hardly paid attention to.  
 
The ambition of the government to engage the Malays in business is a 
major change management process. It is not just a matter of improving the 
managerial or leadership skills of Malays to be more successful in business.  
It was a question of how to bring Malays who were hardly in business for 
several centuries, to the forefront of the corporate and business world so 
that at the end of the process, the Malays in aggregate own 30% of the 
productive wealth of the nation. Given the mammoth task, we can 
understand now, more so on hindsight, how much the government 
underestimated the ambitious task in its hand.  
 
On the area of leadership and change Heifetz, Grashow & Linsky (2009) 
are of the view that the most common cause of failure in leadership is 
produced by treating adaptive challenges as if they were technical 
problems.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that the Malay political leaders treated the 
development of Malay business leaders as a technical problem. In all the 
documents pertaining to NEP, one hardly sees the challenges in relation to 
how to make the Malays adapt to new realities of embracing business 
leadership. Attention was only centred on creating new opportunities for the 
Malays (Dr Mahathir, 1970). However, in later years the leaders did talk 
about culture and value system but still failed to grasp how major a problem 
it was to transform an entire society from the rural mindset to modern 
business leadership (Dr Mahathir, 2002).  
 
The political leadership oversimplified the process and was frustrated when 
it met with failures beyond the imagination of the top leaders. There is a 
sense of betrayal felt by the political leaders on the part of Malays for not 
measuring up to the expectations of the leadership in achieving success in 
business.  
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So what went wrong among other things, is the failure of the government to 
comprehend the issues of transforming the Malays as successful business 
leaders. 
  
To further elaborate on Heifetz et al’s distinction between technical and 
adaptive problems, they describe adaptive challenges as those which can 
only be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, habits and 
loyalties. Making progress requires going beyond any authoritative 
expertise to mobilise discovery, shedding certain entrenched ways, 
tolerating losses and generating the new capacity to thrive anew. 
  
Unfortunately, as Heifetz et al acknowledge, problems do not always come 
neatly packed as either ‘technical’ or ‘adaptive’. Then, how does one know 
whether the challenge is primarily technical or primarily adaptive? You can 
never be certain, but there are some useful diagnostic clues. You know you 
are dealing with something more than a technical issue when people’s 
hearts and minds need to change, and not just their preferences or routine 
behaviours. In adaptive challenge, people have to learn new ways and 
choose between what appear to be contradictory values. Cultures must 
distinguish what is essential from what is expendable as they struggle to 
move forward (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002).  
 
By technical, it is meant solving problems (though complex and critical) 
through known solutions that can be implemented by current know-how. 
They can be resolved through the “application of authoritative expertise” 
(Heifetz et al, 2009, p. 19) 
 
Let us take an illustration in the Malay scenario to appreciate the technical 
and adaptive problems.  
 
Imagine Ali is a fisherman in a Malay village who goes fishing in a sampan 
(small boat) which is not motorised. The government through its initiative 
may provide him with a new motorboat for his fishing business. It means 
teaching Ali to use the new boat and providing basic training on 
maintaining it etc. This involves only a technical change in Ali’s life as a 
fisherman which he could cope with some effort and training. 
  
But if the government through the NEP provides the opportunity to set up 
say a grocery shop in his village by providing him with capital and even 
training – that is an adaptive change.  
 
Ali as a fisherman goes fishing in the morning and returns by mid-day, sells 
his fish and relaxes for the rest of the day. Fishing no doubt, is not an easy 
profession; he has to wake up early, face the sea and spend half a day in his 
work etc. But once his task is completed he is a free man. And if the 
weather is bad, it is his decision if he wants to go fishing that day or not.  
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Having been used to such a life for several years, if Ali were to operate a 
grocery shop, he has to keep stock; open at regular hours; re-order stocks; 
deal with multiple suppliers and customers; keep a bank account etc. The 
technical part in the business is making payments, keeping accounts, 
ordering goods etc., but the loss of his freedom as a fisherman and his 
decision to take a day off during bad weather, and the free time he has at his 
disposal after half-a-day of hard work, would not be that easy for Ali to 
accept and that is the adaptive challenge.  
 
This kind of change would create a massive emotional problem for Ali if he 
is unable to adapt to his new situation. The need to make the transformation 
could be very stressful, both for Ali and Ali’s social environment. 
 
“Core distinctive aspect of leading adaptive change is that you must 
connect with the values, beliefs, and anxieties of the people you are trying 
to move” (Heifetz et al, 2009, p. 38). 
 
Adaptive leadership is about will plus skill and needs to be designed 
carefully and skilfully to achieve success. 
 
“Leadership is necessary when logic is not the answer. Leading adaptive 
change is not about making a better argument or about loading people up 
with more facts” (Heifetz et al, 2009, p. 38). 
 
The authors illustrate this with an example of smoking. If Ahmad is a 
smoker, like most smokers he knows full well that the habit is bad for his 
health. More white papers on the dangers of tobacco and more pictures of 
diseased lungs are not going to change his behaviour. Whatever is keeping 
him stuck in the habit is going to be below his neck. To “move” Ahmad off 
tobacco, one would have to understand and address the needs that are 
making him smoke, whether it gives him pleasure, reduces his anxiety or 
reminds him of his beloved dad. 
  
The same is true for exercising leadership, say Heifetz et al.  “You are 
trying to move people who have not been convinced by logic and facts. 
They prefer the status quo to the risks of doing things differently. They are 
stuck in their hearts and stomachs, not in their heads. To move them you 
need to reach them there. If you are not engaged with your own hearts, you 
will find it virtually impossible to connect with theirs” (Heifetz et al, 2009, 
p. 38).  
   
The argument here is not that the Malay situation is totally adaptive and not 
technical at all. There are of course technical issues involved, such as 
proper training and education, exposure to managing cash flow, marketing 
etc. But what we need to understand is that the adaptive part was to a large 
extent ignored in the development of business leadership.  
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Table 40 below provides a summary of distinguishing technical problems 
and adaptive challenges.   
 
Table 40: Technical problems and adaptive challenges  
 
Kind of challenge Problem definition Solution Locus of work 
 
Technical 
 
 
Clear 
 
Clear 
 
Authority 
 
Technical and 
adaptive 
 
 
Clear 
 
Requires learning 
 
Authority and 
stakeholders 
 
Adaptive 
 
 
Requires learning 
 
Requires learning 
 
Stakeholders 
 (Heifetz, et al, 2009, p. 20) 
 
Adaptive leadership is the practice of mobilising people to tackle tough 
challenges and thrive. Heifetz et al (2009) draw the concept of thriving 
from evolutionary biology, in which they say, a successful adaptation has 
three characteristics:- 
 
1)  Essential DNA for the species’ continued survival is preserved; 
2) The DNA that no longer serves the species’ current needs are discarded 
(reregulated or rearranged); and 
3)  DNA arrangements that give the species the ability to flourish in new 
ways and in more challenging environments are created.  
 
Successful adaptations enable a living system to take the best from its 
history into the future. Heifetz et al provide the following six criteria for a 
successful adaptive leadership:- 
 
a) Adaptive leadership is specifically about change that enables capacity 
to thrive; 
b) Successful adaptive changes build on the past rather than jettison it; 
c) Organisational adaptation occurs through experimentation; 
d) Adaptation relies on diversity; 
e) New adaptation significantly displace, reregulate and rearrange some 
old DNA.; and 
f) Adaptation takes time.  
 
iii) The Government did not pay attention to the Malay culture.  
 
We have seen in Chapter 3, the importance of culture in shaping a 
community and its way of life. After looking at the Malays through four 
cultural models, we were able to make a synthesis of the four cultural 
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models of Hofstede, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Schein and Kets de 
Vries et al, and so we were able to build the cultural construct of a Malay.  
 
We found that the Malays have a very strong power distance in which they 
acknowledge and accept that power is distributed unequally. They are 
collectivist by nature where the interest of the group prevails over the 
interest of the individual. 
 
Malays also fall under the low uncertainty avoidance group. The Malays 
lean more towards particularism and are ascription-oriented where 
relationship more than anything else matters. As they are collectivist by 
nature, they also fall in the category of being a communitarian society 
where they help one another. All these attributes also make them diffuse in 
nature where it takes time to build a relationship. The Malays do not show 
their emotions openly and are by nature shy and are therefore culturally 
neutral.  
 
The Malay communication is high context in nature and is rarely direct to 
the point. The high context culture of the Malays, also make them 
polychronic and they do several things at the same time and urgency of 
time is of little concern to them.  
 
We also saw the sixteen salient Malay characteristics such as their utmost 
regard to the Sultan which is the concept of daulat (divine sanction); their 
respect for hierarchy, status and rank; their deep influence of feudalism; 
their love for artefacts and form over substance; their urge for instant 
gratification; the ease of influence by others; their belief in fatalism and 
deep impact of religion; their attributes of sabar (patience); kasihan 
(sympathy) and malu (shame); envy; dependency on their trickery like the 
Sang Kancil (mousedeer). All of these Malay characteristics fitted well with 
the four cultural models and of the sixteen traits, ten of them were in one 
way or another associated with feudalism. It is therefore not surprising that 
Hofstede’s study ranked Malaysia as number one in Power Distance 
because feudalism and power distance are but two sides of the same coin. 
  
By not paying attention to Malay culture, the government failed to 
understand the Malays when they launched the NEP in 1971 which is the 
most important policy ever for the country since merdeka. Naturally it has 
cost the government a lot in terms of cost and time.  
 
The well-known Malay anthropologist Alatas (1977) observed that “the 
subject of Malay backwardness had continuously attracted attention since 
Abdullah wrote his account of his trip to Kelantan in Singapore in 1838. 
Before the Second World War, a Malay Dato Setia Raja Abdullah 
commented on the need to bring about a change of outlook amongst the 
Malays. He found the superstitious and magical practices amongst some 
Malay farmers inimical to progress…. After the Second World War, Malay 
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leaders like Dato’ Onn bin Ja’afar and Burhanuddin Helmy concerned 
themselves with the Malay backwardness” (p. 167).  
 
After independence too, this topic was often discussed. Well-known 
economist Ungku Abdul Aziz wrote on Malay poverty (Alatas 1977).  
 
Alatas further laments that the idea of mental revolution, a radical change in 
outlook was suggested by him in an article published in 1959. He also 
claims that in 1960, he noted three major problems facing the Malay 
community in Malaysia – to raise the standard of living of the people, to 
preserve the Malay language and culture and to “…accomplish a revolution 
in thought and attitude, abandoning that which obstructs progress, striving 
for that which is good…. A rejection of feudal values and ideas and 
retaining the valuable in Malay culture should inspire a mental revolution 
(revolusi rohani) and our striving in the future, not a clinging to that which 
is stale and polluted…” (p. 167).  
 
While it is true that many writers have pointed out in the past the need for a 
mental revolution, almost everyone who criticised the Malays assumed that 
a mental revolution of discarding what they consider as negative traits and 
adoption of what they recommend as positive traits for progress, could be 
achieved by the Malays at their will and is not an issue. This is where 
almost all Malay leaders, thinkers and writers erred. That “culture consists 
in patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, acquired and 
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups including their embodiment in artifacts: the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas 
and especially their attacked values was completely  ignored” (Kluckhohn, 
1951). 
 
They had no empathy and gave scant attention to the reality of life where 
“culture also is a remarkably durable and persistent factor in human affairs. 
It is the dynamic vessel that holds and revitalizes the collective memories of 
the people by giving emotional life to traditions. Culture has this vital 
quality because it resides in the personality of everyone who has been 
socialized to it. People cling to their cultural ways not because of some 
vague feeling for their historical legacies and traditions, but because their 
culture is part and parcel of their personalities – and we know from 
psychoanalysis how hard (and expensive) it is to change a personality. 
Cultural change therefore involves true trauma” (Pye, 1985, p. 20).  
 
7.15 The Chinese factor in NEP 
 
When the NEP was proclaimed as a national policy – whether the Chinese 
objected to it or not – their natural reaction was to oppose it; if not vocally then 
through their actions. Although the NEP meant to increase the Chinese 
productive wealth from 30% to 40% and that Malay wealth was to be increased 
from less than 2% to 30%, the reduction in the wealth would be mainly from 
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foreigners who held 70% of Malaysia’s corporate wealth in 1971. Even the 
reduction in foreign wealth was to be mainly from the future economic expansion 
which would reduce their wealth consequently. It must be remembered that the 
foreign holdings in Malaysia was mainly held through large corporations. All 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) were exclusively in Chinese hands 
and a small percentage in the hands of Indians and other races.   
        
Immediately, the Chinese in Malaysia could see the threat to their almost 
monopolistic position in the SME which they had enjoyed for more than a 
century. 
 
There are historical records of how the non-Malays had consistently kept the 
Malays out of any form of business. “Everywhere the Chinese and Indians are 
inflexible in excluding the Malay from commerce. When the Kedah Government 
once called for tenders for the erection of buildings and stipulated that a quarter 
of the labour force must be Malay, no Chinese or Indians would condone the 
breaking of their closed ring by tendering, though payment of 10% above the sum 
tendered was offered. When a Malay cooperative society tried to export its copra 
by a Chinese coastal steamer to Singapore, the first cargo was left on the jetty and 
the second was found on arrival to have mysteriously diminished. When the 
government gave loans to Perak fishermen to get them out of the clutch of the 
Chinese middlemen, the Chinese manufacturers at Penang refused to sell the 
fisherman ice” (Winstedt, p.143). 
  
An expert panel member referring to the private sector said, “..it’s largely 
controlled by non-Malays…but they don’t practise fair play and fair trade so 
therefore the Bumiputras have no chance to access their markets although they 
(referring to Bumiputras
42) may be equally efficient… You see Malays don’t 
control the supply chain…We have some studies in the EPU (referring to the 
Economic Planning Unit
43
) and the government, when a board gives 100% to 
Bumiputras, 70 to 80% easily leak out from the system by procurements of 
supplies (to non-Malays)
44
. So these are the reasons here – 1) the Bumiputras 
don’t control the supply chain and 2) the private sector literally closes them so 
they (referring to Bumiputras) are just fighting within a very small market” 
(recorded interview).   
 
Thus, before merdeka the non-Malays openly blocked every opportunity to get 
Malays involved in commerce and now they do it in more subtle ways through 
their trade associations, clans and kongsi-s (triad societies) to prevent Malay 
participation in business. 
 
Even now one hears off and on, stories such as a Malay bread manufacturer’s 
products are being boycotted by the Chinese because the Malay baker stopped 
                                                 
42
  Researcher’s interpretation of the interview 
43
  Researcher’s interpretation of the interview 
44
  Researcher’s interpretation of the interview 
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buying from a well-known Chinese flour distributor. In such instances the 
animosity is never open; it is always behind the curtain. 
 
Therefore; the Malay dream of becoming successful entrepreneurs in certain 
trades and industries is still subtly being thwarted by the well-entrenched and 
experienced non-Malays. 
  
7.16 Unconscious impact of culture in business 
 
We have seen in Chapter 3 how the Malay society is collectivist in nature, 
espouses communitarianism and cooperation with one another in a concept 
known as gotong-royong.  
 
As I had pointed out earlier under large-group regression, because of the harsh 
feudal and colonial administrations, the common Malays had traditionally relied 
on one another for support, giving birth to collectivism as a way of life. The 
modern entrepreneurism based on Western capitalist model is contradictory to 
collectivism and encourages individualism for success. The Malays are not used 
to the philosophy of individualism and therefore, are caught in a dilemma. 
Unconsciously, the defence mechanism of splitting would make them feel guilty 
in discarding their collectivist activities to go for unlimited greed in making 
profits.  
 
Pye (1985) is of the opinion that there are many different paths towards 
modernisation and therefore he will be generally unsympathetic to the suggestion 
that what has been effective in one country should necessarily be tried in another. 
What the Malays were subjected to in making them business leaders was the 
Western model which could be one factor for failure among the Malays. “The fact 
that most Asians were latecomers and had to react to the impact of the West gave 
a common dimension to Asian problems of modernization. Moreover there do 
seem to be some features of Asian civilizations that have set them apart from 
Western civilization. Probably the most significant of these is the Asian tendency 
to place more value on the collectivity and to be less sensitive than the West to 
the values of individualism…. Thus the Western belief that progress should result 
in ever greater scope for individual autonomy is not taken so self-evident by most 
Asians, who are more inclined to believe that greater happiness comes from 
suppressing self-interest in favour of group solidarity” (Pye, 1985, p.26).  
 
While the failure rate of the Malays in individual businesses may have been high, 
there are several shining models of success where the concept of cooperation was 
emulated. Examples of such success stories in Malaysia are: 
 
1) The Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) is a Malaysian 
government agency that was the brainchild of the country’s second Prime 
Minister, Abdul Razak Hussein. Established in 1956, FELDA handles the 
resettlement of the rural poor into newly-developed areas and focuses on 
opening smallholder farms growing cash crops. The commodity company 
processes palm oil, rubber and sugar and manages more than two million 
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acres of plantation, making it one of the world’s largest producers of palm 
oil. In June 2012, FELDA raised US$3.1 billion from its initial public 
offering (IPO) which was the second largest IPO in the world after 
Facebook and the biggest IPO in Asia for 2012.   
 
2) Tabung Haji (Muslim Pilgrims Fund Board) is an independent 
governmental organisation established in 1963 that acts as a savings 
institution for Muslims (especially the poor and needy) to perform their 
pilgrimage to Mecca. With investments in plantations, banking, real-estate 
and manufacturing industries, Tabung Haji is currently a very successful 
investment fund management company with more than 5 million 
depositors and US$9 billion in assets. Today, Tabung Haji’s total funds 
under management are RM23 billion (approximately US$7.5 billion), 
making it the largest non-banking Islamic savings institution in the world.  
 
3) Established in 1954, Bank Rakyat is an entity under the purview of the 
Domestic Trade, Cooperative and Consumerism Ministry. It is currently 
the largest Islamic cooperative bank in Malaysia, with a banking system 
that is based fully on Shariah principles. Its banking products and services 
include consumer financing, commercial financing and deposit as well as 
investment products to cater for various segments of the market. Bank 
Rakyat has consecutively recorded rising profits over the years, posting a 
record net profit that rose 49.5% to RM2 billion in 2011 from 2010 and 
with total assets worth RM72.48 billion at the end of December 2011. 
 
4) Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Malaysia’s largest fund 
management company, was established in March 1978 with the aim of 
serving the Bumiputra community.  In 1979, PNB established Amanah 
Saham Nasional Berhad (ASNB) a wholly-owned subsidiary company, to 
manage the unit trust funds launched by PNB. ASNB has maintained its 
position as a leading unit trust manager in Malaysia, controlling more than 
40% of the total units in circulation. With 10 unit trust funds, 79 billion 
units in circulation and 9 million account holders represented mainly by 
the Bumiputra and to a smaller extent non-Bumiputra communities
45
, 
PNB is now one of the region’s leading investment institutions, with over 
RM120 billion (US$ 40 billion) worth of assets under its management. 
PNB now controls over 300 unlisted and listed leading companies 
including Sime Darby Berhad, Malayan Banking Berhad and Malayan 
Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF). 
 
All of the above institutions were set up in line with the Malay concept of 
collectivism where hundreds of thousands of people pool their resources into 
savings and the funds collected invested in various investments. This cooperative 
and mutual fund model has been successful among the Malays with the support 
and guidance of the government.  
                                                 
45
 ASNB recently opened its doors to allow non-Malays to invest in selected funds. Previously only 
Malays were entitled to invest in the ASNB funds.  
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7.17 The selection process to develop Malay entrepreneurs 
 
The selection process of identifying Malay entrepreneurs by the government to 
fulfil the NEP objectives has been identified as one of the causes for the lack of 
success of the policy. 
 
This process by the government unconsciously followed the feudalistic mindset 
of only selecting a few Malays who were well-connected with the government or 
political leaders.   
 
Jomo & Wee (2004) have also supported the view of this growing abuse by the 
politically well-connected as follows, “The growing abuse of ethnic privileges, 
especially by the politically well-connected, has probably contributed to the 
cultural alienation and Islamic resurgence of the last three decades, with dissent 
among Malays increasingly expressed in an Islamic idiom” (p. 2). 
 
As much as the government leaders criticise feudalism and the need for the 
Malays to discard feudalism, the same Malay leaders who criticise it also fall into 
the same trap. As in the early days of feudalism where only the royalty and noble 
class were involved in trade to the exclusion of the common people, in today’s 
feudalism, only the players or actors have changed but the system seems to be 
still deeply ingrained among all Malays.  
 
Instead of royalty who chose the few who can be in trade, today the politicians 
choose who are to be involved in major businesses. There is widespread 
dissatisfaction among the Malays and it was clear during the focus group 
discussions and expert panel interviews that there is a lack of transparency in the 
selection process of awarding government contracts and privatisation. Figure 45 
depicts the shift in the feudalist mindset of the Malays from daulat historically to 
political leaders currently. 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 45> 
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Figure 45: Feudalism in the Malay mindset: past and present 
 
 
 
 
 
While some politicians have defended their actions by saying that they have to award the 
contracts to people they know who are capable, deep down and unconsciously, it is 
feudalism, particularism and ascription that decide who the winners are. It is still the selected 
number of Malay elite who are repeatedly given major government contracts and businesses. 
As described by one expert panel member, “I think you have to find the flaws with NEP. The 
first problem is the whole short-cut situation. But within the whole context of the creation of 
businessmen with the broader NEP umbrella, there was never really a notion of meritocratic 
principles to that exercise. The party or leaders were bent on picking and deciding on who the 
winners were going to be. The logical thing was to bring a roomful of Malays who are going 
to do business and tell them “you’re going to have the common opportunities and you’re 
going to compete with each other like hell like everybody else. As you climb the pyramid of 
success there will be people who fall on the wayside, and eventually the cream will rise to the 
top. I’m not so sure in the context of modern Malay experiment which still smacks of Malay-
feudal practices, whether there was really a deep interest to see a general success of that 
policy or whether to see success of favoured ones. If you’re looking for root causes, it’s 
somewhere there. I’m not saying the experiment was dishonest but there is this cultural 
imperative in the Malay community. It is a very feudal structure…While NEP seeks to create 
Malay entrepreneurial grouping or a broad-based Malay business presence, it also sought to 
determine who the winners are and that is a fatal flaw.” Another expert panel member also 
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agreed on the feudal mindset: “…we may be into 52nd46 year of independence, but feudalism 
is getting stronger and stronger. I am not a very popular person and I’m not likely to get a 
government contract because I keep reminding the politicians that we vote, we pay your 
salary, because we think that you can do the job. We didn’t force them, but they offered 
themselves. In Malaysia, if a minister does something good, we must praise them. Doing 
something good is his duty and is expected of him, but if he does the wrong thing and we 
point it out to him, he gets very upset whereas it is incumbent upon us to point out to him that 
he is doing something wrong which is not within the contract….I was born before merdeka 
and I was raised in a part British and part national system. My generation is less feudal but 
the younger ones, even those who graduated from Harvard, Oxford etc., when they join 
politics, they succumb….” 
 
Another theory that the politicians use to justify the award of businesses to a very 
few group of people is that the government wanted to create a few billionaires so 
that these billionaires can provide opportunities to other Malays; so as the 
billionaires grow more and more successful, they will in turn create hundreds of 
successful Malay businessmen in a chain reaction. This policy also failed for two 
reasons:- 
 
1)  The policy itself did not succeed as there were more failures than successes; 
and 
 
2)  Even the few who were successful did not help the Malays as the Malay 
leaders expected. 
 
On the other hand, because of the defence mechanism to identify with the 
aggressor, the few successful Malays were more comfortable dealing with other 
successful businessmen who are usually Chinese. The successful Malays, instead 
of helping other Malays as envisaged, looked down upon the not-so-successful 
ones with scorn and felt happy to associate themselves with non-Malays. 
 
The concept of identifying with the aggressor is further reinforced by the 
observation made by Sloane-White (2008): “It’s not only the Chinese who may 
be blamed for Malay failure, but also other, less virtuous Malays variously placed 
throughout capitalist society. Thus it is not only the ‘Chinese other’ that evokes a 
Malay reaction: crucial tales of Malay class vulnerability vis-à-vis a discursive 
‘Malay other’ snake in and out of the explanations and understandings of 
capitalist failure....... Sometimes... the ‘Malay other’ is the Malay elite, the 
politicians and the ‘top people’ with friends in high places. These Malays are 
often in illegitimate alliances with the ‘Chinese other’…” (p. 480). 
 
7.18 Inadequate training and development 
 
Many Malays became businessmen and entrepreneurs without proper training and 
development. It was fashionable for every Malay living in the urban areas to call 
                                                 
46
  Malaysia is now in her 55
th
 year of independence and this quote from the panel member was made 
when this interview was conducted three years ago. 
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themselves entrepreneurs at the height of the NEP in the early 80s when several 
development agencies were set up to develop and finance the budding 
entrepreneurs. But inadequate training coupled with easily available loans from 
agencies such as MARA,
47
 PUNB
48
 and PNS
49
 and Bank Bumiputra
50
 saw the 
derailment of most of these self-styled entrepreneurs within a short period. The 
situation prevailing then is described by Sloane (1999), “… every educated 
middle-class and upper middle-class Malay man and woman I met in Kuala 
Lumpur claimed or wished to demonstrate the highly valorised position of the 
entrepreneur in economic development. In this identity was proof that my 
informants had learned everything NEP had asked of the Malay citizenry. In 
Malay life, I would learn entrepreneurship was least of all a set of business 
behaviours, it was an identity. Indeed…the business which my informants 
established to demonstrate their entrepreneurship sometimes received the least 
attention of all. As such, sequestered in my informants’ understanding of Malay 
entrepreneurship – what they construed as a never-ending set of lapidary 
behaviours intended to serve the needs of the nation and Allah – was, I was to 
learn, an enormous allowance for failure. Even the bankrupt among them could 
claim the social identity of the entrepreneur...” (p.12).  
 
7.19 The dependency syndrome 
 
The Malays have also been criticised for their dependence on the government all 
the time. However in psychoanalysis, it is said that to be dependent is the natural 
human condition; more so in a regressed group. Birth is not one’s choice and one 
cannot be born without a mother. This makes dependence a lifelong impact which 
has a psychological significance. 
  
In Western societies, such dependence in late twentieth century is becoming 
socially unacceptable and dependence is often confused with addiction and no 
difference is discerned between relying on a tradition, seeking approval of others 
or using alcohol or drugs. Even what is considered natural, is assumed often 
unconsciously to be a malign state (Carr, 2001; Kegan, 1995). This is somewhat 
in conflict with the view that there exists an innately unfolding experience of 
human relatedness. 
 
The need for attachment is considered the universal experience of wanting to be 
                                                 
47
  Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), or the Council of Trust for the People, is an agency under the 
purview of the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development that is responsible for developing, 
encouraging, facilitating and fostering the economic and social development in the federation, 
particularly in rural areas. 
48
  PUNB - Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB) is Malaysia’s national entrepreneur 
development corporation. It provides integrated entrepreneur development packages to assist 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs in Retail and Small and Medium sized Enterprise (SME) sectors.  
49
  PNS - Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PNS) is an agency under the Ministry of Domestic Trade 
Cooperatives and Consumerism, which has been mandated to lead the development of Malaysia’s 
franchise industry. PNS aims to develop the franchise industry while increasing the number of 
franchise entrepreneurs through its expertise in providing quality service and products. 
50
  Bank Bumiputra - Bank Bumiputra, now known as CIMB Bank, was originally established in 1965 for 
the purpose of providing loans to Bumiputeras in the fields of trade and industry. 
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close to others and the need for affiliation (Bowlby, 1969; Kets de Vries, 2001a). 
When the need for affiliation moves into a state of dependency and reaches a 
stage of malign state it is described as “dependency culture”- a term used in a 
political sense and regarded as an undesirable facet of life. 
 
As explained by Carr (2001), “One of the basic assumptions that Bion identified 
is that of dependence. In this mode the group regresses to seek its gratification by 
creating a leader….Not surprisingly, therefore, to be dependent is usually 
regarded as a state from which the person or group needs rescuing. Indeed, some 
characterize the state as malign: 
 
The ‘dependency’ group perceives the leader as omnipotent and omniscient while 
considering themselves inadequate, immature and incompetent…Thus primitive 
idealization, projected omnipotence, denial, envy and greed, together with 
defenses against these, characterize the dependency group and its members feel 
united by a common sense of demand that it preferred not to address into those 
who for their own needfulness, helplessness and fear of an outside world vaguely 
experienced as empty or frustrating (Kerrnberg, 1978).” 
 
The Malays are dependent on their omnipotent leaders to provide them with 
support for their survival and over time, the omnipotent leaders begin to enjoy 
this dependence. As it is from their dependent children (the Malays) the leaders 
get support for their political survival to continue as omnipotent leaders. In the 
long-run there develops a mutual dependence between the people and the leaders. 
The leaders then unconsciously want the people to remain regressed so that they 
can continue to be omnipotent and the people are happy to remain regressed as 
long as their leaders provide them with support for survival.  
 
In a Harvard Business Review article ‘The Real Reason People Won’t Change’ 
(2001) and their subsequent book ‘Immunity to Change’ (2009), Kegan and 
Lahey have described the psychological concept of competing commitment, 
otherwise called ‘immunity to change’, as a situation where a person who makes 
a commitment to change inexplicably does nothing because of a hidden 
competing commitment. It is possible that for reasons explained above the Malay 
leaders and the people unconsciously are caught in a similar trap which keeps 
them in the dependency mode and prevents them from moving out of regression 
into progression. Further research needs to be conducted in this area which I have 
discussed in my ‘Reflections for future work on Malay leadership’ in Chapter 9. 
Please refer to the Wheel of Dependency. (Figure 46). 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 46> 
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Figure 46: Unconscious collusion between politicians and Malay 
businessmen perpetuating regression in Malays resulting in 
immunity to change as hypothesized by Kegan and Lahey 
(2009) 
           
 
 
While most of the leaders criticise the Malays for the failure of the NEP, 
unconsciously many of them want the Malays to fail so that the regression of the 
large group continues for them (the leaders) to remain as omnipotent. Only a few 
leaders show genuine concern to bring the Malays out of regression into 
progression; Dr Mahathir Mohamad being one of them.  
 
Even in the Japanese society, the dependency mentality is seen to be present and 
is known as amae (Doi, 1971). Doi describes the amae mentality which has far 
reaching implications in the collectivist society in Japan. According to Ikebe 
(1999) as quoted by Berry et al (2002), “observations of specific behavior suggest 
that amae has aspects of both dependency and attachment, with aspects of 
regression to refuse the reality of separation and to acquire emotional and 
physical comforts from the target of affection. Such formulations suggest 
similarities with psychological mechanisms found elsewhere” (p. 108). Therefore, 
the dependency syndrome is not unique to the Malays alone.  
 
7.20 Current situation of the Malays 
 
Over the last forty years since the NEP was introduced in 1971, the Malays have 
been slowly getting out of the regressive mode into the progressive mode. In the 
early days after merdeka, the quality of education in Malaysia was of a very high 
standard. Students were primarily English-educated. This was part of the positive 
British legacy left behind after merdeka. Over the years however, it is generally 
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felt that the education system in Malaysia has progressively deteriorated. I found 
ample evidence of this during discussions with focus groups and expert panel 
members, all of whom criticised the present education system. Unless the 
Malaysian government makes conscious efforts to substantially improve the 
quality of education, progression of the Malays will be further delayed.  The 
quality of the education system in Malaysia is viewed by an expert panel member 
as follows:  “The problem is that we are producing Malays whom the market 
doesn’t want.” 
 
We have three groups of Malays in the country today. The first group which is 
the most successful group and forms the largest percentage in the country is the 
professional group of Malays like doctors, engineers, lawyers, accountants, 
bankers and other professional and administrative categories who, through an 
educational process which requires professional qualifications, have moved out of 
regression and can be classified as the most successful class of Malays today. 
I must mention here that I myself am a product and beneficiary of the NEP. 
Although urban-bred and having grown up in a middle class family in Penang and 
therefore spared from the large-group regression, had it not been for the 
educational policy under the NEP, I do not think my father would have been able 
to send me to the UK for higher education. My two brothers also benefitted from 
the NEP. All of us were given educational assistance by Majlis Amanah Rakyat 
(MARA)
51
 for further studies both in the country and abroad. 
 
The success in creating a professional class of Malays was primarily due to the 
emphasis of the government on education. Educating Malays in large numbers up 
to tertiary level created a major revolution among the Malays and brought them 
out of regression. In education there were no short-cuts. If a Malay wanted to 
become a doctor or engineer he has to go through the same process as a Chinese 
or an Indian or an Englishman. There are specific number of years of education 
and training required before one could become a professional in any field. By 
putting a large number of Malays through such a process under the NEP and 
creating a specialised institution called Mara Institute of Technology  (MIT) – 
sharing the same acronym as the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) – boosted the morale of the Malays and the Malaysian MIT was targeted 
with producing Malays in various professions from accounting, hotel 
management, professional secretarial courses etc., at diploma levels so that they 
could complement as technicians to the professionals. MIT was a great success 
and can be considered as the most visible success story of the NEP. Today MIT, 
currently called Universiti Technologi MARA (UiTM), has been converted to a 
full university and is the biggest university in the country. Whether it still 
maintains the same quality of education is difficult to say given that most 
members of the focus groups and expert panel criticised the deterioration in the 
quality of education in the country. 
                                                 
51
  Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), or the Council of Trust for the People, is an agency under the 
purview of the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development that is responsible for developing, 
encouraging, facilitating and fostering the economic and social development in the federation, 
particularly in rural areas. 
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At this stage, let us look at what psychoanalysis has to tell us about teaching more 
generally. “According to basic psychoanalytic model (developed mostly by 
observing children in therapeutic nursing schools and young adults in 
classrooms), the teacher emerges in a safe classroom environment, as a person in 
whom the students invest various emotions; the teacher may be experienced as an 
extension of parents or others with whom the student struggles emotionally, or he 
or she may be idealised. When possible, teachers show symbolic representations 
of the intellectual concept or perform the skill as a kind of “show and tell.” This 
performance affects the emotional state of the student, who begins to assimilate 
the meaning of the concept or skill while partly identifying with the teacher. Once 
the students come to identify with the teacher, they experience something similar 
to what psychoanalysts call the separation-individuation process of 
childhood
511
:
52
 the teacher is no longer needed once the student is able to use 
what he or she has been taught to control and relate more adaptively to his or her 
environment. Often, the younger the student is, the more prominent the emotional 
relationship between the teacher and the student. When students are older, 
rational considerations and intellectual activities tend to be superimposed on 
increasingly hidden emotional aspects of teacher-student interaction and 
identification. The student also comes to use logical thinking to evaluate critically 
what he or she is being taught. Thus it is not necessarily an obstacle to education 
when students disagree with their teacher: a good teacher will track down hidden 
concerns and help the student discuss them in order to assist the student’s 
intellectual and emotional development. “The teacher not only imparts 
knowledge, but also nurtures and empowers as the student assimilates the 
teacher’s ways of thinking and behaving and love of the topic or skill that he or 
she is teaching” 512 53 (Volkan,  2004, p. 220-221). 
 
Therefore it is critical to have good quality education to get the regressed group 
out of regression and guide them towards progression. Because of the good 
quality of education that was available in Malaysia at the time of the introduction 
of the NEP, the challenge of getting the Malays out of regression was easier. In 
the focus group and expert panel, most people were very concerned with the 
deteriorating quality of education and the poor command of English among the 
present generation of Malays. They strongly feel that changes to the education 
system needs urgent attention to keep the Malays competitive in the global 
environment. Students without a good command of English will find it extremely 
difficult to get out of their regressive environment due to their lack of confidence 
and inferiority complex. 
 
The second group of the Malays that are fewer in number are the Malay 
businessmen and entrepreneurs. They form only a small group but this group 
comprises people mainly from the Malay elite and urban-bred some of whose 
                                                 
511
 Mahler, Margaret S., on “Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation.”  
52
  The footnote (
511
 Mahler, Margaret S., ) above is an extract from Volkan’s. 
512
  Berman, Jeffret (1994), “Diaries to an English Professor: Pain and Growth in the Classroom.” Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press. 
53
  The footnote (
512
  Berman, Jeffret (1994), above is an extract from Volkan’s. 
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parents may or may not have been in the large-group regression or have managed 
to wriggle out of regression through education and experience.  
 
The third group which still comprises the majority living primarily in the rural 
and semi-urban areas are still in large-group regression. Focus should be 
emphasised on this group through conscious efforts, good education and training 
to guide them out of regression.  
 
Figure 47: Current situation of the Malays  
 
 
This pie diagram is merely for illustrative purpose and does not reflect any ratios due to 
non-availability of appropriate statistics.  
 
7.21 In conclusion 
 
It is true that the Malays have several weaknesses and no one can argue the 
weaknesses in the Malay society pointed out by several Malay thinkers and 
leaders – many of which we have highlighted in this research in several places.  
 
Abdullah and Dr Mahathir are the two most vehement critics of the Malays when 
pointing out the Malay backwardness and their attitudes. Both criticised the 
Malays out of their love for their race as well as their frustration on the lack of 
their progress.   
 
I have shown in the foregoing chapter with historical evidence supported by 
psychoanalytical theories using the Clinical Paradigm, the causes for the Malay 
backwardness in general. 
 
When a race is backward in the overall context, then it is unrealistic to expect 
them to excel in business leadership within a short span of time. Twenty or thirty 
years may be a long time in an individual’s life, but is not a long period for a 
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society or race to make adaptive transformation to be a race of successful 
entrepreneurs and businessmen, given its largely peasantry background for 
several centuries.  
 
The historical weaknesses of the Malays as pointed out by the Malay writers such 
as Abdullah were due to the large-group regression of the Malays.  The regression 
of the Malay race has not been completely overcome even after 55 years of 
merdeka. Please refer to the Cycle of Feudalism diagram (Figure 48). 
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Figure 48: Cycle of Feudalism 
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Dr Mahathir’s criticisms of the present generation of Malays taking a short-cut to 
make profits arose ironically, out of the short-cut methods the government 
employed to create Malay entrepreneurs, as rightly pointed out by one of the most 
successful entrepreneurs who was in the expert panel.  
 
The Malays deserve more empathy, better understanding and a carefully 
structured long-term programme to bring out the vast majority of who are still in 
various stages of large-group regression. In Chapter 6, when we looked at the 
Malays through the eyes of 360-degree feedback instruments, there was some 
evidence from the sample of 41 senior Malay executives to suggest how if the 
Malays are exposed to proper education, good training and development, and 
exposure, effectively bringing them into the progressive mode, they can be 
moulded into successful leaders in business. 
  
For a race that was suppressed for more than 450 years under feudalism and 
colonialism, twenty or forty years is too short a period to change an entire race to 
be as successful as the non-Malays. With a carefully researched new framework 
diligently implemented with a better quality of education, we should consider it a 
success if we are able to bring the entire Malay race out of regression into 
progression in one or two generations from now.  
 
Based on the foregoing discussions, we could possibly pinpoint the failure of the 
government to understand the Malay psychological situation and the “inner 
theatre” of the Malays as the primary cause for the lack of success in the various 
attempts by the government to help Malays achieve the NEP target.  
 
This could be analogous to the medical doctor treating a patient for stomach pain 
by prescribing pain killers when the patient really is suffering from a more 
serious ailment. In a similar fashion, the government was only addressing the 
symptoms of the Malays such as lack of capital, lack of opportunities and lack of 
availability of bank loans etc., without really understanding that the root cause of 
the Malays’ inability to cope in the business field was due mainly to large-group 
regression. 
 
Moving the Malays out of regression and making them successful business 
leaders is an adaptive challenge as we saw earlier in the chapter. As Heifetz & 
Linsky (2002) observed “Indeed the single most common source of leadership 
failure we’ve been able to identify – in politics, community life, business or the 
non-profit sector – is that people, especially those in positions of authority, treat 
adaptive challenges like technical problems” (p. 14). 
 
Heifetz & Linsky (2002) also recommend that in mobilising adaptive work we 
have to engage people in adjusting their unrealistic expectations, rather than 
satisfy them as if the situation were amenable primarily to a technical remedy. 
We have to counteract the people’s exaggerated dependency and promote their 
resourcefulness. This takes an extraordinary level of presence, time, and artful 
communication, but it may also take more time and trust than we have.  
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The greatest challenge facing the Malay leaders based on this research is to bring 
the large majority of Malays out of regression in a conscious manner. In order to 
achieve this, there is no short-cut other than providing them with the best possible 
education from young to tertiary level. Almost every expert panel member and 
the focus groups were uniformly critical of the prevailing education system in 
Malaysia which may in fact unfortunately, prolong the regression among Malays 
rather than helping them getting out of it. A thorough revamp of the education 
system for the Malays would be of immense help to them. It is ironical that the 
Chinese in Malaysia through their superior and competitive education system 
might widen the competitive gap between the two races, unless the Malays are 
also provided with the better education system. In the major Malaysian cities like 
Kuala Lumpur it is not uncommon among the more progressive Malays to send 
their children to Chinese schools. Children from the more wealthy and elite 
families are sent to international schools or overseas like the U.K, U.S and 
Australia for their high school and tertiary education leaving the majority of the 
Malays in the government institutions.  
 
These deeds seem to support the view that the education system in government 
schools and institutions of higher learning are in need of transformation. Once the 
education system is transformed and the other adaptive challenges facing the 
Malays are fully appreciated and understood, the Malays could march towards the 
path of progression more confidently – not merely in politics or business but in 
every facet of life.  
 
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, this research is exploratory in nature 
and at best, is probably the first building block to understand the Malays from the 
angle of psychodynamic psychology. Being exploratory in nature means the ideas 
and findings explored in this research are preliminary and far from being 
conclusive. Further research should be undertaken to test the validity of the 
preliminary findings of this research.  
 
At best this research would have achieved is to sow the seeds to encourage further 
research using the psychodynamic approach to have a better and deeper 
understanding of the Malays as an additional tool for political leaders and policy 
makers to formulate policies that could be implemented more successfully in 
future relating to the development of the Malays.  
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 7> 
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Chapter 8 – Knitting the Research Together 
 
In this chapter which I have called “Knitting the Research Together”, I provide the thought-
process of the entire research to knit each of the seven chapters together to provide the 
common thread from “Introduction” in Chapter 1 to “Unveiling the Malay Leadership 
Mystique through the Clinical Paradigm” in Chapter 7. 
 
The background to conducting this research was adequately explained in the introductory 
chapter.  The research started with an introduction of Malaya which later became Malaysia 
and the major economic problem facing the Malays who were backward in their own 
motherland versus the immigrant races of Chinese and Indians.  The Malay economic 
problem which was not seriously addressed by the leaders of the newly independent country, 
where political power largely vested with the Malays, erupted into racial riots when the 
political dominance of the Malays was threatened after the general elections of 1969, when 
the Malay ruling party, UMNO and its coalition partners fared badly.  The racial riots were 
interpreted largely as the result of the Malays being marginalised economically in their own 
country which went against their not totally unreasonable expectations that their economic 
position would greatly improve after merdeka.  The NEP was formulated to help the Malays 
in the economic front with special affirmative policies with the aim of Malays having a share 
of 30% in the economic pie of the nation within a twenty-year period from 1971 to 1990. 
 
The NEP did not achieve this target even after forty years in spite of the various affirmative 
policies in favour of the Malays leading to criticisms of the Malays by the Malay political 
leaders.  The failure of the Malays to take advantage of the government’s affirmative actions 
led to a widespread feeling that the Malays generally are not capable business leaders and 
entrepreneurs. 
 
As much as the Malay business leadership was under scrutiny, the very Malays who were 
beginning to be branded as incapable business leaders, were however, successfully providing 
political leadership to the country which made Malaysia an economic success story.  Though 
the economic success of Malaysia could largely be attributed to the hardworking Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Malaysia, without an appropriate and pragmatic political leadership and a 
framework of economic policies in which the Malay political leadership played a critical role, 
Malaysia could not have achieved the economic success it enjoys today.  As one expert panel 
member aptly described “without Malay leadership, the rest will crumble.” 
 
I therefore embarked on the research with a dual objective.  The core objective of the 
research was to undertake an exploratory research using the clinical and psychodynamic 
approach to understand the lack of success of Malays in business.  The ancillary objective of 
the research was to assess the political leadership of the Malays to show how they have 
successfully managed the political management of the country. 
 
Having articulated the paradoxical situation of Malay leadership i.e. the Malays who led and 
laid the foundation to make Malaysia a burgeoning economy, have been unable to achieve the 
same level of success when it comes to their own involvement in business; the research 
moved on to the second chapter which looked closely at the “Political Administration and 
Management of Malaysia.” 
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In this chapter, the Malay political leadership of all the five past prime ministers of Malaysia 
from independence in 1957 to 2009 were analysed to show their leadership styles and values.  
In addition, this chapter provided the relevant economic pointers which contributed to 
Malaysia’s economic success under the past five prime ministers. 
 
Having established that Malay political leadership had built an economically successful 
nation, I then laid the groundwork in Chapter 3 to first understand the Malays better naming 
this chapter, “The Inner Theatre of the Malays.”  In order to provide a clear understanding of 
the Malays from the cultural and psycho-social aspects, I drew on the historical and 
contemporary writings about the Malays and used four different cultural models drawn from 
Hofstede, Schein, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner and Kets de Vries. 
 
We were able to understand the Malay way of life through the various dimensions of the 
cultural models.  We understood the Malay as one who accepts high Power Distance, is 
Collectivist in nature with low Uncertainty Avoidance (i.e. he can accept changes without 
great anxiety), prefers Particularism (where bending rules to suit the situation is accepted), 
and Communitarianism (Collectivism and Communitarianism go hand-in-hand.)  The 
influence of feudalism also makes him Diffuse in nature (evasive and tactful) and accept 
Ascription rather than Achievement (“who you know”, rather than “what you know”). 
 
Then we saw the Malay as one who lives in harmony with the environment, has a Being 
orientation (more of Fatalistic), hides his emotion (Neutral and not Affective) and has a High 
context in communication (preferring to be indirect).  All of these cultural attributes of a 
Malay were identified as directly, indirectly or reversely-linked to Power Distance which is 
borne out of feudalism. 
 
Through a literature survey of the Malays, we identified sixteen Malay characteristics and 
linked them to the various dimensions of culture drawn from the four cultural models. 
 
Out of the sixteen attributes of the Malays, we were able to link ten of them directly or 
indirectly to Power Distance which is intertwined with feudalism.  Feudalism combined with 
colonialism were preliminarily identified as the two main causes of the social  and economic 
problems faced by the Malays, with strong support from available literature (Alatas, 1977; 
Andaya & Andaya 2002; Husin Ali, 2008; Milner, 2008; Omar, 2006; Zamani, 2002).  A few 
writers identified feudalism and colonialism as the root cause of some serious psychological 
problems of the Malays (Abdullah, 1843; Alatas, 1977; Clifford, 1898; Dr Mahathir, 1970). 
 
As the research identified that the Malays had psychological problems, my move to use the 
clinical and psychodynamic approach from the onset of this research to understand the 
Malays, was the right decision. 
 
With the historical understanding of the Malays and the understanding of their “inner theatre” 
providing the background for the research, choice of an appropriate methodology was the 
next step. 
 
In Chapter 4 “Research Methodology”, I put forth the case for the selection of an appropriate 
methodology for this research which is largely qualitative and multi-disciplinary in nature.  
After a careful evaluation, a multi-method approach using grounded theory, interpretive 
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methodology, experiential data, fieldwork involving focus groups and expert panel interviews 
and 360-degree feedback instruments providing empirical data, were selected as appropriate 
for an exploratory research to study Malay leadership using the clinical paradigm. 
 
Because the study aims to understand the Malays as a race, psychoanalytical theories 
involving large groups such as large-group identity and large-group regression expounded by 
Volkan were also deemed extremely useful and came in handy to understand and appreciate 
the Malay problems which had hardly been studied through clinical lens. 
 
It was explained in Research Methodology, this research on Malay leadership relied on more 
than one method to understand the Malays.  I called them the five levels and at each level, the 
objective was to go deeper and beneath the surface like peeling the layers of an onion for a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. 
 
At the surface level, the research began by going through a literature survey of published 
works about Malays from historical accounts.  Then works of contemporary writers who 
wrote about Malays and their social and economic problems were analysed.  At a deeper 
level, focus groups and expert panel members who were all Malays, (except 3 of the 20 
expert panel members – one of whom is a British Malaysian, another a Chinese Malaysian 
and finally an Indian Malaysian) provided first-hand information about the various issues 
faced by the Malays from the political, cultural, educational, religious and family dimensions 
as well as the competition from the Chinese. 
 
Based on the focus group discussions and the expert panel interviews, some of the key 
themes that emerged as impediments to Malay leadership in business are:- 
 
 Malay culture of feudalism which led to the dependency and subsidy mentalities; 
 Lack of experience and appropriate training; 
 Politicians’ desire to perpetuate the handout system leading to corruption; 
 Education not tailored to improve Malay acumen in business; 
 The inability of the Malays to compete with the experienced and hardworking; 
Chinese because of lack of adequate training and appropriate education; 
 Misguided religious beliefs and conflicts. 
After discussions with focus groups and expert panel members and hearing their views about 
the Malays and their assessment of the problems faced by the Malays in business leadership, 
the next step was to take a random sample of Malays numbering about 41 and subject them to 
an empirical test through 360-degree feedback instruments. Some of the leading Malay 
corporate figures in the country and some very senior Malay executives and civil servants 
were made to undertake five different 360-degree feedback instruments and the results  
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compared with international database of business leaders across the globe and Asia.  The 
results of these instruments showed that generally, the Malays tended to rank themselves 
higher than the global leaders.  This over-rating by the Malays could be due to the factors of 
self-esteem and positive self-image; social desirability; feudalist and hierarchical mindset 
with high Power Distance; leniency and kasihan factors. 
 
Notwithstanding the dissimilarities between the Malays and global and Asian leaders, a 
surprising element that arose out of the comparison of the four of the five instruments (i.e., 
GELI, PA, LAQ and ILS) is the similarity of patterns between the Malay, global and Asian 
leaders.  This similarity of patterns leads to suggest that there is prima facie evidence to 
suggest that well-educated Malays with good exposure and training who occupy senior 
corporate or governmental positions are not very different from those in the database of 
global and Asian leaders.  This finding however is very preliminary and needs to be affirmed 
by further wider and deeper research.  This is a very important aspect for the research 
because if further research could re-affirm the preliminary finding of this study, then we 
could more confidently hypothesize that once the Malays are taken out of regression into 
progression through proper education and experience, they are capable of competing with any 
global business leaders.  In other words, there are no other inherent weaknesses in the Malays 
other than being regressed due to historical factors which have been elaborated throughout 
the research. 
 
Having gone through the research journey of understanding the Malays at five different 
levels, (historical accounts, contemporary writings, focus group discussions, expert panel 
interviews and 360-degree feedback survey), Chapter 7 is the integrative as well as the 
interpretive chapter which focuses on the crux of the Malay leadership problems in business.  
This chapter through the aid of clinical lens and the psychoanalytic theories of large-group 
identity, large-group regression and transgenerational transmission of trauma, traces the 
origins of Malay civilisation and argues with historical support from several writers that the 
Malays are victims of large-group regression which effectively prevented them from being 
successful in business.  Unless the Malays are consciously brought into a progressive mode, 
success of the Malays in business is likely to be limited. 
 
In addition to regression, this chapter also pointed out to other weaknesses that contributed to 
the failure of the Malays in business.  These include the failure of the government to 
recognise that creating successful Malay business leaders is an adaptive challenge, not a 
technical issue which could be solved merely by providing the Malays with licences and 
finance.  Other factors include the beneath-the-surface racial relations and competition from 
the well-entrenched Chinese entrepreneurs who, through their own subtle ways, check-mate 
the Malay advancement in business and the weaknesses in the implementation of the NEP. 
 
The research pinpoints fundamentally to the failure of the government to understand the 
Malay psychological situation and the “inner theatre” of the Malays as the probable primary 
cause for the lack of success of the Malays in business. 
 
In summary, Figures 49 and 50 graphically represent my thoughts spanning 9 chapters which 
strive to answer the question of why the Malays have been lacking in success compared to the 
Chinese in Malaysia when the resources of the country have been made available to all.  I 
delved into the root cause of the Malay economic problems and their psyche using the lens of 
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Clinical Paradigm and employing psychodynamic psychology of large-group identity and 
large-group regression.   
 
In Chapter 9, some thoughts and reflections for future work to be carried out in order to 
address the past failures are suggested.  It must be borne in mind that this research is the first 
building block of an exploratory research to understand the Malay leadership qualities using 
the psychodynamic approach.  Hence; the findings of this research are preliminary in nature 
and need further rigorous testing. 
 
The preliminary findings of this research however, encourages a starting point in carrying out 
further research and deeper reflection on how to make the quantum leap in crossing the 
proverbial Rubicon to dispel their feudalistic mindset and hopefully find answers to the 
dilemma of the Malays’ lack of success economically and in business. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 49> 
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Figure 49: Knitting the thought process of the research 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Figure 50> 
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Figure 50: Knitting process which led to the preliminary findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Chapter 8> 
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Chapter 9 – Reflections for future work on Malay leadership 
 
Throughout the research, I have emphasised that it is one of an exploratory nature, and multi-
disciplinary in approach and uses the clinical and psychodynamic approach. The same 
approach is recommended to be adopted for future research for a greater understanding of 
Malay leadership. 
 
9.1 Reflections on the future of Malay political leadership 
 
While writing about Badawi in Chapter 2, I had mentioned that – 
 
This was the first time in Malaysian history that a prime minister had been 
forcibly removed; not only that, it was done by a people’s vote, ushering in a new 
chapter in Malay political leadership.  (p. 47) 
 
Soon after he took over as Prime Minister in 2003 when Dr Mahathir stepped 
down after 22 years as the longest serving prime minister in Malaysian history, 
Badawi was immensely popular, and in the general elections of October 2004, 
UMNO – led by Badawi – was returned to power with its best ever victory. 
Badawi was also making some sensible statements, from which some of the 
excerpts are provided below:   
 
 “Speaking as a politician and public servant of over 40 years, I can 
confidently say …that making hard decisions in a country that is just 
starting to grow up, does not get you approval or admiration often; it 
attracts criticism, cynic, even disdain but such is the mantle of 
leadership.” 
 
 “Changing and growing up is a very challenging effort, especially for a 
country as young and as full of contrasts as ours. At this juncture in our 
development, we can plainly see that the roads and rail tracks have been 
laid; the ports and cities have been built; except for some rural areas, our 
infrastructure is largely in place. The phase of hardware development has 
been substantially addressed. However, the software development of the 
country in terms of knowledge, skills and values has not kept pace with 
the country’s highways, airports and townships. In that sense, perhaps our 
cultural and ethical development must be made to catch up with our 
material and physical development. Our software development is thus still 
very far behind.” 
 
 “Unfortunately again, software development is largely intangible; change 
is often really felt through anecdote and experience. In comparison, 
infrastructure or hardware development is a very visible process; it takes 
shape before your very eyes. You cannot mark software development – in 
terms of human capacity development or of institutional building – as 
easily or as directly.” 
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 “Yet in all that I have set out to achieve, the real challenge is mentality. 
Two years ago, I made a speech which started off the phrase “1st class 
infrastructure, 3
rd
 class mentality”. That phrase appeared to strike a chord 
in many Malaysians, with many writing in to say that it aptly described 
the state of Malaysians then. Today, that phrase still largely holds true.” 
 
(Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 2005) 
 
While he made speeches which looked very appealing to the citizens, several of 
the expert panel members openly criticised Badawi as an ineffective and weak 
leader. One even went to the extent of saying that the political leadership of the 
Malays was good until Badawi took over the leadership of the country.  
 
To some extent I realised that these criticisms could be valid because within a 
span of four years, Badawi, who won the 2004 general elections with the biggest 
victory for the ruling party, also managed to get the worst-ever results in the 
following term in 2008 when he called for general elections against warning by 
several party stalwarts that the ruling coalition may lose badly. As warned, 
Badawi faced the worst results in the history of UMNO and was subsequently 
forced to resign as Prime Minister. This method of forcibly removing a Prime 
Minister is very ‘un-Malay’-like and ignored the hitherto Malay political culture 
of daulat (legitimacy), kesetiaan (loyalty) and kehalusan (subtlety) and set a new 
precedent to the Malay political scenario.  
 
As severe criticisms were levelled against Badawi’s style of leadership by some 
members of the expert panel, I decided to add him to the list of my expert panel 
members and interviewed him as the twentieth and last expert panel member. I 
decided on this interview so as to give Badawi an opportunity to air his views 
directly for this research. So I laid out all the criticisms of the expert panel 
members and asked him for his responses which are summarised below:-  
 
On the subject of anti-corruption 
 
Panel member: “Pak Lah promised us that he will reshape the old anti-corruption 
agency into this commission… But today, even if you give them the best benefit 
of doubt, you can’t say that it was anywhere near to what was promised.” 
 
Badawi: “The fact is that the review of anti-corruption, the police, judiciary, 
enforcement agencies – we had to reform those into laws and it wasn’t easy. I had 
to face the elections during that time and we lost two-thirds. I wanted to 
implement it when I had the laws to be set up. I was hoping to continue into 2013 
to give the new generation a chance. I stepped down in 2008 because so many 
issues were coming up. Even my colleagues in the party weren’t happy because 
of the opening up. When we lost two-thirds in the election, UMNO thought this 
was the end of the world, and didn’t know what to do. So they were all very 
angry with me. If I was to remain and fight it out, the fighting will never stop. 
Even if I were to win, there will be no end to the fighting. When Najib took over,  
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he was a fresh man, and the focus was on the new leader and I was out. But I 
believe in continuity, and what Najib is doing is continuity. If we don’t have 
continuity, UMNO would’ve been dead.” 
 
Panel member: “I think the mistake Pak Lah made was making too many 
promises and didn’t deliver. He just wanted to be popular. He wanted to undo 
what Dr Mahathir has done so that people see that he is a new leader.” 
 
Badawi: “I think that interpretation is completely wrong. I was never there to 
fight. I did whatever was needed during my time of administration. I was the one 
who spoke a lot about 2020. My observations when Najib took over, it took some 
months before he mentioned 2020. Mahathir was angry with me because he 
thought I was soft.” 
 
Panel member: “Lack of leadership, poor quality leadership by Pak Lah has 
destroyed the Malay image as good politicians. His mistake was that he listened 
to the force and Musa Hitam.” 
 
Badawi: “I knew Musa and we talked a lot but that’s not true. I don’t think the 
person who commented this can use that argument to relate to this. What he’s 
trying to say is this, because of what happened to me, he interpreted it this way.” 
 
Panel member: “Badawi who was another Malay gentleman somewhat similar to 
Tun Hussein Onn, a good man, well-intentioned, with all personalities and 
qualities of a typical Malay. But he was not a man who could organise and work 
but he was idealistic.” 
 
Badawi: “I brought about a different style, a new movement and that could be 
interpreted in a few ways. People were afraid of opening up. Trusting of goodness 
in people – that’s something that’s always in my character. I always want to give 
people the chance, to talk and listen to them.” 
 
From the discussions with the former Prime Minister it was clear that his priority 
was for the soft skills development rather than physical infrastructure 
development which he felt had reached a good level. He is of the strong opinion 
that, 
 
…if Malay don’t become human capital of high quality, we are finished. 
But if they are conscious of their role, that they must participate and they 
can provide leadership to all races, then they are safe. Competition is 
important for survival. For the sake of the country and all Malaysians, 
Malays need to survive. 
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It was also obvious from Badawi’s response that he agreed to step down because 
he did not want to fight. He was of the opinion that if he had fought, he could 
have won but it would be too damaging to the party (referring to UMNO). So 
even though he was forced to resign in the ‘un-Malay’ way, he avoided conflict 
and stepped down in the Malay way.  
 
But the manner in which Badawi was made to step down may unfortunately set a 
precedent which is untypical of the Malay culture. This leads to the question of 
how successful the political Malay leadership in the country will be in future. No 
doubt for the first fifty-over years since merdeka, the Malays have overall 
provided a stable and admirable leadership in political management of the 
country; how this will be in the next fifty years is wrought with some uncertainty 
based on the poor performance in the 2008 general election of the UMNO-led 
coalition.  
 
As this chapter was being edited, the 2013 Malaysian general elections had just 
concluded with the UMNO-led coalition winning even fewer seats than the 
previous elections in 2008.  We may have to wait for a while to see how the 
political leadership of the Malays would emerge from this new trend which has 
provided a new challenge to Malay leadership in the country. 
 
Badawi also gave the impression that he wanted more openness and that he was 
prepared to face a stronger opposition which ultimately could lead to a two-party 
system.   
 
9.2 Thoughts on Malay leadership in business 
 
Most of what I have produced in this research is based on available literature 
about the Malays; both historical and contemporary. Using the available literature 
about the Malays and with limited work done with focus groups, expert panel and 
360-degree feedback to support my research; I have applied the clinical paradigm 
using the psychoanalytical concepts of large-group regression, large-group 
identity and transgenerational transmission to arrive at some preliminary findings 
about the probable causes of Malay weaknesses in business leadership.  
 
As a researcher involved in exploratory work, I am excited about the prospects of 
future work and I unfortunately have to stop at a point because of time and 
resource constraints. I do have however, some pointers for future research using 
psychodynamic psychology. One of the strongest traits among the Malays I 
noticed during my interviews and focus group discussions was their internal 
struggle with feudalism. Feudalism has such a strong unconscious influence 
among the Malays that it is one of the blind spots that they are unable to either 
recognise or admit. Every successful Malay leader or intellectual, irrespective of 
whether he is a politician or a businessman, has identified feudalist mindset as an 
obstacle for the progress of Malays; yet the very people who criticise feudalism 
fall into the very black hole of feudalism when they achieve a certain level of 
success. They refuse to admit that they also are feudalist in their behaviour. Some 
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of the expert panel members acknowledged that the country is becoming more 
and more feudalist as time passes by.   
 
There may be possible explanations for this blind spot being so strong among the 
Malays. Of course, giving up some of the cultural attributes is very painful, as we 
have seen and is supported by researchers and cultural anthropologists such as 
Pye (1985) and Isaacs (1975). As rightly pointed out by Heifetz & Linsky (2002), 
“Habits, values, and attitudes, even dysfunctional ones, are part of one’s identity.  
To change the way people see and do things is to challenge how they define 
themselves” (p. 27).  Looking at the Malay feudal situation and the failure rate 
among the Malays in business I would propose an in-depth study using the 
psychological dynamic of a hidden competing commitment as identified by 
organisational psychologists Kegan & Lahey (2001; 2009).  
 
Competing commitment, otherwise called immunity to change which I briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 7, refers to a situation where a person who makes a 
commitment to change which is beneficial and genuinely supports the change, 
inexplicably does nothing. Noticing this happening in too many instances, Kegan 
and Lahey (2009) set out to find out the cause which led them  
 
…to a surprising yet deceptively simple conclusion. Resistance to change 
does not reflect opposition, nor is it merely a result of inertia. Instead, even 
as they hold a sincere commitment to change, many people are unwittingly 
applying productive energy toward a hidden competing commitment. The 
resulting dynamic equilibrium stalls the effort in what looks like resistance 
but is in fact a kind of personal immunity to change. (p. 85) 
 
The Malay leaders are anxious about the Malay masses giving up their good 
manners such as being polite, obedient and not openly opposing the elders even if 
they disagree. While these are positive attributes perhaps at the family level, the 
same attributes are seen as weaknesses that others take advantage of in the 
organisational and societal levels. Many writers and those I interviewed have 
pointed this out. How much a Malay has to give up his values seems to be a big 
dilemma of the leaders.  
 
As Heifetz & Linsky (2002) observes,        
    
People must face the challenge of adapting to a tough reality, and the 
adaptation requires giving up an important value or a current way of life. 
Leadership becomes dangerous, then, when it must confront people with 
loss. (p. 13) 
 
They also argue that without learning new ways - changing attitudes, values and 
behaviours - people cannot make the adaptive leap necessary to thrive in the new 
environment. The sustainability of change depends on having the people with the 
problem internalise the change itself. Admittedly, it is not an easy situation or 
decision – if you want to gain something, you have to give up something and 
giving up something you are accustomed to is rather painful.  
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The way forward could be through a more comprehensive study of Malays using 
a multi-method approach conducted by a multi-disciplinary team comprising 
psychoanalysts, cultural anthropologists, historians, economists, experts on 
leadership, political and business leaders as well as multi-racial representatives 
who are capable of appreciating the ‘below-the-surface tensions’ that persist 
among the various races.  
 
Once a comprehensive study is completed, it should not, as what happens in most 
cases, be filed away neatly in the libraries as reference books. The study should 
be carried out with the objective of implementation as the ultimate objective. In 
other words, the study is not an end in itself but a means to an end.  
 
Several experts with deep knowledge in the various areas have been named in my 
research (for example, Berry, Heifetz, Hofstede, Kegan, Kets de Vries, Khoo, 
Schein, Trompenaars, Volkan, etc.). There are of course several other experts 
who may be available to facilitate such a research. Once an in-depth research is 
concluded, the greatest challenge needless to say is its acceptance and 
implementation. Admittedly, in a multi-racial society such as Malaysia, the 
challenges of conducting such a study, and more so implementing its 
recommendations, cannot and should not be underestimated.  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1 under “Reflections and thoughts for future” (page 
26), my thoughts in this epilogue “fly freely in the world of fantasy”. My only 
hope is that my fantasy expressed in this epilogue could become a reality one day.  
 
‘Man proposes, God disposes’ 
 
 
 
 
<End of Research> 
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Appendix 1 
Malaysia – 27th leading trading nation 
Exports 2012 Country Ranks 
http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/exports_2009_0.html  
SOURCE: CIA World Factbook 
 
   1 World $19,944,900,686,850  
2 China  $1,897,000,000,000  
3 European Union  $1,791,000,000,000  
4 Germany $1,543,000,000,000  
5 United States  $1,511,000,000,000  
6 Japan  $800,800,000,000  
7 France $578,400,000,000  
8 Netherlands  $576,900,000,000  
9 Korea, South  $558,800,000,000  
10 Italy $508,900,000,000  
11 Russia  $498,600,000,000  
12 United Kingdom  $495,400,000,000  
13 Hong Kong  $451,600,000,000  
14 Canada  $450,600,000,000  
15 Singapore  $432,100,000,000  
16 Saudi Arabia  $350,700,000,000  
17 Mexico  $336,300,000,000  
18 Belgium  $332,000,000,000  
19 Spain  $330,600,000,000  
20 Taiwan  $325,100,000,000  
21 Switzerland  $308,300,000,000  
22 India  $298,200,000,000  
23 Australia  $266,000,000,000  
24 
United Arab 
Emirates  $265,300,000,000  
25 Brazil  $250,800,000,000  
26 Thailand  $244,400,000,000  
27 Malaysia  $212,700,000,000  
28 Indonesia  $208,900,000,000  
29 Sweden  $204,200,000,000  
30 Poland  $197,100,000,000  
31 Austria  $180,700,000,000  
32 Norway $159,800,000,000  
33 Czech Republic  $146,700,000,000  
 395 
34 Turkey $133,000,000,000  
35 Iran  $131,800,000,000  
36 Ireland  $124,300,000,000  
37 Hungary $115,600,000,000  
38 Denmark  $112,400,000,000  
39 Qatar  $104,300,000,000  
40 Nigeria  $101,100,000,000  
41 Vietnam  $96,810,000,000  
42 Kuwait  $94,470,000,000  
43 South Africa  $94,210,000,000  
44 Venezuela  $89,380,000,000  
45 Slovakia  $86,620,000,000  
46 Chile  $86,130,000,000  
47 Finland  $85,400,000,000  
48 Argentina  $83,710,000,000  
49 Algeria  $78,510,000,000  
50 Iraq  $78,380,000,000  
51 Puerto Rico  $75,740,000,000  
52 Kazakhstan $65,910,000,000  
53 Angola  $65,630,000,000  
54 Romania  $62,500,000,000  
55 Israel  $62,500,000,000  
56 Ukraine $60,670,000,000  
57 Portugal  $56,600,000,000  
58 Colombia  $55,030,000,000  
59 Philippines  $54,170,000,000  
60 Peru  $43,830,000,000  
61 Oman $43,530,000,000  
62 New Zealand  $40,920,000,000  
63 Pakistan  $30,900,000,000  
64 Slovenia  $28,960,000,000  
65 Egypt  $27,960,000,000  
66 Lithuania  $27,040,000,000  
67 Greece $26,640,000,000  
68 Belarus  $26,290,000,000  
69 Bulgaria  $26,080,000,000  
70 Bangladesh  $23,860,000,000  
71 Ecuador  $23,540,000,000  
72 Azerbaijan  $23,480,000,000  
73 Morocco  $20,520,000,000  
74 Bahrain  $20,230,000,000  
75 Luxembourg  $19,500,000,000  
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76 Tunisia  $17,860,000,000  
77 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  $16,920,000,000  
78 Estonia  $15,640,000,000  
79 Turkmenistan  $14,370,000,000  
80 Uzbekistan $13,800,000,000  
81 Equatorial Guinea  $13,650,000,000  
82 Croatia  $13,300,000,000  
83 
Congo, Republic 
of the  $13,250,000,000  
84 Panama $13,220,000,000  
85 Ghana  $13,130,000,000  
86 Libya  $12,930,000,000  
87 Syria  $12,660,000,000  
88 Cote d’Ivoire  $11,240,000,000  
89 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of the  $10,930,000,000  
90 Sri Lanka $10,890,000,000  
91 Gabon  $10,860,000,000  
92 Serbia  $10,790,000,000  
93 Costa Rica  $10,770,000,000  
94 Brunei  $10,670,000,000  
95 Guatemala  $10,320,000,000  
96 Latvia  $10,300,000,000  
97 Paraguay $9,756,000,000  
98 Uruguay $9,716,000,000  
99 Burma $9,543,000,000  
100 Zambia $9,008,000,000  
101 Bolivia  $8,188,000,000  
102 Jordan  $8,066,000,000  
103 
Dominican 
Republic  $7,792,000,000  
104 Sudan  $7,705,000,000  
105 
Papua New 
Guinea  $7,566,000,000  
106 Yemen $7,127,000,000  
107 Honduras  $6,839,000,000  
108 Cambodia  $6,724,000,000  
109 El Salvador  $5,779,000,000  
110 Tanzania  $5,659,000,000  
111 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  $5,579,000,000  
112 Botswana  $5,509,000,000  
113 Kenya  $5,443,000,000  
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114 Lebanon  $5,411,000,000  
115 Cameroon $5,361,000,000  
116 Iceland  $5,300,000,000  
117 Cuba  $4,679,000,000  
118 Namibia  $4,568,000,000  
119 Aruba  $4,348,000,000  
120 Virgin Islands  $4,234,000,000  
121 Chad  $4,088,000,000  
122 Nicaragua  $4,071,000,000  
123 Macedonia  $3,800,000,000  
124 Malta  $3,474,000,000  
125 Georgia  $3,083,000,000  
126 Mongolia  $2,899,000,000  
127 Liechtenstein  $2,830,000,000  
128 Mauritania  $2,745,000,000  
129 Zimbabwe  $2,731,000,000  
130 Mauritius  $2,707,000,000  
131 Mali  $2,700,000,000  
132 Mozambique  $2,646,000,000  
133 Uganda  $2,582,000,000  
134 Korea, North  $2,557,000,000  
135 Senegal  $2,515,000,000  
136 San Marino  $2,457,000,000  
137 Cyprus  $2,372,000,000  
138 Kyrgyzstan  $2,327,000,000  
139 Ethiopia  $2,231,000,000  
140 Swaziland  $1,965,000,000  
141 Moldova  $1,920,000,000  
142 Albania  $1,886,000,000  
143 Laos  $1,842,000,000  
144 Guinea  $1,777,000,000  
145 Tajikistan $1,764,000,000  
146 Jamaica $1,650,000,000  
147 Burkina Faso  $1,591,000,000  
148 Suriname $1,583,000,000  
149 Curacao  $1,500,000,000  
149 Benin  $1,459,000,000  
150 Madagascar  $1,407,000,000  
151 Armenia $1,319,000,000  
152 Niger  $1,124,000,000  
153 Guyana  $1,059,000,000  
154 Lesotho  $978,900,000  
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155 New Caledonia  $969,400,000  
156 Malawi  $921,900,000  
157 Nepal  $896,000,000  
158 Macau  $870,000,000  
159 Togo $865,000,000  
160 Faroe Islands  $848,000,000  
161 Monaco  $711,000,000  
162 Bahamas, The $709,700,000  
163 Haiti  $690,300,000  
164 Fiji $625,300,000  
165 Montenegro  $600,000,000  
166 Afghanistan  $571,000,000  
167 West Bank  $518,000,000  
168 Seychelles  $516,000,000  
169 Belize  $511,700,000  
170 Bhutan  $509,400,000  
171 Kosovo  $500,000,000  
172 Greenland  $485,000,000  
173 Sierra Leone  $469,700,000  
173 Barbados  $467,400,000  
174 American Samoa $445,600,000  
175 Eritrea  $383,500,000  
176 Liberia  $362,300,000  
177 Somalia  $300,000,000  
178 Rwanda  $293,000,000  
179 Gibraltar  $271,000,000  
180 French Polynesia  $211,000,000  
181 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands  $169,200,000  
182 
Central African 
Republic  $168,700,000  
183 Solomon Islands  $163,400,000  
184 Maldives  $163,000,000  
185 Saint Lucia  $162,300,000  
186 Guinea-Bissau  $142,300,000  
187 
Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas)  $125,000,000  
188 Gambia, The $120,400,000  
189 Cape Verde  $108,500,000  
190 Burundi  $106,700,000  
191 
Northern Mariana 
Islands  $98,200,000  
192 Djibouti  $80,400,000  
193 Antigua and $68,000,000  
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Barbuda  
194 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines  $64,400,000  
195 Andorra $64,000,000  
196 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis  $63,100,000  
197 Dominica $47,800,000  
198 Vanuatu  $40,000,000  
199 Grenada  $38,000,000  
200 
British Virgin 
Islands  $35,200,000  
201 Samoa $35,070,000  
202 Bermuda $28,000,000  
203 Anguilla  $26,200,000  
204 Tonga $22,000,000  
205 Marshall Islands  $19,400,000  
206 
Saint Helena, 
Ascension, and 
Tristan da Cunha  $19,000,000  
207 Cayman Islands  $17,000,000  
208 Kiribati  $17,000,000  
209 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  $16,600,000  
210 Comoros $16,300,000  
210 
Micronesia, 
Federated States 
of  $14,000,000  
211 Timor-Leste $9,200,000  
212 Palau  $5,882,000  
213 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon  $5,500,000  
214 Cook Islands  $5,222,000  
215 Montserrat  $3,300,000  
216 Tuvalu  $1,000,000  
217 Niue  $201,400  
218 Nauru  $64,000  
219 Wallis and Futuna  $47,450  
 
 
<End of Appendix 1> 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Chart: Strong investments and foreign participation in the Manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 2> 
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Appendix 3 
 
Chart: One of the highest saving rates in the world 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 3> 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
 
Chart: Transformation from Agriculture to a broader Manufacturing-based economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 4> 
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Appendix 5 
 
Chart: Rising Income Per Capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 5> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 404 
Appendix 6 
 
 
 
Chart: Transformed from a Net Debtor to a Net Savings economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 6> 
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Appendix 7 
 
Chart: Enviable record of strong growth with low inflation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 7> 
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Appendix 8 
 
Malay (in percentage): Membership of Professional Groups 
 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
      
Architects 4.3 10.7 23.6 42.1 45.3 
Accountants 6.8 7.4 11.2 17.1 20.8 
Engineers 7.3 18.5 34.8 42.6 46.0 
Dentists 3.1 10.3 24.3 35.2 44.4 
Doctors 3.7 9.7 27.8 36.8 36.7 
Veterinary Surgeons 40.0 17.8 35.9 41.7 39.0 
Surveyors - 31.2 44.7 45.1 48.2 
Lawyers - 14.8 22.4 32.3 38.0 
  
Source: RHB Research Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 8> 
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Appendix 9 
Explanatory notes to GELI, PA & LAQ 
 
The Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI)  
 
 
GELI measures 12 dimensions of leadership viz: 
 
1. Visioning 
2. Empowering 
3. Energizing 
4. Designing and aligning 
5. Rewarding and feedback 
6. Team building 
7. Global mindset 
8. Outside orientation 
9. Tenacity 
10. Emotional intelligence 
11. Life balance 
12. Resilience to stress. 
 
The GELI database has the data of 8124 leaders from across the globe.  In this section, we 
estimate how our database of 41 Malay leaders compares with this global database.  We note 
that GELI is a 360-degree feedback instrument; the data points consist of observations from 
the observed leaders (we denote these individuals as “Self’s”) and from observers, including 
superiors, co-workers, spouse/partners, and direct reports.   
 
Table 18 (p. 218) lists the major countries of the respondents, and Table 19 (p. 219) details 
the summary statistics for the 12 leadership dimensions measured by GELI instrument in the 
database, and compares it to those in our Malay database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 18> 
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Table 18: Global database of GELI respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 19> 
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Table 19: Mean and Standard Deviations of the Malay database, compared to 
Global GELI database (N = 8124) 
 
 
 
The summary statistics tells us that in some variables there seems to be a significant 
difference between leadership dimensions of the Malay leaders compared to those of the 
global leaders.  Differences are not only at the levels of Self’s, but also at the level of 
observers.  So, for example; observers of Malay leaders rate them higher on the Visioning 
dimension than do the observers of global leaders. 
 
In our subsequent analysis, we test these differences between the Malay and the global 
leaders, and whether these differences are significant when we control for the factors such as 
age, gender and industry. 
 
The analysis of data from a cultural perspective for a 360-degree feedback instrument 
presents some more challenges.  First; the raters are nested within the Self’s, and we need to 
control for the effects of this nesting.  Second; the Self’s were rated from 360-degree 
feedback – that means we have four kinds of observers – superior, subordinates, co-workers 
and other external/internal stakeholders.  Since raters are clustered in Self’s, observations for 
the same Self will likely be correlated because of unobserved self-level effects.  To adjust for 
this, we used multilevel or hierarchical modelling of data.  The unobserved self-level effects 
were considered as fixed parameters.  Thus, we have 12 different equations; one each for 
each dimension of leadership and these dimensions are our dependent variables.  We report 
standard errors that have been adjusted by intra-self-correlations; thus taking care of not only 
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heteroskedasticity of residuals but also that these residuals may be correlated within each 
Self.  The Malay database has data on 41 leaders (Self’s), and their 214 observers (total 255 
data points) 
 
Progressing as above, we test the 12 dimensions of leadership for significant differences 
between the Malay and the global leaders, controlling for the age, gender and industry 
background of participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data (the 
leaders are assessed by 4-7 observers, and these ratings are directed towards a single 
individual). 
 
In our subsequent analysis, we test for significant differences between the Malay and the 
global leaders, when we control for factors such as age, sex and industry. Note that the 
analysis of data from a cultural perspective for a 360-degree instrument presents some 
challenges. First, the observers are related to the Self’s, and we need to control for the effects 
of this nesting. Second, the Self’s were rated from the 360-degree instrument – that means we 
have four kinds of observers – superiors, subordinates, co-workers and other external/internal 
stakeholders. Since observers are clustered in Self’s, observations for the same self will likely 
be correlated because of unobserved self-level effects. To adjust for this, we used multilevel 
or hierarchical modelling of data. The unobserved self-level effects were considered as fixed 
parameters. Thus, we have 12 different equations, one each for each dimension of leadership, 
and these dimensions are our dependent variables. We report standard errors that have been 
adjusted for within self-correlations. Overall, we test the twelve dimensions of leadership for 
significant differences between the Malay and the global leaders, controlling for age, sex and 
industry background of participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data. 
 
The results in Table 20 (p. 220) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on 112 
dimensions of leadership.  Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering 
between the respondents and is coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay Self in our 
database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 20> 
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Table 20: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N = 8124) 
 
 
Leadership dimensions in GELI 
instrument 
Coefficient of Malay Std. Error 
Visioning 1.41* 0.58 
Empowering 1.85** 0.61 
Energizing 1.93** 0.63 
Designing and aligning 3.31*** 0.56 
Rewarding and feedback 2.16** 0.67 
Team building 3.64*** 0.85 
Outside orientation 2.08*** 0.37 
Global mindset 0.73 0.73 
Tenacity 0.10 0.36 
Emotional intelligence 3.45*** 1.04 
Life balance 1.91** 0.67 
Resilience to stress 7.09*** 1.39 
*** highly significant, ** significant, * moderately significant 
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
We see the variable Malay is highly significant (at p<0.001 level) for the Designing and 
aligning, Team building, Outside orientation, Emotional intelligence, and Resilience to 
stress dimensions of leadership and at p<0.01 level for the Empowering, Energizing, 
Rewarding and feedback, and Life balance dimensions.  The variable is also significant at 
p<0.05 level for Visioning dimension.  The variable is NOT significant for Global mindset 
and Tenacity dimensions. 
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to “Malaysian” 
results in a higher rating on ten out of twelve dimensions of leadership, on an average.  The 
chi-square values for the Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all twelve 
regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for the observers, Malaysian leaders exhibit higher ratings on Designing and aligning, 
Rewarding and feedback, Outside orientation, Visioning, Energizing, Team building, 
Empowering, Emotional intelligence and Resilience to stress.  On two dimensions of 
leadership viz. Global mindset and Tenacity, the Malaysian leaders are not different than 
other global leaders.  We note that a positive coefficient on the Resilience to stress dimension 
means that Malay leaders are less resilient to stress compared to global leaders (because 
GELI codes the questions for this dimension in the reverse).  
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Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
 
To understand how Malay leaders compared with other cultures, we now detail the 
comparison and contrast of Malay leaders with other Asians.  Our hypothesis is that Asian 
cultures are closer to the Malay culture, and therefore we will hope to find more similarity 
with the Asian Leaders compared to the global leaders.  Table 21 (p. 222) gives the data 
regarding the countries from which the “Asian” category was selected; note that the list is a 
subset (and expanded version) of the data in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 21: Asian database of GELI respondents 
 
Asian Countries Number of Asian leaders in 
GELI database 
Saudi Arabia 210 
Japan 198 
Singapore 191 
India 163 
China 122 
Emirates 86 
Hong Kong 59 
Qatar 38 
Thailand 32 
Korea 30 
Pakistan 28 
Taiwan 25 
Others 176 
Total (N) 1358 
 
 
The mean variables measured against the Asian leaders are as provided in Table 22  
(p. 231) 
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Table 22: Mean variables measured against the Asian leaders (N=1358) 
 
Leadership 
dimensions in 
GELI 
Asian Self’s Asian Observers Malay Self’s 
Malay 
Observers 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Visioning 46.4 5.2 43.8 7.4 47.0 5.8 45.4 8.0 
Empowering 45.2 5.4 42.4 7.4 46.2 5.3 44.2 7.1 
Energizing 45.2 5.5 44.6 7.6 49.0 5.6 45.9 7.9 
Designing and 
aligning 
38.8 5.6 37.7 6.7 42.2 5.1 40.1 6.6 
Rewarding 
and feedback 
45.3 6.1 42.7 8.0 46.6 6.2 44.0 8.5 
Team building 62.8 7.4 59.3 10.4 65.2 8.7 61.8 11.0 
Outside 
orientation 
28.5 4.2 27.7 4.7 30.4 3.8 20.9 4.1 
Global 
mindset 
44.3 6.8 43.6 7.6 45.4 6.2 44.4 7.7 
Tenacity 28.9 3.7 28.1 4.6 29.9 3.6 28.9 4.7 
Emotional 
intelligence 
67.4 8.7 64.7 11.5 70.0 10.1 66.5 11.8 
Life balance 49.4 7.9 55.3 9.2 55.6 8.7 56.7 9.0 
Resilience to 
stress 
37.6 11.1 44.4 18.5 45.0 16.6 47.5 19.7 
 
 
We now perform the analysis similar to that in the previous section.  We test the twelve 
dimensions of leadership for significant differences between the Malay and the Asian leaders, 
controlling for the age, gender and industry background of participants, and also controlling 
for the nested structure of the data (the leaders are assessed by 4-7 observers, and these 
ratings are directed towards a single individual). 
 
The results in Table 23 (p. 224) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on twelve 
dimensions of leadership.  Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering 
between the respondents and is coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay self in our 
database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
We now perform the analysis similar to that in the previous section. We test the twelve 
dimensions of leadership for significant differences between the Malay and the Asian leaders, 
controlling for the age, sex and industry background of participants, and also controlling for 
the nested structure of the data. The results in Table 23 below show the coefficients for the 
variable Malay on the twelve dimensions. 
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Table 23: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N= 1358) 
 
Leadership dimensions in GELI 
instrument 
Coefficient of Malay Std. Error 
Visioning 165** 0.63 
Empowering 1.70** 0.60 
Energising 1.81** 0.66 
Designing and aligning 2.72*** 0.56 
Rewarding and feedback 1.47* 0.67 
Team building 2.65** 0.86 
Outside orientation 2.13*** 0.40 
Global mindset 0.91 0.70 
Tenacity 0.95* 0.38 
Emotional intelligence 2.11* 0.99 
Life balance 2.31** 0.70 
Resilience to stress 4.29** 1.46 
*** highly significant, ** significant, * moderately significant 
            ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
There are several interesting changes when we restrict our attention to Asian leaders.  First, 
we see that the variable Malay is still highly significant (at p<0.001 level) for the Designing 
and aligning and Outside orientation dimensions, and significant (at p<0.01 level) for 
Visioning, Empowering, Energizing, Team building, Life balance and Resilience to stress.  
However; the variable Malay is now significant for the dimension of Tenacity – this variable 
is not significant when the comparable set is that of global leaders.  So, we can say that 
Malaysian leaders are higher on the dimension of Tenacity compared to other Asian leaders.  
The variable of Global mindset remains insignificant as earlier. 
 
The chi-square values for the Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all twelve 
regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for observers, there are three ways in which Malay leaders are similar to, or different from 
Asian leaders. 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher scores on Visioning, Empowering, Energizing, Designing and 
aligning, Rewarding and feedback, Team building, and Outside orientation dimensions of 
leadership.  They are different from Asian leaders, as well as world leaders on these 
dimensions. 
 
Malay leaders exhibit higher Tenacity scores compared to Asian leaders, but not when 
compared to global leaders.  They are more like global leaders, and different from other 
Asian leaders on this dimension. 
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Malay leaders are less Resilient to stress compared to global leaders, and even when we 
compare them to only their Asian counterparts, we see that Malay leaders continue to be 
significantly different on this dimension. 
 
 The Personality Audit (PA) 
 
The Personality Audit database has the data of 2,727 leaders from across the globe.  In this 
section, we estimate how our database of 41 Malay leaders compares with this global data 
base of Personality Audit (PA).  We note that PA is a 360-degree feedback instrument; the 
data points consist of observations from the observed leaders (we denote these individuals as 
Self’s) and from observers, including superiors, co-workers, spouse/partners, and direct 
reports.  
 
Table 25 (p. 227) lists the major countries of the respondents, and Table 26 (p. 2328) details 
the summary statistics for the seven personality traits measured by the PA instrument, in the 
PA database, and compares it to those in our Malay database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank. Please see next page for Table 25> 
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Table 25: Global database of PA respondents 
 
Countries 
Number of Global leaders 
in PA database 
Britain 395 
France 321 
Netherlands 273 
America 151 
Australia 141 
Germany 128 
Sweden 120 
Switzerland 65 
Greece 64 
India 64 
Belgium 59 
Singapore 59 
Spain 57 
Denmark 48 
Saudi Arabia 46 
Ireland 45 
Canada 43 
China 40 
Italy 38 
Emirates 35 
Brazil 34 
Portugal 34 
Russia 34 
Estonia 30 
South Africa 30 
New Zealand 26 
Others 347 
Total (N) 2727 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 26> 
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Table 26: PA - Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Global leaders (N= 2727) 
 
 
 
The summary of statistics tells us that in some variables there seems to be a significant 
difference between the personality of the Malay leaders compared to that of the global 
leaders. 
 
Our analysis in this paper is not focused on the revalidation of the 7 personality dimensions 
of PA instrument; rather, we focus on isolating the differences on these dimensions between 
the Malay culture and the rest of the world.  While the responses from individuals cannot 
provide reliable estimates about cultures, they can supply information about differences 
between these cultures, if we have matched samples or, alternatively, if we control for factors 
such as age, gender and industry. 
 
The analysis of data from a cultural perspective for a 360-degree feedback instrument 
presents some challenges.  First; the raters are nested within the Self’s, and we need to 
control for the effects of this nesting.  Second; the Self’s were rated from 360-degree 
feedback – that means we have four kinds of observers: superiors, subordinates, co-workers 
and other external/internal stakeholders.  Since raters are clustered in Self’s, observations for 
the same ‘Self’ will likely be correlated because of unobserved self-level effects.  To adjust 
for this, we used multilevel or hierarchical modelling of data.  The unobserved self-level 
effects were considered as fixed parameters.  Thus, we have 7 different equations; one each 
for each dimension of personality, and these dimensions are our dependent variables.  We 
report standard errors that have been adjusted for intra-self-correlations thus taking care of 
not only heteroskedasticity of residuals but also that these residuals may be correlated within 
each self.  The Malay database has data on 41 leaders (Self’s), and their 182 observers (total 
233 data points). 
 
Progressing as above, we test the seven dimensions of personality for significant differences 
between the Malay and the global leaders, controlling for the age, gender and industry 
background of participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data (the 
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leaders are assessed by 4-7 observers, and these ratings are directed towards a single 
individual). 
 
We now perform a multilevel regression analysis on the PA data, similar to what we did in 
GELI. We test the seven personality variables for significant differences between the Malay 
and the Global leaders, controlling for the age, sex and industry background of participants, 
and also controlling for the nested structure of the data.  Table 27 below shows the results for 
the variable Malay on the seven dimensions of personality:- 
 
The results in Table 27 (p. 229) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on seven dimensions of 
personality.  Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering between the respondents and 
is coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay Self in our database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
 
Table 27: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N= 2727) 
 
 
              ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
We see that the variable Malay is highly significant (at p<0.01 level) for the Self-esteem, 
Vigilant/Trustful, and Laissez-faire/Conscientious, dimensions of personality.  The 
variable is NOT significant for the other four dimensions.  
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to “Malaysian” 
results in a higher rating on these three dimensions, on an average.  The chi-square values for 
the Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all seven regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for the observers, Malaysian leaders exhibit higher Self-esteem, are more Trustful, and are 
more Conscientious than their global counterparts.  On the other four dimensions of 
personality, the Malaysian leaders are not different than other global leaders. 
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Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
  
To understand how Malay leaders compared with other cultures, we now detail the comparison and 
contrast of Malay leaders with other Asians.  Our hypothesis is that Asian cultures are closer to the 
Malay culture, and therefore we will hope to find more similarities with the Asian leaders compared 
to the Global leaders.  Table 28 (p. 231) gives the data regarding the countries from which the 
“Asian” category was selected; note that the list (315 in total) is a subset (and expanded version) of 
the data in Table 18. 
 
Table 28: Asian database of PA respondents 
 
Asian Countries Number of Asian leaders in PA 
database 
Bahrain 3 
Bangladesh 1 
China 40 
Emirates 35 
Philippines 1 
Hong Kong 19 
India 64 
Indonesia 4 
Iran 1 
Japan 11 
Jordan 1 
Korea 10 
Mauritius 1 
Mongolia 1 
Myanmar 1 
Nepal 1 
Pakistan 4 
Saudi Arabia 46 
Singapore 59 
Sri Lanka 2 
Taiwan 5 
Thailand 5 
Total (N)  315 
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Table 29 (p. 240) shows the mean variables measured against the Asian leaders as provided 
below: 
 
Table 29: PA – Comparisons of Malay leaders versus Asian leaders (N=315) 
 
 
PA Asian 
Database 
Malay Database 
Personality variables measured by the PA 
instrument 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Low self-esteem / High self-esteem 31.35 4.31 31.78 3.91 
Vigilant / Trustful 28.20 5.49 28.89 5.54 
Laissez-faire / Conscientious 32.18 5.30 34.37 4.04 
Self-effacing / Assertive 30.10 4.98 31.10 4.57 
Introverted / Extroverted 28.83 5.71 28.45 5.61 
Low-spirited / High-spirited 33.66 5.09 34.22 4.55 
Prudent / Adventurous 29.71 5.60 30.53 5.43 
 
 
We now perform the analysis similar to that in the previous section.  We test the seven 
dimensions of personality for significant differences between the Malay and the Asian 
leaders, controlling for the age, gender and industry background of participants, and also 
controlling for the nested structure of the data (the leaders are assessed by 4-7 observers, and 
these ratings are directed towards a single individual). 
 
The results in Table 30 (p. 233) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on seven 
dimensions of personality.  Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering 
between the respondents and is coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay Self in our 
database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 30> 
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Table 30: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N= 315) 
 
 Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer status; 
Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors 
Personality variables measured by PA 
instrument 
Coefficient of Malay Std. Error 
Low self-esteem / High self-esteem 0.309 0.43 
Vigilant / Trustful 0.003 0.54 
Laissez-faire / Conscientious 1.99*** 0.55 
Self-effacing / Assertive 1.06* 0.55 
Introverted / Extroverted -0.729 0.61 
Low-spirited / High-spirited 0.367 0.51 
Prudent / Adventurous 0.42 0.57 
*** highly significant, ** significant, * moderately significant 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
We see now that the variable Malay is highly significant (at p<0.01 level) for the Laissez-
faire/Conscientious dimension of personality and at p<0.1 level for the Self-
effacing/Assertive dimension.  The variable is NOT significant for the other five dimensions. 
 
Note that there are no limits placed on the coefficient of Malay a priori.  Recall that Malay is 
a binary variable that is “0” if the leader is Malay and “1” if he/she is not. The coefficient of 
Malay represents the rate of change of Personality variables as a function of change in Malay 
from “0” to “1”. Thus, the coefficient of Malay indicates how a shift in the leader’s 
nationality from any other to “Malaysian” from within the Asian cluster results in a change in 
any personality dimension, on an average. 
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to “Malaysian” 
from within the Asian cluster results in a higher rating on these two dimensions, on an 
average.  The chi-square values for the Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all 
seven regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for the observers, Malaysian leaders are more Conscientious than their Asian counterparts.  
This finding is also consistent with the Global aggregate tests, and seems to be a specific 
characteristic of Malay leaders. 
 
Interestingly, the data also shows that on an average, Malay leaders exhibit a higher degree of 
Assertiveness compared to their Asian counterparts. We note that the dimension of Self-
esteem is no longer significant, indicating that Self-esteem is a personality dimension that is 
similar in Malay and other Asian leaders. 
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Overall, there are three ways in which Malay leaders are similar to or different from Asian 
leaders:- 
 Malay leaders exhibit higher levels of Conscientious compared to global as well as 
Asian leaders.  They are different from Asian leaders, as well as World leaders on this 
dimension. 
 Malay leaders exhibit higher Self-esteem and are more Trustful compared to global 
leaders, but not when compared to leaders within Asia.  They are more like Asian 
leaders on this dimension. 
 Malay leaders exhibit higher levels of Assertiveness compared to Asian leaders, but 
are near to global leaders on this dimension.  They are more like global leaders (and 
different from Asian leaders) on this dimension. 
 
 The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) 
 
The Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) database has data of 1,349 leaders from 
across the globe.  In this section, we estimate how our database of 41 Malay leaders compares 
with this global database of LAQ.  We note that LAQ is a 360-degree feedback instrument; 
the data points consist of observations from observed leaders (we denote these individuals as 
“Self’s”) and from observers, including superiors, co-workers, spouse/partners, and direct 
reports.  Table 31 (p. 235) lists the major countries of the respondents, and Table 32 (p. 235) 
details the summary statistics for the eight archetypes of leadership traits measured by the 
LAQ instrument in the LAQ database, and compares it to those in our Malay database. 
 
Table 31: Global database of LAQ respondents 
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Table 32: LAQ Leadership archetypes (N =1349) 
 
Leadership 
Archetypes in 
LAQ 
Global Self’s 
Global 
Observers 
Malay Self’s 
Malay 
Observers 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Builder 32.7 4.8 30.7 5.4 33.5 5.1 32.4 6.0 
Change 
catalyst 
31.3 4.9 31.2 5.6 33.1 5.0 32.6 6.3 
Coach 33.7 4.9 33.1 6.7 36.0 4.4 33.9 7.2 
Communicator 29.2 5.5 30.6 6.2 30.8 6.7 32.9 6.9 
Innovator 30.4 5.3 30.8 5.9 31.8 5.6 32.1 6.4 
Processor 27.2 6.3 30.2 6.5 33.4 4.6 33.6 6.0 
Strategist 29.6 5.8 31.4 6.2 32.5 5.9 33.5 6.7 
Transactor 29.1 6.1 30.7 6.1 31.2 5.8 31.9 6.8 
 
 
The summary statistics tells us that in some archetypes there seems to be a significant 
difference between the Malay leaders and the global leaders.  Differences are not only at the 
level of Self’s, but also at the level of observers.  So, for example; observers of Malay leaders 
rate them higher on the Builder archetype, than do the observers of global leaders. 
 
In our subsequent analysis, we test these differences between the Malay and the global 
leaders, and whether these differences are significant when we control for the factors such as 
age, gender and industry.  Our analysis in this paper is not focused on the revalidation of the 
8 Leadership Archetypes; rather, we focus on isolating the differences on these dimensions 
between the Malay culture and the rest of the world.  While the responses from individuals 
cannot provide reliable estimates about cultures, they can supply information about 
differences between these cultures, if we have matched samples or, alternatively, if we 
control for factors such as age, gender and industry. 
 
The analysis of data from a cultural perspective for a 360-degree feedback instrument 
presents some challenges.  First, the raters are nested within the Self’s, and we need to 
control for the effects of this nesting.  Second, the Self’s were rated from a 360-degree 
feedback – that means we have many kinds of observers – superiors, subordinates, co-
workers and other external/internal stakeholders.  Since raters are clustered in Self’s, 
observations for the same Self will likely be correlated because of unobserved self-level 
effects.  To adjust for this, we used multilevel or hierarchical modelling of data.  The 
unobserved self-level effects were considered as fixed parameters.  Thus, we have 8 different 
equations; one each for each archetype of the leadership archetype, and these archetypes are 
our dependent variables.  We report standard errors that have been adjusted for intra-self-
correlations thus taking care of not only heteroskedasticity of residuals but also that these 
residuals may be correlated within each Self.  The Malay LAQ database has data on  
41 leaders (Self’s), and their 309 observers (total 350 data points). 
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We now perform a multilevel regression analysis on the LAQ data, similar to what we did in 
the GELI and PA. We test the eight leadership archetypes for significant differences between 
the Malay and the Global leaders, controlling for the age, sex and industry background of 
participants, and also controlling for the nested structure of the data. The results in Table 33 
(p. 236) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on the eight leadership archetypes.  
Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering between the respondents and is 
coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay self in our database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
We notice that the variable Malay is highly significant for five out of eight archetypes of 
leadership, significant for one and moderately significant for one, meaning the Malays are 
rated higher than the global leaders for seven dimensions. The only dimension that has 
similar rating between the Malays and the global leaders is the Coach dimension. 
 
Table 33: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N = 1349) 
 
 
   ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
We see that the variable Malay is highly significant for seven out of eight archetypes of 
leadership.  The variable is NOT significant for the Coach archetype. 
 
These results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to “Malaysian” 
results in a higher rating on seven archetypes, on an average.  The chi-square values for the 
Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all eight regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for the observers, Malaysian leaders exhibit higher scores on seven archetypes of leadership 
(Builder, Change catalyst, Communicator, Innovator, Processor, Strategist, Transactor) 
than their global counterparts.  On the Coach archetype, the Malaysian leaders are not 
different from other global leaders. 
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Analysis and Comparison with Asians 
 
To understand how Malay leaders compared with other cultures, we now detail the 
comparison and contrast of Malay leaders with other Asians.  Our hypothesis is that Asian 
cultures are closer to the Malay culture, and therefore we will hope to find more similarity 
with the Asian leaders compared to the global leaders.  Table 34 (p. 238) gives the data 
regarding the countries from which the “Asian” category was selected; note that the list is a 
subset (and expanded version) of the data in Table 18. 
 
Table 34: Asian database of LAQ respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mean variables measured against the Asian leaders are as provided in Table 35 (p. 238) 
and reproduced below:- 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 35> 
 
 
 
 
 
Asian Countries Number of Asian leaders in 
LAQ database 
Bahrain 2 
China 9 
Emirates 33 
Philippines 1 
Hong Kong 11 
India 64 
Indonesia 1 
Iran 1 
Japan 15 
Jordan 2 
Kenya 1 
Korea 6 
Mauritius 1 
Pakistan 4 
Saudi Arabia 40 
Singapore 12 
Taiwan 2 
Thailand 1 
Total (N)  206 
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Table 35: LAQ – Mean variables between Malay leaders and Asian leaders (N=206) 
 
 
LAQ Asian 
Database 
LAQ Malay 
Database 
Leadership Archetypes in LAQ Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Builder 33.5 5.3 33.5 5.10 
Change catalyst 32.20 4.9 33.1 5.0 
Coach 34.9 5.0 36.0 4.4 
Communicator 30.0 6.0 30.8 6.7 
Innovator 31.30 5.6 31.8 5.6 
Processor 30.2 5.6 33.4 4.6 
Strategist 31.1 6.0 32.5 5.9 
Transactor 30.0 5.80 31.2 5.8 
 
 
We now perform the analysis similar to that in the previous section.  We test the eight 
archetypes for significant differences between the Malay and the Asian leaders, controlling 
for the age, gender and industry background of participants, and also controlling for the 
nested structure of the data (the leaders are assessed by up to 15 observers, and these ratings 
are directed towards a single individual). 
 
The results in Table 36 (p. 239) show the coefficients for the variable Malay on eight 
archetypes of leadership.  Variable Malay is coded as a dummy variable for clustering 
between the respondents and is coded 1 if the respondents are rating a Malay Self in our 
database of 41 Malaysian leaders. 
 
 
 
 
 
<This space is intentionally blank.  Please see next page for Table 36> 
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Table 36: Coefficient of variable Malay; controls for age, gender, industry, observer 
status; Multilevel Regression; Clustered Standard Errors (N= 206) 
 
Archetypes measured by the LAQ 
instrument 
Coefficient of Malay Std. Error 
Builder 1.66** 0.62 
Change catalyst 1.36* 0.60 
Coach 0.30 0.68 
Communicator 2.29** 0.73 
Innovator 1.24 0.65 
Processor 1.99** 0.63 
Strategist 2.32*** 0.68 
Transactor 1.29** 0.69 
*** highly significant, ** significant, * moderately significant 
   ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
We see now that the variable Malay is highly significant (at p<0.001 level) for the Strategist 
archetype of leadership, and significant (at p<0.01 level) for the Builder, Communicator and 
Processor archetype.  It is significant at p<0.05 level for the Change catalyst archetype.  The 
variable is NOT significant for the Coach, Innovator and Transactor archetypes.  These 
results indicate that a shift in the leader’s nationality from any other to “Malaysian” from 
within the Asian cluster, results in a higher rating on five archetypes, on an average.   The 
chi-square values for the Wald test indicate that the model is significant for all eight 
regressions. 
 
Overall, we can say that irrespective of age, gender and industry background, and controlling 
for the observers, Malaysian leaders score higher than their Asian counterparts on some 
leadership archetypes, while they are similar to their Asian counterparts in the roles of 
Coach, Innovator and Transactor.  These findings are aligned with the global aggregate 
tests, and seem to be a specific characteristic of Malay leaders. 
 
 
 
<End of Appendix 9> 
 
 
 
 
 428 
Appendix 10 
 
Defense Mechanisms in Psychoanalysis 
 
 Regression – This describes a return to a way of functioning that would have been 
characteristic of an earlier stage of development. Stages of extreme dependency can 
often be ‘regressive’ in form. They are defensive because they enable the individual to 
avoid facing something disturbing by taking refuge in – or fixating upon – a way of 
dealing with anxiety that was successful in the distant past. 
 
 Reaction-formation – This is a very familiar mechanism in which someone defends 
against an unconscious idea by asserting its opposite. Extreme politeness as a defence 
against envious hostility might be a common example of this; also risk taking as a 
way of dealing with timidity and hyper anxiety, or bullying as a defence against 
feelings of inferiority. 
 
 Denial – Moore and Fine (1990) define this as a ‘primitive or early defense 
mechanism by which an individual unconsciously repudiates some or all of the 
meanings of an event.’ Denial is a defence that has been described in some detail by 
psychologists interested in processes by which people refuse to see the implications of 
their actions (for example Cohen, 2011). Denial can sometimes be a way of refusing 
to allow an idea access to consciousness at all (‘it did not happen’), which means it 
merges with other defences such as repression. But it can also signify apparent 
acceptance of something (‘yes, I did do it’) while refusing to acknowledge the 
significance or meaning of the event (‘it was only a slight nudge’; ‘it was an accident 
and does not mean I wanted to kill him’). 
 
 Projection – This is defined by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, p.349) as an ‘operation 
whereby qualities, feelings, wishes or even “objects”, which the subject refuses to 
recognize or rejects in himself, are expelled from the self and located in another 
person or thing. Projection so understood is a defence of very primitive origin which 
may be seen at work especially in paranoia, but also in “normal” modes of thought 
such as superstition.’ The husband who sees his wife as being aggressive towards him 
when he is full of anger towards her is an example here; the psychotic patient who 
hears voices coming from outside, which are really articulations of her inward 
thoughts, is another. Projection is very common and forms a basis of Melanie Klein’s 
developmental theory. It is often easily recognizable when one realizes one has been 
‘made to feel’ something (for instance anxiety) by a person one is with. 
 
 Displacement – This occurs when the emotional charge attached to one idea or object 
is shifted to another, more easily acceptable one. ‘Kicking the cat’ is a familiar 
example: people who cannot acknowledge the rage they feel towards their intimates 
or perhaps people they are dependent on (parents, employers, and so on), may 
commonly ‘take out’ their feelings on others. Freud sees this as a fundamental way in 
which the unconscious operates, particularly visible in dreams. It also occurs in 
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psychoanalytic therapy where a patient may treat the therapist ‘as if’ the therapist 
were a parent. 
 
 Sublimation – This is a very important defence, and according to Freud it is also the 
basis for creativity. The idea here is that many activities that seem ‘sublime’ or 
uplifting are in fact fuelled by sexual impulses that cannot be expressed directly. 
Basically, energy from the drives is channelled in socially acceptable ways, which 
brings partial satisfaction to the person concerned and also advances culture. Art is 
such a socially sanctioned way of expressing the drive. Sublimation is crucial for the 
development of culture, while also defending society and the individuals within it 
from direct exposure to the drive. 
 
 Identification with the aggressor – This refers to the situation in which someone has 
been subjected to aggression. A way of dealing with the anxiety this produces is to 
unconsciously take on the propensities of the aggressors – to ‘identify’ with them. 
This can be done by idealizing the aggressor, or by becoming like the aggressor. For 
instance, people who are consistently tyrannized may act in the same way towards 
others who are less powerful than them. Identification with the aggressor is a useful 
way of understanding why suffering individuals sometimes admire their torturers and 
make others suffer, and it has been used to make sense of the behaviour of delinquents 
and criminals as well as the military and the police. 
 
(Frosh 2012, p. 64-66) 
 
 Splitting – Some people engage in us-versus-them thinking. For them there are no 
gray areas. They “split” everything into black or white. For example, they see people 
are either for them or against them; there’s no middle ground.  
 
 Repression – People who employ repression experience seemingly inexplicable 
memory lapses. They “forget” to do things that they have no interest in doing.  
 
 Humor – Humor results in a playful approach to overcoming difficult issues. It can be 
seen as an overt expression of feelings without unpleasant effects on others.  
 
(Kets de Vries 2001, p.18-20) 
 
 
 latah - “Latah is originally a Malay term for a broad category of strange behaviour. 
Literally it means ‘Tiklish’ ‘Jumpy’ or ‘Love-madness’. Latah is described to occur in 
Indonesia and Malaysia but also in certain regions of Africa and Arabia... In 1849, 
J.R. Logan was the first to write in English about Latah behavior and described it as 
an uncontrollable startle reaction...”  
 
In latah, “responses are stimulus-induced. Clinical features are coprolalia (more 
specifically, involuntary blurting of sexually obscene words like genitalia), saying 
idiosyncratically stereotyped things or calling out the name of the thing that excited 
them (e.g. ‘tiger?’) echolalia, echopraxia and compulsive unquestioning obedience 
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when ordered to perform actions which may be ridiculous, improper or even 
dangerous (“forced obedience”). Usually the patients are prone to constant teasing by 
others. Latah is typically evoked by being poked forcefully in the side, loud noises, 
unexpected or phobic objects (snakes, spiders etc.) and possibly merely the presence 
of Westerners. The individuals are conscious while being Latah and able to recollect 
their behaviour afterwards but claim to not be able to constrain their actions. Latahs 
are typically middle-aged women of low social-economical status...there is an absence 
of Latah among preadolescent children. Geertz described that the persons severely 
afflicted with Latah give an appearance of being under extreme tension...Latah 
patients have a licence to mock those about them regardless of relative social status 
and show conduct considered improper for Malay women. Lower-status persons are 
more likely to receive startle-teasing than those of higher status. Although they are 
often embarrassed, Latahs are not considered either morally or legally responsible for 
what they do after being startled.” 
 
Bakker, M.J. & Tijssen, M.A.J. (2009).  Appendix I: Culture-specific startle 
syndromes of The startle reflex in children with neuropsychiatric disorders. Retrieved 
from http://dare.uva.nl/document/136129 
 
 
<End of Appendix 10> 
 
 
 
 THE MALAY LEADERSHIP MYSTIQUE  
 
Building a background to a psychoanalytic understanding of  
Malay leadership qualities in politics and business 
 
 
 
This is an exploratory research to understand the Malay leadership qualities in politics and 
business. 
 
The need for the research was borne out of the constant criticism of the Malays by 
political leaders and others about the inability of the Malays to be successful in business 
in spite of the enormous efforts by the Malaysian government to bring the Malays to be 
involved actively in business after independence. 
 
A brief background at the outset of the research meandered through Malaya, which was 
what the country was known earlier, then to her independence, and later to her identity as 
Malaysia in 1963.  The major economic problem facing the Malays then was that they 
seemed to lag behind the immigrant races of Chinese and Indians.  The Malay economic 
problem which was not seriously addressed by the leaders of the newly independent 
country, where political power largely vested with the Malays, erupted into racial riots 
when the political dominance of the Malays was threatened after the general elections of 
1969, when the Malay ruling party, UMNO and its coalition partners fared badly.  The 
country entered unchartered terrain with this infamy, largely interpreted as the result of 
the Malays being marginalised economically in their own country which went against 
their not totally unreasonable expectations that their economic position would greatly 
improve after independence.  The NEP was then formulated to help the Malays in the 
economic front with special affirmative policies aimed at the Malays having a share of 
30% of the economic pie of the nation within a twenty-year period from 1971 to 1990. 
 
However, despite the implementation of the NEP where affirmative policies were crafted 
in favour of the Malays, it did not achieve the target envisaged even after forty years.  The 
failure of the Malays to take advantage of the government’s affirmative actions led to a 
widespread feeling that the Malays generally are not capable business leaders and 
entrepreneurs. 
 
As much as the Malay business leadership was under scrutiny, the very Malays who were 
beginning to be branded as incapable business leaders were conversely, successful in 
providing political leadership to the country which made Malaysia an economic success 
story.  Though the economic success of Malaysia could largely be attributed to the 
hardworking Chinese entrepreneurs in Malaysia, the impact of an appropriate and 
pragmatic political leadership and a framework of economic policies in which the Malay 
political leadership played a critical role cannot be disregarded and Malaysia could not 
have achieved the economic success it enjoys today, sans this political leadership.  As one 
expert panel member aptly described “without Malay leadership, the rest will crumble.” 
 
I therefore embarked on the research with a dual objective, the core, being to undertake an 
exploratory research using the clinical and psychodynamic approach to understand the 
lack of success of Malays in business; the ancillary, being the political leadership of the 
Malays to show how they have successfully managed the political management of the 
country. 
  
Having articulated the paradoxical situation of Malay leadership i.e. their ability to lead 
and lay the foundation to make Malaysia a burgeoning economy and their inability to 
achieve the same level of success when it comes to their own involvement in business; the 
research looked closely at the “Political Administration and Management of Malaysia” 
where the leadership of all the five past prime ministers of Malaysia from independence in 
1957 to 2009 were analysed to show their leadership styles and values.  This provided the 
relevant economic pointers which contributed to Malaysia’s economic success under the 
past five prime ministers. 
 
Having established that Malay political leadership had built an economically successful 
nation, it gave me the impetus to cast my research net a little wider to understand “the 
inner theatre” of the Malays better from the cultural and psycho-social aspects. I drew on 
the historical and contemporary writings about the Malays and used four different cultural 
models drawn from Hofstede, Schein, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner and Kets de 
Vries. 
 
The Malay way of life, as seen through the various dimensions of the cultural models 
employed in this research, gained traction for it revealed the Malay as one who accepts 
high Power Distance, is Collectivist in nature with low Uncertainty Avoidance (i.e. he can 
accept changes without great anxiety), prefers Particularism (where bending rules to suit 
the situation is accepted), and Communitarianism (Collectivism and Communitarianism 
go hand-in-hand.)  The influence of feudalism also makes him Diffuse in nature (evasive 
and tactful) and accept Ascription rather than Achievement (“who you know”, rather than 
“what you know”). 
 
It further revealed that the Malay is one who lives in harmony with the environment, has a 
Being orientation (more of Fatalistic), hides his emotion (Neutral and not Affective) and 
has a High context in communication (preferring to be indirect).  All of these cultural 
attributes of a Malay were identified as directly, indirectly or reversely-linked to Power 
Distance which is borne out of feudalism. 
 
Through a literature survey of the Malays, we identified sixteen Malay characteristics and 
linked them to the various dimensions of culture drawn from the four cultural models. 
 
Out of the sixteen attributes of the Malays, ten of them were directly or indirectly linked 
to Power Distance which is intertwined with feudalism.  Feudalism combined with 
colonialism were preliminarily identified as the two main causes of the social  and 
economic problems faced by the Malays, with strong support from available literature 
(Alatas, 1977; Andaya & Andaya 2002; Husin Ali, 2008; Milner, 2008; Omar, 2006; 
Zamani, 2002).  A few writers identified feudalism and colonialism as the root cause of 
some serious psychological problems of the Malays (Abdullah, 1843; Alatas, 1977; 
Clifford, 1898; Dr Mahathir, 1970). 
 
As the research identified that the Malays had psychological problems, it lent credence to 
the decision to use the clinical and psychodynamic approach from the onset of this 
research to understand the Malays. 
 
With the historical understanding of the Malays as well as their “inner theatre” providing 
the background for the research, the case for the selection of an appropriate methodology 
for this research which is largely qualitative and multi-disciplinary in nature, was then put 
 forth.  After careful evaluation, a multi-disciplinary approach using grounded theory, 
interpretive methodology, experiential data, fieldwork involving focus groups and expert 
panel interviews and 360-degree feedback instruments providing empirical data, were 
selected as appropriate for this exploratory research to study Malay leadership using the 
clinical paradigm. 
 
Because the study aims to understand the Malays as a race, psychoanalytical theories 
involving large groups such as large-group identity and large-group regression expounded 
by Volkan proved to be an insightful dimension in understanding and appreciating the 
Malay problems which had hardly been studied through clinical lens. 
 
It was explained in the chapter on Research Methodology (Chapter 4) that this research on 
Malay leadership relied on more than one method to understand the Malays.  Ergo; it 
called for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter; metaphorically, like the 
peeling of the layers of an onion.  I called them the five levels and at each level, the 
objective was to go deeper and beneath the surface.  
 
At the surface level, the research began by going through a literature survey of published 
works about Malays from historical accounts.  Then works of contemporary writers who 
wrote about Malays and their social and economic problems were analysed.  At a deeper 
level, focus groups and expert panel members who were all Malays, (except 3 of the 20 
expert panel members – one of whom is a British Malaysian, another a Chinese Malaysian 
and another an Indian Malaysian) provided first-hand information about the various issues 
faced by the Malays from the political, cultural, educational, religious and family 
dimensions as well as the competition from the Chinese. 
 
Based on the focus group discussions and the expert panel interviews, some of the key 
themes that emerged as impediments to Malay leadership in business are:- 
 
 Malay culture of feudalism which led to the dependency and subsidy mentalities; 
 Lack of experience and appropriate training; 
 Politicians’ desire to perpetuate the handout system leading to corruption; 
 Education not tailored to improve Malay acumen in business; 
 The inability of the Malays to compete with the experienced and hardworking 
Chinese because of lack of adequate training and appropriate education; 
 Misguided religious beliefs and conflicts. 
 
The discussions with, and views of, the focus groups and expert panel members  about the 
Malays and their respective assessment of the problems faced by the Malays in business 
leadership, laid the groundwork in taking a random sample of Malays numbering about 41 
and subjecting them to an empirical test through 360-degree feedback instruments. 
Several distinguished and eminent corporate personalities of the country undertook the 
five different 360-degree feedback instruments and the results compared with 
international database of business leaders across the globe and Asia.  The results of these 
instruments showed that generally, the Malays tended to rank themselves higher than the 
global leaders.  This over-rating by the Malays could be due to the factors of self-esteem 
and positive self-image; social desirability; feudalist and hierarchical mindset with high 
Power Distance; leniency and kasihan (sympathy) factors. 
 
Notwithstanding the dissimilarities between the Malays and global and Asian leaders, a 
surprising element that arose out of the comparison of the four of the five instruments viz 
 the Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI), Personality Audit (PA), Leadership 
Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ) and Inventory Leadership Style (ILS), is the similarity of 
patterns between the Malay, global and Asian leaders.  This similarity of patterns suggests 
prima facie evidence that well-educated Malays with good exposure and training who 
occupy senior corporate or governmental positions are not very different from those in the 
database of global and Asian leaders.  This finding however, is very preliminary and 
needs to be affirmed by further wider and deeper research.  This is a very important aspect 
for the research because if further research could re-affirm the preliminary finding of this 
study, then we could more confidently hypothesize that once the Malays are taken out of 
regression into progression through proper education and experience, they are capable of 
competing with any global business leaders.  In other words, there are no other inherent 
weaknesses in the Malays other than being regressed due to historical factors which have 
been elaborated throughout the research. 
 
Having gone through the research journey of understanding the Malays at five different 
levels, (historical accounts, contemporary writings, focus group discussions, expert panel 
interviews and 360-degree feedback survey), the facts and data were integrated and 
interpreted with the focus on the crux of the Malay leadership problems in business.  With 
the benefit of clinical lens and the psychoanalytic theories of large-group identity, large-
group regression and transgenerational transmission of trauma, the origins of Malay 
civilisation could be traced and argued with historical support from several writers that 
the Malays are victims of large-group regression which effectively prevented them from 
being successful in business.  Unless the Malays are consciously brought into a 
progressive mode, success of the Malays in business is likely to be limited. 
 
Amid a backdrop of regression, other weaknesses surfaced which contributed to the 
failure of the Malays in business.  These include the failure of the government to 
recognise that creating successful Malay business leaders is an adaptive challenge, not a 
technical issue which could be solved merely by providing the Malays with licences and 
finance.  Other factors include the beneath-the-surface racial relations and competition 
from the well-entrenched Chinese entrepreneurs who, through their own subtle ways, 
check-mate the Malay advancement in business and the weaknesses in the implementation 
of the NEP. 
 
The research pinpoints fundamentally to the failure of the government to understand the 
Malay psychological situation and the “inner theatre” of the Malays as the probable 
primary cause for the lack of success of the Malays in business. 
 
Some thoughts and reflections for future work have been offered in this research to 
address the past failures unearthed in this research.  As this research is only exploratory in 
nature, it is to be espoused that further rigorous testing and a deeper reflection is key in 
making that quantum leap in ferreting answers to the dilemma of the Malays’ lack of 
success economically and in business. 
 
 
 DE MYSTIEK VAN MALEIS LEIDERSCHAP 
 
Bouwstenen voor een psychoanalytisch begrip van Maleise 
leiderschapskwaliteiten in politiek en bedrijfsleven  
 
 
Dit is een verkennend onderzoek om de Maleise leiderschapskwaliteiten in de politiek en 
het bedrijfsleven beter te begrijpen. 
 
De noodzaak tot onderzoek kwam voort uit de niet-aflatende kritiek, onder meer door 
politieke leiders, op de Maleiers (autochtone Maleisiërs) en hun onvermogen om met 
succes deel te nemen aan het bedrijfsleven, ondanks de enorme inspanningen van de 
Maleisische overheid om de Maleiers na de onafhankelijkheid hier actief bij te betrekken. 
 
Een korte oriëntatie aan het begin van het onderzoek kronkelde door Malaya, de naam 
waaronder het land eerder bekend was, daarna zijn onafhankelijkheid, en vervolgens zijn 
identiteit als Maleisië in 1963. Het belangrijkste economische probleem waar de Maleiers 
toen voor stonden was dat ze achter leken te blijven bij de Chinese en Indiase 
immigranten. Het Maleise economische probleem, dat niet serieus werd aangepakt door 
de leiders van het nieuwe onafhankelijke land en waarvan de politieke macht grotendeels 
bij de Maleiers lag, barstte uit in rassenrellen na de algemene verkiezingen in 1969, toen 
de dominante Maleise partij, UMNO, en zijn coalitiepartners het slecht deden en hun 
politieke dominantie werd bedreigd. Het land begaf zich op onontgonnen terrein met deze 
beruchte tegenslag, welke grotendeels werd gezien als het gevolg van de economische 
marginalisatie van de Maleiers in hun eigen land, dit tegen hun niet geheel onredelijke 
verwachtingen in dat hun economische positie na de onafhankelijkheid aanzienlijk zou 
verbeteren. De NEP (nieuwe economische politiek) werd geformuleerd om de Maleiers op 
economisch gebied te helpen met een voorkeursbeleid met als doel in een periode van 
twintig jaar van 1971 tot 1990 voor de Maleiers een aandeel van 30% in de economische 
taart van het land te behalen. 
 
Ondanks de implementatie van het stimulerend beleid van de NEP .waarmee links en 
rechts voorkeursbehandelingen werden gecreëerd voor de Maleiers, werd dit doel na zelfs 
veertig jaar nog niet bereikt. Het falen van de Maleiers om van de positieve 
regeringsmaatregelen te profiteren, leidde tot het wijdverbreide sentiment dat de Maleiers 
in het algemeen geen bekwame bedrijfsleiders en ondernemers zouden zijn. 
 
Terwijl het Maleise zakelijke leiderschap kritisch onder de loep werd genomen waren de 
Maleiers, die op het punt stonden te worden gebrandmerkt als onbekwame zakenlieden, 
tegelijkertijd succesvol in hun politieke leiderschap, dat van Maleisië een economisch 
succes maakte. Hoewel het economische succes van Maleisië dan vooral mag worden 
toegeschreven aan de hardwerkende Chinees Maleise ondernemers, kan de impact van een 
juist en pragmatisch politiek leiderschap, en een raamwerk voor het economische beleid 
waarin het Maleise politieke leiderschap een cruciale rol speelde, niet buiten beschouwing 
worden gelaten. Maleisië zou zonder dit politieke leiderschap niet zijn huidige 
economische succes hebben bereikt. Een paneldeskundige gaf een treffende omschrijving: 
"Zonder Maleis leiderschap zal de rest teloorgaan." 
 
Ik ben dan ook aan dit onderzoek begonnen met een tweeledig doel. De kern was om een 
verkennend onderzoek uit te voeren met behulp van de klinische en psychodynamische 
 benadering om het gebrek aan succes van de Maleiers in het bedrijfsleven beter te 
begrijpen. Het bijkomende doel was om de politieke leiding van de Maleiers te laten zien 
hoe zij met succes politieke leiding hebben te weten geven aan hun land. 
 
Na het uiteenzetten van de paradoxale situatie van het Maleise leiderschap, namelijk de 
kwaliteit om leiding te geven en de grondslag te leggen voor de groeiende economie van 
Maleisië afgezet tegen het onvermogen om eenzelfde niveau van succes te bereiken in 
hun eigen betrokkenheid bij het bedrijfsleven, richtte het onderzoek zich op 'het politieke 
beheer en management van Maleisië'. Hiertoe werd het leiderschap van alle vijf premiers 
van Maleisië vanaf de onafhankelijkheid in 1957 tot en met 2009 geanalyseerd om hun 
leiderschapsstijl en waarden te kunnen beschrijven. Dit wees op de relevante economische 
factoren die hebben bijgedragen tot het economische succes van Maleisië onder de laatste 
vijf premiers. 
 
Toen was vastgesteld dat het Maleise politieke leiderschap een economisch succesvol 
land had weten op te bouwen, werd dit de aanzet om mijn onderzoek uit te breiden en 'het 
innerlijke theater' van de Maleiers in zijn culturele en psychosociale aspecten beter te 
gaan begrijpen. Ik maakte hiertoe gebruik van historische en hedendaagse teksten over de 
Maleiers, en gebruikte vier verschillende culturele modellen ontleend aan Hofstede, 
Schein, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner en Kets de Vries. 
 
De analyse van de Maleise manier van leven volgens de verschillende dimensies van de 
culturele modellen die in dit onderzoek werden gebruikt bleek vruchtbaar. Het bracht aan 
het licht dat de Maleier een grote machtsafstand aanvaardt en collectivistisch is ingesteld 
met een lage onzekerheidsvermijding (d.w.z. dat hij veranderingen zonder veel angst 
accepteert). Verder geeft hij de voorkeur aan particularisme (het soepel toepassen van 
regels om aan situaties tegemoet te komen) en communitarisme (collectivisme en 
communitarisme gaan hand in hand). De invloed van het feodalisme maakt hem ook 
diffuus van aard (ontwijkend en tactvol), en hij accepteert toeschrijving meer dan prestatie 
('wie je bent' in plaats van 'wat je weet en kunt'). 
 
Verder bleek dat de Maleier iemand is die in harmonie leeft met zijn omgeving, zich 
oriënteert op zijn (meer fatalistisch), zijn emoties verbergt (neutraal en niet affectief), en 
een hoge context aanhoudt bij communicatie (is liever indirect). Van al deze culturele 
attributen van de Maleier werd vastgesteld dat ze direct, indirect of omgekeerd gerelateerd 
waren aan machtsafstand, hetgeen voortkomt uit feodalisme. 
 
Door middel van literatuuronderzoek naar de Maleiers identificeerden we zestien Maleise 
kenmerken en koppelden deze aan de verschillende culturele dimensies die werden 
ontleend aan de vier culturele modellen. 
 
Van de zestien kenmerken van Maleiers waren er tien die direct of indirect verband 
hielden met machtsafstand, dat verweven is met feodalisme. Feodalisme in combinatie 
met kolonialisme werden voorlopig gezien als de twee belangrijkste oorzaken voor de 
sociale en economische problemen van de Maleiers, hiervoor bestaat sterke steun uit de 
beschikbare literatuur (Alatas, 1977; Andaya & Andaya 2002; Husin Ali, 2008; Milner, 
2008; Omar, 2006; Zamani, 2002). Een paar schrijvers identificeerden feodalisme en 
kolonialisme als de hoofdoorzaak van een aantal ernstige psychologische problemen 
onder de Maleiers (Abdullah, 1843; Alatas, 1977; Clifford, 1898; Dr. Mahathir, 1970). 
 
 Aangezien onderzoek bevestigde dat de problematiek van de Maleiers ook psychologisch 
van aard was, ondersteunde dit de beslissing om vanaf het begin van dit onderzoek de 
klinische en psychodynamische aanpak te gebruiken om de Maleiers beter te begrijpen. 
 
Met een historisch begrip van de Maleier en van diens 'innerlijke theater' als achtergrond 
voor het onderzoek, kwam de keuze van een geschikte methodiek voor dit onderzoek, 
grotendeels kwalitatief en multidisciplinair van aard, aan de orde. Na zorgvuldige 
evaluatie werd gekozen voor een multidisciplinaire aanpak met gebruikmaking van de 
zogenaamde ‘grounded theory', interpretatieve methodologie, ervaringsgegevens, 
veldwerk bestaande uit interviews met focusgroepen en expertpanelinterviews, en 360 
graden-feedbackinstrumenten. Deze verschillende methoden vormen een geschikte 
aanpak om via het klinisch paradigma relevante empirische gegevens te verzamelen voor 
dit verkennende onderzoek naar Maleis leiderschap. 
 
Omdat de studie probeert de Maleiers te begrijpen als een ras, bleken psychoanalytische 
theorieën over grote groepen, waaronder large group identity en large group regression 
zoals uiteengezet door Volkan, een inzichtelijke dimensie te bieden voor het begrijpen en 
evalueren van de Maleise problemen, die nog nauwelijks waren bestudeerd vanuit een 
klinische perspectief. 
 
In het hoofdstuk over onderzoeksmethodologie (hoofdstuk 4) werd uitgelegd dat dit 
onderzoek naar Maleis leiderschap op meer dan één methode berust om de Maleiers te 
begrijpen. Dit vroeg derhalve om een omvattend begrip van het onderwerp, wat 
metaforisch gezien overeenkomt met het pellen van de lagen van een ui. Ik noemde ze de 
vijf niveaus, en op elk niveau was het doel om dieper, en onder het oppervlak te kijken.  
 
Op een eerste niveau begon het onderzoek met een literatuurstudie van gepubliceerde 
werken over Maleiers in historische verslagen. Daarna werden de werken van 
hedendaagse schrijvers over de Maleiers en hun sociale en economische problemen 
geanalyseerd. Op een dieper niveau boden de focusgroepen en paneldeskundigen, allen 
Maleiers (met uitzondering van 3 van de 20 paneldeskundigen waarvan één Britse, één 
Chinese en één Indiase Maleisiër), informatie uit eerste hand over de verschillende 
problemen waarvoor de Maleiers zich gesteld zien op het gebied van politiek, cultuur, 
onderwijs, religie, familie en daarnaast de concurrentie met de Chinezen. 
 
Op basis van discussies in de focusgroep en interviews met deskundigenpanels, kwamen 
enkele belangrijke thema's naar voren als belemmeringen voor Maleis leiderschap in het 
bedrijfsleven: 
 
 De Maleise feodale cultuur leidde tot afhankelijkheid en de subsidiementaliteit; 
 Gebrek aan ervaring en passende opleiding; 
 De wens van politici om het weggeefsysteem in stand te houden leidt tot corruptie; 
 Het onderwijs is niet afgestemd op het verbeteren van de Maleise inzichten in het 
bedrijfsleven; 
 Het onvermogen van de Maleiers om met de ervaren en hardwerkende Chinezen te 
concurreren door gebrek aan voldoende opleiding en het juiste onderwijs; 
 Misleide of misplaatste religieuze overtuigingen en conflicten. 
 
De discussies in de focusgroepen en de visies van de paneldeskundigen over de Maleiers, 
en hun respectieve evaluaties van de problemen van de Maleiers met leiderschap in het 
bedrijfsleven, legden de basis voor een aselecte steekproef van 41 Maleiers om hen te 
 onderwerpen aan een empirische toets met 360 graden-feedbackinstrumenten. 
Verschillende onderscheiden en eminente zakelijke persoonlijkheden in het land 
ondergingen de vijf verschillende 360 graden-feedbackinstrumenten. De resultaten 
daarvan werden vergeleken met een internationale database van zakelijke leiders, 
mondiaal en uit Azië. Uit de resultaten met deze instrumenten bleek dat de Maleiers 
zichzelf, in het algemeen, hoger dan de mondiale leiders inschaalden. Deze 
overwaardering door de Maleiers zou te wijten kunnen zijn aan factoren als eigenwaarde 
en een positief zelfbeeld, sociale wenselijkheid, de feodale en hiërarchische mindset met 
een hoge machtsafstand, meegaandheid en kasihan (mededogen). 
 
Niettegenstaande de verschillen tussen de Maleiers, de mondiale, en de Aziatische leiders, 
was er een verrassend element dat naar voren kwam bij de vergelijking van vier van de 
vijf instrumenten – de Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI), de 
persoonlijkheidsaudit (PA), de Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ), en de 
Inventory Leadership Style (ILS) – en dat is de overeenkomst in patronen tussen de 
Maleise, wereldwijde en Aziatische leiders. Deze gelijkenis in patronen biedt prima facie 
bewijs dat goed opgeleide Maleiers op senior bedrijfs- of overheidsposities met goede 
blootstelling aan ervaringen en training, niet erg veel anders zijn dan die in de database 
van wereldwijde en Aziatische leiders. Deze bevinding is echter nog maar zeer voorlopig, 
en moet worden bevestigd door meer, breder en diepergaand onderzoek. Dit is een zeer 
belangrijk aspect voor het onderzoek. Als nader onderzoek de voorlopige bevinding van 
deze studie opnieuw zou bevestigen, dan kan met meer vertrouwen de hypothese worden 
aangenomen dat als de Maleiers eenmaal uit de regressie komen en zij zich verder 
ontwikkelen dankzij de juiste opleiding en ervaring, ze ook in staat zullen zijn om te 
concurreren met alle leiders van internationale bedrijven. Er zijn, met andere woorden, 
geen andere, inherente zwakke aspecten met betrekking tot de Maleiers, dan behalve de 
regressie als gevolg van historische factoren, waar verder in het onderzoek op in is 
gegaan. 
 
Na het doorlopen van de onderzoekstocht om de Maleiers op vijf verschillende niveaus te 
begrijpen (historische verslagen, eigentijdse geschriften, focusgroepdiscussies, interviews 
met deskundigenpanels en 360 graden-feedbackonderzoek), werden de feiten en gegevens 
geïntegreerd en geïnterpreteerd met de focus op de grote vraag naar de Maleise 
leiderschapsproblemen in het bedrijfsleven. Met behulp van het klinisch perspectief en de 
psychoanalytische theorieën over grote groep-identiteit, grote groep-regressie en de 
transgenerationele overdracht van trauma, en met de steun van verschillende historische 
auteurs, kon beargumenteerd worden dat de oorsprong van de Maleise cultuur kan worden 
afgeleid uit het feit dat de Maleiers slachtoffer zijn van grote groep-regressie, die effectief 
voorkomt dat ze succesvol worden in het bedrijfsleven. Tenzij de Maleiers doelbewust in 
een progressieve modus worden gebracht, zal het succes van de Maleiers in het 
bedrijfsleven waarschijnlijk beperkt blijven. 
 
Tegen de achtergrond van regressie kwamen andere gebreken naar boven die hebben 
bijgedragen tot het falen van de Maleiers in het zakenleven. Hieronder valt onder andere 
het falen van de regering om in te zien dat het creëren van succesvolle Maleise zakelijke 
leiders een adaptieve uitdaging is, en niet een technisch probleem dat kan worden 
opgelost door Maleiers simpelweg te voorzien van vergunningen en financiële middelen. 
Andere factoren zijn onder meer de rassenrelaties die onder de oppervlakte spelen, de 
concurrentie van de stevig gevestigde Chinese ondernemers die op subtiele wijze de 
Maleise vooruitgang in het bedrijfsleven schaakmat zetten, en zwakke punten in de 
implementatie van de NEP. 
  
Het onderzoek wijst in beginsel op het falen van de regering om de Maleise 
psychologische situatie en het 'innerlijke theater' van de Maleiers te begrijpen als de meest 
waarschijnlijke, primaire oorzaak voor het gebrek aan succes van de Maleiers in het 
bedrijfsleven. 
 
Een aantal gedachten en overwegingen voor toekomstig werk werden in dit onderzoek 
aangeboden om de eerdere mislukkingen aan te pakken die in dit onderzoek aan het licht 
zijn gekomen. Aangezien dit onderzoek slechts van verkennende aard is, is het belangrijk 
om te benadrukken dat verdere rigoureuze tests en een dieper gaande reflectie de sleutel 
zullen zijn tot het maken van die spectaculaire vooruitgang naar het uitvogelen van de 
antwoorden op het dilemma van het gebrek aan economisch en zakelijk succes van de 
Maleiers. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEGANJILAN KEPIMPINAN MELAYU 
 
Membina latar belakang kepada pemahaman psikoanalitik dalam kualiti-
kualiti kepimpinan Melayu dalam politik dan perniagaan 
 
 
Ini adalah satu kajian penerokaan untuk memahami ciri-ciri kepimpinan Melayu dalam 
politik dan perniagaan. 
 
Keperluan untuk penyelidikan ini lahir daripada kritikan berterusan terhadap orang 
Melayu daripada pemimpin-pemimpin politik dan lain-lain mengenai ketidakupayaan 
orang Melayu untuk berjaya dalam perniagaan walaupun usaha-usaha besar telah 
dijalankan oleh kerajaan Malaysia untuk melibatkan orang Melayu secara aktif dalam 
perniagaan selepas kemerdekaan. 
 
Latar belakang ringkas pada permulaan penyelidikan berkeliaran melalui Malaya, iaitu 
nama yang diberikan kepada negara Malaysia sebelum ia mencapai kemerdekaan. 
Masalah ekonomi utama yang dihadapi oleh orang Melayu ketika itu ialah bahawa mereka 
seolah-olah ketinggalan berbanding kaum pendatang Cina dan India. Masalah ekonomi 
Melayu ini tidak ditangani dengan serius oleh pemimpin-pemimpin negara ini yang baru 
sahaja merdeka, di mana majoriti kuasa politik berada di tangan orang Melayu. 
Akibatnya, masalah ini meletus menjadi rusuhan kaum apabila dominasi politik orang 
Melayu diancam selepas pilihan raya umum 1969, apabila parti pemerintah Melayu, 
UMNO dan rakan-rakan gabungannya merosot teruk. Rusuhan kaum ini telah ditafsirkan 
sebagai hasil daripada orang-orang Melayu yang terpinggir dari segi ekonomi di negara 
mereka sendiri, walhal mereka berharap kedudukan ekonomi mereka dapat ditingkatkan 
selepas merdeka. Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB) atau NEP (New Economic Policy) telah 
digubal untuk membantu orang Melayu dalam bidang ekonomi dengan dasar-dasar 
afirmatif khas supaya mereka dapat memiliki 30% daripada semua jenis peringkat 
kegiatan ekonomi negara dalam tempoh dua puluh tahun, iaitu dari 1971 hingga 1990. 
 
Empat puluh tahun telah berlalu tetapi DEB masih tidak mencapai objektifnya walaupun 
pelbagai dasar afirmatif yang memihak kepada orang Melayu telah diperkenalkan. Ini 
menyebabkan ramai pemimpin-pemimpin politik Melayu mengkritik bangsa mereka 
sendiri. Kegagalan orang Melayu untuk mengambil kesempatan daripada tindakan 
afirmatif kerajaan membawa kepada perasaan yang meluas bahawa orang Melayu secara 
umumnya tidak mampu memimpin dalam perniagaan dan keusahawanan.  
 
Walaupun kepimpinan Melayu dalam perniagaan dipersoalkan, orang-orang Melayu yang 
telah mula dilabelkan sebagai pemimpin perniagaan yang tidak berupaya telah berjaya 
membawa kepimpinan politik kepada negara lalu menjadikan Malaysia sebuah negara 
yang maju dari segi ekonomi. Kemajuan ekonomi di Malaysia boleh dikaitkan dengan 
usahawan-usahawan Cina yang bekerja keras di Malaysia. Tetapi tanpa kepimpinan 
politik yang sesuai dan pragmatik dan rangka kerja dasar ekonomi di mana kepimpinan 
politik Melayu memainkan peranan yang penting, Malaysia tidak akan dapat menikmati 
kejayaan ekonomi pada hari ini. Mengikut salah seorang ahli panel pakar, “tanpa 
kepimpinan Melayu, yang lain akan runtuh."  
 
Oleh itu, saya telah memulakan penyelidikan dengan dua objektif. Objektif utama kajian 
ini adalah untuk menjalankan penyelidikan penerokaan menggunakan pendekatan klinikal 
dan psikodinamik untuk memahami kekurangan kejayaan orang Melayu dalam 
perniagaan. Objektif sampingan kajian ini ialah untuk menilai kepimpinan orang Melayu 
dalam politik untuk menunjukkan bagaimana mereka telah berjaya menguruskan politik di 
negara ini. 
 
Setelah menjelaskan keadaan paradoks kepimpinan orang Melayu, iaitu orang Melayu 
yang telah memimpin dan menyediakan asas untuk menjadikan Malaysia sebuah negara 
yang ekonominya berkembang tetapi tidak dapat mencapai tahap kejayaan yang sama 
dalam perniagaan; kajian ini berpindah ke bab kedua yang berfokus kepada “Political 
Administration and Management of Malaysia” (Pentadbiran Politik dan Pengurusan 
Malaysia). Dalam bab ini, kepimpinan politik Melayu di bawah lima bekas perdana 
menteri Malaysia dari 1957 (tahun kemerdekaan) ke 2009 telah dianalisis untuk 
menunjukkan gaya kepimpinan dan nilai-nilai mereka. Ini menerangkan faktor-faktor 
ekonomi yang telah menyumbang kepada kejayaan ekonomi Malaysia di bawah lima 
bekas perdana menteri tersebut. 
 
Setelah menetapkan bahawa kepimpinan politik Melayu telah membina sebuah negara 
yang maju dari segi ekonomi, ia memberikan saya dorongan untuk meluaskan 
penyelidikan saya bagi memahami "teater dalaman" orang Melayu dengan lebih jelas dari 
aspek-aspek budaya dan psikososial. Saya merujuk kepada tulisan-tulisan sejarah dan 
kontemporari mengenai orang Melayu dan menggunakan empat model budaya yang 
berbeza oleh Hofstede, Schein, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner dan Kets de Vries. 
 
Cara hidup orang Melayu melalui beberapa dimensi model-model budaya yang digunakan 
dalam kajian ini telah mencapai momentum kerana ia menunjukkan bahawa orang 
Melayu menerima Power Distance yang tinggi dan adalah Collectivist secara semula jadi 
dengan Uncertainty Avoidance yang rendah (dia boleh menerima perubahan tanpa 
kebimbangan besar). Orang Melayu juga lebih cenderung kepada Particularism 
(menerima perubahan dalam peraturan-peraturan untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan sesuatu 
keadaan) dan Communitarianism (Collectivism dan Communitarianism saling bersama-
sama).  Pengaruh feudalisme juga menjadikan dia Diffuse secara semula jadi (bersifat 
mengelak dan bijak) dan menerima Ascription, bukannya Achievement (“siapa yang kamu 
tahu” dan bukannya “apa yang kamu tahu”). 
 
Seterusnya kita menentukan bahawa orang Melayu hidup dalam harmoni dengan alam 
sekitar, mempunyai orientasi Being (lebih kepada Fatalistic), menyembunyikan emosinya 
(Neutral dan bukan Affective) dan mempunyai High context dalam komunikasi 
(berkomunikasi secara tidak langsung). Kesemua sifat-sifat budaya Melayu telah dikenal 
pasti secara langsung, tidak langsung atau berkaitan dengan Power Distance yang 
ditanggung daripada feudalisme. 
 
Menurut kajian sastera orang Melayu, enam belas ciri-ciri Melayu telah dikenal pasti dan 
ciri-ciri ini dikaitkan dengan pelbagai dimensi budaya yang ditarik daripada empat model 
budaya. 
 
Daripada enam belas ciri-ciri orang Melayu, sepuluh telah dihubungkan secara langsung 
atau tidak langsung kepada Power Distance, yang berkait rapat dengan feudalisme. 
Feudalisme bersama colonialism (penjajahan) telah dikenal pasti sebagai dua faktor utama 
yang menyebabkan masalah sosial dan ekonomi di kalangan orang Melayu. Ini disokong 
oleh beberapa kesusasteraan (Alatas, 1977; Andaya & Andaya 2002; Husin Ali, 2008; 
Milner, 2008; Omar, 2006; Zamani, 2002). Beberapa penulis telah mengenal pasti bahawa 
feudalisme dan penjajahan merupakan punca masalah psikologi yang serius di kalangan 
orang Melayu (Abdullah, 1843; Alatas, 1977; Clifford, 1898; Mohamad, 1970). 
 
Kajian ini telah mengenal pasti bahawa orang Melayu mempunyai masalah-masalah 
psikologi, lalu ini membawa saya kepada keputusan untuk menggunakan pendekatan 
klinikal dan psikodinamik dari awal kajian ini bagi memahami orang Melayu.   
 
Pemahaman sejarah orang Melayu dan “inner theatre” mereka telah menyediakan latar 
belakang untuk penyelidikan ini. Justeru, langkah seterusnya adalah untuk memilih 
metodologi yang sesuai untuk penyelidikan yang bersifat kualitatif dan multi-displin ini. 
Selepas penilaian yang teliti, pendekatan multi-method (multi-kaedah) menggunakan 
grounded theory, interpretive methodology, experiential data, kerja amali yang 
melibatkan focus groups dan temuduga dengan expert panel (panel pakar) dan instrumen-
instrumen 360-degree feedback yang menyediakan data empirikal telah dipilih dan 
dianggap sesuai untuk penyelidikan penerokaan yang  mengkaji kepimpinan Melayu 
menggunakan clinical paradigm (paradigma klinikal). 
 
Oleh sebab kajian ini bertujuan untuk memahami Melayu sebagai satu bangsa, teori-teori 
psikoanalitikal yang melibatkan large groups (kumpulan-kumpulan besar) seperti large-
group identity (identiti kumpulan besar) dan large-group regression (kemerosotan 
kumpulan besar) yang dijelaskan oleh Volkan telah dibuktikan sebagai berguna untuk 
memahami dan menghargai masalah-masalah orang Melayu yang kurang dikaji melalui 
clinical lens (kanta klinikal).  
 
Bab “Research Methodology” (Bab 4) telah menjelaskan bahawa penyelidikan mengenai 
kepimpinan Melayu ini bergantung kepada lebih daripada satu kaedah. Ia memerlukan 
pemahaman yang lebih menyeluruh bagi memahami subjek ini; bagaikan mengupas 
lapisan bawang untuk memahami subjek dengan lebih komprehensif, saya telah mengenal 
pasti lima peringkat dan di setiap peringkat, objektifnya adalah untuk pergi lebih 
mendalam dan di bawah permukaan lapisan tersebut. 
 
Di surface level (peringkat permukaan), penyelidikan dimulakan melalui kajian karya 
sastera tentang bangsa Melayu menurut sejarah. Kemudian hasil karya penulis-penulis 
kontemporari mengenai masalah-masalah sosial dan ekonomi orang Melayu dianalisa. Di 
peringkat yang lebih mendalam, focus groups dan ahli-ahli expert panel yang semuanya 
terdiri daripada Melayu (kecuali 3 daripada 20 ahli-ahli expert panel – mereka terdiri 
daripada orang British, orang Cina dan orang India yang semuanya berwarganegara 
Malaysia) telah memberi maklumat secara langsung tentang isu-isu yang dihadapi oleh 
orang Melayu dari segi politik, budaya, pendidikan, agama dan keluarga serta persaingan 
dengan orang Cina.  
 
Menurut perbincangan focus group dan temuduga dengan ahli-ahli expert panel, beberapa 
tema utama yang muncul sebagai halangan kepada kepimpinan Melayu dalam perniagaan 
adalah: -  
 
• Budaya Melayu feudalisme yang membawa kepada pergantungan dan mentaliti 
subsidi; 
• Kekurangan pengalaman dan latihan yang sesuai; 
• Keinginan ahli-ahli politik untuk mengekalkan sistem handout (pemberian) yang 
membawa kepada rasuah; 
• Pendidikan tidak dibentuk untuk meningkatkan kepintaran Melayu dalam 
perniagaan; 
• Ketidakmampuan orang Melayu untuk bersaing dengan orang Cina yang 
berpengalaman dan rajin kerana kekurangan latihan yang mencukupi dan 
pendidikan yang sesuai; 
• Konflik agama dan kepercayaan sesat 
 
Selepas perbincangan dengan focus groups dan ahli-ahli expert panel dan mendengar 
pandangan mereka mengenai orang Melayu dan penilaian mereka terhadap masalah yang 
dihadapi oleh orang Melayu dalam kepimpinan perniagaan, langkah seterusnya adalah 
untuk mengambil sampel rawak yang terdiri daripada 41 orang Melayu. Mereka kemudian 
mengambil ujian empirikal melalui instrumen-instrumen 360-degree feedback. Beberapa 
tokoh korporat yang terkemuka di Malaysia telah mengambil bahagian dalam lima 
instrumen 360-degree feedback yang berbeza. Seterusnya keputusan instrumen-instrumen 
ini dibandingkan dengan data antarabangsa yang terdiri daripada pemimpin-pemimpin 
perniagaan dari Asia dan seluruh dunia. Keputusan instrumen-instrumen ini menunjukkan 
bahawa secara amnya, orang Melayu lebih cenderung untuk menilai diri mereka lebih 
tinggi daripada pemimpin-pemimpin global. Penilaian yang berlebihan oleh orang Melayu 
mungkin disebabkan faktor-faktor harga diri dan imej diri yang positif; keinginan sosial; 
pemikiran feudal dan hierarki dengan Power Distance tinggi; kelonggaran dan faktor-
faktor kasihan.  
 
Walaupun wujudnya beberapa perbezaan antara orang Melayu dan pemimpin-pemimpin 
global dan Asia, elemen yang tidak disangkakan telah timbul daripada perbandingan 
empat instrumen tersebut, iaitu Global Executive Leadership Inventory (GELI), 
Personality Audit (PA), Leadership Archetype Questionnaire (LAQ), dan Inventory 
Leadership Style (ILS), di mana terdapat persamaan corak antara pemimpin-pemimpin 
Melayu, global dan Asia. Persamaan ini menunjukkan adanya bukti prima facie yang 
mengusulkan bahawa orang Melayu yang berpendidikan tinggi dengan pendedahan dan 
latihan yang baik yang menduduki jawatan kanan korporat atau kerajaan tidak begitu 
berbeza daripada pemimpin-pemimpin global dan Asia dari data tersebut. Walau 
bagaimanapun, penemuan ini masih terlalu awal dan perlu disahkan oleh kajian lanjut 
yang lebih luas dan mendalam. Ini merupakan satu aspek yang sangat penting untuk 
penyelidikan ini. Jika penyelidikan lanjut boleh menegaskan semula penemuan awal 
kajian ini, maka kita akan lebih yakin dengan hipotesis bahawa apabila orang Melayu 
diambil daripada regression (kemerosotan) ke progression (perkembangan) melalui 
pendidikan dan pengalaman yang betul, mereka mampu bersaing dengan mana-mana 
pemimpin perniagaan global. Dalam erti kata lain, tiada kelemahan yang wujud dalam 
Melayu selain daripada kemunduran akibat faktor sejarah seperti yang telah dibentangkan 
sepanjang penyelidikan ini. 
 
Setelah memahami orang Melayu di lima tahap yang berbeza dalam penyelidikan ini 
(keterangan sejarah, tulisan kontemporari, perbincangan focus groups, temuduga dengan 
ahli-ahli expert panel  dan  kajian 360-degree feedback), fakta-fakta dan data telah 
diintegrasikan dan ditafsirkan dengan memberi fokus kepada punca utama masalah 
kepimpinan Melayu dalam perniagaan. 
 
Dengan bantuan clinical lens dan teori-teori psikoanalitik seperti large-group identity, 
large-group regression dan transgenerational transmission of trauma, asal-usul tamadun 
Melayu dapat dikesan dan disokong oleh sejarah melalui beberapa penulis bahawa orang 
Melayu menjadi mangsa large-group regression dan inilah yang telah menghalang 
kemajuan mereka dalam bidang perniagaan. Selagi orang Melayu tidak bertukar ke cara 
yang progresif, selagi itulah kejayaan orang Melayu dalam perniagaan akan terhad. 
 
Selain regresi, telah juga timbul kelemahan-kelemahan lain yang menyumbang kepada 
kegagalan orang Melayu dalam perniagaan. Ini termasuk kegagalan kerajaan untuk 
mengakui bahawa mewujudkan pemimpin perniagaan Melayu yang berjaya merupakan 
satu cabaran penyesuaian, bukan isu teknikal yang boleh diselesaikan hanya dengan 
menyediakan lesen dan kewangan kepada orang Melayu. Faktor-faktor lain termasuk 
hubungan kaum yang turun naik dan persaingan daripada usahawan-usahawan Cina yang 
menggunakan cara-cara halus untuk mengakali orang Melayu daripada mencapai 
kemajuan dalam bidang perniagaan serta kelemahan-kelemahan dalam pelaksanaan DEB.  
 
Penyelidikan ini menunjukkan bahawa kegagalan kerajaan untuk memahami keadaan 
psikologi dan "inner theatre" orang Melayu merupakan punca utama yang mungkin 
menyebabkan orang Melayu kurang maju dalam perniagaan. 
 
Beberapa pemikiran dan renungan untuk kerja-kerja masa depan telah ditawarkan dalam 
kajian ini untuk menangani kegagalan-kegagalan dahulu. Walaupun kajian ini hanyalah 
penyelidikan penerokaan, ujian-ujian lanjut dan gambaran yang lebih mendalam adalah 
penting dalam membuat lonjakan kuantum bagi menyelidik jawapan-jawapan kepada 
dilema kelemahan orang Melayu dalam ekonomi dan perniagaan.  
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
